The Balkan league
I. E. Gueshoff
THE BULGARIAN TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS WITH SERBIA AND GREECE
1. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Serbia 112
2. Secret annex to the Treaty 114
3. Military Convention between Bulgaria and Serbia 117
4. Agreement between the Bulgarian and Serbian General Staffs 122
5. Opinions of the Representatives of the General Staffs 124
6. Agreement between the Bulgarian and Serbian General Staffs 126
7. Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bulgaria and Greece 127
8. Military Convention between Bulgaria and Greece 130
9. Memoir of the Bulgarian Government on the Serbo-Bulgarian Arbitration 133
I. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia
His Majesty Ferdinand I, Tsar of the Bulgarians, and His Majesty Peter I, King of Serbia, being firmly convinced of the unity of interests and the identity of fate of their States and of the two kindred nations, the Bulgarian and the Serbian, and determined to defend those interests with united force and to work for their general advancement, have agreed upon the following :
Article 1.—The kingdom of Bulgaria and the kingdom of Serbia guarantee to each other their national independence and the integrity of their national territories, binding themselves absolutely and without reservation to succour each other with their entire forces, in the event of one of them being attacked by one or more States.
Article 2.—The two contracting parties also undertake to come to each other’s assistance with all their forces in the event of any Great Power attempting to annex, occupy, or even temporarily to invade with its armies any part of the Balkan territories which are to-day under Turkish rule, if one of the parties should consider this as contrary to its vital interests and a casus belli.
Article 3.—The two contracting parties bind themselves not to conclude peace except jointly and after a preliminary understanding.
Article 4.—For the complete and most appropriate application of this treaty, a military convention will be concluded which will provide minutely for everything that may have to be undertaken by either side in the event of a war, or that appertains to the military organisation, disposition, or mobilisation of the armies and the relations between the higher commands which must be settled in time of peace, as a preparation for the war and its successful prosecution. The military convention will form an integral part of the present treaty. Its formulation must begin at the latest fifteen days after the signature of the present treaty, and the convention must be ready within a maximum period of two months.
Article 5.—This treaty and the military convention will remain in force from the day of their signature to December 31, 1920 (old style), inclusive. They can be prolonged after that date through an additional understanding, explicitly ratified by the two parties. If, on the day when the treaty and the convention expire, the contracting parties should be engaged in war, or should not yet have wound up the situation arising from a war, the treaty and the convention will retain their force until the conclusion of peace, or until the situation resulting from a war has been definitely settled.
Article 6.—The treaty will be signed in two identical copies, both of them in Bulgarian and Serbian. They will be signed by the two Rulers and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The military convention, also in two copies, both of them in Bulgarian and Serbian, will be signed by the Rulers, the respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and by special military plenipotentiaries.
Article 7.—The treaty and the convention may be published, or communicated to other States, only after a preliminary agreement between the two contracting parties, and even then only jointly and simultaneously by the two sides.
In the same way, a third party may be admitted to join the alliance after a preliminary understanding between the two parties.
Made in Sofia, on February 29, 1912 (old style).
Iv. Ev. Gueshoff.
II. Secret Annex to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia
Article 1.—In the event of internal troubles arising in Turkey which might endanger the State or the national interests of the contracting parties, or of either of them ; or in the event of internal or external difficulties of Turkey raising the question of the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula, that contracting party which first arrives at the conclusion that in consequence of all this military action has become indispensable must make a reasoned proposal to the other party, which is bound immediately to enter into an exchange of views and, in the event of disagreement, must give to the proposing party a reasoned reply.
Should an agreement favourable to action be reached, it will be communicated to Russia, and if the latter Power is not opposed to it, military operations will begin as previously arranged, the parties being guided in everything by the sentiment of solidarity and community of their interests. In the opposite case, when no agreement has been reached, the parties will appeal to the opinion of
Russia, which opinion, if and in so far as Russia pronounces herself, will be binding on both parties.
If, Russia declining to state an opinion and the parties still failing to agree, the party in favour of action should on its own responsibility open war on Turkey, the other contracting party is bound to observe towards its ally a friendly neutrality, ordering at once a mobilisation in the limits fixed by the military convention, and coming to its assistance in the event of any third party taking the side of Turkey.
Article 2.—All territorial gains acquired by combined action within the scope of articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, and of article 1 of this secret annex, shall constitute common property (condominium) of the two allies, and their repartition will take place immediately or, at the latest, within a period of three months after the restoration of peace, the following principles being observed :
Serbia recognises the right of Bulgaria to the territory east of the Rhodope Mountains and the River Strouma ; while Bulgaria recognises a similar right of Serbia to the territory north and west of Shar Mountain.
