GOD'S PROVIDENCE IS MY INHERITANCE

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SIR EDWARD BOYLE B.T.
PREFACE

The following pages were in process of printing when it was announced that Bulgaria was proclaimed a republic.

It is known that as soon as the Allied offensive in Macedonia began, two Bulgarian brigades mutinied and marched on Sofia. They summoned the Government to depose Ferdinand, conclude an immediate peace, execute Radoslavov, and liberate the incarcerated Agrarian deputies.

The Government attempted to oppose them by means of the Cadets and German troops quartered in Sofia. For a few days the mutineers were held in check on the outskirts of the Bulgarian capital, but finally they obtained the upper hand, and Malinov submitted to their demands.

It may be assumed that the Agrarian leader Stamboliski, on recovering his liberty, considered that the change of rulers was merely a case of substituting King Stork for King Log. Seeing
that British and French troops were policing the Balkans and that there was no risk of interference on the part of Bulgaria's neighbours, he, like the practical man he is, seized the opportunity of making a clean sweep of the old system.

All friends of the Balkan peoples should rejoice at this consummation, for the application of the Agrarian programme is the best guarantee for the pacification of the Balkans. The views of the Agrarians are the very antithesis of those held by the militarists, chauvinists, and the reptilian personalities about Ferdinand, who for the past twenty years have batten on the toil of the peasantry. In order that these incendiaries may be prevented from lifting their heads again, it is necessary that the large number of Macedonian immigrants in Bulgaria, whose longing for freedom the former so adroitly exploited for their own ends, should be reinstated in their homes. The Allies ought to hold a plébiscite in Macedonia and the Dobrudja, and this would clear Bulgaria of all the disaffected elements, for both Macedonians and Dobrudjans would hasten to make their voices heard in the shaping of their countries' destinies.
The danger of leaving the Macedonians in Bulgaria will be better realized if it be remembered that in September 1915 the Agrarians and Socialists failed to thwart the Bulgarian mobilization mainly because Ferdinand had previously mobilized 40,000 Macedonians, whom he used as a bludgeon to overawe the Bulgarians into accepting his policy. The Bulgarian peasantry once freed from these restive elements will work out the salvation of their country in their own manner, and no one acquainted with their sterling qualities can doubt of their ultimate success.
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Bulgaria's unexpected capitulation was the result, not only of the military defeat inflicted on her army, but also of the growing conviction of her people that they had little to fear from the triumph of the Allied cause. Nevertheless, but for the brilliant success of the Salonica army and the inability of Germany to lend any effective aid to her Balkan ally, it may be safely assumed that the feeling of the people would never have been able to exercise a decisive influence in the shaping of Bulgaria's policy. The peace party in Bulgaria had been steadily growing in strength as may be gathered from the attitude of the Agrarians, Social Democrats, and Radicals—the three parties which are undoubtedly backed by the bulk of the Bulgarian people—but unfortunately they were not in a position to impose their views on the Government, which was entirely controlled by the pro-German elements.
The majority in the Sobranje was composed of three so-called "Liberal" parties, which are pro-German, and therefore any Government in power was bound to take their views into consideration, unless it could reckon on the support of the Crown. However, on this matter of policy Crown and Parliamentary majority were at one. That the nation was resolutely in favour of peace may be inferred from the fact that, when the mandate of the present Chamber expired a few months ago and the question of its renewal was discussed, the Socialists, Agrarians, and Radicals expressed themselves in favour of holding fresh elections immediately, while all the other parties, including that of Malinov, steadfastly opposed this view, and put forward as their strongest argument against consulting the electorate, that the "plank" on which the election would be decided would be: peace or the prolongation of the war. As it was feared that the people would vote in favour of peace, it was decided that a consultation of the people's will should be deferred until a time when its expression could not traverse the policy hitherto followed; and eventually the Sobranje voted for the prolongation of the mandate until six months after the demobilization of the army. When, last June, Malinov was called upon to form a new Cabinet, he was confronted with the dilemma of either pursuing the policy of his predecessors in office,
and thereby alienating the Left parties from which he derived his main support both within and without the Chamber, or of heeding the voice of the nation and coming into conflict with both Crown and Parliament. Malinov was not the man to grapple with such a difficult problem, and to assume the rôle of champion and spokesman of the nation's wishes. He followed a middle course, which was the easiest thing for him to do, and his line of conduct might have been traced beforehand with almost mathematical precision. It was merely a question of estimating aright the powers of the two opposing forces, and of solving a very simple algebraic equation. We thus see Malinov on his assumption of office, and when German influence was still in the ascendant, making the most fervid declarations as to his intention of pursuing a pro-German policy. A little later, when war-weariness began to manifest itself in an alarming manner in Bulgaria, and the Left parties were wildly clamouring for a democratic peace and the renunciation of Bulgarian claims to the Morava district and Northern Dobrudja, we find him attempting to preach unity and compromise, and expounding the axiom "neither to the Left nor to the Right." Finally, when the Allies began thundering at Bulgaria's door, and it became threateningly clear that it might yield, the Bulgarian Prime Minister falls further into
line with his supporters of the Left, and declares in his mouthpiece, the Preporets (September 18, 1918):

The enemy is furiously attacking our lines at a moment when much is being said about a just peace based on the principle of self-determination.

If the Entente's declarations were sincere, would this fresh sacrifice of lives be necessary in order that a just peace should be arrived at in the Balkans? The flag under which the Entente is fighting is also Bulgaria's flag. A small people like ours could only ensure its security, liberty, and national unity under the ægis of justice. Bulgaria would willingly accept the just verdict of an impartial international tribunal, which certainly would not fail to acknowledge her rights. Why, then, all these fresh sacrifices? Has the Entente become a plaything in the hands of the Serbians and the Greeks? Is it not fighting to secure their domination in the Balkans? What, then, becomes of the self-determination of peoples? Is it a mere empty word?

This sudden blustering of the Government organ evoked the following just remark from the Zemledelsko Zname, of the Agrarian party:

This is all very well, and we congratulate the Government organ on what it says, although this is rather late. At the same time, however, we ask what has it done so far to bring Bulgaria near to such an international tribunal?

It may be stated without exaggeration that the vast majority of the Bulgarian people never approved of the pro-German policy which was foisted on them by their rulers, and only accepted it because they were given to understand—and the attitude of the Entente gave colour to the belief—that Bulgaria's ethnical unification could
not be achieved in co-operation with the Allies. Tsar Ferdinand’s responsibility in involving his country in the war was so patent that when it became evident that his personal policy had failed, he, like a criminal fearful of being brought to justice, made haste to escape from the country and sought refuge among his confederates. There are scarcely any circumstances that can be adduced in extenuation of his guilt, for he deliberately tricked his people and involved them in the war by false pretences, as we see if we read the text of the Bulgarian declaration of war against Serbia.

Prior to October 1915, no one acquainted with the Bulgarian people would have admitted that they in any way approved of the Germanophil policy of their rulers, and there are plenty of indications that even their prolonged military co-operation with the Germans has done nothing to allay that inveterate hatred of the “Schwaba” which the Bulgarians share with all Slav peoples. Not only were political relations between Bulgaria and her allies strained almost to breaking-point long before she capitulated, but what is even more significant is, that notwithstanding the most assiduous attempts at a German cultural penetration of Bulgaria—a movement which was fostered and upheld alike by Ferdinand and by his Ministers—the Bulgarian people showed themselves hostile to this propaganda, and had
even organized themselves to oppose it by forming the league of Bulgarian Authors and Professors. Even Germans, and here we have the testimony of Von den Steinen, deplored that their propaganda in Bulgaria had failed. More remarkable still, they attributed this failure to the hatred and contempt with which those corrupt Bulgarian politicians, to whose subservience they owed Bulgaria's adherence to the Central Alliance, were regarded! And what was the fate foreshadowed for these pro-German politicians? In the words of Von den Steinen: "At the next Parliamentary elections these parties (the Radoslavov coalition) will simply be extirpated, and then our situation will indeed be difficult if we have not succeeded in forming other ties with the Bulgarian people."

And does not the following statement made by Madjarov, the Minister of Agriculture, and probably the most Germanophil member of the present Malinov Cabinet, corroborate to some extent the views of Von den Steinen? "Germany," he says, "should get more into touch than she has done hitherto with the intellectual classes of Bulgaria, and should not regard the alliance as a purely party matter. The mistakes committed by the last Bulgarian Government are connected in the popular mind with Germany, because the people are convinced that Germany encouraged them."
Indeed no better proof could be furnished of the Bulgarians' disavowal of the policy of Radoslavov than the pronouncement in the organ of the Agrarian party. Commenting on his fall it said: "The Bulgarian people feel as if they had been freed from a huge millstone hanging round their neck."

The resolutions passed by the Social Democrats at the meeting of the party in Sofia on September 1 and 2, 1918, are tantamount to a downright denunciation of the policy hitherto followed.

1 Zemledelsko Zname, June 26, 1918.
2 The following were some of the resolutions adopted:

I. Against Imperialism and for a Lasting Peace.

The meeting considers that the principal duty of the Social-Democratic party in the present circumstances is to facilitate the conclusion of a democratic peace, based on the principle of the self-determination of peoples. Consequently, Bulgarian policy should restrict its pretensions by openly declaring itself against the annihilation of States which are awaiting their restoration and by renouncing the conquest of territories which form an integral part of neighbouring States, for this would infringe the vital interests of these States and would hinder a common understanding among the Balkan peoples. This understanding is indispensable for the independence of the Balkans and the peaceful development of the peoples inhabiting them.

The party has been, and remains, the resolute opponent of all Imperialism, which aims at imposing itself for its interests and for the purpose of maintaining perpetual discords among the Balkan peoples. For this reason a policy of understanding, aiming at solving the territorial questions which separate us from Serbia, Greece, and Rumania, imposes itself on all.

(2) The meeting emphasizes the necessity of creating a League of Nations as a condition of a permanent peace,
The Press organ of the party characterized Radoslavov's policy as a "churlish provocation of our neighbours." The Narod, in fact, had always combated the immoderate demands of the Bulgarian Jingoes, as may be seen from an article it published on March 18, 1918, in which it counselled moderation and leniency towards Rumania.  

and expresses itself in favour of the treaties so far concluded in order that the establishment of an international régime, based on the liberty of the peoples and the right of self-determination, be arrived at.

(3) Social Democracy is the resolute opponent of all wars of conquest, and recommends an early peace, but as long as the enemy is at our frontiers, lying in wait to invade our territories (which could only result in the destruction and subjugation of the country), it proclaims that it is the supreme duty of the army and of the population to defend the independence of Bulgaria.

1 "Hardly any other nation has had such a lesson as the Bulgarians. The year 1913 should be remembered, when some of us believed that Bulgaria could not do without Rodosto, and claimed Salonica, because its Hinterland would have been ours. Bulgaria must not show herself revengeful in Bucarest. The questions it would take centuries to solve cannot be settled at one stroke. In short, Bulgaria must come to an understanding with Rumania, and not behave towards her as a dictator or a conqueror. Every word, every action of our delegation which may be interpreted as a sign of sympathy and friendship towards Rumania, will have greater importance than the obtaining of the most strategical frontier. This attitude should not be dictated by regard for the corrupt Rumanian landlords, who, had the military situation been different, would not have scrupled to appropriate Varna, Shumla, and Rustchuk, but by respect for the Rumanian nation, for whose sake every care should be taken to avoid injury to its aspirations for independence, union, and cultural pro-
It is indeed highly regrettable that Entente diplomacy in the course of the last three years has done so little to exploit that profound dislike and latent hostility which the majority of the Bulgarian nation had always felt for its late ruler and the views he professed. It may even be said that the policy pursued in leading Entente quarters—namely, that of embracing in one sweeping condemnation everything Bulgarian, directly contributed to the strengthening of the ties between the Bulgarian monarch and his people, and to it should be ascribed the fact of the nation having been turned unwillingly and unwittingly into a weapon of reaction.

Had the Entente leaders officially announced their determination to apply without discrimination the principle of nationality in the Balkans, it would have been materially impossible for the Bulgarian Government to prolong the war for the attainment of any object which the nation did not approve. And the Bulgarian people's demands were modest and equitable, and could have certainly been satisfied by the integral carrying out of the principle suum cuique. That these Bulgarian claims were on the whole moderate and logical will be realized if we remember that in 1876 the European Powers, gress. Bulgaria has lived through a great tragedy, and she should be careful. No considerations whatever should make her pitiless. Good-neighbourly relations between the small Balkan countries must be the chief aim of their statesmen.'
through their delegates in Constantinople, conceded of their own free will to Bulgaria almost all she is claiming to-day as her patrimony. It would certainly have been useless to have attempted the detachment of official Bulgaria from the Central Powers as long as the latter were unbeaten, but much could have been done in the way of undermining the position of Bulgaria’s rulers, and the strengthening of the pacifist and pro-Entente elements in the country. It would only have been necessary to adjust our programme to that of America to have compelled Tsar Ferdinand to come to terms with the Allies, or to avow openly that he was fighting for the Teutons.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Had such a line of conduct been adopted, nothing would have been easier than to create a Bulgarian national movement similar to the Greek national movement initiated by M. Venizelos. There is no reason to suppose that General Radko Dimitriev, the idol of the Bulgarian army, who was fighting in Russia, and the score of Bulgarian officers who were with him, would have refused to head such a movement, if guarantees had been forthcoming that the Allies would do justice to Bulgarian claims. There were plenty of Bulgarian deserters who would have readily volunteered to join, and several thousand Bulgarians would certainly have flocked from the United States. That there were sufficient elements to form a nucleus is shown in the following quotation from the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (July 15, 1917, p. 297): “En tout cas on remarque toujours parmi ces troupeaux d’Asie et d’Afrique, des Européens très bruns, l’air vigoureux et intelligent, qui portent l’uniforme français avec un léger signe distinctif: ce sont des déserteurs bulgares. On les emploie, au dehors, à des travaux dont il vaut mieux ne rien dire et dont ils s’ac-
favoured the latter policy, we may be certain that his people would not have followed his lead, and thereby forfeited every claim to American sympathy. How highly the latter was valued is obvious from the following remarks of a Bulgarian ex-Minister ¹: "America will be the arbiter at the future peace conference. The Americans sympathize with us because our cause is just, we only wish to safeguard our independence and liberty, and to realize our national unification. The Americans cannot but support us." It is mainly owing to the justice of the Bulgarian national claims that the United States, in spite of all the pressure brought to bear, refused to declare war on Bulgaria. Mr. Flood, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives in Washington, stated in December 1917: "Bulgarian interest in the war is purely local. The Bulgarians not only have no interests in German plans for world conquest, but are already beginning to appreciate the dangers of German domination."

This was a correct appreciation of Bulgarian quittent à la grande satisfaction de leurs chefs." It may also be noted that there were several Bulgarians serving in the French Légion Étrangère, among them the son of General Ivanov, of Adrianople fame. This scheme was mooted and it was even proposed that the Allies should offer a new ruler to the Bulgarians, who would have strongly appealed to them owing to his family name. Nothing, however, came of this proposition.

¹ T. Todorov.
aims. Even Tsar Ferdinand had not dared to place his army at the complete disposal of the Germans, and it will be found that in the Bulgaro-German treaty there is a stipulation by which Bulgarian troops were to be employed only in regions to which the Bulgarians laid claim. Thus quite a storm of protests arose in the Sobranje when Bulgarian troops were sent north of the Danube to operate against Rumania, because Bulgarian claims were confined to the south of the river, and Radoslavov was at pains to find a justification for this apparent breach of the allied agreement.

The Bulgarian Government also had judiciously abstained from declaring war against us, in order to justify itself in the eyes of its people by taking up the posture of a victim, and it inculcated hatred of us among them by disseminating the belief that we were bent on Bulgaria’s dismemberment.

The Americans are at a distance which permits them to judge dispassionately, and we may assume that it was their knowledge of the justice of some of the Bulgarian national claims that prevented them from severing diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. The case of Turkey is quite different. America has undoubtedly been influenced in her attitude towards her by the extensive missionary interests she possesses in the Ottoman Empire, which would be gravely
compromised by her declaring war against it. There is valuable American property in Turkey which would be put in jeopardy, and the magnificent educational and missionary work accomplished during the last fifty years would run the risk of being undone. The magnitude of the educational work accomplished by America in the Near East has not been properly appreciated in this country. Not only Robert College, rightly considered as a model establishment of its kind, is an American institution, but there are American colleges in Kharpur, Aintab, Marsovan, Beirut, Tarsus, and Marash, and a girls' college in Arnaoutkeuy, Constantinople; besides innumerable schools opened by American missionaries and maintained by funds generously contributed by the American public for the diffusion of knowledge among the races downtrodden by the Turks.

There is little doubt that certain secret agreements precluded us from countenancing the just aspirations of the Balkan nations and from adopting a policy that might have facilitated an early disruption of the Central Alliance. For Entente diplomacy, in spite of all its numerous professions of faith, does not in the least appear to have aimed in the early period of the present conflict at upholding the principles it advocated. Instead of standing firmly by the principle of nationality, the application of which has been
universally admitted as essential for a rational settlement of the Balkan question, it rather seemed to favour the "compensation" theory. On September 29, 1915, Lord Crewe said: "From our point of view it is immaterial by whom a particular district is occupied so far as our national interests are concerned." This was the spirit that made it possible for us to promise Constantinople to Russia, the Serbian Banat to Rumania, and Jugo-Slav and Greek districts to Italy. Can we then wonder if this attitude of the Allied Powers estranged both Greeks and Bulgarians, and turned these potential allies into covert or open adversaries of the Entente?

At the time Russia was the main hope and stay of the Allies, and there was some excuse for Western acquiescence in the Russian demands, although these constituted a violation of the principles championed by the Coalition. But can it be said in defence of the policy pursued by the Entente that the removal of this incubus, which the Russian revolution so auspiciously effected, was taken advantage of to allay the just apprehensions the Russian designs on Constantinople had raised both in Bulgaria and Greece? The moment was extremely propitious for influencing the Russophil elements in Bulgaria, but unfortunately nothing seems to have been done. Bulgaria, it may be said, was a closed book for the Allies, and very few persons of
authority in our midst possessed sufficient knowledge of its people to enlighten our leaders as to the necessity for a new orientation of our policy. But if ignorance of Bulgaria may be pleaded in justification of our abstinence from all diplomatic offensives against the Bulgarian Government, it is impossible to put forward any excuse for the way we handled the situation in Greece. With the tragi-comedy played by the late King Constantine we need not concern ourselves here, but as to the causes of the highly dangerous atmosphere pervading Greece throughout this summer it would be well to enlighten public opinion, so that the danger with which every deviation from the accepted principle of nationality is fraught in the Balkans should be properly realized. It would be no exaggeration to say that we were probably heading for a fresh Balkan disaster, when Marshal Foch dispelled by his victories the legend of German invincibility which had hitherto had such a wide currency in the Near East.

The disquieting symptoms which manifested themselves in Greece were neither few nor isolated. It is doubtful, however, whether they attracted the attention of those in charge of our foreign policy. At any rate no steps appear to have been taken to remedy the evil, and things were left to take their course.

Mutinies broke out in the Greek army in
Lamia, Thebes, Nauplia, Corinth, and Serfidje. The revolt in this last locality seems to have been of a serious character, for over 1200 officers and soldiers were subsequently court-martialed, including a colonel who was reported to have counselled his men to husband their ammunition, "as they would very soon need it for use against the British and French." Throughout Greece there was a barely disguised feeling of dissatisfaction with the policy pursued by M. Venizelos, and many people in Greece began to manifest regret for the departure of their late "martyr" king. Greek officers were caught singing the ode to King Constantine and were punished, while hundreds of others were dismissed from the army for their avowed pro-Constantinian sympathies. We hear of a general and a bishop condemned to four and five years' imprisonment respectively, because they did not sufficiently conceal their hostility to the present régime,¹ serious misgivings as to the loyalty of the officers and of the higher officials to M. Venizelos' Government were expressed in the Press,² and even when an appeal

¹ *Nea Hellas*, June 16, and *Proodos*, July 11, 1918.
² The following leader in the *Hestia* (June 23, 1918), under the heading "Unfortunately such is the Truth," provides sufficient insight into the morale of the country:

"We do not wish to pretend that all our Deputies are innocent, that none fails to forget the advancement of his private interests in view of the critical state of the situation. Fortunately the exceptions are few, as also are those who imagine that by personal and provincial acts of corrup-
was made to Greek ladies for Red Cross work they ostentatiously refused to co-operate, although they served most devotedly during the Balkan Wars.

We need not go far to seek the causes which gave rise to these most disappointing manifestation they will be able to survive in case the policy which they make a pretence of following proves unsuccessful [sic]. And we say pretend, because the depravity of the former and the stupidity of the latter are such that it is not possible to consider them as real Liberals [sic]. [This paragraph is very obscure in the original.] But this attitude of certain deputies pales before a systematic opposition with which the Government meets in every undertaking from prominent civil servants in the various administrations. We do not understand how it comes about that in almost all the civil services the principal people, newly nominated or remaining from before [the change of Government], are reactionaries. This is a fact which nobody can deny and for which the Government is entirely responsible.

"This is a serious matter for all the services, but it is particularly critical for the military administration and those connected with it.

"No one is in ignorance of the fact that the trustworthy officers, to whom was confided the task of requisitioning beasts of burden, not only appropriated the public money, but placed themselves at the head of the Thebes mutineers. Can the Government assure us that the officers employed since on this and similar missions are devoted to the present régime? We have received a definite accusation about the wife of such an officer, who is said to visit the houses of the peasants of a certain province and harangue them against the war.

"The Government had obtained powers to degrade reserve officers to the rank of privates for having participated in the anti-Venizelist riots of December 1916, or for having taken an active part in the 'Reservist' movement. Has the Government made use of this prerogative in a manner enabling it to declare with authority that among the
tions. It would be a grave mistake to attribute them to an alleged lack of martial spirit among the Greeks, as there is a tendency to do, for the Greeks have given the lie to this theory on more than one occasion, indeed whenever they have known what they were fighting for. The real cause of the lack of enthusiasm among some, and of the passive opposition to M. Venizelos' policy on the part of others, was that the mass of the Greek people saw no valid reason why they should fight at all. The German propaganda had assiduously fostered the belief that Germany would keep her promise to King Constantine and restore to Greece what King Constantine volun-
mobilized officers of the reserve no vile adherents of King Constantine have been included? Has any control been exercised?

"Our private information leads us to believe that the reactionaries already occupying posts and even important posts [literally 'central'] are so many that they cannot be counted on one's fingers. We may point out that one was nominated to a post in Athens just after he had been released on bail by the Court. We need hardly say that the main object of such men is to find soft jobs for those who share their opinions. In spite of the risk of being misrepresented, we consider it our duty to lay stress on these matters in order to draw to them the attention of the Prime Minister, who is also Minister for War.

"There is plenty of time for the purification of the other services. But for the complete purification of the military service and a minute examination of the officers, whom the nation entrusts with the task of washing off the stain upon its honour, immediate and energetic action is absolutely necessary. It is a thousand times better that a few persons should be wronged than that persons unworthy of being officers and Greeks should remain within the ranks of the army."
tarily allowed the Bulgarians to occupy. Germany, declared her agents in Greece, and they were legion, is holding Northern Dobrudja as a pledge until Bulgaria evacuates all Greek territory, and as a proof of Germany’s goodwill towards the Greek nation the fact that the Central Empires had not declared war against Greece was pertinently evoked. And the Greek people, who still suffered from the after-effects of the insidious German propaganda carried on for some three years in their midst, asked themselves: Why should we fight when we can get back our territory without waging war?—while many came to the conclusion that by fighting they would only provoke Germany’s wrath and make her withdraw her promises. The logical inference drawn by all was: boycott the war, give as little provocation as possible to Germany, and show that Greece has fallen a victim to violence and so will have a right to appeal to Germany’s clemency.

Are we to blame the Greek people for this deplorable situation? The guilt is largely ours, for from the very first we cold-shouldered M. Venizelos. The way the Greek national movement in Salonica was treated by the Entente forms one of the least inspiring chapters of the history of the war.¹ Even after M. Venizelos’

¹ It is intelligible that even the pro-German Greek General Dusmanis, now interned by the French, should in
return to Athens we did nothing to help him arouse in the Greek nation that enthusiasm without which no people can be expected to fight. To the thousands who had flocked to his standard in Salonica, his appeal was to wash off the stain cast on Greek honour, and to drive out the Germans and Bulgarians from Greek territory. Such promptings may have proved sufficient to the brave and warlike Cretans, or to the unredeemed Greeks, who burned to avenge themselves on the prime instigators of the wholesale extermination of which their kinsmen were the victims in Turkey. But they could not possibly be expected to kindle enthusiasm within the precincts of the Hellenic kingdom. First, because the view that Greece was not bound by her treaty to succour Serbia had been instilled into the public by the previous rulers of Greece, and secondly, because for reasons already adduced, it was generally held that a struggle against the Central Powers could only yield negative results. As a consequence M. Venizelos’ warlike shout “To Sofia!” failed to stir the Greek people

an interview have expressed his commiseration for M. Venizelos in the following terms: “Venizelos never saw the game of the European Powers. They played with him and they broke him. Even when he split Greece in two with his revolution, and went with them, they never meant to give him a chance. He could have raised an army of 150,000 sturdy fighters, but his Western friends hindered him in every possible way by restricting the zone of his operations.”
sufficiently, and the bright hopes nurtured by the Philhellenes began to vanish into thin air.

Many admirers of M. Venizelos hold that his powers border on the miraculous, and such an opinion is justifiable when we come to consider that it was he who in 1909 helped Greece out of the Serbonian bog in which she had hitherto floundered. His only shortcoming is his extreme modesty, and this at a period when Imperialism is rampant is bound to prove an impediment. All are acquainted with the aspirations of the Hellenic race. The chief object is the liberation of some 5,000,000 Greeks throughout the Ottoman Empire. The emancipation of these unredeemed fellow-countrymen is all the more ardently desired to-day, because they have been subjected to the most brutal persecution by the Young Turks.

Inspired by the Germans, who saw in the Greek element the only obstacle to their pacific penetration of Turkey, the Turks began to apply a systematic policy of annihilation to the Greek race throughout their empire. The persecutions began in 1913, and resulted at first in the forcible expatriation of some 400,000 Greeks, mostly from European Turkey. As these Ottoman Greeks, however, sought refuge in the Hellenic Kingdom, and thereby tended to increase its strength, the Turks changed their system, and instead of expelling their Greek subjects pro-
ceeded to banish them into the interior of Asia Minor, where they let them die of starvation. Thus all the flourishing Greek settlements along the coast of Asia Minor, from Trebizond to the Bosphorus, along the entire coast of the Sea of Marmora, and from the Dardanelles as far south as Mersina, have ceased to exist. In the homes vacated by the Greek settlers, Moslems were installed, or, when this could not be accomplished, houses were set on fire so that every vestige of these communities should be destroyed. The policy of ruthless extermination which had been applied to the hapless Armenians has since been applied to the Greeks, and they, who for five centuries were able to maintain their supremacy in the Ottoman Empire in spite of all the persecution to which they had been subjected, ran the risk of being completely wiped out. In the past the Turks were only actuated by their barbarous instincts, and these proved unavailing against the deep national consciousness of the Greeks. Of late, however, when the murderous activities of the Turks were guided by German intelligence, this Turkish policy of wholesale murder and rapine caused consternation throughout the Hellenic world. It is the untold suffering to which these unfortunate Ottoman Greek populations have been subjected that enabled M. Venizelos to muster round him in Salonica the Army of National Defence. According to a
Greek paper,\(^1\) 45,000 men of the lately styled Venizelist army were refugees from Turkey. We can easily imagine, therefore, what are the sentiments cherished by these troops. The Greek nation had little cause for enmity against the Bulgarians, for the most savage Bulgarian excesses pale and sink into insignificance before the holocaust in which more than 500,000 Greeks have perished in Turkey.\(^2\)

The unanimous desire by which the Greek nation was, and is, animated, is a deep yearning for revenge against the Turkish oppressor, and as regards the Bulgarians they would willingly accept the principle of "live and let live." This may seem to some a rather bold assertion to make, nevertheless it is a fact. German propaganda in Greece may be credited with having effected that which Entente politicians had in vain striven to attain—namely, to appease the unreasonable hatred with which the Greeks viewed everything Bulgarian. In corroboration of this assertion we need only recall how a Greek Prime Minister, the late M. Theotokis, asserted that Germany stopped the pursuit of the Salonica army in 1915, because Greece had intimated that she could not countenance the invasion of Greek territory by Bulgarians. By

\(^1\) *Hellin*, February 25, 1918.

\(^2\) See articles in *Revista d'Italia*, *New York Times*, and *National Zeitung* of Basle, which cannot be accused of partiality for the Greeks.
May 1916, however, owing to the soporific effects of German propaganda in Greece, Greek suspicion and hatred of the Bulgarians had vanished as if by miracle, and the whole of Greek Eastern Macedonia was handed over to the Bulgarians. I could not see the slightest signs of dissatisfaction in Athens at the time, and this transfer evoked no protest from any quarter save an impotent outcry in the Venizelist Press!

The Bulgarians were then alluded to as “οἱ φίλοι μας οἱ Βουλγαροί,” and M. Passarow, the Bulgarian Ambassador in Athens, was the lion of Athenian society—to use a French expression, “on se l’arrachait.” He was daily entertained by the leading families of Kifissia, the aristocratic suburb of Athens.

The old anti-Bulgarian passions had burned out so completely that M. Venizelos found it necessary, in order to persuade his troops to fight the Bulgarians, to preach the gospel of hate against the latter, and he undertook a tour of inspection on the Macedonian front, in which he endeavoured by his harangues to revive the old feud between the two nations. We see this from the following passage of one of his speeches delivered on the Struma front, and reported by the *Embros* (August 20, 1918): “Do you know for how long we have been fighting against the Bulgarians? It is neither five,
ten, twenty, but 1350 years. And this because the Bulgarians are covetous and seek to subjugate their neighbours. We do not seek to conquer Bulgarian territories. We wish to live at ease within our entirely Greek frontiers. Of course war is not pleasant, but we have to accept it because we do not wish to become enslaved by the Bulgarians."

One is inclined to think that at a time when both Greeks and Bulgarians were burning to attack the Turks, it would have been more judicious to fan the flame of their common hostility to Turkey than to attempt to rekindle their old mutual hatred. Much could have been done in that direction, for anti-Turkish feeling was running so high at the time in Bulgaria that the Bulgarians would certainly have connived at a Greek attack on Turkey. A Bulgarian paper, in fact, went so far as to hint that the Greeks should attack the Turks, and even instructed them how they could best achieve success.¹

¹ "The final aim of the Greeks, their secret ambition, is Constantinople. The Dardanelles block the way by sea, and the overcoming of this obstacle is beyond the forces of the Greeks. Therefore the Greeks must advance by land. A glance at the map will show that the distance by way of Asia Minor is much shorter than by way of the Balkan peninsula. Besides, if the Greeks proceed through Macedonia and Thrace they will encounter Bulgarian resistance. Even if we should assume that they will be more fortunate than the British and French, and that they will manage to pierce our positions, they will be unable to advance on Constantinople, because their rear will be con-
The Allies, however, have not only abstained from encouraging the legitimate and natural desire of the Greeks to throw themselves wholeheartedly into a struggle against their secular oppressors, but have done everything to disillusion them and to damp their ardour. M. Venizelos could hold out no better inducement to the Greeks to fight than the fear of a hypothetical future Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans, nor could he offer any more solid comfort to them than that conveyed in his Kifissia speech of June 27, 1918, namely: “Even beaten with the Entente, Greece would be in a better position as regards her national future than she would be if victorious with the other group.”

Greek patriots were dismayed by the coolness manifested by the Entente for their cause, and by the disdain with which Greek aspirations were regarded. It is true we heard little owing to the draconian Greek censorship and to the complete muzzling of the Greek Press. But the manifestations which have been referred to were portents which it was senseless to disregard. To what extremes the Greek Government had

continually threatened by the forces of the Central Alliance. Moreover, the Greeks will be forced to overcome our organized defences and then attack the Turks, while owing to the great length of the Asia Minor coast they will only need to wage a war of movement in that country.”—Voenni Izvestia, April 19, 1918,
thought fit to go in order to stifle the voice of the nation may be seen by its prohibiting the meeting of a Pan-Hellenic Congress which was convoked in Athens last March. Not less symptomatic was the recent dismissal from his post of the able editor of the *Allytrotos*, who ventured to champion rather too openly the cause of the unredeemed Greeks. According to an Athens daily,¹ the Government forbade the various irredentist associations, such as those of the refugees from Thrace, Asia Minor, Epirus, etc., to have programmes deviating in the slightest degree from the official policy of the Government.

Disapproval of the policy pursued could only find free expression in the Chamber. Stratos, an ex-Minister, speaking on April 9, 1918, asked what compensations the Allies were offering to Greece in exchange for the blood she was asked to shed, and for the economic servitude she was being forced into, and pertinently remarked that if the Entente thought fit to erect a Jewish State in Palestine, the Greeks had a right to demand of the Allies that they should at least grant autonomy to their co-nationals in Thrace and Asia Minor. No reference to these remarks of Stratos appear in the Parliamentary reports published in the Athenian Press, and the reason is obvious. Such criticism would be heartily

¹ *Nea Hellas*, August 23, 1918.
approved by the Greek public, which was at a loss to understand why it should fight if it were not to liberate its enslaved kinsmen in Turkey. The quarrel of the Great Powers was on a level too high for the Greek people to comprehend, and such explanations as were furnished by M. Venizelos were not of a nature to fire their imagination. Undoubtedly the Greek Prime Minister must have enlightened the Entente's leaders as to the psychological state of his people, and in his conversations with them must have emphasized the necessity of offering some tangible inducement to the Greeks. Our leaders ought to have realized that however great M. Venizelos' talents as a statesman, and however great his popularity in Greece, there is a limit to what he could have accomplished if left morally unsupported. If we wished (and who among us did not?) that M. Venizelos should work wonders in Greece, we ought to have lent him our unstinted support, the necessity for which we shall grasp if we ponder over the truism contained in Archimedes' words: "δός μοι πά στῶ καὶ τὰν γὰν κινήσω." Unfortunately it does not appear that the Entente statesmen manifested any great concern for the state of mind of the Greek people. It is said that M. Clemenceau, in the course of a conversation he had with M. Venizelos on the subject, exclaimed to the latter: "My dear friend, don't forget after all that you
[Greeks] were assassinating us last year in Athens." The statesmen of the Entente have thought fit to declare their resolution to erect an independent Poland, a free or autonomous Armenia, Jugo-Slavia, Bohemia, etc., but they have failed to make a similar statement concerning the Ottoman Greeks. Not only have they ignored these Hellenic populations, but what is truly amazing is that Mr. Lloyd George, speaking on January 5, 1918, should have stated that "we are not fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race." Such an utterance could not fail to produce the most appalling effects on Greek public opinion. The veracity of Mr. Lloyd George's statement cannot be contested. Constantinople, Thrace, and the entire coast of Asia Minor are now predominantly Turkish in race, for the compact Greek populations which dwelt there until 1913-1914 and gave a purely Greek character to these districts have been either massacred or forcibly deported. It is intelligible, therefore, that the Greeks should have felt dismayed at the unwitting irony contained in the Prime Minister's words, for they implied that the Turks would be pardoned for all those crimes by the committal of which they succeeded in establishing priority rights over what had always been regarded
as the indisputable inheritance of the Greek race.¹

¹ As an example of the methods adopted for rendering Thrace predominantly Turkish in race, the following passage from the Constantinople Sabah of March 1918 may be cited:

"The Vali of Adrianople, Zakeria Bey, gave the following details as regards the settlement of immigrants in the Adrianople vilayet during the four years following the Balkan Wars. Thirty thousand Mussulmans from Bulgaria were settled in eighty Bulgarian villages, whose inhabitants emigrated to Bulgaria. [The Sofia Preporets, March 30, 1918, affirms that these Bulgarians were driven away at the point of the bayonet.] Some 213 villages containing 35,000 houses were built, in which another 150,000 Moslems were settled, while other refugees were lodged in 15,000 houses whose Greek owners had quitted the Ottoman Empire.

"The owners of these Greek houses are in Greece, and can state the reasons which compelled them to abandon their property. To what extent the southern portion of the Adrianople vilayet was Greek in character may be seen from the figures adduced by the Bulgarian author Karaiovev, who can hardly be reproached with pro-Greek leanings. According to him the sanjaks of Rodosto and Gallipoli had in 1900 a population of 105,607 Greeks, 74,761 Turks, 17,353 Bulgarians, and 8000 Pomaks.

"As to Constantinople, the only claim the Turks have to that city is possession. Out of a total population of 1,200,000 there is a compact mass of 400,000 Greeks, of whom 70,000 were Hellenic subjects. The bulk of the Turkish population is composed of State functionaries who are not permanent residents. If their number be, therefore, deducted from the autochthonous Turkish population, it will be found that the Greek element is by far the most numerous. This is apparent to all who have visited Constantinople. Greek is the dominant language, and European residents find it is indispensable to learn it, while on the other hand very few among them take the trouble to learn Turkish. Even the better-class Turks, those who do not ve in the seclusion of the Moslem quarters of the city,
Sympathy for the common Turk is comprehensible. Every European resident in Turkey find it necessary to acquire a smattering of Greek, because they cannot get on without it.

"Many Europeans are well acquainted with Western Asia Minor, and can bear witness to the indisputably Greek character of those regions. Even the Corriere d'Italia has recently acknowledged that Asia Minor is as Greek as Athens or Constantinople, and suggests that Italy should restrict her claims to Adalia, Adana, and the Taurus, and not oppose the Greek claim to Smyrna in the event of a partition of Turkey. It is to the interest of Italy, says the Corriere, to support all the Greek claims, including that to Constantinople.

"The northern part of Asia Minor is not so well known, and a few figures concerning the region between Batum and Sampsun are necessary to prevent the repetition of regrettable statements.

"This district roughly comprises 170,000 sq. km., and had a population of 3,500,000, of whom 1,500,000 were Greeks professing the Orthodox faith. There were another 500,000 Greeks converted to Islam, but still retaining their mother tongue, while yet another 250,000 professed Mohammedanism, but secretly held the Christian faith. These were locally known as Stavriots. The remaining population was composed of Turks, Armenians, Circassians, Kurds, and Georgians. There were some 1100 flourishing Greek communities possessing and maintaining 2000 churches, 1400 schools, 2000 priests, and 2000 teachers. The Greek pupils attending these schools numbered approximately 90,000.

"These facts should not cause surprise, because long before the overthrow of the Byzantine Empire there existed a strong and flourishing Greek kingdom in this district, which in 1457 finally came under the sway of the Turks.

"These are figures relative to the period prior to the war. Since then the whole district has been ravaged, and the Greeks have been forced to embrace Mohammedanism, massacred, or deported. The Young Turks may now look on it with equanimity, for the region is incontestably predominantly Turkish in race."

BULGARIA

has been favourably impressed by the Turkish peasant's kindliness, simplicity, and courage. But to see such sympathy extended to those who have proved the executioners of the Turkish peasantry is really bewildering. We could indeed do no greater injustice to the Turkish people than to allow them to remain under that Camorra which has brought destruction and ruin upon them. And for this reason it is really unthinkable that some British papers should have lent the hospitality of their columns to the emissaries of that set of assassins, the so-styled Young Turks, who thought it prudent to drape themselves in the cloak of Socialism and Freemasonry in order to win the support of our gullible pacifists in view of future contingencies. Readers may judge of the deplorable effect this Young Turk propaganda has had among our Greek Allies by the protest which the articles in the Herald evoked in the Greek Press:

A Socialist organization of 2,000,000 is non-existent in Turkey, where there is not a single Socialist. Such an organization is impossible owing to the theocratic principles prevailing in Turkey and the primitive state of Turkish mentality. The so-called Young Turk Committee is a criminal organization which, under the guise of a political party, has committed unheard-of atrocities against the Christian races in Turkey, and specially against the Greeks and Armenians, having exterminated those races by massacres, forcible conversions to Mohammedanism, famine, torture, and banishment into the interior of Asia Minor. In this manner one and a half million of Greeks and one million of Armenians have been exterminated, and this systematic annihilation continues.
It is a deliberate lie that agents were sent from Greece in order to rouse the Ottoman Greeks against Turkey, for such an act on the part of the Greeks would have been the height of folly. No one could contemplate provoking revolt among a pacific and unarmed population surrounded by Turks on all sides, for such an act would have been tantamount to exposing the Greeks to massacre.

The self-styled Turkish Socialists must consider the British public exceedingly credulous when they have recourse to such lies in defence of the indescribable excesses they have committed against the unfortunate Christians. That this bloodthirsty Young Turk Committee should attempt such a distortion of facts constitutes an indirect acknowledgment of the crimes they have committed against thousands of innocent women and children. These crimes, before the monstrosity of which the whole world shudders, are in the knowledge of all Governments.—*Allytrotos*, June 23, 1918.

But enough has already been said concerning the martyrdom of the Ottoman Greeks. What their kinsmen in the Hellenic kingdom desired and still desire of us is that we should permit and assist them to liberate these long-suffering populations. Before Russia's collapse we were debarred from countenancing Greek claims, but now there can be no valid arguments against these. M. Politis, the Greek Foreign Minister, has formulated the aspirations of the Hellenic nation,¹ and it must be acknowledged that they

¹ "We should certainly be greatly disappointed if the coming Peace Congress did not sanction our aspirations, and if important portions of Hellas actually under foreign domination were not to be freed. Heavy responsibilities weighed on Greece at her birth: all the questions which European diplomacy did not wish to settle, questions that imperatively demand solution as a matter of national honour, and of the responsibilities we have assumed towards
are studiously moderate. It would indeed be an act of great injustice if we did not countenance their complete realization, and tantamount to repeating what an Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs (San Giuliano) once declared to a representative of Greece: “The liberty of the small does not count when confronted with the interests of the great.” Some people may object that the services rendered by Greece would be rewarded too highly. But it should be remembered that this is not a question of recompense, but of justice. Moreover, we must admit that we are entirely to blame if by restricting the zone of M. Venizelos’ operations we failed to turn the Greek factor to account and bring Turkey to her knees. Indeed, it would have sufficed had the

our oppressed brothers, questions that dominate our national life. We shall therefore at the Peace Congress ask that these mortgages be paid off in order that Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, the islands and the countries of Hellenic influence in Asia Minor may develop freely in full communion of thought with the Mother Country, securing the unity of political régime towards which for so many centuries the efforts of the unredeemed Greeks have tended. I conceive Pan-Hellenism, not in the form of absolute annexations, but of intermediary solutions, such as autonomy for certain districts and a régime of guarantees for others. The minimum of our claims will be the final release from the disgraceful yoke of the barbarous conquerors of people of Hellenic origin and descent.”—Morning Post, October 16, 1918.

1 How largely responsible the Entente is for the gradual cooling of Greek enthusiasm for the Allied cause will be realized if it be remembered that even when Greek help was being solicited for the Dardanelles expedition, Russia did her utmost to discourage the Greeks by formally
Entente Powers permitted M. Venizelos to add one word to his battle-cry, making it "To Saint Sofia!" instead of "To Sofia!" He could then have worked wonders with his Greeks.

But even to those who look askance at Greek aggrandizement we would point out that not even the award of Constantinople to Greece could be adequate to express the gratitude we owe to the Greek Premier for the inestimable services he has rendered to the Allied cause. In fact any person endowed with average intelligence must realize that it was through M. Venizelos' unswerving loyalty and boundless devotion to our cause that our Salonica army was spared a Sedan, and that our interests in the Near East did not suffer irreparable disaster.

Our Balkan policy, however, if policy it can be termed, was from the beginning incoherent and aimless.

The taunt Baron Schenck, the organizer of the German propaganda in Greece, uttered when constrained to quit that country is certainly not devoid of truth. "I depart," he said, "with a mind at ease, for I leave the Entente and its representatives to complete my task." And subsequent events have fully confirmed the Teuton's prognostication. Could there be, for instance, a more senseless act than the forcing of announcing that no Greek troops would be allowed to enter Constantinople.
another king on the Greek people? We talk of the desirability of a Balkan League or of the federation of the Balkan peoples, and yet put fresh obstacles in the way as soon as one impediment is removed by the inexorable march of events. It cannot be gainsaid that the various Balkan dynasties form the main stumbling-block in the way of this desideratum. It is the rival ambitions of the various Balkan kinglets, nurtured and fostered by unscrupulous courtiers and politicians, which have hitherto baulked the aims of these peoples. And the Greek nation, which had had the opportunity of realizing at such terrible cost to themselves the wickedness and folly of kings, and were bent upon eradicating root and branch that foul growth which had poisoned their national life and stifled the nation's consciousness, failed once more of their object, thanks to the untoward action of the Protecting Powers. Had the Greek people been allowed to remove, using the expression of a distinguished Greek politician,¹ "its hereditary rulers, whose nefarious influence on the people's rights had been so well comprehended by its ancestors 2000 years ago," the danger that Greece would slide back once more into that state of disorganization and semi-anarchy so dear to the Greek politicians of the pre-Venizelist period would have been averted, or at least greatly reduced. While now

¹ M. Thalis Coutoupis.
we may fear that with the passing away of the great statesman who guides the destinies of Greece, the country may lapse into its old vicious habits.