As regards the territory lying between Shar Mountain and the Rhodope Mountains, the Archipelago and the Lake of Ochrida, if the two parties should become convinced that the organisation of this territory into an autonomous province is impossible, in view of the common interests of the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalities, or owing to other internal and external causes, in such a case the said territory will be disposed of in accordance with the following declarations : Serbia undertakes to ask for nothing beyond a line, drawn on the accompanying map, which starts from the TurcoBulgarian frontier, at Mount Golem (north of Kriva Palanka), and follows a general southwestern direction to the lake of Ochrida, passing
through Mount Kitka, between the villages of Metchevo and Podarjikon, through the heights to the east of the village of Nerav, along the watershed to the height 1,000, north of the village Bashtevo, between the villages of Lubentzi and Potarlitza, through the height Ostritch 1,000 (Lissetz Mountain), the height 1,050, the height 1,000, through the village Kashali, along the main watershed, Gradishte Mountain to the height Gorishte, towards the height 1,023, along the watershed between the villages of Ivankovtzi and Logintzi, through Vetersko and Sopot on the Vardar ; then across the Vardar, along the mountain ridge towards the height 2,550, as far as Peropole Mountain, along its watershed between the villages of Krapa and Barbares to the height 1,200, between the villages of Erkenovo and Drenovo, to the height Tchesma (1,254), along the watershed of Baba Mountain and Kroushka Tepessi, between the villages of Salp and Tzersko, to the height Protoiska Mountain, east of the village Belitza, through Brejani to the height 1,200 (Ilinska Mountain), along the watershed through the height 1,330, to the height 1,217 an(I between the villages of Livoishta and Gorentzi to the lake of Ochrida, near the monastery of Gabovtzi. Bulgaria undertakes to accept this line, if His Majesty the Russian Emperor, who will be requested to act as supreme arbitrator, pronounces in its favour. It is understood that the two parties bind themselves to accept as a definite frontier the line between the indicated frontiers which His Majesty the Russian Emperor will esteem to correspond best to the rights and the interests of the two parties.
Article 3.—A copy of the treaty and of the secret annex, as also of the military convention, will be jointly communicated to the Russian Government, which will be asked to take note of them, to show itself benevolent towards their aims, and to request
His Majesty the Russian Emperor to accept and sanction the parts reserved by the treaty for His Majesty and the Imperial Government.
Article 4.—All disputes concerning the interpretation and the execution of any part of this treaty, of its secret annex, and of the military convention will be submitted to the final decision of Russia, as soon as one of the contracting parties declares that, in its opinion, an agreement by direct negotiations is impossible.
Article 5.—No disposition of the present secret annex shall be made public, or communicated to another State, without the previous consent of the two parties and the permission of Russia.
Made in Sofia, on February 29, 1912 (old style).
Iv. Ev. Gueshoff.
III. Military Convention between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia
In conformity with the spirit and in virtue of article 3 of the treaty of friendship and alliance between the King of the Bulgarians and the King of Serbia, as also in order to ensure the successful prosecution of the war and the attainment of the objects of the alliance, the two contracting parties have agreed upon the following conditions which will have the same force and value as the dispositions of the treaty itself.
Article 1.—The King of the Bulgarians and the King of Serbia undertake, in the eventualities specified by articles 1 and 2 of the treaty of alliance, and by article 1 of its secret annex, to render each other mutual help : Bulgaria, with an army not less than 200,000 strong ; and Serbia, with an
army not less than 150,000 strong, fit to fight on their frontiers and to take part in military operations outside their countries.
These figures do not comprise soldiers of a supernumerary character, the third class of the Serbian reserve troops, or the second class of Bulgarian reserve troops.
This army must be sent to the frontiers, or beyond the frontiers of the two countries, in the direction where military operations are expected to take place, in accordance with the causes and objects of the war, not later than twenty-one days after the declaration of the war, or after one of the allied Governments shall have announced that a casus fœderis has arisen. In all events and before the specified period has elapsed, the two parties will consider it their duty as allies—in so far as this shall be compatible with the nature of the military operations, or might have a favourable influence on the issue of the war—to send their armies to the theatres of war in sections, while the mobilisation and the concentration are still proceeding, immediately after the seventh day following the declaration of the war, or the announcement of the casus fœderis.
Article 2.—If Roumania attacks Bulgaria, Serbia must at once declare war on her, and send a force at least 100,000 strong to the middle Danube, or to the Dobrudja theatre of war.
If Bulgaria is attacked by Turkey, Serbia undertakes to invade the Turkish territory, and to send to the Vardar theatre of war a force of at least 100,000 men.
Should Serbia be then at war with another country, separately or jointly with Bulgaria, she will use all her free forces against Roumania or Turkey.
Article 3.—If Austria-Hungary attacks Serbia, Bulgaria must immediately declare war on Austria-Hungary
and undertakes to send to Serbia an army at least 200,000 strong which, united to the Serbian army, will act offensively or defensively against Austria-Hungary.
Bulgaria owes Serbia the same assistance if Austria-Hungary sends, on whatever pretext, her troops to the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, with or without the consent of Turkey, Serbia being thereby forced to declare war on her or to order her army into the Sandjak in defence of her interests, thus provoking an armed conflict with Austria-Hungary.