The Crown, in order to regain its lost power, will find it expedient to revive the Spoils System, which rendered the monarch the supreme dispenser of all favours; and the opponents of M. Venizelos, whose enmity is due solely to his drastic measures against the disorganization and corruption on which they throve, will be only too anxious to further its nefarious designs.

It is, indeed, most regrettable that the leaders of the Entente should not yet have grasped the incontrovertible truth contained in Alfieri’s famous epigram:

Che cosa è rè?
Di reo due terzi egli è;
Anzi per dire il vero,
La differenza è zero.

which is nowhere so applicable as in the Balkans.

We crave our readers’ forbearance for this long digression from our original subject, but Balkan questions are so closely intertwined that it is impossible to treat of one without raising points affecting the whole issue.

Now that the last scene in the bloody tragedy is being enacted in the Near East, the question of effecting an equitable and lasting settlement should be dominant in the minds of all thoughtful
persons. Such a settlement can only be enduring if it is just to all parties. As President Wilson stated on September 27, 1918: "The price to achieve a secure and lasting peace was impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interests are crossed; and not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with." The Allies have it in their power to satisfy to the full all equitable demands of the nationalities dwelling in Central and Eastern Europe, and it is incumbent upon them to do so. As Mr. Roosevelt so forcibly declared: ¹

The task of merely giving autonomy to the subject races of Austria amounts to a betrayal of the Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Italians, and Rumanians. The first should be given their independence, and the other three united to the nations to which they really belong. Moreover, it would be a betrayal of civilization to leave the Turk in Europe, and to fail to free the Armenians and other subject races in Turkey.

It may be appropriate to cite here the following words of Mazzini published in the Roma del Popolo shortly before his death in 1872:

The Turkish Empire is doomed to break up, perhaps before the Austrian, but the fall of the one will follow close upon that of the other. The populations which revolted in order to become nations are almost all distributed between the two empires, and cannot come together without emancipating themselves from the one as well as from the other. . . . What is necessary that the insurrection should be speedily converted into victory? Harmony between the Slav, Hellenic, and Rumanian elements, which are to-day

¹ Kansas City Star, October 13, 1918.
jealous of each other owing to old recollections of war and of mutual oppression. It is the mission of Italy to propose the basis of this accord and to make it prevail.

These words of Mazzini are prophetic. It is in the hands of Italy more than in those of any other Power to facilitate a just settlement of the Balkan question. Would that the consciousness of the greatness of Italy's mission might dawn in time on her rulers! How highly desirable this consummation is may be judged from an article in the *Perseveranza* (October 1, 1918) which utters a warning against the danger of giving Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria and compensating Serbia on the Adriatic coast, "entirely at the expense of Italy and Albania." The mischief which would inevitably follow should such a course be adopted is manifest to all, for if the Great Powers will not show themselves generous and just towards their Serbian and Greek allies, no one can reasonably ask these to be magnanimous towards their enemies, the Bulgarians. The result would be the non-satisfaction of Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian aspirations; this would tend to perpetuate that atmosphere of distrust and hatred prevalent in the Balkans since the Treaty of Berlin, which was inspired by frankly self-seeking motives. This state of affairs may be to the liking of financiers interested in armament works, who found in the rivalries of the Balkan States an exceedingly lucrative source of revenue, but it is
not likely to be approved by the general public, which has had enough of war and unrest. The dire consequences of our having countenanced an unjust settlement in the Balkans in 1878 and in 1913 are sufficiently obvious, and it is to be hoped that politicians will draw a lesson from the past.

If, on the other hand, full satisfaction of their national aspirations be granted to the Serbians and Greeks, very few among them will be found to demur at our doing justice to the Bulgarian claims also. In this connexion we need only refer to the Corfu declaration of July 25, 1917, in which it is explicitly stated that:

"The territory [of the future Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes] will include all territory compactly inhabited by our people. Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others, but only what is its own." This is evidently incompatible with the retention of Macedonia by Serbia, since the bulk of the Macedonians are Bulgarians, and if a reader has any lingering doubts as to the ethnical aspect of Macedonia, the evidence adduced in a subsequent chapter should be sufficient to convince even the most biased of Bulgaria's right to that district.

1 We consider it superfluous to dwell on the ethnical claims of the Jugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary, since these have been recently expounded in a masterly fashion by many distinguished writers.
According to Reuter,\(^1\) M. Passitch reiterated his determination to uphold this pact, and stated that "The Serbian Government is determined to stand by the Declaration of Corfu. It neither pursues nor desires, nor intends to pursue, an Imperialistic policy, because the Serbian democratic people has staked everything upon its liberation from Austro-Hungarian Imperialism."

Even the Greeks would readily forgo their rights to Cavalla if by such a sacrifice they could ensure permanent peace in the Balkans, and secure the redemption of their brethren in Turkey, Northern Epirus, and the Dodecanese. M. Thalis Coutoupis, the distinguished Venizelist ex-Minister and deputy for Laconia, speaking at a public meeting in Athens on November 4, 1917, affirmed that even the inhabitants of Cavalla, by returning a Venizelist deputy, demonstrated their readiness to cede their town to aliens (Bulgarians) if this would bring about the assignment of Smyrna or Asia Minor to Greece. And M. Venizelos, in the memorable speech he delivered on August 26, 1917, admitted that had he believed that the cession of Cavalla to Bulgaria would have ensured permanent peace in the Balkans he would not have hesitated to agree to it.

But if the Mazzinian spirit, which proclaimed "that every nation had the right to be free and

\(^1\) The Times, October 17, 1918.
united," and "that the natural geographical boundaries of nations had been set by God and were therefore inviolable," seems to be dead on this side of the Atlantic, or if Italy's allies and co-signatories of the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) feel precluded from assuming the rôle of arbitrators, a rôle incompatible with that of a contracting party, it becomes once more plain to all that recourse must be had to America to break the vicious circle into which secret diplomacy has drawn us.

Fortunately for us, President Wilson has already formulated the following ideal principles which must inspire future peace, and in them all may behold a guarantee for the pacification of the Balkans:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game now for ever discredited of the balance of power.

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States.

Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.— (From President Wilson's Message to Congress, February 11, 1918.)
If these views prevail, as we must hope they will, it will be found necessary at the final settlement to acquiesce in all just ethnic claims, as well as in some of the Bulgarian demands, for most of the latter are ethnically unassailable.¹

¹ What reasons, for instance, could be adduced in favour of the Dobrudja’s retrocession to Rumania? This province was forced upon the Rumanians as compensation for that part of Bessárabia which was taken from them in 1878. The Rumanians vehemently protested at the time, affirming that the Dobrudja was Bulgarian. (Consult on the subject “Charles de Roumanie,” par un témoin oculaire, or the masterly work of F. Damié on Rumania.) Now that they have obtained the whole of Bessarabia, the Dobrudja should logically revert to its rightful owners.

Economical considerations, some would maintain, render the possession of Constanta by Rumania imperative, but impartial people would have a right to add that the very same reasons demand the cession of Cavalla to Bulgaria. However, whatever the fate of Northern Dobrudja (and I must admit that before 1913 I never came across a Bulgarian who expressed regret for the attribution of this district to Rumania, for even the most Russophil among them were pleased at a buffer having been created between their country and Russia, with regard to whom they were unanimous in their conviction that “distance makes the heart grow fonder”), there are absolutely no grounds on which the return of Southern Dobrudja to Rumania could be justified. This province, which was so unjustly wrested from Bulgaria in 1913, had at the time a total population of 280,000, of which 134,331 were Bulgarians, 106,830 Turks, and only 6359 Rumanians. Even the latter were not slow to admit the iniquity of their action, and professed readiness to make amends, as soon as they perceived that by discarding the doctrine of equilibrium (by which they had sought to justify their attitude towards Bulgaria in 1913) and invoking instead the principle of nationality they stood to gain. Thus the Bucarest Universul on June 10, 1915, wrote: “Sooner or
Our Balkan Allies must certainly exact safeguards for the future, and before giving any satisfaction to the Bulgarian people it is absolutely essential for the security of peace in the Balkans that the cleansing of their Augean stable be imposed on them. Bulgarian Imperialism is not an invention of Bulgaria's opponents, it is a reality, and constitutes a danger for all Balkan nations, including the Bulgarians themselves. Tsar Ferdinand had succeeded in modelling the national army of Bulgaria on the Prussian model, and in saturating its officers with the spirit that gave rise to the Zabern incident. The manner in which the Bulgarian army dealt with the Sofia demonstrations of 1907, and with the Rustchuk affair of 1909, conclusively proves that it has been converted into a Prætorian Guard. It is true that now a more popular ruler has ascended the Bulgarian throne, but we may well have our doubts as to his professed attachment to democratic principles, especially when we consider the influence which his Catilinian father must have had on him. His patronage of the Bulgaro-German Cultural League gives us good reason to be uneasy as to his future attitude, for if he were a real democrat he later in applying the principle of nationality on which we ourselves rely for the realization of our nation's unification, we shall have to return to the Bulgarians the quadrilateral (Southern Dobrudja) which we took from them. This is a certainty."
would not certainly have become such a zealous apostle of *Kultur* in his country. At any rate it will be imperative to revise the Bulgarian constitution and deprive Bulgaria's ruler of those prerogatives which Ferdinand managed to arrogate to himself, and by which he secured autocratic powers. The necessity for this will be fully demonstrated in subsequent chapters.

The Bulgarian people have of late been clamouring for the impeachment of all those men of dubious antecedents by whose co-operation and support Ferdinand was able to drag Bulgaria into the war. The Agrarians in their organ insistently demanded "that the whole Radoslavov gang be brought to justice," and the Social Democrats in the last congress of their party passed a resolution asking "that the responsibility of the late Cabinet [Radoslavov's] be established, as well as that of all its confederates, and that their properties be seized." These are propitious omens, but we should have felt more confident as to the future had the Bulgarians taken justice into their own hands and sent the whole of the Coburg family home. For if the Western Allies feel inclined to shout "No peace with the Hohenzollerns," our Balkan Allies may well say the same of the Coburgs. It is to be hoped that the righteous indignation aroused by Tsar Ferdinand and his acolytes, intelligible and justifiable though it may be,
seeing that to his act more than to any other we owe the undue prolongation of the war, will nevertheless not be allowed to obscure our vision to such an extent as to cause us to vent our anger on the unfortunate Bulgarian people. For Bulgarian Imperialism sprang solely from the Crown and its boundless ambitions, and it would indeed be a very great error to attribute the same spirit to the people. Nothing could be more foreign to the nature of the Bulgarian peasant than a desire for conquest, and it is grotesque to ascribe to him Imperialistic tendencies of which he would be the first to feel the evils and the last to reap the benefits. Nor is it only the peasantry which is averse to a policy of conquest, but also the great mass of educated people. The Bulgarian schools are hotbeds of Socialism, the majority of the teachers being Socialists, who scoff at the idea of nationalism. State patriotism, which swells the head, is not taught in Bulgarian schools, as is the case in Serbia and Greece, and for this reason Bulgarian youths are for the most part internationalist in sentiment. Any person who has had some intercourse with Bulgarian students must have been struck with this peculiarity.

In order to stifle what there is of Bulgarian Imperialism, we should help the Bulgarian people to obtain the upper hand in the Government of their country, and we cannot better effect this
purpose than by manifesting a desire to do them justice.

Bulgaria is a small country, which cannot hope to develop freely if left to herself. She needs external aid and support, and if we will not offer these, she has no alternative to economic and political gravitation towards Germany, however distasteful this prospect may be.\(^1\) It would be a capital mistake if we persisted in our present policy and gave Bulgaria cause for rancour against us. For, whatever the measure of our success in the West, the Germans are not likely to relinquish their ambitions entirely, and an unsatisfactory Balkan settlement is only too likely to afford them fresh opportunities for intrigue. The Germans, to whatever extent they are beaten, will emerge from the struggle with the conviction of their own superiority, and with their acknowledged resourcefulness and the immense natural wealth of their country, assets of which we cannot deprive them, they will constitute a menace which it would be puerile to disregard. The only way by which we can hope to circumscribe Germany's inordinate ambition is by a thorough application of the principle of nationality and by establishing independent national States, jealous of their liberty and

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\(^1\) The Allies should insist on Bulgaria's repudiating her war debt to Germany, as otherwise she will remain at the mercy of the latter.
anxious to resist any encroachment on their independence. And in no direction does this need appear so urgent as in the Near East, for Russia, who acted as a weighty counterpoise to German influence in that quarter, has collapsed, and none of the Allies is in a position to fill up the void. It is therefore imperative to create a local force capable of thwarting all German schemes of penetration. Such a force can only evolve from a group of States which do not seek to destroy one another. This purpose may best be achieved by our refusing to tolerate any arrangement which places one Balkan nationality under the rule of another. And then we may be certain that Bulgaria will not again seek redress for her wrongs in an alliance with the Teutons. Balkan feuds would cease, and a strong barrier would be erected against a possible revival of the German _Drang nach Osten._
CHAPTER II
POLITICAL PARTIES

The inordinate subdivision of political parties in Bulgaria is by no means justified by any fundamental differences in their programmes. The main distinction between them until recently was the amount of sympathy or suspicion they professed for Russia. Each party presented a different shade of Russophilism or Russophobia, and this differentiation was deftly exploited by Tsar Ferdinand to suit his purpose. Although Russophilism was the outward criterion, nevertheless the parties present certain well-defined tendencies which permit of their classification under the three distinct headings, Reactionary, Conservative, and Radical. The Radoslavov Cabinet was composed of the first, and included the so-called Liberal, Young Liberal, and National Liberal Parties. Gueshov’s and Malinov’s parties represent the conservative elements, while the Radicals, Agrarians, and Socialists constitute the third class. Danev’s party may be considered as a cross between conservative and radical. Party spirit is extremely virulent, and there is no limit to political
intrigue. When in opposition, parties will unite to overthrow the Government, but seldom contrive to agree in sharing office. They do nothing to enlighten public opinion, and their sole activity consists in heaping abuse on the party in office and in intriguing with Court circles for its overthrow.

Most of the parties come into being to further the personal ends of their leaders. The development of the party is usually limited by the number of posts and favours available for distribution. It can attract to its orbit a certain number of "bosses" necessary for filling the Ministerial seats and the most important Government posts. When in process of time the aspirants to these honours increase and cannot all be satisfied, the party splits, and a readjustment takes place. Naturally this fissiparous tendency of Bulgarian parties was greatly encouraged by Ferdinand, who was fully alive to the advantages inherent in the application of the principle: *divide et impera*. These tendencies account for the superabundance of political parties in Bulgaria. There are as many as ten.

The most influential party, the one which could claim to represent the Bulgarian well-to-do and propertied classes, was the Nationalist. Its leader, I. E. Gueshov, whose moderation and statesmanship have been duly apprized in this country, would under happier circumstances
have rendered immense services to Bulgaria and to the cause of civilization in the Near East. His extreme respect for constitutional methods, however, brought him into conflict with Ferdinand, and between 1903 and 1911 Gueshov refused every invitation from the Palace. Unfortunately he is not of a combative disposition, and preferred to give way rather than to oppose the desires of the King. Owing to his advanced age the practical leadership of the party devolved upon T. Todorov, a brilliant orator and a capable solicitor. He occupied the post of Minister of Finance when his party was last in power, and in this capacity showed great ability. His criticism of the financial situation of his country has always been most comprehensive, and he is rightly regarded as an authority on Bulgarian financial matters. Another distinguished member of the party is Bobtchev, professor of law in the Sofia University, a talented writer and an historian. He was an extreme Russophil, and at the time of the Balkan Wars was Bulgarian Ambassador in Petrograd. Until lately he was the president of the Slav Club in Sofia, the "Slavianska Besseda," and was the editor of two Bulgarian periodicals, one literary, the other legal.

Bobtchev has taken a leading part in bringing his country into touch with other Slav nations. It was largely due to his initiative that a Slav
Congress met in Sofia in July 1910, with the object of furthering the union of Slavs on intellectual, literary, scientific, and economic grounds. Some eighty Russian delegates, with Guchkov, then president of the Duma, at their head, as well as fifty Serbian, fifty Czech, and as many Croatian, Slovene, Bosnian, and Montenegrin delegates participated. The Czech leader, Kramarz, was elected honorary president, and Bobtchev chairman. The enthusiasm and sense of solidarity which this meeting of delegates of all Slav countries provoked was indescribable, and may be gauged by some of the speeches which were made. Bobtchev stated that Bulgaria was weak, but strong in her Slav sympathies; poor, but rich in her love for Slavdom. Guchkov hinted that Bulgaria had not yet completed her task, and called upon the Bulgarians to be brave and strong, and to remember that they could reckon on the assistance of their friends.

The satisfaction of the delegates was marred only by the absence of representatives from Poland. To emphasize the solidarity of the Slav nations a meeting of the Slav gymnastic leagues was simultaneously convoked. Over 1700 "Sokols" or members of the gymnastic leagues from Croatia, Bohemia, Serbia, etc., met in Sofia under the auspices of the Bulgarian "Younak" organization. One of the most fêted detachments was naturally the Bulgarian
"Younaks" from Uskub, for Macedonia was still Turkish, and the Macedonians were not yet urged to style themselves Serbians. Those indeed were halcyon days for the Neo-Slav enthusiasts, and it may be affirmed without exaggeration that this Slav Congress prepared the ground for the Bulgaro-Serbian treaty of 1912 and the Balkan Alliance.

One of the most sympathetic figures in Gueshov's party is undoubtedly Atanas D. Burov, a member of a highly respected and influential family of Northern Bulgaria. His integrity, business aptitude, and frankness are in marked contrast to the qualities usually displayed by Bulgarian politicians. He does not mince his words when denouncing an abuse, even when the perpetrator is of a rank that usually assures immunity from criticism. Burov's rather intemperate, but perfectly justifiable, language regarding the Crown has on many occasions caused a temporary strain in his relations with Gueshov. Among other prominent members of the party are Boris Vasov, the younger brother of the national poet and of General Vasov; Madjarov, late Bulgarian Ambassador in Petrograd; Peev-Platchkov, the chief editor of the Mir, the party organ, who is an accomplished English scholar; Jablanski, Gubidelnikov, Dimtchew, and Kanazirski.

The Nationalist party succeeded Stambulov
in power and remained in office from 1894 to 1899, and in 1911 it again assumed office in coalition with Danev's party.

Some of the chief measures passed were the reduction of the Chamber's mandate from five to four years, and the adoption of proportional representation. Gueshov's great mistake—one he shared with Malinov and Danev—was that he allowed himself to be prevailed upon to alter the Bulgarian constitution so as to permit the King to conclude treaties with foreign Powers without consulting the Chamber—a change most detrimental to Bulgaria since it left its ambitious ruler free to dispose of the destinies of the country. The necessity of secrecy concerning the Bulgaro-Serbian negotiations and the ensuing treaty of 1912 may be urged in extenuation. It is certainly interesting to note that the Agrarians displayed in this connexion a much keener political flair than all the other parties combined, for they contested most stubbornly the passage of this measure. It is true Gueshov's party was somewhat badly shaken at the last elections and saw the number of its adherents reduced to ten in a House of 245 seats, but this may be largely ascribed to the campaign of calumny which was directed against its leader during the period preceding the elections. Gueshov and Danev were held up to the public as the moral authors of the disaster which befell Bulgaria in 1913, and
everything possible was done to discredit them. The weakening of the party can, however, only be temporary, for its connexion with a large portion of the electorate is too sound to suffer from a momentary set-back. Its strength lies in the fact that its partisans are mostly of the *bourgeois* class, generally a conservative and stable element. It possesses the peculiar feature, that its leaders are mostly interrelated by marriage, thus forming a veritable clan.

The Nationalist party may justly claim to be one of the most tolerant as regards the foreign minorities in Bulgaria. On many occasions it has lent its support to the Greek communities in Philippopolis, Stanimaka, and Burgas to elect Greek deputies to the Sobranje, and it is mainly through its help that the first Jewish deputy in the Bulgarian Chamber was elected.

The Democrats, under the leadership of Malinov, are the strongest party in the Sobranje after the Liberals and Agrarians, being represented by thirty-one deputies. Their adherents are mostly recruited from among the intellectuals, the lesser *bourgeoisie*, and the wealthier peasants. Malinov is by birth a Bessarabian, and is well-intentioned and honest according to Bulgarian political standards, but lacking in determination.

His advent to power in 1908 was greeted with enthusiasm as he was looked upon as a social reformer, and it was generally supposed that his
coming heralded the introduction of an era of real Parliamentarism. Subsequent events proved that these hopes were ill-founded, for on the declaration of Bulgaria's independence in 1908, Malinov publicly stated that Bulgaria would never condescend to pay an indemnity to Turkey, and that liberty was bought by blood and not by money. He had reckoned, however, without Tsar Ferdinand, who, not wishing so soon to jeopardize his newly acquired crown, ordered the Bulgarian Minister in Paris to announce that "the Bulgarians were good payers." Malinov swallowed the rebuff, and in due course voted for the payment of an indemnity to Turkey.

Malinov's conception of democracy must indeed be of a very hazy sort if we are to judge from his behaviour in the Rustchuk affair. Early in 1909 a Moslem girl of Rustchuk eloped with her lover, a Bulgarian from the same town. They repaired to a village in the neighbourhood, where the girl was baptized and subsequently married to the Bulgarian. After the performance of these religious ceremonies the couple returned to Rustchuk. Unfortunately the father of the bride happened to be one of the religious heads of the Moslem community in that town, and he looked upon his daughter's conduct as a disgrace to himself and a provocation to all his co-religionists. The Moslems, who form an important element in the Rustchuk department, began
an agitation for the restitution of the girl to her family. Deputations were sent to Sofia soliciting the Government's intervention in what was regarded as an outrage to the Moslem faith, while the Christian population, on the other hand, naturally sympathizing with the lovers, indulged in street demonstrations in their favour. An authority possessing even a small grain of sense would have counselled the newly married pair to leave Rustchuk for a couple of months until the popular passions they had roused by their elopement had subsided. The Malinov Cabinet, however, desiring to placate the Turks, whose susceptibilities it had wounded by the declaration of Bulgaria's independence, ordered the Rustchuk police to seize the bride and hand her back to her father. The police succeeded in carrying out the first part of the order, but in the meanwhile the population got wind of the plot, and set about to thwart its further execution. The crowd became so hostile that the police with their captive had to seek refuge in a police station, where they were immediately besieged by the populace, which demanded that the bride should be set at liberty, and threatened to storm the police station if its desire was not fulfilled. Neither entreaties nor threats could move the crowd to yield, and finally it rushed the police cordon, broke into the police station, carried off the young bride in triumph, and after
restoring her to her husband facilitated the flight of both from the town. All would have ended there if it had not been for the truly astonishing conception Malinov and his colleagues formed of their responsibilities. They decided that the affront inflicted on the police as representatives of authority ought to be punished in an exemplary manner. On the following day, the last day of February 1909, when the population of Rustchuk was celebrating its victory by holding a meeting, the military were ordered to disperse the crowd which had collected in the market square. The unwary Rustchuk citizens had scarcely recovered from their surprise at the brief summons shouted by the commander of the troops before the soldiers fired on the assembly. A squadron of cavalry, debouching from a side street, began to sabre the hapless civilians. Over thirty persons, among them several women and children, died from sabre and bullet injuries, and in addition there was a large number of wounded. As may be seen from this incident, Malinov and his colleagues may vie with the notorious Russian General Trepov, whom indeed they have surpassed in brutality. On another occasion Malinov forgot his party principles to such an extent as to conclude an address to Ferdinand with a phrase that certainly had nothing democratic about it, and by which he will be known to posterity in
Bulgaria: "With you, for you, and always by you."