If Turkey attacks Serbia, Bulgaria must immediately cross the Turkish frontiers and set aside at least 100,000 men of her army, mobilised in accordance with article 1 of the present convention, sending them to the Vardar theatre of war.
In the event of Roumania attacking Serbia, Bulgaria undertakes to attack the Roumanian forces as soon as they cross the Danube and invade the Serbian territory.
If, in any of the eventualities specified in this article, Bulgaria should find herself, separately or together with Serbia, in a state of war with another country, she binds herself to send all her free forces to the assistance of Serbia.
Article 4.—Should Bulgaria and Serbia declare war on Turkey in accordance with a previous agreement, both parties undertake, in the absence of any special disposition to the contrary, to detach from their armies, mobilised in accordance with article 1 of the present convention, at least 100,000 men each and to send them to the Vardar theatre of war.
Article 5.—If one of the contracting parties declares war on a third party without a preliminary understanding with the other party, or without the latter’s consent, the non-consenting party is relieved of the liabilities specified in article 1 of the present convention, but must observe throughout the war
a friendly neutrality towards its ally, mobilising immediately at least 50,000 men and concentrating them in such a way as to ensure freedom of movement to its ally.
Article 6.—In the event of a joint war, neither party has the right to conclude with the enemy an armistice for more than twenty-four hours in the absence of a preliminary understanding with its ally, or without the latter’s consent.
No peace negotiations may be opened, nor a treaty of peace concluded, without the previous consent of both parties, given in writing.
Article 7.—During the war, the armies of each contracting party will be commanded by its own officers, and their operations will be conducted through the same medium.
When army corps belonging to both parties are engaged against one and the same enemy force, the general command will devolve, both armies being equal, on the officer of senior rank, effective command being taken into account.
When one or more armies of one contracting party are placed under the orders of the other party, they will be commanded by their own officers, who, as regards the strategic operations, will follow the orders of the officer commanding the army to which they are attached.
In the event of a joint war against Turkey, the chief command in the Vardar theatre of war will belong to Serbia, if the principal Serbian army is operating in that theatre and is numerically superior to the Bulgarian army, sent to in that quarter in virtue of article 4 of the present convention. But if the main Serbian army does not operate in that theatre or is numerically weaker than the Bulgarian forces, the chief command will devolve on Bulgaria.
Article 8.—If the armies of the two contracting parties are placed under one command, all the
orders and directions regarding the strategic leadership of the general tactical operations will be issued in two languages—Bulgarian and Serbian.
Article 9.—As regards the clothing and the commissariat, housing, medical assistance, transport of sick and wounded, burial of dead, transport of war materials and of other similar articles, the armies of each contracting party will enjoy equal rights and facilities on the territories of the other party, utilising the same methods as the allied armies and conforming themselves to the local laws and regulations. All local authorities are bound to give the allied armies every assistance to that effect.
The payment of supplies will be effected by each side separately on the basis of local prices, preferably in money, and only in exceptional cases by bonds.
The transport of troops and all military materials, provisions and other articles by railway, and the cost of the transport, will be at the charge of the party through whose territories the transport is effected.
Article 10.—The trophies belong to the army which has captured them.
If these trophies have been captured as a result of fighting in which the two armies have participated, the two armies will divide them in proportion with the strength of the operating forces.
Article 11.—In time of war, each contracting party will be represented on the staff of the Headquarters, or of the commanders of armies, by special delegates who will maintain relations between the two armies.
Article 12.—All strategic operations and unforeseen cases, as well as the disputes which may arise, will be settled by mutual agreement between the two Headquarters.
Article 13.—The chiefs of the General Staffs of
the allied armies will, immediately after the conclusion of the present convention, agree as to the repartition of the mobilised armies, in accordance with article i of the convention, and as to their dispatch to the zones of concentration in the cases hereafter described. They will also determine what roads must be mended or freshly built for the rapid concentration of the armies on the frontiers and for all further operations.
Article 14.—The present convention becomes operative from the day of its signature, and will retain its force as long as the treaty of friendship and alliance, of which it forms an integral part.
Iv. Ev. Gueshoff.
Lieut.-Gen. N. Nikiphoroff.
General R. Putnik.
Varna, April 29, 1912.
IV. Agreement between the Bulgarian and Serbian General Staffs
In accordance with article 13 of the military convention between the kingdom of Bulgaria and the kingdom of Serbia, their special delegates, after taking into account their respective plans of operations, have agreed upon the following :
In case of a war of Bulgaria and Serbia against Turkey.
On the supposition that the main Turkish forces are concentrated in the region : Uskub, Koumanovo, Kratovo, Kotchani, Veles—the allied armies operating in the Vardar theatre of war will be distributed as follows :
1. A Serbian army of two divisions will advance towards Uskub, by way of Kara-Dag, and will form the right wing of the allied armies.
2. A Serbian army, consisting of five divisions and one cavalry division, will advance along the valley of Moravitza and Ptchina towards the front Koumanovo-Kratovo. This army will form the centre of the allied armies and will operate against the front of the enemy.
3. A Bulgarian army, consisting of three divisions, will form the left wing of the allied armies, and will be detailed to operate against the right wing and in the flank of the enemy, following the direction of Kustendil, Kriva-Palanka, Uskub, Koumanovo, Tzarevo Selo, Kotchani.
4. The two Chiefs of Staffs of the allied armies will reconnoitre the region between Kustendil and Vranja, and if the reconnaissance establishes that large masses of troops may be employed in the direction of Kustendil, Kriva-Palanka, Uskub, the two Serbian divisions, destined to act through Kara-Dag towards Uskub, will be used for strengthening the left wing of the allies and will concentrate near Kustendil, provided the general situation allows such a thing.
5. For the protection of the right wing of the allied armies, the Chief of Staff of the Serbian army will use the remaining three divisions of the Serbian second-class reserves, according to his discretion.
6. The Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian army will see that the road from Bossilegrad to Vlassina is constructed as soon as possible.
7. Should circumstances render it necessary that the Bulgarian army in the Maritza theatre of war should be strengthened while all the forces set aside for the Vardar theatre of war are not needed there, the required forces will be transferred from the Vardar theatre to the Maritza theatre. In the same way, if the situation requires the strengthening of the allied armies in the Vardar theatre of war, and the operations in the Maritza theatre of war do not demand the presence of all the forces reserved
for that theatre, then the necessary forces will be transferred from the Maritza theatre to the Vardar theatre.
The two Staffs of armies undertake :
(a) To exchange with one another all information concerning the armies of their neighbours ;
(b) To supply each other with a sufficient number of military manuals, instructions, maps, etc., whether they be public or secret ;
(c) To attach to each other’s army a sufficient number of officers for familiarising themselves with the allied armies, and for learning their language, bearing in mind article n of the military convention ;
(d) The Chiefs of Staff of the Bulgarian and Serbian armies will meet every autumn to exchange views on the general situation, and to consider what changes should be made in their agreement so as to meet the altered circumstances.
(Signed) General R. Putnik.
Varna, June 19, 1912 (old style).
Note.—The grouping of the allied armies and the main principle of the operations belong to the Serbian General Staff, and I assume no responsibility whatever for them.
(Signed) General Fitcheff.
V. Opinions of the Representatives of the General Staffs
At the meeting for the examination of the plan of operations against Turkey, the Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff proposed :
1. I consider that the principal theatre of operations,
in the event of a war with Turkey, will be the valley of Maritza, where the decisive stroke must be dealt, because I think that the main forces of the Turkish army will be concentrated in that theatre, both on account of the character of the ground and of other important strategic considerations.
2. On this assumption, I propose that the allied Serbian General Staff should examine in what way the Bulgarian army in the valley of Maritza can be strengthened, so as to secure for it a numerical superiority over the enemy, it being always supposed that the main Turkish force will be concentrated there.
3. The troops necessary for strengthening the Bulgarian army in the Maritza theatre of war might be supplied by the allied forces in the Macedonian theatre of war, irrespective of their nationality.
Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Army,
of the General Staff.
Belgrade, August 23, 1912 (old style).
At the meeting for the examination of the plan of operations against Turkey, the Chief of the Serbian General Staff was of opinion :
1. That the Vardar theatre of war will be the principal one, and that the main enemy forces will be concentrated there ;
2. On this assumption, it is necessary to concentrate in this theatre, from the very first, a superior allied army ;
3. Taking into consideration the general importance of the Vardar theatre of war and the configuration of the ground, also the time of the year when the operations will be carried out and the political circumstance that the Turkish forces in
this theatre will be opposed by the Greek and Montenegrin armies, the Serbian General Staff declares :
(a) That the entire Serbian army must operate against the Turkish forces in the Vardar military theatre ;
(b) That the allied Bulgarian army must send to the Vardar theatre, by way of Kustendil, at least one Bulgarian division (24 battalions, with artillery and the other special troops) which will form part of the Serbian army.
Assistant Chief of the General Staff,
Colonel of the General Staff.
Belgrade, August 23, 1912 (old style).
VI. Agreement between the Bulgarian and Serbian General Staffs
In virtue of article 4 of the military convention between the kingdom of Bulgaria and the kingdom of Serbia, the Chiefs of their General Staffs, acting as specially appointed delegates, after examining the plan for an offensive war against Turkey, have mutually agreed on the following :
1. The entire Serbian army will operate in the Macedonian theatre of war, undertaking at the same time to protect the line Kriva Palanka—Kustendil.
2. The entire Bulgarian army will act in the valley of Maritza, leaving at first one division on the line Kustendil—Dubnitza, the latter place being protected by a special garrison.
3. One Serbian division of the first class will be taken by railway to Kustendil and will form with the Bulgarian division a special army, co-operating with the main Serbian forces.
Should the principal Serbian army throw the Turks beyond the line Uskub—Veles—Shtip and advance to the south of that line, the Bulgarians will be free to utilise their division for reinforcing their army in the Maritza theatre, leaving on the Macedonian frontier reserve troops of the second class.