Malinov’s lack of moral courage may best be illustrated by the following example. It is well known how diligently he worked in the summer of 1915 to further an agreement between his country and the Entente, and how he insisted on the expeditious dispatch of an army to Salonica by the Entente Powers. His political opponents have made capital out of this, attacking him as instrumental in the advent of Entente troops on the Macedonian Front. Malinov had not the courage to admit that he was at the time an Ententophil, but through his organ, the Preporets, he has endeavoured to justify himself by asserting that “he was trying to hoodwink the Entente, so that the Serbians might not attack Bulgaria before she was ready.”

The most outstanding personality in the party is N. Mushanov, the ex-Minister of Public Instruction and present Minister of Public Works. He is extremely energetic, and possesses all the qualities which are lacking in his chief.

A. Liaptchev, the present Finance Minister, has already served in the same capacity. He is noted for his independent character and for his pugnacity.

M. Takev, the Minister of the Interior, also occupied the same post in the Malinov Administration of 1908, but owing to his implication in
the Rustchuk affair was relegated to the less important post of Minister of Railways. He is responsible for the introduction of a law compelling municipalities to hold a referendum for any undertaking or change of a local character. He used to profess republican opinions.

Professor G. Danailov, the Minister of Commerce, is a prominent professor of the Sofia University, where he formerly held the chair of Political Economy. He is the author of several treatises on finance, and is a strong supporter of the pro-German policy. Professor V. Mollov, the Minister of Railways, is another convert to this policy. He was Professor of Criminal Law in the Sofia University, and was nominated to the post of Minister of Education in 1910, when Malinov reorganized his Cabinet.

R. Madjarov, the Minister of Agriculture, is a nephew of Karavelov, the founder of the party, and was formerly a judge. He may be considered the most Germanophil member of the present Cabinet.

The party was originally led by Karavelov, who took office on three different occasions, in 1880–1, 1884–6, and lastly in 1901, for a period of a few months only, in a Coalition Cabinet with Danev. The party came in again in 1908, and remained in power until March 1911.

The appellation "Democrat" which this party has assumed is a misnomer. Far from serving
the people's cause, the "Democrats" unwittingly rendered signal service to Tsar Ferdinand's régime. Prior to their assumption of power in 1908, an Opposition "block" had been formed which pledged itself to curb the unconstitutional practices of the King, and compel him to conform more to parliamentary methods. The soul of this movement was the Nationalist party, and for a time the "block" succeeded in exploiting the national indignation, which had been roused to fever heat by the high-handed methods of the Stambulovists, and thus succeeded in moderating the latter's excesses, which were the outward manifestations of Tsar Ferdinand's unconstitutional activities. As soon as it became evident that a Cabinet change was impending, Malinov and Danev, tempted by the lure of power, began to show signs of wavering. Malinov declared that the formation of a coalition Cabinet from five parties was an absurdity, and would never be accepted by Ferdinand, and when the latter asked him to form a Cabinet he manifested no scruples, and hastily accepted the offer, thereby completely ruining the policy of the "block." (The block included the Nationalists, Progressists, Democrats, Radicals, and Social Democrats.)

The Progressists, led by Danev, were originally a very influential party, and were noted for their probity. It is the Russophil party par excellence, and, as Danev put it, "they made no politics
with Russia." In other words, they implicitly obeyed Russia's wishes. Had Danev stuck to this principle in 1913, he would have piloted the Bulgarian ship of state safely into harbour. Unfortunately the Bulgarian victories in Thrace had turned his head, and he began coquetting with Russia, with disastrous results to his country and to his party. Much has been written against Danev. In the flush of victory his judgment may have been momentarily obscured; in normal circumstances, however, he is a most genial and a truly honourable man. He is one of the few bourgeois politicians who is really popular among the peasantry. The disaster which befell Bulgaria in 1913 wrecked the party. Danev¹ countermanded the order given by Ferdinand to attack the Serbians and Greeks,

¹ Danev was apparently hoping that Russia, in virtue of her secret treaty of 1902 with Bulgaria, guaranteeing the latter's territorial integrity, would intervene and save the situation. The Russian Government, however, not only abstained from carrying out its engagements, but let loose Rumania on the hard-pressed Bulgarians, with the result that the latter had to capitulate. The disloyal behaviour of Russia towards her former protégés grievously compromised her prestige in Bulgaria, and alienated many of the foremost Russophils. The disillusionment of the Russophils was carried a step further when the late Tsar Nicholas visited Constantza early in the summer of 1914, and was pleased to accept the honorary colonelship of a Rumanian cavalry regiment, the first to enter the Bulgarian town of Silistra. The toasts exchanged on that occasion between the late monarchs of Rumania and Russia were couched in terms which led the Bulgarians to infer that it was
hoping that Russia would intervene and save the situation, but in this he was disappointed. Russia was unable or unwilling to act. Bulgaria’s quondam allies having had time to recover from their surprise, attacked the Bulgarians in their turn, and Danev was held up as the person responsible for the ensuing catastrophe.

The disappearance of Tsarism will further weaken the party, and it is very unlikely that it will ever recover its old prestige, which was largely due to the belief that it enjoyed the goodwill of Russian Court circles. For the

necessary for them to look elsewhere than to Russia for friendship and protection.

This impolitic act of the late Tsar Nicholas greatly facilitated Tsar Ferdinand’s task. As an instance of the revulsion of feeling which resulted among the Bulgarian intelligentsia, I would cite the case of Nicolai Mitakov, one of the pioneers of Bulgarian journalism.

Mitakov was a rabid Russophil, and an irreconcilable enemy of Tsar Ferdinand and his Austrophil leanings. He was the proprietor and editor of the Sofiski Vedomoshi, in which he never ceased attacking Ferdinand and his unconstitutional acts. During the Stambulovist régime of 1903–1908, Mitakov’s attacks became so aggressive in tone—he threatened Ferdinand with Stambulov’s fate—that the King hinted to certain of his officers that he would be pleased if he were freed from the attacks of this canaille. The officers acting on this hint descended on the editor, wrecked his office, smashed his press, set upon and nearly murdered him. Mitakov, who was well over fifty, took a long time to recover from his injuries, while his paper did not survive the attack. As a result of the events of 1913, however, Mitakov passed over to the other camp, and he now occasionally contributes to the Narodni Prava virulent attacks on the Entente.
moment Danev's only companion in the Sobranje is Dr. Hodjov, a prominent Sofia solicitor and an extremely amiable and unassuming man.

Other prominent members are Al. Ludskanov, Abrashev, Sarafov, Christov.

The organ of the party, the Bulgaria, was suspended on the declaration of war.

The Radicals are the most upright and independent of Bulgarian politicians. They are idealists. Their leader, Naitso Tsanov, has declared that he would refuse to accept office if asked to do so by Tsar Ferdinand, and would only comply with such a request if it emanated from a majority in the Chamber. He has never wearied in his scathing condemnation of the personal régime established by Ferdinand, and the attitude he has assumed towards the Crown has been most uncompromising. He refused to have any dealings with the Palace, and the only occasion on which he sought an audience from Ferdinand was on September 17, 1915, when he warned the King not to launch Bulgaria upon a war against Russia, characterizing such a policy as a "premeditated crime." Tsanov is extremely popular in the Vidin district. The municipality of that town used to be in the hands of his adherents, and was conducted very much on communist principles. Another outspoken critic of Ferdinand's unconstitutional practices is Stoyan Kosturkov, the present Minister of
Education. He was formerly a director of one of the State colleges, and enjoys a well-deserved popularity in Bulgaria. He has few superiors as a debater, and is rightly considered a tribune of the people. He was for a long time the editor of the Radical, the party organ. Having studied law in Geneva, he became acquainted with several of the Russian Socialist leaders, with whom he is intimately connected.

Dr. Fadenchecht, the present Minister of Justice, is a converted Jew. He was a Professor of Civil Law in the Sofia University, and lately a solicitor in Sofia. K. Siderov and Gheorgov are the other leading members of the party, which actually possesses five seats in the Chamber. It has a big following among teachers and State functionaries, and it may be said that it practically dominated several unions of civil servants, such as the leagues of teachers, railway-men, and post-office employees.

It cannot be said, however, that it is a really popular party. Its extreme idealism is against it, for the general public in Bulgaria prefers a party that has some prospect of coming into power, and from which it may derive some benefit.

The Agrarians do not actually constitute a political party, but rather a league of representatives of peasant proprietors. The entry of the Agrarians on the political stage is of recent date,
and is largely due to the arrogance with which political parties had treated the hard-working peasantry. Most of the parties had lost touch with the peasants, scarcely condescended to inquire into their sufferings, and did little to improve their moral and material position. They saw in the peasantry merely an instrument for obtaining power; they would make the most alluring promises in order to secure the agrarian vote, but when the elections were over they would do nothing to redeem their pledges. They would foist on the peasants their own candidates, usually strangers to the locality, and out of touch with the constituency they were to represent. The peasants at last sought means by which to safeguard their interests, and naturally the rural co-operative societies formed a nucleus for the Agrarian movement.

The birth of this movement may be referred to the brutal acts of the Radoslavov-Ivantchev Cabinet of 1899. By its methods of extortion and its absolute disregard of law, it provoked the peasants to an open revolt, which was brutally subdued by the massacres of Trestenik and Durankulak. The Agrarian movement is the most hopeful portent in Bulgarian public life, as it testifies that the most numerous class in Bulgaria, aware of the injustice with which it is treated, and conscious of the political and economic oppression to which it is subjected, has
resolved to defend its rights by organizing itself into a powerful body. Owing to the absence of any other political force capable of regenerating Bulgarian public life, the task devolves on the Agrarian organization. For this reason its evolution should be followed with extreme interest, all the more since owing to the comparative weakness of the Socialist proletariat in Bulgaria, the Agrarians are bound to take the lead in shaping the future destiny of their country.

As was to be expected, the Agrarian organization is composed of men who have little experience in politics. They are fiercely hostile to the present form of Government. Thus in the last Agrarian Congress a resolution was passed prohibiting the Agrarian deputies from holding any intercourse with the King, who was denounced as the author of Bulgaria's misfortunes. Foremost among their aims are the curtailment of the bureaucracy, a drastic reduction in the number of civil functionaries, the disbanding of the regular army and the creation of a militia, and alleviations in the burden of taxation. In a sense they are Republicans, and may be compared to the Russian Revolutionary Socialists. The nominal leader, or rather president, of the organization was Alexander Stamboliski, who in consequence of his outspokenness at the fateful audience of September 17, 1915, between the leaders of the Opposition and Ferdinand, has
been imprisoned by order of the latter. This act of Tsar Ferdinand is easily comprehensible, for the Agrarian leader was his most determined and fearless adversary. The scenes which resulted from the unrelenting opposition displayed by Stamboliski and his followers at the sitting of the extraordinary National Assembly in Tarnovo in June 1911, when they attempted to oppose the amendment to the Bulgarian constitution, conferring on the King powers to conclude secret treaties, are memorable for the implacable hostility manifested by the Agrarians towards the Crown.

After the conclusion of the Balkan Wars, Stamboliski's denunciation of Ferdinand's behaviour became so fierce that for a time it was believed he would succeed in rousing the masses, and meting out just retribution to the author of Bulgaria's misfortunes. The jealousy with which the other parties regarded the rising power of the Agrarians and the fear that Bulgaria's neighbours were ready to take advantage of any internal trouble to cut off further slices from her territory, were the sole factors which deterred Stamboliski and his adherents from ridding their country of the cancer which was eating into her vitals. The present leader of the Agrarians is Draghiev. He is scrupulously attached to the interests of the party, and no consideration will make him depart from the
guiding principles set down by the Agrarian Congress. He is pitiless towards those of his adherents who have ignored party discipline, and in this respect he has probably shown too much severity.

Draghiev is a personality who will play a leading part in the future destinies of the country. He certainly possesses many qualities which mark him out as a leader. He is a fluent speaker, his language is plain and homely and appeals to the peasants. He is exceedingly unassuming and frank, and those who are unacquainted with him manifest their surprise when they find that this popular leader has not yet discarded his peasant garb. To his friends’ remonstrances on this point, Draghiev has invariably answered: “We should behave like the people, live like the people, for we have been sent here to defend the interests of the people.” These words are characteristic and express his attachment to the cause he is serving.

Draghiev’s orthodoxy has not been to the liking of the majority of the Agrarian deputies, who sought to make use of their privileged positions to further their private interests after the declaration of war. They were incited thereto by the Government, which was anxious to weaken the unity of the party. By associating various Agrarian deputies in commercial enterprises undertaken under the ægis of the Govern-
ment, and by offering them opportunities for participating in profitable speculations, the Radoslavov Government succeeded in creating discord among the Agrarians and enlisting the services of several of their number. The Spartan Draghiev could not tolerate such an infraction of party discipline, and without hesitation proceeded to dissociate himself from those who had compromised themselves. As he and his fifteen incorruptible adherents were in a minority and could not exclude the incriminated members, Draghiev seceded and established a new party. Several attempts have been made by the inculpated members to compose the quarrel and restore the unity of the party, but Draghiev has remained adamant on the point, and has refused to readmit them to the fold, although individuals offered to make amends and promised not to repeat the offence. Draghiev’s wrath is certainly justifiable, for some of his late colleagues have acted in a disgraceful manner, and have indeed proved traitors to their cause. To their repeated solicitations, Draghiev has answered through the Press, intimating his refusal to have any further dealings with them. He has made public his decision in a long declaration, in which, among other things, he says:

Has not your partisan Al. Dimitrov admitted that from having been a deputy he became a volunteer spy? After this moral degradation can he any longer represent the Agrarian organization?
Is it not true that you approve of spying and informing, and that you tolerate spies in your midst?

Is it not true that you countenance profiteering, and allow members of your group to carry on speculations, while Bulgaria's sons are suffering and dying on the battlefields?

How earnestly we should have desired to have you with us! But you have deserted your posts and have fallen morally.

We have regretfully had to exclude you from our party, because the high and vital interests of the party rendered this imperative. All your appeals for admission or union are in vain. Your fall must be judged by the Agrarian Congress. We are very sorry for your present position, but do not ask us to share your moral downfall. This is not in the interest of the party. Be patient, and await the verdict of the pending Agrarian Congress.

The unscrupulousness of some of the Agrarian deputies may be gauged by the fact that the party organ, the Zemledelsko Zname, which had ceased publication by decision of the party council, has, in spite of Draghiev's protest, again been started by some of the excluded members with the manifest object of furthering their individual ends. How largely the dissident group has profited by the late Government's largess may be illustrated by the fact that it recently acquired a building in Sofia at the price of 546,000 fr. which is to serve for a club. Its store also, which is conducted on co-operative lines and supplies agricultural machinery to the peasantry, seems now to be doing a roaring trade, although prior to the war it was on the verge of bankruptcy. It is evident that all this
money has not been thrust on it for nothing, and that certain deputies must have rendered signal services to Radoslavov and his followers. Two of them (Al. Nedev and Djankardashliski) were so completely seduced by the late Government that they repudiated their allegiance to their party and formally joined the former Government coalition, without, of course, running the risk of seeking re-election in their constituencies.

The Agrarians were opposed to the war, they were for the maintenance of strict neutrality. They disapproved of every manifestation of Jingoism, and would willingly have renounced even Macedonia had they been granted the possibility of carrying through their somewhat communistic programme. In a conversation I had with some Agrarians in 1914, I remember that they did not express regret so much at Macedonia being under Serbian rule as at the draconian administration the Serbians imposed on the Macedonian population, which rendered life unbearable in that region and thereby incensed Bulgarian public opinion. "If the Serbians," they said, "had a little sense, they would try to conciliate the Macedonians by kindness, and they would endeavour to attract the bulk of the Macedonians in Bulgaria back to their country. Then all of us here in Bulgaria would feel inclined to put our own house in order
rather than to think about Macedonia, whereas now these Macedonians\(^1\) with their endless complaints leave us no peace."

The Agrarian party actually occupies forty-five seats in the Chamber (at the elections it had secured fifty-one seats, but six Agrarian deputies, among them Stamboliski and Sharenkov have been imprisoned for their opposition to the pro-German policy). Some of the most distinguished adherents of Draghiev are: St. Momtchew, St. Kolarov, and Al. Radolov. The rival group is headed by Tsanko Bakalov, but save about half a dozen members who have completely disgraced themselves, the others do not seem to

\(^1\) The Macedonian immigrants form the most influential element in Sofia. By the energy and enterprise they have displayed they have become a factor that has always to be taken into consideration in a survey of Bulgarian politics. In fact they form "a State within the State," for they have succeeded in penetrating into all the branches of the administration, as well as into the army, and carried on a persistent propaganda in favour of involving Bulgaria in a war for the liberation of their country. They were most bitter in their condemnation of the Serbians, and refused to be reconciled to the idea of Macedonia remaining under Serbian rule, a rule harsher and more hated by them than the much-abused Turkish régime. One may form an idea of the influence they wield, if it be noted that there are actually 800 officers of Macedonian origin serving in the Bulgarian army. There were also over 600 teachers in Bulgaria who were by birth Macedonians. Liaptchev, the present Minister of Finance, and General Protoguerov, the Bulgarian Food Controller, are Macedonians. Even Missirkov, the spokesman of the 200,000 Bulgarians of Bessarabia at the National Bessarabian Council which discussed the union of Bessarabia with Rumania, was a Macedonian.
have committed any such unpardonable offence as to justify Draghiev's uncompromising demeanour towards them. Even in their paper they were very tepid in their praise of the pro-German policy, and for this reason the Zemledelsko Zname was not allowed to be sent to the troops at the Front.

The split in the Agrarian party, however, may be due to graver reasons than those which are apparent, and may lead to far-reaching results for the party. The war has contributed largely to the enrichment of the peasantry, but this increase in wealth has not been evenly distributed. The small holders, who constitute the great majority, have obviously profited less than the large proprietors. For the former could produce little in excess of their personal requirements, whereas the latter were able to dispose of large quantities of produce and to make correspondingly large gains. These enriched farmers may possibly be attracted by the bourgeois parties, a tendency manifested to a very small degree by the parliamentary group led by Tsanko Bakalov.

On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the holders of the smaller properties (owners of a half to two hectares), who constitute about half of the peasantry, will be able to earn their living on the land after the war, owing to the increased taxation to which they will be liable. Up to the
outbreak of the war they had the greatest difficulty in making two ends meet, and this is why emigration to America was so popular. The poorer peasant used to repair to America, work for five or six years, and return with money to buy land sufficient to support himself and his family. The extent to which America has indirectly helped the Bulgarian peasantry to realize its ideal of happiness may be gauged by the fact that there are some 100,000 able-bodied Bulgarians actually in America. This fact will also explain why no Bulgarian Government dared provoke the anger of the United States, to which the majority of Bulgarians feel indebted alike for their spiritual and their material welfare.

The Socialists are divided into two mutually hostile factions of about equal strength. The so-called "Broad" Socialists are really Social Democrats, and under the able leadership of Sakuzov are exercising a growing influence in the country. The ground was not favourable for the development of Socialism in Bulgaria; she had no extensive industrial proletariat with the attendant exploitation of labour from which Socialism usually derives its strength. To make up for this apparent weakness, Socialism in Bulgaria seems to have proportionately more adherents among the lower grade State functionaries and school teachers than in other
countries. Had the Socialist leaders applied their energies to redressing the wrongs of the peasantry they would undoubtedly have secured a very far-reaching popularity and influence. To court the favour of the peasant, however, who being a small holder is regarded as a bourgeois and therefore an enemy, was beneath the dignity of the more exalted heads of the party. They thus failed to adapt themselves to local conditions and lost a great opportunity, for the peasants meanwhile organized themselves into a party which will always exert greater influence owing to the numerical superiority of its adherents. The discussion as to whether the peasants were worthy or not of the attention of the Socialists was really the main cause which led to the split in the Socialist party. Sakuzov and his followers held that co-operation with the peasants did not go counter to the spirit of the party, and that it was essential for the common good of that party and the peasants. These views appeared heretical to the other section, and finally in 1903 the rupture was definitely consummated. Sakuzov and his colleagues, Dr. Djidrov, Dr. Sakarov, Assen Tsankov, and Kr. Pastuhov, are among the most enlightened of Bulgarian politicians, and it is to be regretted that the weakness of their group does not allow them to play a more important part in the destiny of their country. The party organ is the Narod.
The “Narrow” or Doctrinaire Socialists are led by Blagoev. It is difficult to find a case of such extreme bigotry and blind attachment to dogma as that furnished by these Socialists. Even Trotsky, who during his stay in Sofia in 1909 sided with them as against the “Broad” Socialists, was astonished at their fanaticism, and earnestly counselled them to mend their ways. Their extreme intolerance exasperated even this Bolshevik leader, and he manifested his disapproval by publicly dubbing them “Seminarists.” They were on very intimate terms with Parvus, the notorious German propagandist, who succeeded in imbuing them with such extreme Russophobia that prior to Bulgaria’s intervention in the war they openly maintained that it was Bulgaria’s duty to defend Constantinople by force of arms against Russian autocracy. By their refusal to co-operate with the bourgeois parties of the Opposition they greatly strengthened and facilitated the task of the Radoslavov Cabinet.

The chief members of this Socialist group are Chr. Kabaktchiev, Lukanov, and Kirkov.

The party organ is the Rabotnitseski Vestnik or Workmen’s Journal. The two Socialist groups are represented in the Chamber by twenty-one deputies (ten Broad and eleven Narrow).

The partisans of Radoslavov number some eighty-eight deputies in the Chamber. Of these,
however, twenty-one are Moslem, and are only nominally adherents of the party. To one conversant with Bulgaria’s affairs this number will appear ludicrously small for a dominant party, and will be taken as a conclusive proof of weakness. For it must be remembered that in Bulgaria a certain number of constituencies, the so-called “Government’s dowry,” always returns Government candidates. Furthermore, in the last elections the bulk of the forty-one deputies unconstitutionally elected from the territories acquired as a result of the Balkan Wars were practically nominated by the Government, and not elected by the population. If these points be taken into consideration and a further allowance made for the privileges which the possession of power at the time of the elections always confers on a party, it will be seen that this impressive array of some eighty-eight deputies is indeed a very poor achievement. In fact, had the party been in Opposition it is doubtful whether it would have succeeded in returning even one or two deputies to the Chamber, for its mainspring is solely royal favour and not the nation’s goodwill.