4. The organisation of the transport will be as follows : the railway line Pirot—Tzaribrod—Sofia—Kustendil will be placed at the disposal of the Serbian General Staff on the fifth day of the mobilisation. The transport will be effected by Serbian trains, the Bulgarian rolling stock being then employed for other purposes.
5. The revictualling of the Serbian division will be undertaken in the first instance by the Bulgarian Ministry of W ar.
The foodstuffs consumed will be paid for by the Serbian Ministry of War in kind.
6. The agreement between the Chiefs of the two General Staffs signed at Varna on June 19, 1912, continues in force notwithstanding the present combination.
(Signed) Major-General Fitcheff,
Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Army.
General R. Putnik.
Sofia, September 15, 1912 (old style).
VII. A Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bulgaria and Greece
Taking into consideration that the two kingdoms strongly desire the maintenance of peace in the Balkan Peninsula and can, by means of a solid defensive treaty, better secure that end ;
Bearing in mind that the peaceable existence of the various nationalities in Turkey, based on a real
and genuine political equality and on the respect of all the rights of the Christian nationalities in the Empire, whether they derive from treaties or have been conceded to them in a different way, constitutes an indispensable condition for the consolidation of peace in the East ;
Lastly, taking into account that the joint efforts of the two kingdoms in that direction would facilitate and strengthen the good understanding between Greeks and Bulgarians in Turkey, thereby helping their good relations with the Ottoman Empire ;
The Government of His Majesty the Tsar of the Bulgarians and that of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, promising not to impart to their purely defensive agreement any aggressive tendency and determined on concluding with each other a peaceable and mutually protective treaty, on the lines indicated hereafter, have appointed as their plenipotentiaries . . . . .
Who, after verifying their credentials, agreed upon the following :
Article 1.—If, notwithstanding the sincere wish of the two high contracting parties and the efforts of their Governments to avoid all aggression or provocation against Turkey, one of the parties should be attacked by Turkey, either on its territory or through systematic disregard of its rights, based on treaties or on the fundamental principles of international law, the two contracting parties undertake to assist each other with all their armed forces, and not to conclude peace except by joint agreement.
Article 2.—The two high contracting parties promise each other to use their moral influence over their co-nationalists in Turkey so as sincerely to assist the peaceable existence of the nationalities forming the population of the Empire ; they also promise to support each other and to act together, both as regards the Turkish Government and to-
wards the Great Powers, in all actions having for object to secure the respect of the privileges deriving from treaties or otherwise conceded to the Greek and Bulgarian nationalities, and to obtain political equality and constitutional guarantees.
Article 3.—The present treaty will remain in force for a period of three years from the date of its signature, and will be tacitly prolonged for another year, unless previously denounced. The denunciation must take place at least six months before the end of the third year from the day of its signature.
Article 4.—The present treaty will be kept secret and may not be communicated to any third State, totally or in part, nor be published, totally or in part, except with the consent of the two contracting parties.
The present treaty will be ratified as soon as possible. The exchange of the ratifications will take place in Sofia (or in Athens).
In proof whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed their seals.
Made in Sofia, in two copies, on May 16, 1912 (old style).
Iv. Ev. Gueshoff.
[ Declaration by Bulgaria ]
The first article does not apply to the case of a war breaking out between Greece and Turkey in consequence of the admission in the Greek Parliament of the Cretan deputies, against the wishes of Turkey. In that event, Bulgaria is only bound to observe towards Greece a benevolent neutrality. As the settlement of the Eastern crisis, due to the events of 1909, and of the Cretan question harmonises with the general interest, and is even likely
to consolidate the international situation favourably to peace, without upsetting the equilibrium in the Balkan Peninsula, Bulgaria (independently of any engagements assumed by the present treaty) promises in no way to embarrass any eventual action of Greece tending to solve this problem.
Iv. Ev. Gueshoff.
VIII. Military Convention between Bulgaria and Greece
His Majesty the Tzar of the Bulgarians and His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, desirous to complete by a military convention the treaty of defensive alliance, concluded in Sofia on May 16, 1912, between the kingdom of Bulgaria and the kingdom of Greece, have appointed as their plenipotentiaries for that purpose:
H.M. the Tzar of the Bulgarians—H.E. Monsieur Iv. Ev. Gueshoff, etc., etc. ;
H.M. the King of the Hellenes—H.E. Monsieur D. Panas, etc., etc. ;
Who, after having examined each other’s credentials and found them to be in good and regular form, agreed upon the following :
Article 1.—If, in conformity with the engagements assumed by the treaty of defensive alliance, concluded in Sofia on May 16, 1912, between Bulgaria and Greece, this latter country should intervene by arms against Turkey in the event of a Turco-Bulgarian war, or should Bulgaria intervene against Turkey in the event of a Greco-Turkish war, the two parties, Bulgaria and Greece, undertake to cooperate with each other, viz. : Greece, with an army at least 120,000 strong ; and Bulgaria, with an army at least 300,000 strong. These forces must
be ready to start towards the frontiers and to participate in any military operations outside the boundaries of their respective territory.