Radoslavov, during his brief tenure of office in 1899, had compromised himself to such a degree by peculation, infringement of the laws, and violence, that he and his colleagues were subsequently impeached and condemned to various
terms of imprisonment and the loss of civil rights. Nor was this Radoslavov's first offence. In 1889 he was condemned to a year's imprisonment for having published a defamatory telegram concerning Stambulov and his august royal master. It is to Dr. Danev that the credit of bringing Radoslavov and his administration to trial is due. But if all honest people will applaud Dr. Danev for his courage in instituting a court of justice and for eliminating such criminal elements from Bulgarian public life, they will equally condemn Tsar Ferdinand, who a few years later ordered the rehabilitation of Radoslavov and his acolytes. Ferdinand's object in this action was that of securing one more tool for his dirty work. After Radoslavov's condemnation it would be idle to contend that he could ever dare present himself before the electorate and demand its support were he not backed by the Crown.

Radoslavov has greedily claimed the major share of the credit which the transient success of the Germanophil policy brought to Bulgaria, but in reality he played a very secondary part in directing his country's policy. Bulgarian Ministers were very seldom acquainted with the schemes of their ruler, and served solely as tools in carrying out his plans. Far from being the originator of the pro-German policy, it is certain that Radoslavov was kept absolutely ignorant of
his master’s secret designs even until the middle of the summer of 1915. Radoslavov, indeed, is little more than a crafty old peasant, and can hardly be credited with possessing enough political acumen to dream of embarking his country on such an ambitious and risky enterprise as was Bulgaria’s intervention on the side of the Central Powers. Even his compatriots derided him, and his speeches were often made the subject of jokes in the Press. Indeed the expression “the glorious ideas of Dedo (uncle) Radoslavov” had become a standing joke in Bulgaria. It is true that Radoslavov has obtained a degree as a doctor of laws in Heidelberg University, but his mental powers are very limited, and the only reason for his appointment to the post of Prime Minister was his extreme subservience to Ferdinand. His other colleagues in the Cabinet were Pechev, the Minister of Public Instruction, and Dintchev, the Minister of Agriculture. The organ of the party is the Narodni Prava. Tontchev, the late Minister of Finance, was up to the time of Radoslavov’s imprisonment a partisan of the latter. When the party seemed to have been definitely wrecked by the condemnation of its leaders, Tontchev endeavoured to build up a following from the less discredited elements. His group, however, is devoid of any significance, and in spite of all the advantages it enjoyed at the polls through sharing in the
prerogatives of power, had not succeeded in electing more than thirteen deputies to the Sobranje.

The other Minister in the Radoslavov Cabinet belonging to Tontchev's faction was Bakalov, the late Minister of Commerce. The following anecdote will show the calibre of the men composing the so-called Young Liberal party. The most talented deputy of the party is G— S——, a man of considerable accomplishment, of whom it might have been expected that he would have spurned the idea of associating himself with a coterie which is nicknamed in Bulgaria the "Thieves Party." S——'s friends, when they heard of his decision to offer his allegiance to Tontchev, remonstrated with him and endeavoured to dissuade him from committing an act which seemed to them tantamount to moral degradation. S——'s reply to this admonition was edifying, and goes far to explain the rapid increase in the number of political coteries in Bulgaria. "I admit," he said, "the moral superiority of other parties, but if I were to join one of them I should be relegated to a back seat, for they have numerous partisans, and it is doubtful if my turn would ever come to fill a prominent post. By adhering to Tontchev's party, however, I may aspire to ministerial office should he ever assume power, for the number of his partisans is limited. As
for Tontchev's chances of being called to form a Cabinet, they are daily increasing. Out of our ten parties there are barely four which enjoy royal favour, and consequently our turn will not be long delayed. I only aspire to be Minister once, that is enough for me."

The Stambulovist party, which formed the other wing of the Radoslavov coalition, consists nominally of the followers of Stambulov. Although a few members of the party are inspired by high ideals and lofty patriotism, the vast majority are men whose sole consideration is personal advancement. Their tenure of office from 1903 to 1908, first under Ratso Petrov, later under Dimitre Petkov, and finally under Gudev, was characterized by an orgy of illegality and abuse. After the Stambulovists had left office, a parliamentary Commission was appointed to investigate their acts, and the Sobranje, acting on the report of this Commission, decided to arraign the ex-Ministers and most of their partisans before a special court.

The indictment consisted of 700 folio pages, and contained over forty counts! The outbreak of the Balkan War prevented the Government from proceeding with the State trial. The impending menace to the Stambulovists will go far to explain their untiring activity in endeavouring to discredit and overthrow the Danev-Gueshov coalition Ministry. In fact their only hope of
salvation from the moral ruin with which the State trial threatened them lay in the overthrow of the upright Danev and the substitution in office of another party endowed with less respect for the law. Thus the Stambulovists easily lent themselves to all the intrigues of the Austrian agents and helped to envenom the discord among the Balkan Allies, hoping thereby to undermine the Government's position. In this they were diligently assisted by Radoslavov and his partisans, who sought to revenge themselves on Danev for their condemnation. Thus while Gueshov and his supporters were advocating a policy of conciliation, and recommended the cession of Salonica to Greece, the partisans of Ghenadiev and Radoslavov were violently protesting against the policy of compromise. One of the factors which forced Danev to assume a more unyielding attitude than Gueshov was this Chauvinist agitation of his political rivals, who publicly denounced every concession and protested against the submission of the dispute between the Balkan Allies to arbitration. Ghenadiev went so far as to threaten Danev that he would provoke riots in Sofia should Danev leave for Russia to confer with the Prime Ministers of the other Balkan States in order to arrive at an amicable settlement.

The Stambulovists encouraged Ferdinand to fall foul of his allies, and brought about this
result at a disastrous cost to their country. The outbreak of the war among the Balkan allies caused the overthrow of the Danev Cabinet and paved the way for the advent of the Stambulovists in coalition with Radoslavov's followers. As was to be expected, they hastened to rescind the order for a State trial, and in this they were heartily assisted by Radoslavov, who owed his rehabilitation to the Stambulovists. They thereby freed themselves from the Damocles sword which had so long been hanging over them.

Nothing could equal the corruption and the utter disregard of public opinion under the Stambulovist régime from 1903-8. The late Prime Minister, Dimitre Petkov, on one occasion displayed his cynical contempt for the public by bluntly retorting to some of the deputies who were reproaching him for certain illegalities and pointing out to him the deplorable effect they would have on public opinion: "I make water on public opinion." On another occasion when friends were trying to persuade him not to commit an act which was likely to cast a stain on his name he brazenly replied: "I am so full of blots that a fresh stain will not show."

Misappropriation of public funds and peculation in connexion with army supplies were rampant. One of the many affaires which engaged public attention at the time was that of Colonel Metchconev. He had supplied gun-
powder which was absolutely worthless. Being a favourite of the King he was calmly acquitted. The misdeeds of General Ratso Petrov, the ex-Prime Minister, who made a huge fortune by embezzling public funds, were appropriately versified by a witty poet, the General being described as making out of the horses supplied to the Government a napoleon apiece, and out of every fortification erected in defence of the country a prop for himself:

Ot kontche,
Po napoleontche,
I ot fseko ukreplenie,
Podkreplenie.

In justice to the Bulgarian army it must be admitted that several leading officers endeavoured to protest against the prevalent corruption by handing in their resignations. The case of General Peev may be cited as an example. After his retirement he published a series of pamphlets in which he exposed all the evils from which the army was suffering with the purpose of rousing the public and forcing it to check the growing evil.

I have a letter from a Bulgarian officer dated June 15, 1904, in which the following passages occur:

I do not think there is any institution where fraud is so rampant, where favouritism is so highly developed, as in the Bulgarian army. From the Minister of War to the sub-lieutenant, even to the sergeant, every one steals right
and left. The newly supplied rifles are of such poor quality that I am afraid they will fall to pieces after a few rounds. The boots are of the same description; after wearing them for a month you go barefooted. We laugh at the Turkish army, but we are no better. I assure you, my dear friend, that if we had declared war on Turkey last year we should have been beaten, because we had only fifty bullets to a rifle. Think of all the fuss we then made!

The fortifications we are now making are not really intended for defence; their purpose is to furnish the "bosses" with a pretext for appropriating public money.

For petty meanness, the following exploit of the then Minister of Justice can hardly be surpassed. The Sofia Municipality had decided to make a free distribution of fuel to the poor, whereupon the Minister decided to take advantage of this to secure his fuel supply gratis. He forthwith issued a certificate to the effect that his sister, who was keeping house for him, was indigent, and thus enabled her to secure a share of the fuel designed for the populace. Unfortunately for those concerned, an Opposition paper got wind of this shady transaction and made the facts public, with the result that even the Stambulovists derided their Minister for his lack of dignity.

Another crime with which the Stambulovist régime has been branded is the persecution of the Greek element throughout Bulgaria in 1906. Greek churches, schools, and property were ruthlessly seized, and pogroms were organized in several towns. The town of Anhiallo on the Black Sea, mainly inhabited by Greeks, was set
on fire and completely destroyed. The man chiefly responsible for these barbarous acts was Ghenadiev. Being a Macedonian he had been incensed by the murderous activities of the Greek bands in his country, and was wreaking his vengeance on the defenceless Greek population in Bulgaria. Even the arch-cynic Petkov demurred at such violence, and remarked that no good would come to Bulgaria from it. Ghenadiev, however, was all-powerful and had his way.

Another of Petkov's acts which is characteristic of the period was his treatment of his colleague Gatev. The latter, by exception an honest man, was the Minister for Railways. When the Government was considering the construction of the trans-Balkan railway, Tarnovo to Stara-Zagora, Gatev insisted on the adoption of the scheme worked out by the technical staff, while his colleagues and Tsar Ferdinand, being interested in some coal-mine concessions in the Trevna district, which they had granted to themselves, wished that the line should be deflected so as to traverse the region where the mines were located, thus enabling them to dispose very advantageously of their concessions. As a change in the original plan would have seriously impaired the carrying capacity of the line and would have increased considerably the cost of construction, Gatev resolutely opposed the idea, and refused to yield on the point. In order to
overcome Gatev's obstruction, Petkov hit on the plan of sending him on a mission abroad, and temporarily took charge of the Ministry of Railways. No sooner had Gatev turned his back than Petkov submitted to the Sobranje a Bill for the construction of the trans-Balkan railway with the desired modification, and had the Bill carried post-haste by his docile supporters, or "boys" as they were familiarly termed by him. Gatev, of course, resigned as soon as he became acquainted with the trick which had been played on him.

Such was the abhorrence and disgust felt by the public for this gang of depredators that at the elections following on their retirement from office in 1908, not a single Stambulovist deputy was elected. In the present Chamber they secured the return of thirty-two of their partisans; of these about twenty continued to support Ghenadiev, after the latter had formally renounced the traditional anti-Russian policy of the party, while the other dozen deputies grouped themselves round Dobri Petkov, the notorious ultra-Germanophil Momtchilov,¹ Vice-President

¹ The following anecdote sufficiently illustrates the moral standing of this personage. Early this year, General von Mackensen consigned to Momtchilov 5000 kg. of flour to be distributed gratuitously among the poor of Tarnovo, where the General had his headquarters at the time of Rumania's intervention. Momtchilov, who is a deputy of the Tarnovo Department, received the flour, and instead of handing it over to the Tarnovo Municipality, began selling it to private buyers at 2 to 3 fr. per kg. The Mayor of Tarnovo has
of the Chamber, and Koznitski, the late Minister of Railways. The views of the two rival factions were voiced respectively by the *Volya* and the *Nov-Vek*, both of which have ceased to appear. After the condemnation of Ghenadiev the number of Stambulovist deputies decreased to twenty-nine, of whom eleven supported Ghenadiev and eighteen Dobri Petkov. The same disgraceful acts which characterized the Stambulovists' tenure of office in 1903–8 have marked their administration since their resumption of power. Jointly with the Radoslavists, they have systematically exploited the people and have heaped up enormous fortunes. One of the tricks to which they resorted to fleece the population was that of occasionally prohibiting the export of agricultural produce. This would bring down the price of such commodities. The Government partisans would then hasten to buy up all the available supply, raise the embargo on its export, and quietly dispose of it abroad, thus reaping enormous profits. One of the most venal deputies was undoubtedly Pavel Ghenadiev, the younger brother of the Minister. Together with some of his followers he practically monopolized the export trade to Turkey, and regardless of embargoes and prohibitions, smuggled huge

since been obliged to bring an action against this pillar of German *Kultur* in Bulgaria in order to recover the value of Von Mackensen's generous gift.
quantities of food-stuffs across the frontier. He brazenly advertised in the papers during 1915 that he was buying all kinds of produce, irrespective of prohibitions as to export. An amusing incident happened to P. Ghenadiev in the course of one of his smuggling enterprises. The export of gold in coins had been forbidden. Ghenadiev secured some 40,000 fr. in gold and went to Rustchuk, where the police prefect was ordered to see him on board the steamer which was to take him across the Danube to Rumania, and prevent any of the subordinate officials from doing their duty. The programme worked out on the Bulgarian bank of the river, but in Giurgevo the Rumanian authorities insisted on searching Ghenadiev, and as there was no police prefect to shield him, his gold was discovered and seized. Ghenadiev preferred to create a disturbance in order to get his money back, rather than to keep silent and avoid a public scandal. Diplomatic notes were exchanged between Rumania and Bulgaria on the subject, and eventually the money was restored, but not before the affair had made the round of the Press. No proceedings, however, were taken against the culprit, for this would have constituted an anomaly and an infraction of the unwritten law as hallowed by practice. For in Bulgaria there are two weights and two measures, and as the Bulgarians express it: "The law is a cobweb fatal
only to small flies and harmless to the larger insects."

Patriotic Bulgarians are fully aware of the danger which the system of corruption fostered by Tsar Ferdinand constitutes for their country. Ferdinand aimed at creating a powerful moneyed class as a counterpoise to the democratic elements. By widespread corruption, and by making promotion in the army and in the civil service conditional on the amount of servility displayed, he succeeded to a certain extent in rendering a numerous class subservient to his will. The Radoslavov clique was entirely recruited from such elements, and had nothing in common with the mass of the people. Even the Bulgarians make no secret of the corruption reigning in their midst, as may be gathered from the following article in the Mir, January 6, 1917. The writer eluded the censor’s vigilance by ascribing to China the remarks and descriptions intended for Bulgaria:

China with its many millions is unconquerable, but is governed by persons who have been accused and condemned, and who, nevertheless, have again become Ministers. Men without conscience and scruples, who have lost every moral criterion, persons who stand on the lowest step of the moral ladder, who rob and encourage their partisans to do likewise. They make use of the power they hold to commit crimes and illegalities under cover of the law. People for whom the country’s honour, welfare, and safety have each a price. To obtain servile tools, these rulers are not deterred from vitiating the intelligentsia, corrupting the people, spreading throughout the country vice, corruption, and
abuses, and creating an atmosphere of absolute physical and moral decomposition... a stinking slough.

This is a picture of China.... Thank God that things are different with us in Bulgaria!

Bulgaria will be doomed to certain destruction, even if her territory become a hundred times greater, should her inner life resemble that of China.

Bulgaria will only be great, really great, when she revives morally, and by her creative power rises high above her neighbours.

The above is corroborated by the report which a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, nominated to examine the irregularities and abuses among military and civil officials, presented to the Sobranje in March 1917. It contained, among other things, the following remarks:

It is regrettable to note that in these times of crisis for the country some unscrupulous State servants had devoted their energies entirely to enriching themselves by criminal methods.

One of the most talented Bulgarian writers, that keen observer of public life, Stoyan Mihailovski, has placed the following words in the mouth of the hero of a play:

Cupidity is the mainspring of our Government circles. Do you see this pretty, coquettish, Bulgarian capital? It is built out of plunder and robbery! Do you recollect what a dirty village it used to be some twenty-five years ago? Now it shines, it attracts like a Parisienne.... Well, to me, it is a thousand times filthier, filthy in the purity of its atmosphere, foul in the cleanliness of its streets and courtyards, foul because it is a living proof that the history of young Bulgaria has begun by spoliation....
CHAPTER III

IN THE WAKE OF THE BALKAN WARS

The outbreak of the European War found Bulgaria in a state of intense political ferment following on the disastrous termination of the Balkan Wars. An atmosphere of bitterness and distrust permeated all circles, and was intensified by a campaign of mutual recrimination in which the various political factions were indulging. Instead of drawing the only logical conclusion from the calamity which befell Bulgaria in 1913, and endeavouring to guard against a possible recurrence of the evil, Bulgarian politicians acted in a way which emboldened the real culprits and encouraged them to persevere in their nefarious activities. The controversy as to who was responsible for the disaster was fostered by all those who were anxious to distract public attention from the guilty parties. Responsibility weighed heavily on Tsar Ferdinand, for his guilt in precipitating the second Balkan War had been more or less established by the various disclosures made in the Sobranje and in the Bulgarian Press. But thanks to the mutual distrust
with which the various political coteries viewed each other, and the personal animosities by which prominent politicians seemed to be inspired, no effective measures were taken to check the encroachments made by the Crown on the nation's liberties. And when at last those very persons who had compassed Bulgaria's ruin in 1913 were about to launch their unfortunate country on another bloody adventure, the people and its leaders found themselves incapable of opposing any effectual resistance to the policy which was being foisted on them. This inability of the national will to assert itself was not, however, due entirely to local causes. Other circumstances had done much to accentuate the sense of helplessness and discouragement among the foremost opponents of Tsar Ferdinand's régime. The hostile attitude adopted towards Bulgaria by Entente countries in general and by Russia in particular, from the time of the outbreak of the second Balkan War, had sapped the confidence with which these States were regarded by the more progressive elements in Bulgaria,

1 Yet a further reason which restrained the Bulgarians from meting out a just retribution to the authors of their misfortunes was the fear that their neighbours should take advantage of any internal trouble in Bulgaria to cut off further slices from her territory.

2 Russia's unfriendliness towards Bulgaria was largely due to the fact that she was afraid to alienate Serbia, for she counted on the latter as a pawn to be used against Austria.
which intuitively turned to them for support against the pro-Austrian and reactionary tendencies manifested by Tsar Ferdinand. Bulgarian democracy had repeatedly and vainly appealed to the Entente to redress the wrongs it had suffered at Bucarest at the hands of the other Balkan States; the Entente, however, turned a deaf ear to these prayers, and by its attitude disheartened and discredited Ententophil circles in Bulgaria.

Had the Bulgarians been allowed to decide for themselves, they would undoubtedly have remained neutral spectators in this world-war as long as we abstained from satisfying their grievances, and their displeasure would never have expressed itself in open hostility to us. Tsar Ferdinand, however, who was on the lookout for an opportunity of recovering his prestige, so seriously impaired by his attitude during the Balkan Wars, and who was seeking to regain his vanishing authority, saw in an alliance with Germany a sure pledge for the attainment of both these ends.

Tsar Ferdinand's pro-Austrian proclivities are well known. He was ever a willing tool of Austria, and his subservience to the Ballplatz may be gauged by the policy which led to the war among the Balkan Allies in June 1913. It is more than probable that he ventured on this fratricidal struggle after receiving explicit pro-
mises of Austrian military assistance, for no responsible politician would have ventured to expose his country to risks such as those incurred by Bulgaria in June 1913 without having obtained guarantees beforehand. If he deliberately ignored the possibility of Rumanian and Turkish invasion, it was because this danger was outweighed by the knowledge of forthcoming Austrian assistance. In this connexion a quotation from an article by D. Mishev which appeared in the Bulgarian review, *Sfobodno Mnenie*, a few months prior to Bulgarian intervention in the present war may prove illuminating. Mishev is a distinguished Bulgarian publicist and the author of the well-known treatise on Macedonia: *La Macédoine et sa population chrétienne* (Paris, Librairie Plon et Cie, 1905). He was a devoted Ententophil, and in the summer of 1915 started a daily paper in Sofia, the *Balkanski Zgovor*, the main purpose of which was to popularize the idea of a reconstruction of the Balkan League under Entente auspices.

It cannot any longer be denied [he writes] that Austria-Hungary drew Bulgaria into the war with the Balkan Allies. That war was a vital question for Austria, and in order to provoke an armed conflict, Austria-Hungary had in all likelihood promised that she would support Bulgaria not only diplomatically but also by other and more efficacious means—by war! By such a promise the rear of Bulgaria on the Rumanian and Turkish frontiers would be guaranteed. Without such a guarantee the negotiations with Rumania surely would not have been carried on in so superficial a manner, nor would the Bulgarian troops
have been withdrawn from Tchataldja. Is it admissible that without such a guarantee our High Command could have decided to enter into the war with the Allies? That our High Command must have received such a guarantee may be inferred from the negligent and light-hearted manner in which our High Commanders declared war. They were absolutely convinced that neither Rumania nor Turkey would cross our open frontiers.

And such was the reliance placed on Austrian assistance among Tsar Ferdinand's *entourage* that he felt capable of dispensing with public support, and proceeded to entrust the Government on July 27, 1913, to persons such as Radoslavov, Tontchev, and Ghenadiev, who were devoid of all authority and completely bankrupt morally. Their entire subservience to Ferdinand was the King's only inducement to call them to power. What was the programme of this triumvirate may be judged from the letter they addressed to Tsar Ferdinand on July 5, 1913, a letter undoubtedly inspired by Ferdinand himself.

*Your Majesty,—* When we were invited to the consultation at the Palace, we declared to you that in order to secure an advantageous solution of our conflict with Greece and Serbia by war it would be absolutely necessary to secure ourselves against attack by Turkey and Rumania and to obtain the support of Austria-Hungary. All the conditions necessary for the success of such a policy were within our grasp, but no attention was given to our advice. Complete subservience to Russian policy was continued, notwithstanding the obvious evils of such a course, and thus Bulgaria was brought to this present critical moment. We think to-day, as we thought then, that the salvation of our State can only be found in a policy of intimate friend-
ship with Austria-Hungary. That policy should be adopted at once and without hesitation, because every hour is fateful. We invite Your Majesty to act immediately in order to save Bulgaria from further misfortune and the dynasty from fresh responsibility.

Your Majesty's devoted subjects,

Dr. V. Radoslavov
Dr. N. Ghenadiev
D. Tonchev.

Apparently there were good reasons for confidence in Austria. M. Take Jonescu affirms that during May 1913 the Austrian Minister in Bucarest informed him that he had been instructed to assure the Rumanian Government of Austria's readiness to defend Bulgaria by force of arms. This evidence is further corroborated by Giolitti's statement in the Italian Chamber, to the effect that early in August 1913 Count Berchtold, then Austrian Foreign Minister, had solicited Italy's support for an attack upon Serbia.

It is also significant that when Tsar Ferdinand's plans had miscarried and Bulgaria had been unsparingly chastised by her vindictive neighbours, he should have abandoned the country, which was seething with dissatisfaction, and repaired to Austria-Hungary, where he spent the greater part of the autumn of 1913. It was commonly believed in Sofia that he would not return, it was even reported that he had dispatched his Chamberlain to Paris, and that the
latter had rented a sumptuous residence in a fashionable suburb of that city for a term of years. It appears, however, that Francis Joseph was able to dissuade Tsar Ferdinand from taking such an extreme step, giving him assurances that he would soon have an opportunity of retrieving his ill-luck. At any rate, the Austrian Emperor's attitude towards the Bulgarian ruler was described as exceedingly cordial, surpassing in amenity the customary courtesies exchanged even between allied monarchs. When at last Tsar Ferdinand returned to Bulgaria, he came with the firm determination to persist in the pro-Austrian policy he had initiated, and to maintain in power the Radoslavov Cabinet, the only ministry amenable to such a course. And this in defiance of public opinion and in spite of the nation's will. The new Government had to appeal to the country for its support, as the Sobranje, being mainly composed of partisans of Gueshov and Danev, had been dissolved. The elections in Bulgaria are practically always sham affairs. The King appoints the Ministers, who in their turn dissolve the Sobranje or Parliament, as it is always packed with adherents of their predecessors in office. Before carrying out elections the Ministers take measures to ensure their success at the polls. All officials, high and low, mayors, prefects, councilllors, both communal and urban, even policemen are dismissed
whole sale, and replaced in their functions by partisans of the Cabinet.

All these new civil servants have but one object in view: the return of the candidates of the party which has appointed them. If the elections are in their favour, their posts are assured for as long as their party remains in power; their failure to secure the return of the Ministerial deputies, on the other hand, entails their dismissal for lack of zeal or ability.

It is easy to imagine the abuse, the violence, and the law-breaking which occur during the elections. The Liberal groups forming the Government had recourse to all these electoral malpractices. They could boast a very ugly renown won in previous experiences, for they not only made use of artifices which custom had to some extent consecrated in Bulgaria, but they went even further, employing gangs of armed ruffians to terrorize the peaceful population. These ruffians were mostly armed with heavy clubs or sopas, whence the nickname Sopadji bestowed on the Liberal groups. The Bulgarian comic papers always represented the leaders of the self-styled Liberal coteries carrying huge clubs, and it may be said that the sopas is the emblem of these parties. The methods adopted by these gangs were as follows: In districts where the Opposition was likely to succeed in electing the parliamentary candidate, a body of
Sopadjis was dispatched a few days before the election took place. By their threats and by their menacing attitude they so intimidated the population that on the election day only partisans of the Ministerial party ventured out of doors to vote. If their opponents dared to show themselves, they were sure to return home with broken heads or ribs. It may be asked what the policemen were doing? They were either lending a hand to the Sopadjis if the Opposition proved obstinate and were foolish enough to persist in getting their heads broken, or, if the preliminaries had been sufficiently impressive and the electors had taken their cue, were to be found in public-houses drinking to the health of the Minister of the Interior, who on such days could always handle the secret funds to the delight of his subordinates. At times, however, the population was so maddened by the exasperating behaviour of the Sopadjis that it got the upper hand and chastised these bullies as they deserved.

Although Radoslavov and his colleagues were considered past masters in the art of "making" elections in Bulgaria they failed to secure even a bare majority in the Chamber despite their craft and skill. This is all the more remarkable, for in Bulgaria a considerable number of constituencies invariably return Government nominees. Such constituencies are generally or
mainly composed of Moslem or Jewish electors, who are not interested in party strife, and whose principal aim is to secure the election of deputies belonging to the party in power, so that they may enjoy the Government's goodwill. For favouritism is so deep-seated in the State organism that an electoral district lacking a political intercessor receives no help from the State. This is a peculiar manifestation of Bulgarian parliamentarism, and the constituencies evincing it are collectively designated by an appropriate term, namely, "the Government's dowry."

The elections took place early in December 1913, and they resulted in a scathing condemnation of the Austrophil policy which was being ruthlessly pursued by Ferdinand. The Government obtained 95 seats in the Sobranje as against 109 seats secured by the Opposition.

The prospects were indeed dark for Ferdinand and his accomplices, who felt the ground giving way under their feet. Chance, however, favoured them once more.

The Socialists refused on principle to cooperate with the bourgeois parties of Gueshov, Malinov, or Danev, while the Agrarians stated that they would have to refer to a congress of their party before coming to a decision. Thus the new Chamber, unable either to pass a vote of confidence in the Cabinet or to appoint a new
one, was dissolved, and new elections were decided upon. A fresh election campaign was started, and all possible means were devised to shift the responsibility for the second Balkan War from the shoulders of the King and his councillors to those of Gueshov and Danev.

Tsar Ferdinand and his companions, however, had plainly seen that they could not possibly obtain the support of the country, even with all the means at their disposal. Some fresh means had to be devised if they were to face the risks of another election with better chances of success.

The artful mind of Ferdinand was not slow to evolve a new plan of campaign; it was decided to incorporate the territory awarded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Constantinople, and to carry on elections therein. A great part of the population was Turkish, and Tsar Ferdinand, by coqueting with Turkey, succeeded in placating his new subjects, who had just exchanged Turkish for Bulgarian rule. The Government also settled some 150,000 refugees in this district, and by granting them lands managed to influence their votes. Further, instead of allocating to the new province the same proportion of parliamentary representatives as to the rest of the country, a false census was used to create a disproportionate number of parliamentary seats.

Radoslavov and his colleagues spent several weeks touring the newly acquired province with
the object of "preparing" the elections in the "Liberal" fashion already described, while all members of the Opposition were excluded from this Government preserve, on the pretext that the Turkish population was still restless.

The incorporation of a new territory should be sanctioned by an extraordinary National Assembly; elections cannot take place in it until its incorporation has been voted; these are precepts of the Bulgarian Constitution. No account, however, was taken of these stipulations, nor of the vehement protests of the Opposition. Thus Tsar Ferdinand had his own way again, as was his wont, for he had long been accustomed to dispose of Bulgaria as if she were his private estate.

The result of the new elections, even with the stratagem of the incorporation of the new territory, were scarcely favourable to Tsar Ferdinand and his Cabinet. In the new Chamber they had a bare majority of ten (127 to 117) including the Turkish members elected from the new territory.

Most of these Turkish deputies had been and still were members of the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress, which held the reins of power at Constantinople. They received their instructions from the headquarters of the Committee, and found in Ferdinand and his Ministers the most obedient of servants, by whom their wishes were taken as orders. For what could
Radoslavov and his colleagues do? If they refused any of the demands of these Turkish deputies, the mere threat of going over to the Opposition sufficed to paralyse every effort of resistance. Can we therefore wonder at the rapprochement between Bulgaria and Turkey, and the subsequent conclusion of an alliance?

But the ascendancy of a foreign State in Bulgaria was not to be confined to Turkey. Owing to the parlous financial situation of the country the raising of a loan abroad had become urgent. France's, England's, and finally Russia's financial assistance was besought, but it was either refused or offered on conditions which were tantamount to complete renunciation of Bulgaria's national aspirations. No Bulgarian Government could possibly subscribe to such terms, and the Entente financiers by their uncompromising attitude inadvertently helped to tighten Germany's grip on Bulgaria. Baffled in its efforts to secure a loan in Entente countries, the Bulgarian Government turned to Austria and Germany. The financial position of the country was desperate, and the very existence of the Government had become dependent on the raising of a loan. It was then that an extraordinary activity manifested itself in the Bulgarian Court. Tsar Ferdinand (who had hitherto always left a free hand to his Ministers in the matter of State loans, conniving at the preliminary levying of a
certain amount of commission for their personal benefit, this being a ministerial prerogative hallowed by tradition in Bulgaria) now assumed a leading part in the negotiations. Being unable for obvious reasons to conduct personally the negotiations between the Austro-German financiers and the delegates of the Bulgarian Government, he enlisted the services of his brother, Prince Philip of Coburg, for the delicate task of intervention in this transaction. Prince Philip's rôle evidently consisted in smoothing over difficulties and removing the manifold obstacles in the way of an agreement. His goings and comings to and from Sofia, Berlin, and Vienna became so constant at the time that this Coburg Prince might have suddenly been called upon to act as a "King's Messenger" between these capitals. And there were ample reasons for these endless journeys. The Teuton financiers, having got an inkling of the dire straits of Tsar Ferdinand's Government, insisted on usurious returns for their money in the form of economic concessions which would have reduced Bulgaria to economic dependence on the Central Empires.

The German syndicate demanded the control and exploitation of all the coal mines in the possession of the State, from which practically the whole of the country's coal output was obtained, also the control of a railway to be made via Hascovo to Porto-Lagos, as well as that of the
harbour at Lagos. Further, a virtual monopoly of the export of tobacco was to be guaranteed to it. The aim of the German bankers was evidently to obtain the exploitation of Bulgaria’s newly acquired tobacco districts, with the object of discounting the growing preponderance of the American Tobacco Trust in Germany.

The revelation of these demands in the Sobranje led to unprecedented scenes of tumult. Vehement protests were made both within and without the House, and all those who dared to contemplate the imposition of such a yoke on Bulgaria were held up to public opprobrium. The Opposition deputies declared that “The scheme must be considered as dishonouring and disastrous for our country. . . . The signing of agreements of this kind by a Bulgarian Minister of State constitutes an outrage on the dignity and credit of Bulgaria.” And in truth, acceptance of even the first of these stipulations would have placed the entire economic life of Bulgaria at the mercy of the Teutons. It would have conferred on them the right to supply or withhold the coal necessary for the working of the State railways. Imagine all traffic completely suspended at a moment when the State might have found it necessary to decree a general mobilization! And yet, unthinkable as it appears, the Government finally managed to
carry this measure in spite of the determined resistance of the Opposition.

The demand for a monopoly in the export of tobacco, however, had finally to be withdrawn, for the Government found that this condition was combated not only by the Opposition but also by its Turkish supporters, chiefly deputies from the tobacco-growing districts of Xanthi and Gumurджина, to whose personal interests it was highly prejudicial. Finally the Germans condescended to withdraw this clause, and an agreement was reached with the Government, which managed to carry the measure through Parliament. The Germans, however, knowing the shifty customer they had to deal with in Ferdinand, did not advance the money in a lump sum, but insisted on paying it in small instalments every fortnight or month. The reason was obvious; they wanted to secure a pledge for the future docility of the Bulgarian Government, and in this they succeeded, for by merely threatening to suspend the advances they compelled Bulgaria to submit to their dictation. Radoslavov and his colleagues were in a most unenviable situation, depending for their maintenance in power on the Turkish deputies sitting in the Sobранje, and on the Germans for the pittance which was doled out to them every few weeks. They had no serious backing in the country, and naturally could not be expected to
defend themselves against the ever-increasing pressure brought to bear on them by Teuton diplomacy.

It must not be supposed that this financial measure was passed without evoking the most strenuous opposition throughout the country. Controversy on this financial Bill became so embittered, and party feeling ran so high, that even in Sofia scenes were witnessed which recalled the stormy days of the first years of Bulgaria's political life.

A meeting of protest, to which all prominent commercial men in Sofia were convened, took place at the "Battenberg," one of the largest restaurants of the Bulgarian capital. The proceedings, however, were cut short by the sudden irruption of a shaika or band of ruffians, some of them disguised in policemen's uniforms. They set upon the defenceless gathering, mercilessly beat all those on whom they could lay hands, completely wrecked the premises, and after putting to flight all those who had not been incapacitated in the contest, departed, manifesting their gratification at the accomplishment of their "highly patriotic" duties by loud hurrahs for Dedo (uncle) Radoslavov and his colleagues.

A few days later I happened to visit an eye-witness of the fray. He was an elderly and highly respectable man, and one whom I should have thought would have been spared any
indignity owing to his advanced age. To my surprise I found him with his head swathed in bandages, and his right arm in a sling. Bitter, indeed, were his comments on the incident and the pusillanimity displayed by the public. His concluding remarks were not devoid of truth: “We Bulgarians are not yet a nation, for we are still devoid of a national consciousness. We are merely striving to become a nation, and like a flock of sheep we are being led goodness knows whither.”

No one could expect the Bulgarians to have completely emancipated themselves in so short a period from the vices which five centuries of Turkish domination had inculcated. The notion that there is no remedy against Government abuse, and that it is a necessary evil, has unfortunately become so ingrained among the public that its yearning for an improvement in this direction does not go beyond a desire for a Government which would only abuse its authority discreetly. As a distinguished Bulgarian author wrote¹: “The Bulgarian’s sole preoccupation is how to earn his daily bread. To him everything else is God’s or the Government’s business. Drought, hail, inundation, health, suffering, famine, abundance—these are God’s affairs. War, peace, taxes, rights, injustice, punishment, all these are the Government’s business. To all

¹ Stoyan Mihailovski.
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these the Bulgarian is deaf and blind. 'Abstain from any participation in public affairs' seems to be his motto.'

It is true that there are several politicians who when in Opposition denounce the abuses committed by the governing party, but they have signally failed to create a popular movement capable of bridling the predatory instincts of those in power. They have failed, either because their past does not inspire confidence or because they are too weak and disunited to enter into a serious conflict with the Government, which derives its strength from and relies on all the organized forces in the country: the army, the police, and the bureaucracy. Unfortunately there is no other power capable of opposing or checking the systematic misrule which has taken root, and the people seem to realize their helplessness, for it has even found expression in the saying, "One cannot oppose authority" (protiv Tsarstinata ne se otiva).

It is to this conviction that we must attribute the indifference of the Bulgarian public to national welfare, which has made them the unhappy victims of their politicians. The latter in their turn, demoralized by that atmosphere of corruption and intrigue so characteristic of Turkish rule, continued to crouch before their late ruler, as they did of yore before their Turkish overlords, and sacrificed the welfare of
their nation for the satisfaction of their petty personal ambitions. Undoubtedly parliamentarism would have developed and prospered at the same rate as other institutions if it had been properly fostered, but in Tsar Ferdinand constitutional government found its most implacable enemy. His ideal of kingship being power without responsibility, he never ceased to employ the most cunning and artful devices to undermine constitutionalism and thwart the efforts of those who desired to disseminate democratic principles throughout the country. It may sound strange, but next to nothing had been done in the way of inducing the people to take a fair share in the government. Until quite recently the bulk of the population systematically abstained from voting owing to the intimidation to which they were subjected during the elections.

The Constitution had conferred on the Bulgarian ruler practically unlimited power. He was free to choose his Ministers, and he was the ultimate arbiter in all civil and military appointments. Functionaries were obliged to carry out the most illegal orders for fear of losing their situations, politicians had to secure Ferdinand's favour by the most abject servility if they aspired to acquire or retain power, while in the army promotion depended, not on merit, but on the devotion officers manifested for their King and his personal policy.
In such an atmosphere character deteriorates, men are debased, and all sentiments of right and honour tend to disappear. Politicians, in order to win their master’s goodwill, would blindly further his most criminal designs, and naturally sought solace for their moral degradation in peculation and illegal gains. The absolute control which Ferdinand wielded over the army was the main source of his strength. He was the Commander-in-chief of the Bulgarian forces, and the Minister of War was merely a sort of head clerk, who was responsible, not to the Sobranje, but to the King. As the King was responsible to no one for his acts, it is easy to understand how he was able to issue the order for attacking Bulgaria’s allies on June 29, 1915, and subsequently to evade all responsibility.

Stambulov was the only statesman who perceived how seriously the army organization menaced Bulgarian liberties. He drew up a scheme for the reorganization of the army on a constitutional basis, and managed to get it voted by the Sobranje in 1893. But Tsar Ferdinand, by his habitual underhand methods, foiled Stambulov’s patriotic purpose, first by depriving the Premier of the services of his able Minister of War, General (then Major), Savov, and shortly afterwards by causing Stambulov’s fall and assassination.

Although a constitutional monarchy, it may be
said that Bulgaria has seldom been ruled by constitutional means. Tsar Ferdinand was not a person to let slip the reins of power which he grasped at the assassination of Stambulov. Crafty and astute, he never appeared to be encroaching on the constitutional liberties of his people. Although the Constitution was continually violated, he took good care that the breaches were committed by his Ministers. It was in the choice of these persons that Ferdinand showed remarkable cunning, for he usually recruited them among men who were not only lacking in character and prestige but whose previous record unfitted them for any high position. Among them were persons convicted of smuggling, fraudulent bankruptcy, and various other crimes. The deeper their moral turpitude, the safer and the more valuable they seemed to their royal master, as he could be quite sure that all his behests would be obeyed implicitly by them.

Men of character who were likely to prove independent were not welcome at Ferdinand’s Court. They were only appealed to in moments of great difficulty, or at times when their support was indispensable for the execution of his designs.

The pseudo-constitutional régime established by Tsar Ferdinand in Bulgaria was more detrimental to the country than the most absolute autocracy, for every member of the governing
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coterie which shared for a brief period the prerogative of power with him, acted as an irresponsible autocrat. During the brief space of time any political faction was permitted to remain in power, its chief aim was to plunder, in order not only to satisfy the greed of its partisans but also to create some reserves on which to draw during the lean Opposition years that inevitably followed. They thus exhausted the State’s resources, foisted on the State contradictory and often prejudicial programmes of policy, as has been the case in practically every branch of the administration, rendered the development of industry insecure, weakened the forces of production, demoralized the working classes, and created a legion of hungry office-seekers ready to offer their support to any politician who would hold out to them a promise of a State or municipal office.

And yet in spite of this blight on Bulgarian political life, thanks to the unceasing toil and industry of the peasant, Bulgaria had attained a foremost place among the Balkan States. We may imagine, therefore, what would have been the progress achieved had not the nation’s energy been squandered and its activities thwarted by the malevolent influence of Tsar Ferdinand, that evil genius of Bulgaria.
CHAPTER IV

THE UNEDIFYING STORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The dilatory fashion in which negotiations between the Entente and Bulgaria were conducted is certainly not a subject to which Allied diplomacy would refer with pride were it ever called upon to vindicate its activities. After failing to obtain Greece's support for the Dardanelles Expedition, the Entente decided to sound Bulgaria, and in March 1915 certain verbal proposals were made to the Sofia Cabinet through Sir Arthur Paget. To these the Bulgarian Government replied by a request for an elucidation of the Entente terms. No answer was vouchsafed for a long time, however, and the one which was finally given plainly intimated unwillingness to continue the pourparlers. We need not go far to seek an explanation for this attitude. Entente diplomacy was placing great hopes on the impending Italian intervention and on the success of the Dardanelles campaign. Under these circumstances it felt in a position to dispense with the help of the Balkan States, and accordingly treated them with scant courtesy. The prospect
of acting without the co-operation of these greedy, clamorous, intemperate, would-be customers must certainly have proved alluring to many politicians. That such views were prevalent may be inferred from the off-hand way in which even Serbia's ethnic rights were treated. There is good reason to assume that the Russian Government, which sought to keep Serbia under its influence, and therefore aimed at maintaining her preponderately Orthodox, did not view the Jugo-Slav movement very favourably, and consequently supported Slav interests in a half-hearted manner in the negotiations between the then Triple Entente and Italy. The Tsardom, in fact, does not seem to have desired to see Serbia enriched by more than Bosnia, Herzegovina, and a part of Dalmatia, so that the onus for the apparent disregard of the principle of nationality evinced in the Convention of London of April 26, 1915, may, with some justification, be laid on Russia. As a consequence of this cavalier treatment of our Balkan Ally, sympathy with Serbia grew stronger among the other members of the Entente, and the view gained ground that her claims had been unduly neglected, and that it would be incompatible with the dignity of the Allies to insist on her making further concessions. Unfortunately this attitude proved disastrous both to Serbia's cause and to that of her well-wishers. It may be compared to the case of a
patient who has developed gangrene in a finger. A timely amputation would save the hand, but if the doctor is persuaded to postpone the necessary operation, it will be found that not only the finger, but the hand, wrist, and even the whole limb may finally have to be sacrificed if the life of the patient is to be saved.

So it has been in the case of Serbia. Had Bulgaria been granted even a part of her moderate demands at the time of Italy’s intervention and before the Russian disasters in Galicia and Poland, her intervention on the side of the Allies would have become an accomplished fact. No Bulgarian Government could have withstood the outburst of popular feeling in favour of the Entente which a spontaneous offer of Macedonia would have provoked in Bulgaria at that propitious moment.

If Serbia is to blame for her uncompromising attitude on the Macedonian question, it must be admitted that Entente diplomacy also bears a share of the responsibility, for it was the inconsiderate fashion in which Serbian interests in the Adriatic were treated that rendered the Serbians so reluctant to renounce their territorial possessions in Macedonia. The Entente, before subscribing to all the Italian demands, might have considered that there were other potential allies whose support might have been acquired without prejudice to the principles embodied in the
Allied programme. In fact, had the Allied diplomats early in the spring of 1915 displayed as much generosity in Sofia as in Rome, they would undoubtedly have succeeded in winning Bulgaria’s military support, which would have involved that of Greece.  

Serbia might have been allowed temporarily to occupy Northern Albania as compensation for the immediate cession of Macedonia to Bulgaria, and it is hardly credible that she would have demurred, in view of the immense advantage to be derived from Bulgaria’s co-operation both by Serbia and the Entente. Bulgaria’s intervention, which would have been immediately followed by that of Greece, would have realized better results than Italy’s, for one such result would have been Turkey’s definite overthrow.

It is a fact that Radoslavov expressly assured some prominent Macedonian leaders in the spring

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1 The intervention of either Bulgaria or Greece at the time would have inevitably involved that of the other State. Any intelligent person who happened to be in Sofia early in 1915, when the Entente was negotiating with Greece for her participation in the Dardanelles expedition, could testify that the Bulgarian Government was ready to mobilize the army and march against Turkey as soon as Greece’s adherence to the Entente had been announced, so as to secure a right to a share in the spoils. Not even Tsar Ferdinand thought it opportune at that time to evince his pro-Austrian leanings, so sure did he feel of the success of the proposed enterprise against the Dardanelles by combined Entente and Greek troops. The agreement between Ferdinand and Germany was apparently entered into subsequently, during July 1915.
of 1915 of his readiness to co-operate with the Entente as soon as the latter would guarantee the eventual cession of Macedonia to Bulgaria through an occupation by British and French troops. Such a proposition was even made to Russia by one of the prominent members of the Macedonian community in Sofia, the late Dr. Vladov, with the authorization of the Bulgarian Government, but unfortunately no satisfactory answer was returned.