The said forces must complete their concentration on the frontiers and be ready to cross them at the latest on the twelfth day after the mobilisation order, or after one of the contracting parties shall have announced that a casus fœderis has arisen.
Article 2.—In the event of Greece being attacked by Turkey, Bulgaria undertakes to declare war on the latter State, and to attack it with all her forces, consisting of at least 300,000 men, conforming her movements with the plan previously elaborated by the Bulgarian General Staff.
If Bulgaria is attacked by Turkey, Greece binds herself to declare war on the latter State, and to attack it with all her forces, consisting of at least 120,000 men, conforming her operations to the plan previously elaborated by the Greek General Staff. The chief aim of the Greek fleet will be to secure naval supremacy over the Ægean sea, thus interrupting all communications by that route between Asia Minor and European Turkey.
In the eventualities specified by the previous two articles, Bulgaria undertakes to assume with an important part of her army offensive operations against the Turkish forces concentrated in the vilayets of Kossovo, Monastir, and Salonica. If Serbia should take part in the war, in accordance with her agreement with Bulgaria, the latter will be allowed to use her forces in Thrace ; but in that case she guarantees to Greece by this convention that a Serbian army of at least 120,000 men will act on the offensive against the Turkish forces concentrated in the said vilayets.
Article 3.—If Bulgaria and Greece should declare war on Turkey, in accordance with a special agreement, they undertake to place in the field the number
of men mentioned in article i of the present convention, unless it be otherwise stipulated.
The dispositions of the last two paragraphs of article 2 are in such a case obligatory.
Article 4.—If one of the contracting parties declares war on a State other than Turkey without a previous understanding with the other party and without its consent, the non-consenting party is relieved of the obligations entailed by article 1, but must observe all through the war a friendly neutrality towards its ally.
Article 5.—In the event of a joint war, neither party will have the right of concluding an armistice for more than twenty-four hours without the consent and preliminary agreement of the allied State.
Similarly, the consent of the two parties, specially given in writing, is indispensable for either party to open peace negotiations or to conclude a treaty of peace.
Article 6.—If, after Bulgaria and Greece have mobilised or commenced a joint war, the latter country should find itself obliged to settle the Cretan question in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of Crete and, in consequence of that action, is attacked by Turkey, Bulgaria undertakes to assist Greece in accordance with article 1 of the present convention.
Article 7.—The Chiefs of the Bulgarian and Greek Staffs undertake, in the event of a war, to communicate to each other their plans of operations, as opportunity may offer. They also undertake every year to inform each other of the alterations in those plans, rendered necessary by new circumstances.
Article 8.—The present convention will become binding on the two parties immediately after its signature, and will retain its force as long as the treaty of defensive alliance, signed on May 16, 1912, of which it forms an integral part.
Made in Sofia, in two copies, on September 22, 1912 (old style).
Iv. Ev. Gueshoff.
Captain G. G. Metaxas.
IX. Memoir presented by the Bulgarian Government on the Serbo-Bulgarian arbitration 
This Memoir refers to the part played by Russia in the liberation of Bulgaria, describes the struggle of the Serbians and Bulgarians for Macedonia, and
1. In connection with this Memoir, prepared (as I have already explained in Chapter III) at the request of the Russian Government in its capacity as arbitrator, it is not without interest to recall the efforts of one of the members of M. Pashitch’s Cabinet, in the official Samouprava, as early as April 1913, to prove that our treaty with Serbia ought not to be carried out, because, according to a famous clause in international law, treaties are observed, pacta sunt servanda, but only provided there is no change in the situation, rebus sic stantibus. The Carnegie Commission severely blames this thesis of Serbian statesmen and professors, and quotes against it numerous works by German publicists like Keffter, Bluntschli, Jellinek, and especially a new essay by Professor Erich Kauffmann (Das Wesen des Völkerrechts und die Clausula “rebus sic stantibus”). The Carnegie Commission says : “The allegations of a change in the circumstances was but a pis aller, to which recourse was had upon the failure of the attempts at giving a forced interpretation to the terms of the treaty and thereby proving that the Bulgarians had been the first to violate it. What makes the violation particularly odious, is that a condition vital, nay essential, to one of the contracting parties, indispensable to the conclusion of the treaty, was violated by another party as soon as the common end had been obtained. The Serbians did not know what the English call ‘ fair play.’ ... It may be said with Jellinek, that there is not only no international treaty, but even no general law to which the clause rebus sic stantibus may not be applied. There could be no progress were there no means of adapting legislation to changing circumstances. But it does not follow that the series of necessary adaptations can be understood as a series of breaches of the law (Rechtsbrüche). One law is changed by another law. A treaty must be changed by another treaty. This principle is formally recognised in one of the cases cited as ‘ precedents ’ by the Serbian professors. . . .” The Commission also recalls the unanimous declaration of the seven Great Powers at the London Conference of January 17, 1871, that “it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power may evade its treaty engagements, nor modify the stipulations without the consent of the contracting parties by means of a friendly understanding.”
the treaties and conventions concluded between them, refuting the arguments on which the Serbians based their claims for compensations, not mentioned in the treaties, in the following terms :
1. The Serbians maintain that the events which led to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire were not fully foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the treaties of alliance, and that this fact gives them the right to call for an entire revision of the treaty. In our opinion, the text of the treaty is clear and gives a definite answer to these unjustifiable Serbian demands. It states that the Serbians have a right to the zone beyond Shar Mountain, and the Bulgarians to all the territory east of the Rhodopes and the Strouma. The territories between Shar Mountain and the Rhodope Mountains are also apportioned in the treaty, which therefore must clearly have had in view the possibility of what
actually occurred—the dismemberment of all Turkey in Europe.
2. The Serbians found their pretensions to a revision of the treaty on the fact that, after its conclusion, Greece and Montenegro took part in the war against Turkey. But this is no reason for modifying the relations between Serbia and Bulgaria. The arrival of the Greeks in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula gave assistance to Serbia which was not mentioned in the treaty. And now we are expected to pay for this help by recompenses to Serbia. The arrival of the Greeks, far from strengthening the Serbian pretensions, on the contrary gives Bulgaria a right to make greater claims.
3. The Serbian pretext, that they mobilised more troops than were called for by the treaty, is equally vain. Admitting for a moment the truth of such a statement, it should be observed that the contingent named in the treaty was a minimum to which either of the contracting parties might add at its convenience by calling out more troops. If Serbia did this, although Bulgaria never asked for anything of the kind—Serbia at the time did not even inform Bulgaria of the fact—she cannot now use it as an argument for the necessity of revising the treaty. Besides, to be just, we must point out that Bulgaria did not keep to the minimum of troops provided for in the treaty ; she called to the colours 620,000 men, far exceeding the strength of the Serbian army.
4. The Serbians attempt to justify their demand for revision by alleging that, contrary to the text of the treaty, we sent less than 100,000 men to the Vardar theatre of war, while the Serbians helped us with two of their divisions in the Thracian theatre of war. This Serbian argument is not valid, because a comparison of the treaty of alliance with the military convention, supplemented by the agreements between the two General Staffs, signed
on June 19, August 23, and September 15, 1912, which in virtue of articles 2, 3, 4, and 13 of the military convention form an indivisible whole, will clearly show that, notwithstanding the original convention, the distribution and employment of the allied forces were settled by the two Staffs, before the declaration of the war, precisely as they took place in reality.
The military convention contained only a conditional stipulation that 100,000 Bulgarian troops should be sent to the Vardar theatre of war, the words used being “if no other special arrangement be made.” But the supplementary agreements, afterwards concluded on the basis of the military convention, removed this obligation, replacing it by the engagement for Bulgaria to send one division to the Vardar theatre of war, and that only for a certain time, until the Serbian troops should have thrown the Turkish army behind the line Uskub— Veles—Shtip (arrangement of the two General Staffs, September 15, 1912). As a matter of fact Bulgaria sent the Seventh Rilo division, increased to a complement of 32,000, which, after having given substantial help in the battle of Koumanovo, occupied the whole Strouma valley and did not leave the Vardar theatre till much later than had been contemplated.
Serbia asserts also that without being obliged by the treaty she sent two divisions to assist the Bulgarians in capturing Adrianople. But the military aid of Serbia at Adrianople had been stipulated by article 7 of the military agreement of June 19 which arranges for the transport, according to circumstances, of the necessary troops from the Vardar theatre to the Maritza theatre, and vice versa. The two Serbian divisions at Adrianople were sent to replace the Bulgarian troops which went to Tchataldja to fight the enemy for the happy issue of the common cause. Independently
of this, the principal object of the treaty was to break the military power of Turkey, and from that standpoint, it is not this or that secondary arrangement that is of consequence : the really important thing is to know what dealt the decisive blow to Turkey. By the terms of the treaty, the relation between the Serbian and Bulgarian forces was 3:4. We may, therefore, say that by demolishing four-sevenths of the Turkish forces Bulgaria entirely fulfilled all her obligations which some people now seem to consider as so many faults. The remaining three-sevenths of the Turkish forces were left by the treaty for Serbia to deal with. The crushing defeat inflicted on the Turkish forces at Bounar Hissar and Lule-Bourgas, and the raising of the rampart to block them in at Tchataldja and Bulair, against which all the Turkish reserves from Asia Minor wasted their strength in vain, were greater tasks than were incumbent on Bulgaria. From this point of view, it is absurd to pretend that the success of the war of liberation depended on the number of troops employed by Serbia in excess of those provided for by the treaty. The historical truth appears—and will be recognised universally, as it is already recognised by the specialists—when one examines the losses suffered in the course of the war. Those of Bulgaria amount to 93,000 men (killed, dead of illness, and wounded), while the Serbian total does not exceed 25,000 casualties.