The apparent neglect with which the Entente treated Bulgaria during the fateful months following Italy's intervention could not but increase the disillusionment of our supporters in Bulgaria. For those who have not come into personal touch with Bulgarians it is impossible to form a just idea of the disappointment caused by such a crying injustice as the retention of Macedonia by Serbia. What the partition of Poland and the forcible annexation of Alsace-Lorraine are respectively to the Poles and to the French, the dismemberment of Macedonia was to the Bulgars. It was an open sore in the national life, it embittered public feeling against the Entente nations, who although proclaiming themselves the champions of right, yet neglected to redress what, in the eyes of the Bulgarians, was the supreme wrong. The chagrin of the Russo-philis at Russia's abandoning the traditional policy consecrated at San Stefano was intense,
France was regarded with some resentment owing to M. Delcassé’s having suggested a partition of Bulgaria in 1913, and all regretted, as Ghenadiev’s organ, the *Volya*, said, “that Britain did not play the leading part in the negotiations between the Entente and Bulgaria, for Serbia’s resistance would have been overcome and an agreement easily reached.”

Indeed, the Allied decision to allow Russia to play the leading part in all Balkan negotiations could not but have the most baleful consequences for the Allied cause, owing to the suspicion with which Russian policy was regarded by all the Balkan States with the exception of Serbia. The mortifications suffered by the Entente Powers in the Near East may be ascribed solely to this initial mistake. At any rate Radoslavov’s words: “Had not England yoked herself to the same chariot as Russia, it would have been extremely difficult for Bulgaria to refuse her active support to the British world policy,” ¹ may be taken as genuinely expressive of the distrust with which the Tsardom was viewed not only by those at the head of affairs in Bulgaria but also by many other prominent Balkan politicians and intellectuals.

Further proposals were submitted to the Bulgarian Government at the end of May 1915, when Bulgaria was asked to place the whole of

¹ *Illustrierte Zeitung*, No. 122,
her military forces at the disposal of the Allies and to declare war against Turkey. In exchange she was promised the uncontested zone in Macedonia, Thrace as far as the line Enos-Midia, and the restitution of that part of the Dobrudja which had been annexed by Rumania in 1913.

The Bulgarian Government replied within a fortnight; the point on which it insisted most strongly was the question of guarantees for the carrying out of these offers.

The reluctance of the Entente to force Serbia to relinquish Macedonia exasperated Bulgarian public opinion, and led it to lose hope of ever obtaining satisfaction from the Entente. The attitude of the Serbian Press at the time was sufficiently provocative to have deterred the most optimistic politicians in their endeavour to reconstitute the Balkan League. The misfortune of Serbia lay in the fact that her Government was dominated by the military. M. Passitch was unable to make concessions distasteful to this party, and could only yield to force. A cursory glance at the Serbian Press of the period would have convinced any unbiased person that Serbia was not in a mood to make the necessary concessions to Bulgaria voluntarily, and that drastic action ought to be taken. The following comment in the Radnitske Novine, a Serbian Socialist paper, the only one which seems to have been capable of cool judgment, indicates the chauvinist
rage which blinded the Serbians to the disasters threatening their unfortunate country:

If we were to judge from what is written in the Mali Journal [another Serbian daily] and its contemporaries, we should infer that Serbia is not at war with Austria, but with Bulgaria. While in Bulgaria several influential papers write sympathetically about Serbia, and express a desire for an understanding with us [Serbians], no one among us has shown any sympathy for the kindred Bulgarian people, although it was they who lost in the war against us. In spite of the fact that the Bulgarians are in a much better situation than ourselves, and can dominate us, it is we who stir up strife, it is we who rattle our swords. Does not the policy pursued by Serbia to-day deserve the appellation "madness"?

Some extracts from the Serbian Press of that period will prove that there was no exaggeration in thus stigmatizing the divagations of Serbian journalists.

The Mali Journal, May 20, 1915, wrote:

What was incontestably Bulgarian is now incontestably Serbian.

The semi-official Pravda of May 28, 1915, wrote:

No Serbian Government will be found to agree to the giving away of Serbian territories.

And in its subsequent issue added:

What has been acquired by blood will only be yielded by blood.

The Tribuna, May 23, 1915, said:

If it should happen that the smallest part be taken from the lands which Serbia acquired by blood, we shall know how to repay this injustice, and in order to guarantee ourselves once for all against Bulgaria, we shall do what we
ought to do in Albania—namely, occupy all the Serbian districts as far as the Yantra and the Maritsa, and incorporate them in a great Serbia, a united Jugo-Slavia.

The *Samoyprava*, June 3, 1915, exclaimed:

To yield to Bulgaria! ... how monstrous, how unnatural! It is a bloody blow to the feelings of our people. Serbia will never yield.

While the *Bitolski Novine* of the same date stated:

Two and a half years ago we won Macedonia by the sword, and only by the sword can we be forced to yield it.

Even the Rumanians were surprised at this frenzied chauvinism of the Serbian Press, and suggested that a more moderate attitude was indispensable. The Bucarest *Universul*, June 4, 1915, frankly admonished the Serbians in the following terms:

Concession at the right time of what is necessary, is more heroic and more beneficial than stubborn refusal.

How inordinate the Serbian claims appeared even to the few people in Serbia who had not been contaminated by the prevailing chauvinism may be gathered from another article in the *Radnisske Novini*, in its issue of June 3, 1915. Under the heading “Our Claims,” it ironically remarked:

At this time when a great Serbia is being created, no territory in which we may have historic or ethnic rights should be left out of account.

In regard to Macedonia, Albania, and three-fourths of Bulgaria our rights have been proved. Everything in these countries is Serbian, and only Balkan absent-mindedness
is responsible for certain foreign appellations encountered in those lands. But we do not consider that we should stop at this. There is a great deal more we should ask. For instance, why should not Salonica be ours? Our Doitchin resided there for a long time. Why should not Seres be ours, when it is known for a fact that under its walls Dushan was taken with an attack of diarrhœa? We may also ask for a part of Asia Minor. Did not Serbians shed their blood there while supporting Bayazid in his struggle against Tamerlane? And what, pray, can be said about California? Are there not several Serbian towns there also?

If there were Serbians sensible enough to deride in such a scathing manner the inordinate jingoism of their rulers, surely this fact ought to have been sufficient to lead Entente diplomats to the only logical conclusion—namely, that a policy of voluntary compromise was impossible, and that a settlement would have to be imposed from above.

If the execution of such a scheme was impracticable in 1913 owing to the rivalry between the European Powers, its realization early in 1915 ought not to have presented insuperable difficulties, for it is hardly likely that any Balkan State would have then willingly incurred the risk of a rupture with the Entente by refusing to submit to an equitable verdict.

Nevertheless, the Entente lost valuable time in vain efforts to wring concessions from the Balkan States on behalf of Bulgaria. Even as late as the beginning of August 1915, when fresh propositions were made to Bulgaria, no adequate
guarantees could be given as to their realization, for Bulgaria’s neighbours continued to resist stubbornly the Entente’s counsels of moderation. To the territorial concessions previously made to Bulgaria the Entente added Seres, Drama, and Cavalla. The occupation of Macedonia by Bulgaria, however, was to be deferred until after the war. But Serbia maintained a sullen silence and refused to signify her acceptance of the propositions, thereby strengthening the natural suspicion felt by the Bulgarians towards their neighbours. The uncompromising attitude of the Serbian Government may be gauged by the fact that M. Passitch intimated his Government’s consent to these concessions only on September 1, and made certain reservations about Prilep, Ochrida, and a common frontier with Greece which robbed the offer of most of its value. The Entente Powers took note of the Serbian reply, and made a final offer to Bulgaria on September 14. It came,

1 It was certainly not M. Passitch who was to blame for this lack of political insight, but rather certain extreme jingoism among the Serbians who were wont to shout at the time: “Better the Austrians in Belgrade than the Bulgars in Monastir.” These gentry were incapable of gauging the magnitude of the interests at stake, and of taking into account the sacrifices on the part of their Allies which their stubbornness entailed, believing as they did that the final victory of the Entente would spare them the necessity of making concessions which seemed too humiliating to their ultra-Chauvinism.
however, too late to influence the Bulgarian Government, which had already bound itself to Germany.

But it must in justice be admitted that the Bulgarians, who only two years previously had learnt to their cost the inanity of treaties,¹ were perfectly justified in fighting shy of the promises held out to them by the Entente, especially when Serbia, the party chiefly concerned, signified her assent in such a half-hearted manner. It is obvious that their faith in Serbia’s promises, to be redeemed after the war and when Serbia would be strong enough to repudiate them, could only be very limited. And there was some good ground for this distrust, for at the time the Serbian Prince Regent thought it expedient to issue a proclamation to the Macedonians, promising them constitutional rights; in this he alluded to them as sons of Dushan, thereby indicating his resolve to retain them under Serbian rule. Unbiased persons cannot but agree that there is some truth in the assertion made by the Prepozets, in August 1918, that “Bulgaria is where she is, because her Balkan enemies did everything possible to prevent her being where they are.”

Nevertheless, in spite of the unfavourable out-

¹ The Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, the Petrograd Protocol of 1913, and the Treaty of London (May 1913) were torn up, to the great disadvantage of Bulgaria, a few months after their conclusion.
look the Bulgarian Parliamentary Opposition gladly seized upon the offered opportunity, and a satisfactory solution would have been easily reached if the Bulgarians had been allowed to decide for themselves. In fact the Opposition leaders were exceedingly anxious to reach an agreement with the Entente, for they were afraid that Tsar Ferdinand would plunge their country into a fresh adventure. The pro-German proclivities of the Cabinet were daily becoming more manifest, and the series of defeats Russia had sustained rendered the Bulgarian Government less amenable to Entente influence. German influence was now in the ascendant, for while the Entente statesmen had been wasting their time in the hopeless endeavour to reconstitute the Balkan League, their enemies had been methodically at work extending their power in Bulgaria. Newspapers had been bought or subsidized, new ones had been created, and all these employed their power to spread suspicion of the Entente. The basest calumnies were launched against the Allies, and reports were concocted to impress the public with the Entente’s lack of unity. The Russian defeats in Poland were ascribed to British and French selfishness, and the venal Press warned the Bulgars against allying themselves with nations which could not be relied on, and left their allies in the lurch. The following quotation from the Nov-Vek, the organ of the
late Minister, Dobri Petkov, July 30, 1915, is characteristic of the line of action adopted by the Germanophil Press:

If the British and French were sincere Allies they would not persist in their present criminal inactivity. On the contrary, at the time of the Galician battles, and specially now when the Russian army is being stifled under German pressure, it is the duty of the British and of the French as loyal Allies to assist the Russians, even at the cost of the greatest sacrifice. Evidently one must conclude that either the Allies of Russia are unable to undertake an offensive against the Central Powers, or are deficient in loyalty towards their Ally. The first supposition would prove that we were right in objecting to take sides against the Central Powers, the second hypothesis would demonstrate that Bulgaria must not link her fate with such Allies.

The comings and goings of German high personalities such as Prince Hohenlohe, the Duke of Mecklenburg, etc., furnished the pro-German newspapers with splendid opportunities for interviewing these personages, and exploiting public credulity with all sorts of tales about German invincibility.

The Bulgarian Press had so magnified German successes and the new German military inventions that the Bulgarians began to feel rather nervous at the impending attack upon Serbia which was being announced as imminent. For after the crushing defeats Russia had sustained it was commonly expected that the Austro-Germans would shortly turn their attention again to Serbia. The public was anxiously demanding
what should be done in such an eventuality. The overthrow of Serbia was looked upon as certain, and the prospect of a German demand for a free passage through Bulgaria was not to be dismissed too lightly. How this matter was engrossing public opinion about the end of August 1915 may be seen from an article which appeared in the *Mir*:

When we see the Germans resolved to reach our frontiers we should ask the Entente whether they are prepared to furnish us with the necessary means for stopping them. We should not care to have to wait for the final victory of the Allies in order to be freed, as is the case with the Belgians. Our Government should settle this question with our neighbours, and take the necessary measures. It is possible that the Balkan theatre of war may be of second-rate importance to the Entente, but it is the decisive one for us small nations, and we would wish to take measures in advance for ensuring our safety.

The Entente’s indecision, their delay in settling the Balkan question, the divided counsels which seemed to prevail among their leaders, all tended to weaken our prestige and undermine the confidence which our friends reposed in us, whereas the activity which the Germans displayed in all their undertakings could not fail to win the admiration of all impartial observers. As a Bulgarian politician put it, Germany was succeeding because, after meditating for fifty years, she was acting, while the Entente, in spite of its favourable situation, instead of acting was meditating.
Sofia had been flooded with a number of doubtful characters, who turned the most popular cafés of the town into their headquarters. They spread the vilest insinuations against the Entente Powers, and held these nations up to execration, depicting them as Bulgaria’s executioners in 1913. The old bugbear of the Russian menace was once more conjured up, and the public was warned to beware of Russia, the suppressor of nationalism. This propaganda was further fostered by the large number of newspapers which were subsidized or started by the Germans. The Utro and Dnevnik were readily placed by their mercenary owners at the disposal of the Teutons. The Kambana’s services were secured by a very liberal sum which enabled its impecunious proprietor to acquire a building worth some 100,000 fr. in the Plostad Slaveykov in Sofia. This paper was financed so liberally by its German patrons that it started a morning edition in the summer of 1915, entitled the Balkanska Poshta. It has rendered invaluable assistance to the German cause, and the Kaiser has awarded the order of the Prussian Crown to the owner in recognition of his devotion to Germany.

The Austro-Hungarian Legation, too, started the daily Zavet, which was for some time thrust gratuitously on the public, and supplied the Bulgarski Tergovski Vestnik with abundant funds,
enabling it to increase its publication from three to six times a week.

The only independent non-party paper which continued to expose the falsehoods circulated against the Entente, and was indefatigable in pointing out what a snare Austro-German friendship had proved to Bulgaria in the past, was the *Balkanska Tribuna*. Its proprietor, Ikonomov, had been previously imprisoned when the Stambulovists were in power, on the pretext that he was morally implicated in the murder of the late Minister Dimitre Petkov, but really on account of his unsparing criticism of the reactionary tendencies of Bulgaria's ruler. Every obstacle was placed in the way of the publication of this paper. Consignments of its printing paper were delayed at the Customs, attempts were made to break up its printing-press, and finally the Government began suspending it at brief intervals. The proprietor then hit on the ingenious idea of publishing another paper, the *Zaria*, simultaneously, so that the publication of at least one of these pro-Entente newspapers was secured. It is gratifying to note that the zeal and devotion of this publicist were at last recognized by the Russian Government, and that some compensation was awarded to him for the heavy losses he incurred through the periodical suspension of his papers.

By August it had become apparent that Tsar
Ferdinand was hand in glove with the Germans. The first intimation of Ferdinand’s secret intentions was conveyed by the forced resignation of General Fitchev, the Minister of War, on August 19, 1915. The patriotism and independent character of the General made his retention of such an important position impossible when the subordination of the Bulgarian army to the German command had been decided upon. General Fitchev would not only have refused to acquiesce in such a plan, but would probably have opposed it. Another indication of Tsar Ferdinand’s plans was furnished by the Bulgaro-Turkish negotiations for the cession of Turkish territory to Bulgaria. And yet a further proof that the Germans considered Bulgaria’s adhesion to their cause as certain was the fact that German agents were acquiring the entire supply of wool in the country, as well as large quantities of produce, and were warehousing them at the Danubian ports, or stipulating for their delivery there by October 1915. As long as Serbia commanded the Iron Gates the Danube waterway was effectually barred, and the Germans could not dream of exporting these goods by the river. If, therefore, they were making all these preparations which indicated an assurance on their part of being able to utilize the Danube, it was to be inferred that they were resolved to crush Serbia. It is surprising, but nevertheless true, that at
this critical moment Serbian Government circles did not display the slightest alarm at the Austro-German menace. They considered the ominous mustering of Austrian and German troops in Hungary as destined to overawe Rumania, and were confidently counting on Greek and Rumanian assistance, should Bulgaria decide to throw in her lot with the Central Powers.

The vacillating attitude of the Bulgarian Government during the late summer of 1915 should not be attributed to hesitation on its part as to its future policy. Its alliance with the Central Powers was not due to any fortuitous circumstance, such as the Russian ultimatum of October 3, 1915. Though Bulgarian Government circles would like us to believe this, it is, indeed, too great a strain on our credulity, for there is abundant evidence of their having previously planned and prepared their co-operation with the Central Powers. It is now an established fact that in July 1915, Colonel Gantchev was secretly dispatched to German Headquarters to arrange for the future campaign against Serbia, and it is probable that General Fitchev’s dismissal was mainly due to this event, as the negotiations had to be concealed from him.

The following personal experience of the writer throws some light on the underhand attitude of the Bulgarian Government and on the duplicity of its dealings with the Entente Powers, which
up to the last moment it was endeavouring to hoodwink by assurances of loyalty. In August 1915, I became acquainted with two gentlemen, P—— and M——, who were acting as agents for some American army equipment factories, and were negotiating with the Bulgarian Government for the supply of 60,000,000 fr. worth of military stores. The negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily, and General Fitchev had made arrangements for a delivery of these goods at Dedeagatch. Soon after General Fitchev's enforced resignation, the War Ministry asked that delivery should be effected in Salonica, and through the medium of a Greek bank. We may infer from the countermanding of the instructions that General Fitchev was ignorant of the secret schemes of his Government, and that the latter had not only resolved to fight against us, but was confidently relying on the benevolent neutrality of Greece, and perhaps on her eventual assistance. The hesitation shown by the Radoslavov Cabinet is to be explained by its not possessing the confidence of the country or even of the parties constituting it. Tontchev and his group were out and out pro-German, Radoslavov was hesitating, and, like a dutiful servant, awaited his royal master's commands. Ghenadiev, on the other hand,

1 Should these lines come to the notice of these gentlemen, I should feel greatly obliged if they would refund me the 1000 fr. I lent them to facilitate their hurried departure from Sofia.
although he had come into power pledged to conduct an Austrophil policy from the early summer of 1915, manifested strong pro-Entente sentiments, and openly declared that Bulgaria should not allow herself to be dragged into a war against Russia. This pronouncement caused a tremendous sensation. It was indeed a momentous decision for the leader of the Stambulovist party, whose fundamental principles were suspicion and hatred of Russia. It was nothing short of a complete renunciation of the political programme of the party and, as was to be expected, caused its disruption. Minister Dobri Petkov, the Vice-President of the Sobranje, the ultra-Germanophil Dr. Momtchilov, and some ten other Stambulovists severed all connexion with Ghenadiev, formed a new political group, and started as their organ the Nov-Vek.

Both this newly created party and the adherents of Radoslavov and Tontchev were furious at Ghenadiev’s apostacy, but the latter found no difficulty in justifying himself by invoking patriotic reasons, and by affirming that he prized Bulgaria’s interests more than either Austria’s or Russia’s.

Ghenadiev’s defection placed the Radoslavov Government in a very serious predicament, for it lost it the slight majority it possessed in the Chamber. Radoslavov could ill afford to dispense with Ghenadiev’s support, and he avoided
a rupture by formally promising Ghenadiev to maintain neutrality. In order to counterbalance this threatened defection of Ghenadiev, Radoslavov was secretly planning the substitution of the Agrarians for the Stambulovists in his Cabinet, and was trying to win the support of the former by the most alluring promises.

The closing of the Dardanelles and the mining of the Danube by the Serbians had practically stopped the export of Bulgarian produce. The consequent loss was severely felt by the rural population, who were the producers, and Radoslavov took advantage of the dissatisfaction among the Agrarians to win their consent for an attack on Serbia, which, he argued, would remove one of the obstacles to export trade, and would permit Bulgaria to dispose of her grain to the Central Powers at very remunerative prices. But the Agrarians refused to swallow the bait, and divulged Radoslavov's proposals to the whole of the Opposition, whereupon all the Opposition leaders presented a request to the Prime Minister emphasizing the necessity of summoning the Chamber without further delay, in order to deliberate on the policy Bulgaria ought to adopt. Radoslavov, however, knowing that the majority of the Chamber would be opposed to him, strenuously resisted this demand.

On August 26 the united Opposition, with the exception of the Doctrinaire Socialists, addressed
the following appeal to the Bulgarian people as a protest against the Government's attitude:

Owing to the grave events with which we are confronted, the parliamentary groups of the Democrat, Agrarian, National, Progressist, Radical, and Social Democrat parties, after consultation on the situation of the country and the relations of the Government with the belligerents, have unanimously recognized the need for the Government to maintain constant touch with the nation's representatives, and examine in advance with them the attitude which Bulgaria should adopt regarding the war.

It was for this purpose that the Opposition parties urged the immediate convocation of the Chamber to an extraordinary session.

This request of the Opposition has been met with a categorical refusal on the part of the Prime Minister, who has even hinted that in the event of a disagreement arising between the Chamber and the Government the former might be dissolved, thus permitting the continuation of the present foreign policy. This policy, which aims at destroying and not at creating, at dividing rather than at bringing together, is the policy of a Government twice defeated at the elections, which public opinion considers nefarious, a Government that cannot even rely on the actual majority in the Chamber. A policy contrary to the interests of the State, imposed by force and in opposition to the sentiments and will of the people, may lead to disaster.

Believing that the Government does not wish to come to an understanding with the people in the person of its legal representatives, and fearing that we may be confronted with a new adventure, we protest against this action of the Government, and we hope that the nation will support our protest by an energetic intervention in favour of an immediate convocation of the Chamber to an extraordinary session.

The abstention of the Doctrinaire Socialists from this joint protest against the reactionary tendencies of the Cabinet was due to their
fanatical attachment to Socialist tenets, which rendered them blind to realities. They were so violently opposed to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia that they almost lent their support to the Germanophil Cabinet.

The excitement caused by the publication of this manifesto quickly subsided, for the Government hastened to issue a denial of the imputations made against it, and reaffirmed its determination to maintain neutrality, at the same time accusing the Opposition of scheming to plunge the country into war on the side of the Entente.

The visit to Sofia early in September of the Duke of Mecklenburg, accompanied by the director of the Oriental section of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and their repeated interviews with Tsar Ferdinand left no room for doubt as to the real intentions of the Bulgarian ruler and the imminence of the danger. The Opposition prepared a fresh manifesto to the Bulgarian nation, to which the signatures of the élite of the intelligentsia were appended. The manifesto, unfortunately, was seized by the police before issue, and its signatories either arrested or prosecuted. The Preporets, which reproduced it, was also seized, but not before several copies had been circulated. This manifesto, which was signed by several professors, generals, colonels, ex-ministers, and
literary men, among whom figured the national poet, Ivan Vazov, although it failed to obtain the wide publicity it was intended to have, nevertheless deserves to be quoted, as it plainly discloses the sentiments animating the real leaders of the Bulgarian nation at that time:

TO THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE

Citizens,—A terrible danger is threatening Bulgaria. She is being drawn into the camp of her hereditary enemies, contrary to her interests, her traditions, and her duty. Let us grasp the meaning of this menace and let us be filled with a sense of our duty towards our motherland.