5. The Serbian assertion that the taking of Adrianople by Bulgaria gave Serbia the right to claim special compensation only deserves a passing notice, since it clearly follows from the terms of the treaty that, leaving to Bulgaria the zone to the east of the Rhodopes necessarily implied leaving to her Adrianople, a first-class fortress, only twenty miles from her frontier, almost at the foot of the Rhodopes.
As to the assertion that the war would never have been resumed but for Adrianople, it must be pointed out that hostilities were reopened in consequence of the collective decision of all the allies, dictated by their common interest. If Adrianople still held out, Scutari and Janina were not taken either, and Turkey refused to cede the islands, neither would she hear a word of any war contribution.
6. It remains to examine the attempts of Serbia to make the revision of the treaty depend on the decision of those Great Powers owing to whom Serbia had been forced to withdraw from the coast of the Adriatic, which her troops had conquered.
We cannot but regret the decision of the Great Powers ; still, from the point of view of our rights this fact is of no importance, as the treaty does not oblige the allies to keep the coast of the Adriatic at any price, but merely makes its conquest and retention depend on favourable circumstances. Bulgaria, whose duty it was to lend Serbia armed assistance if the new territories of the latter were in danger, never refused help within the limits of the treaty. In fact, the Serbians did not evacuate the shores of the Adriatic by agreement with us : they did so without even informing us. Justice forces us to add that if Serbia was deprived of part of the conquered territory, the same thing happened to Bulgaria who, by the decision of the Great Powers, was obliged to retire from her outposts near Constantinople and evacuate the shore of the sea of Marmora, accepting the Midia—Enos line. More than this, Bulgaria was obliged to pay for the violation of the status quo in the Balkans, by which all the allies profited, by the cession of a part of her own territory and the loss of the town of Silistria, one of the most painful operations imaginable. Serbia’s access to the sea is, no doubt, a very important matter to her, but that question was settled by the
decision of the Great Powers to guarantee Serbia a free railway to one of the Adriatic ports, and also by the fact that after the annexation of the Sandjak Serbia will be able to use the Montenegrin ports. Setting aside this question on which Serbia has obtained satisfaction, the economic value of the territory which she gave up is not equal to that of the regions which we ceded along the sea of Marmora.
To all these Serbian pretensions one remark is applicable: during the war, Serbia conformed entirely to the arrangements of the General Staffs and undertook a number of special operations, without making any preliminary declaration concerning contractual rights as regards Bulgaria. We may assume that this conduct arose from the knowledge that she was acting on the basis of the treaty and strictly within its limits. If, in any of these cases she had felt that she was overstepping those limits and consequently assuming an unforeseen task, thus lightening Bulgaria’s labour, she would, without doubt, have announced the fact in due time. If such a declaration had been made, the Bulgarian Government would have been able to choose its position, and in case the demands formulated by Serbia affected the vital interests of Bulgaria and threatened the bases of the treaty with Serbia, it could have stopped the carrying out of the treaty, rather than consent to the undermining of its foundations. If Serbia had made the slightest attempt to violate the bases of her agreement with Bulgaria and claimed the possession of this or that part of the uncontested zone, whether because a treaty had been arranged with the Greeks or the Montenegrins in view of their co-operation against the Turks, or because Serbia had mobilised more troops than were mentioned in the treaty, or because the displacement or employment of the allied troops was such and such, or because Serbia had
retired from the Adriatic, or because Adrianople was taken by the Bulgarians, it is no exaggeration to say that Bulgaria would rather have closed the whole joint enterprise than admit any tampering with the uncontested zone, which was established after long and laborious negotiations and which is so intimately bound to Bulgaria by common sufferings and by the hopes of centuries.
For the rest, most of the facts above mentioned, on which the Serbians base their arguments, occurred before the mobilisation and before the declaration of the war, so that the Serbian claims, had they been formulated in time, might have prevented any initiative on the part of Bulgaria, since they were fatal to Macedonia, which has been for so many years the object of her aspirations, and for the sake of whose freedom Bulgaria had concluded the treaty with Serbia.
From all that has been said it will be clearly seen that during the course of the war nothing occurred to modify the bases of the treaty, or to give Serbia a right to territory south of the stipulated frontier line. Even if we admitted for a moment the possibility of tampering with the treaty and altering its foundations—which we absolutely deny—there is nothing to warrant such conduct in the present instance. Under these circumstances only one conclusion can be drawn—that the demand of the Serbian Government for the revision of a treaty, which by its very nature would mean the destruction of the foundations of that treaty, is clean contrary to the precise meaning of the treaty. The circumstances accompanying the war afford no justification for this demand, which must, therefore, be treated as of no consequence.
Conscious of the poor foundations of her claims which nothing in the treaty warrants, Serbia attempts to base her demand on a circumstance entirely alien to the treaty, by declaring that she wishes to
maintain the balance of power in the Balkans. Let us point out that before the war no balance of power existed as between Bulgaria and Serbia. Neither can it exist after the war, so long as there is a marked difference between the two countries, both in population and in the geographical positions which they occupy.
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