All of us, professors, writers, merchants, agriculturists, workmen, citizens without distinction of party, inhabitants of towns or villages, let us forget party differences and let us unite to save Bulgaria. Is it not clear to all, especially after the signature of the agreement with Turkey, that the present Government has definitely taken sides with the Central Powers, and that it waits for a favourable moment to plunge the country into a war in the interest and at the will of Germany? That the Government is gagging the Press, forbids public meetings, does not convoke the Chamber, encourages and protects the venal Press, in order to stifle the sentiments of the nation and involve its sons in a terrible war which will ruin Bulgaria's last hopes and lead her to disaster?

Let us rise as one man and let us not allow this act of madness to be carried out. Let us give our support to the Democratic, Agrarian, National, Progressist, Radical, and Socialist parties which have given us an example of unanimity by their appeal of August 26.

Let all citizens adopt the watchword of the Opposition parties. Enough of discord and indifference! Let us all fulfil our patriotic duty courageously. The destiny of our country depends to-day on our unity. It depends solely on us to direct Bulgaria's foreign policy in a spirit consistent with the will and traditions of the Bulgarian people, and not in contradiction to the sacred heritage of our history and our forefathers.
Let us not permit a return to June 29 [1913, the date of the attack against Serbia and Greece]. Let us not permit Bulgaria to be involved in a fresh and more terrible disaster!

Let us resist the will of isolated personalities [Tsar Ferdinand], irresponsible and foreign to Bulgarian interests and sentiments. Let all Bulgarians throughout the country demand the convocation of the Chamber, so that the voice of the nation may be heard.

Citizens, success and victory depend on solidarity and union.

Bulgaria is on the brink of a precipice. Let us awake to unite and save her! The sacred memory of the generations which created our beautiful country, the blood of the heroes who glorified her at Lule-Burgas and Adrianople, call us forth to perform our duty with self-sacrifice at this most critical hour of Bulgarian history.

It is certainly most regrettable that the Entente Powers did not avail themselves of the prevailing pro-Entente sympathies in Bulgaria to thwart the secret plans of Tsar Ferdinand. This would have involved the infringement of Bulgarian sovereignty. But would it not have been justifiable to neutralize the unconstitutional and underhand dealings of an autocrat even by high-handed measures, especially when such momentous interests were at stake?

No one acquainted with the situation in Bulgaria at that time can believe that a proclamation by the Entente Powers, and by Russia in particular, calling upon the Bulgarian people to rise and help their liberators, and promising them the realization of the Treaty of San Stefano, would have left the country
indifferent. The mere presence of a few Russian warships off Varna and Burgas, and the landing of a few Russian troops would have set the country ablaze with enthusiasm, and nothing would have deterred the Bulgarians from throwing themselves in the fray on our side. The offers to serve in the Russian army, the monetary contributions to the Russian Red Cross, the public prayers for the success of the Russian arms, the numberless messages and resolutions of sympathy that ceaselessly poured in at the Russian Legation in Sofia from all over the country revealed unmistakably the strong pro-Russian feeling of the masses.

I vividly recollect the visit one September morning of an old client and his son from the small Balkan town of Troyan. After the usual cigarette and cup of Turkish coffee, and the interchange of the customary courtesies, perceiving the uneasiness of my elder interlocutor, I proceeded to question him as to what had brought him so suddenly to the capital, since he professed to be unwilling to transact business. He then confided to me that a German aeroplane had landed a few days previously in their locality. The local authorities proceeded to arrest the two German aviators, but the latter protested, and loudly affirmed that Bulgaria had concluded an alliance with Germany, that very shortly they
would be fighting shoulder to shoulder, and that therefore they ought as allies to be allowed to proceed on their voyage. The authorities eventually wired to Sofia, and the airmen, instead of being interned, were set free. The statements of the Germans, and the subsequent attitude of the Bulgarian authorities towards them, had aroused the suspicions of my old client, and he had decided to come to Sofia and seek an explanation from the leader of his party. The possibility of Bulgaria's taking up arms against Russia appeared to him so monstrous that, forgetting himself, he turned to his son and muttered: "If you youngsters dare lift your hands against those who liberated us, we, your elders, who are conscious of the blessings conferred on us by Russia, will shoot you like curs."

So deep was the conviction that Bulgarians would refuse to fight against Russia that the public disbelieved the warnings of the Opposition, and derided the idea that the Government could contemplate an alliance with the Central Empires against Bulgaria's liberators. Had the Ministers of the Entente Powers departed from the reticence which international conventions imposed on them, and brought the secret plottings of Tsar Ferdinand to the knowledge of the nation, they would have aroused such a storm of indignation in
Bulgaria that the execution of the German plan would have been rendered impossible.

The Opposition leaders made another determined effort to detach the Government from the Germanophil policy it had espoused. They solicited an audience from Tsar Ferdinand, and were received by him on September 17. They unanimously declared that in order to safeguard the country against a policy contrary to the interests and sentiments of the nation, the formation of a coalition Government was essential, and they protested violently against any agreement being made with the Central Powers.

Tsanov, the Radical leader, denounced the contemplated action against Russia as a premeditated crime.

Stamboliski, the Agrarian leader, was most outspoken in his remonstrance. He fearlessly condemned the Germanophil policy, and he assigned the chief responsibility for the calamitous consequences which he foresaw would ensue to Ferdinand personally.

The latter was infuriated by the brutal directness of the Agrarian leader's speech, and complained to Gueshov, but Gueshov calmly retorted: "He takes in the palace the freedom of speech he has been denied outside." And, in fact, the sentiment of the nation had ceased to find adequate expression owing to the
prohibition of meetings, the promulgation of martial law, and the gagging of the Press. The liberty of the latter was further restricted by the establishment of a preventive censorship on September 17.

The audience ended in a very stormy manner. Ferdinand, maddened by the threats of Stamboliski, intimated to the Opposition leaders that he had already decided on the policy to be followed, and that nothing would make him swerve from his course.

The failure of the Opposition and the utter disregard of constitutional practices by Tsar Ferdinand should not be a surprise to any one, for the Bulgarian parties had suffered constitutional forms to become the screen of what was in practice an autocracy.

There was nothing to deter Bulgaria's ruler from violating the Constitution. If any of his Ministers were impeached and condemned for a breach of the fundamental laws of the country, a breach always committed at the inspiration of the Crown, Ferdinand invariably forced the party coming next into office to pass an amnesty Bill to exonerate the culprits.

At this particular period martial law was proclaimed. According to article 73 of the Bulgarian Constitution, martial law cannot be enforced unless sanctioned by the Chamber within five days of its proclamation. This
statute, however, was disregarded, the Press gagged, the Opposition terrorized, and the Sobranje not convoked.

According to article 47 of the Constitution, the King may publish decrees, having the binding force of law, with the approval and on the responsibility of the Ministers, but only if the State is in imminent danger, and if it is found impossible to summon the Sobranje. When the mobilization order was issued, no danger was threatening Bulgaria; nevertheless, the Chamber was not convoked, the reason being that it would have voted against such an order.

The mobilization of the Bulgarian army was decreed during the night of September 21, and the pretext furnished by the Government was that it was intended to overawe the Serbians and render them more amenable to the cession of Macedonia. Bulgaria, it was asserted, would not attack Serbia if the latter yielded. The mobilization provoked no outburst of enthusiasm, and the Bulgarians flocked to the colours sullen and discontented. The behaviour of the men afforded a remarkable contrast to the joy they had displayed three years earlier when war against Turkey was announced. The Social Democrats and Agrarians endeavoured to hamper the carrying out of the mobilization by distributing broadcast mani-
festoes declaring that the mobilization was an anti-national measure, and enjoining reservists not to obey the call.

Not only the men, but even their leaders were dissatisfied at the policy pursued, and the Government, aware of the unpopularity of its measure, took good care to prevent any insubordination in the army by nominating as commanders personal favourites of the King. The old generals who had distinguished themselves in the Balkan Wars, such as Savov, Ivanov, Fitchev, Radko Dimitriev, Vasov, Guenev, and Shishkov, were given no commands, for they had rendered themselves suspect by their pro-Entente sympathies. General M. Savov, much to the annoyance of his master, made no secret of his views at the time, and these were that he could bring Turkey to her knees in twenty-five days, and thereby shorten the war considerably, whereas Bulgaria’s intervention against the Entente would unduly prolong it. Greece’s decree of mobilization on September 23 caused consternation in Government circles. Radoslavov provoked a scandal and accused the German Minister of having deceived the Bulgarian Government. Tontchev, the extreme pro-German member of the Government, and his friend Bakalov tendered their resignations. Tsar Ferdinand tried to obtain Malinov’s support by offering him and
his partisans the vacant Ministerial seats, but the leader of the Democrats rejected the offer on the ground that he disapproved of a Germanophil policy. The Press not only did not announce the mobilization of the Greek army for a few days, but thought fit to calm the public by spreading a report that M. Venizelos had resigned. When at last the news of the Greek mobilization could not be hidden from the public, since the Greek Consulates were advising their nationals of it, the Press announced the fact, but simultaneously furnished a reassuring explanation as to Greece's attitude. Greece, it was stated, would not consider Bulgaria's armed intervention a sufficient reason for helping Serbia by armed force, for her treaty obligations did not compel her to participate in a general war.

The assurances which were undoubtedly offered by the Germans as to the real state of affairs in Greece must have calmed Ferdinand's momentary dismay, for finally he refused to accept the resignation of his Ministers, and when Russia and her Allies presented an ultimatum on October 4, summoning Bulgaria to break off relations with the Central Powers within twenty-four hours, he directed Radoslavov to furnish an evasive answer such as could not possibly have satisfied the Entente Powers. The hopes built by Germany on
Greece’s attitude were unfortunately fulfilled. M. Venizelos resigned on October 4, and Constantine’s disloyalty to his ally, Serbia, enabled Ferdinand to stab Serbia in the back.

No explanation has yet been furnished as to why the Entente permitted Constantine to flout Venizelos, who was enjoying the confidence of the Greek nation, and to break his pledged word to Serbia with such disastrous consequences for the Allied cause, although the treaty of 1863 gave to the Protecting Powers the right to interfere and oppose such a manifest violation of the Hellenic Constitution as was the forced resignation of M. Venizelos. There is not the slightest doubt, however, that if M. Venizelos had remained in power the Greek army would have rescued Serbia, and would have prevented the terrible tragedy that befell our Balkan Ally. The Bulgarian army would have become demoralized by the resistance it would have encountered, and by its inability to effect a rapid junction with the Germans. At the moment it did not possess sufficient rifles, and was short of ammunition; the artillery had only 400 shells per gun. As a Bulgarian friend of mine, a Colonel in the Reserve, told me a few days prior to the departure of the Entente Ministers from Sofia, the only hope of turning back Bulgaria then lay in a defeat of the Bulgarian
army. Such a defeat would have encouraged the Bulgarians to mutiny. As for the Bulgarian Government, it had sold itself to the Germans, and it was no use trying to win it back. The Entente might have offered not only Macedonia but even Belgrade without inducing it to depart from the decision it had taken.

Though it seems a paradox, many patriotic Bulgarians wished and hoped for such a defeat as would have saved them not only from German tutelage but also from the corrupt rule of Ferdinand.

The reply offered by the Bulgarian Government to the Entente Powers having been judged unsatisfactory, diplomatic relations with Bulgaria were severed, and the Allied Ministers left on October 7, after notifying the Bulgarian Government that any hostile act against Serbia would be considered tantamount to a declaration of war against the Entente. This intimation, however, was powerless to intimidate Tsar Ferdinand, and at the time prearranged with the Germans the Bulgarian army invaded Serbia.
CHAPTER V

INTERVENTION AND AFTER

In his decision to side with Germany, Tsar Ferdinand must have been influenced not only by his belief in a German victory but also by the expectation that the Entente Powers would be unable or unwilling to lend any effective help to Serbia. The Bulgarian Government, early in October 1915, endeavoured to hearten the public by assuring it that the occupation of Macedonia would at most entail a possible struggle with Serbia, and that the Entente would only protest for the sake of appearances. The Austro-Germans under the redoubtable Von Mackensen were represented as about to deal Serbia her death-blow, and Macedonia was running the risk of invasion. As it would not be easy to induce the Austro-Germans to evacuate that region once they had installed themselves there, it was claimed that the immediate occupation of Macedonia was a national duty, and that it was imperative to forestall them. Since the Entente had already offered to cede Macedonia after the war, surely it could not now object to
the Bulgarians occupying it in advance; for obviously the Entente would prefer to see Bulgarians there rather than Germans. These, it must be admitted, were not bad arguments to bring forward even to the Russophils, who looked askance at the prospect of attacking Serbia, and thereby offending Russia. The manifesto by which the declaration of war against Serbia was made public followed the same lines. Here is the text of this momentous document:

MANIFESTO TO THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE

Bulgarians,—You all are witness to my unsparing efforts since the beginning of the European war to maintain peace in the Balkans, and tranquillity within the country.

I and my Government have endeavoured by maintaining neutrality up to now to realize the ideals of the Bulgarian people. Both groups of belligerent Powers acknowledge the great wrong inflicted on us by the partitioning of Macedonia, and both belligerent parties are agreed that the greater part of Macedonia should belong to Bulgaria.

Only our treacherous neighbour Serbia has remained obdurate to the counsels of her friends and allies. Serbia not only refused to listen to their advice, but, inspired by envy and avidity, even attacked our territory, and our brave troops have been obliged to fight in defence of their own land.

Bulgarians, in 1912 precious national ideals compelled me to call forth our brave army to a struggle in the course of which, full of self-abnegation, it severed the chains of slavery and unfolded the flag of liberty. Our Allies the Serbians were then the chief cause of our losing Macedonia.

Weary and exhausted, though unvanquished, we had to furl our banners until better days. The good days have come much earlier than we could have hoped. The European war is drawing to its close. The victorious armies of
the Central Empires are in Serbia and are rapidly advancing. I summon the Bulgarian armed nation to the defence of its native land desecrated by a disloyal neighbour, and to the liberation of our enslaved brethren under the Serbian yoke.

Our cause is just and holy.

I therefore order our brave army to drive the enemy out of the precincts of the kingdom, to overthrow our disloyal neighbour, and to emancipate our brethren suffering under the Serbian yoke.

We shall fight against the Serbians in conjunction with the brave troops of the Central Empires.

Let the Bulgarian soldier advance from victory to victory!

Forward! May God bless our arms!

Ferdinand.

The belief was so prevalent that the Entente Powers would take the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia as an accomplished fact, and that the diplomatic tension would soon be relieved, that many friends in Bulgaria strongly advised me not to leave, and assured me that within a few weeks the Entente Ministers would be back. In view of subsequent events, it may be maintained that acquiescence in the Bulgarian coup would have been the most sensible policy for us to have pursued. The other alternative was to constrain King Constantine to carry out his pledge to Serbia, not only because Serbia was our Ally, but because the large majority of the Greek nation with M. Venizelos at its head had expressed itself firmly in favour of assisting Serbia. Entente diplomacy, however, chose another path, only
to adopt, in June 1917, the very course it ought to have taken in October 1915. Unfortunately Serbia had been overrun in the meanwhile, and Greece had been rendered helpless by the baleful German propaganda. The only circumstance that may be adduced in extenuation of this manifest blunder is that we were playing second fiddle to Russia. War was declared against Tsar Ferdinand, and nothing done against King Constantine, not because the former was more culpable than the latter, but simply because Constantine happened to have a Russian Grand Duchess for his mother. She interceded on his behalf in Petrograd, and enabled her son to befool the Entente diplomatists for two years, to the immense delight of the Teutons. In fact our relations with Greece up to June 1917 must have been a source of endless mirth to our enemies, and London Opinion (November 18, 1916) in a clever cartoon fittingly depicted the Allied behaviour to Greece as the most comical thing on earth. Greek patriots may well complain of our attitude during that period, for it was mainly our apathy and shortsightedness that enabled the Germans to deprive Greece of her strength and to undermine her morale.

The Bulgarians, once involved in the war, accepted the situation, being assured by their Government that the aspirations of the nation
would be realized at a very small sacrifice. These aspirations even the Opposition parties came regretfully to admit were unrealizable in co-operation with the Entente. The leader of the Social Democrats, Sakuzov, clearly explained the attitude of the Opposition in an interview with the *Korrespondenz Bureau*, in the course of which he said:

The Entente would never have purchased our neutrality at the price of Macedonia; it would not have been promised, much less given to us, even had we fought for the Entente. Thus we have lost the basis on which we founded our opposition to Radoslavov's policy.

Toleration of the Government's policy, however, does not imply approval, as the *Mir* (January 31, 1917) endeavours to make plain:

The Bulgarian Opposition, which represents the nation, held views contrary to those of the Government, but when war was declared it had to keep silent, in common with all Oppositions in all belligerent countries, for otherwise it would have demoralized the nation and encouraged the enemy. The Opposition is in no way to be considered as responsible for a policy it disapproved, and to which it has passively submitted out of patriotism. The policy of the Government will be judged by the results obtained.

The lukewarmness of the Opposition and of the public towards the Government's policy forced the latter to foster the belief that the Entente was bent upon the dismemberment of Bulgaria, and that consequently the war had to be carried on to the bitter end, no compromise being possible. Every article in the Entente Press advocating the chastisement of
Bulgaria was seized upon and diligently circulated in the local Press, for the purpose of impressing on the Bulgarians that their salvation lay in a close union with the Germanic Empires, seeing that the Entente Powers were bent on Bulgaria's ruin. This was such a familiar argument that we even find it employed in a circular letter addressed during July 1918 by the Stambulovist Central Committee in Sofia to their partisans, a document well worth reproducing:

Let us have no illusions! Our enemies are fighting for our annihilation. If we in our generosity are ready to offer an honourable peace to our enemies, they (in the event of a victory, which God forbid!) out of their cruelty and envy will annihilate us. They will ravage and burn our villages and towns. They will not leave one stone standing upon another, and our country will be divided and subjugated.

This was the main plank of the enemy propaganda. It did not serve to buoy up the nation's spirit, but it convinced it of the necessity of continuing a war that from the start had been most unpopular. The Bulgarians, in short, were confronted with the dilemma of going on or going under. The unpopularity of the pro-German policy may be gauged by the attitude of a section of the Government's supporters. In July 1916 the Government came very near to defeat in the Chamber on a motion by Malinov to postpone discussion on the Budget, which Radoslavov
declared he would consider equivalent to a vote of censure. Malinov at the time was seeking to overthrow the Government, because he was opposed to its policy of declaring war against Rumania, and was endeavouring to keep Bulgaria neutral in the conflict between Rumania and the Central Powers.

The bulk of the Stambulovists voted with the Opposition, and the Government would certainly have been defeated had not Gueshov's party unexpectedly decided to cast their votes for Radoslavov. This action on the part of one of the Opposition parties saved the Cabinet at the time, but we must not for a moment entertain the belief that Gueshov's party had been won over to the view of the Cabinet. We should rather attribute their attitude to their sense of patriotism. They were actuated by the principle: "My country right or wrong." To what, indeed, could the overthrow of the Radoslavov Cabinet have led? Either to internal troubles and disorder culminating inevitably in defeat, a defeat disastrous to Bulgaria, for no mercy could be expected from her vindictive enemies; or—the more probable alternative—to a coup d'état, suppressing the Sobranje and the restricted constitutional liberties still enjoyed by the Bulgarians. Gueshov chose a lesser evil, the maintenance of the then existing régime, and
unbiased persons will scarcely blame him. This trial of strength between the Government and the Sobranje served as a warning to Radoslavov, who immediately took proceedings to restore the Chamber to its former state of subservience. A charge was trumped up against Ghenadiev and his most devoted followers, and sentences of imprisonment for various terms were passed on them by a court martial at Sofia in October 1916. It is needless to say that their seats in the Sobranje were thereupon filled by persons in whom the Government had greater confidence. After this little operation, the constitutional and democratic Bulgarian Government proceeded to carry on business in its habitual pseudo-parliamentary manner, which permitted Tsar Ferdinand to boast in a subsequent interview with the *Neue Freie Presse*, that many Entente countries might envy the democratic institutions existing in Bulgaria!

We need not feel much sympathy for the fate that befell Ghenadiev, as the best that can be said of him is that he was an unscrupulous adventurer. Radoslavov, who is a nonentity, had long envied the growing influence of this rival of his, and from the time Ghenadiev first manifested pro-Entente sympathies, set himself to compass his ruin and that of his partisans. Even before the declaration of war
Ghenadiev, suspected of harbouring evil designs against the Government, was arrested, but by the timely intervention of his influential Macedonian friends was released. In April 1916, he and some of his prominent supporters were again arrested, but subsequently were set at liberty, until by their attitude in the Sobranje they sealed their doom. It may be mentioned that a distinguished member of the party was assassinated in Sofia early in January 1916, probably with the connivance of the authorities. There could scarcely be a more dastardly crime than that to which Dr. Utchormansky fell a victim, for he was a straightforward man, and one of the few honest Stambulovists. He had completed his studies in the United States, and held extremely liberal views. He probably was the most Ententophil member of his party, although I recollect that he was not sparing in his denunciations of the Entente for its attitude, which, according to him, was unwittingly driving Bulgaria into the arms of Germany. But his was not a solitary opinion. Had not Bulgarian politicians been entreating the Entente for two whole years to take into consideration the wrong done to Bulgaria, and warning it of the possible consequences that might ensue if the wound inflicted on Bulgaria at Bucarest were allowed to fester? Their
appeals, however, were left unheeded, though it is well known that despair is a bad counsellor.

The spirit of opposition to Radoslavov's policy had not been crushed out entirely from among the Stambulovists by the condemnation and imprisonment of Ghenadiev, and the attitude of the remnant grouped round the ex-Minister Apostolov continued to inspire distrust in the Government. Even a year after Ghenadiev's condemnation we find a deputy (Karakashev) belonging to Dobri Petkov's faction formally transferring his allegiance to Apostolov, Ghenadiev's friend and successor. There are even grounds to believe that Radoslavov's resignation was brought about by the formal withdrawal of both the Stambulovist groups from the Government, which took place in May 1918.

One of the most significant manifestations of discontent with the Government policy was the formation of an association in Sofia, which was joined by the most prominent authors and professors. This society, founded in February 1917, proposed to instil national self-consciousness in the masses, and to guide the national forces in the right direction, so that the nation might not be taken unawares and forced to pursue an anti-national policy, as had been the case in the present war. In order to guard against possible attempts to
stultify the action of the society, it was declared that only donations approved by the directorate would be accepted, and that contributions might be rejected without explanation.

Although several prominent members of the Nationalist and Democratic parties joined the league, neither the Minister of Education nor the President of the Sobranje, who were invited to become members, did so. On the contrary, the Government started a violent campaign against it in its organ, the *Narodni Prava*, virulently attacking its members for the Russophil sentiments they had manifested in the past, and characterizing them as unfit to guide the Bulgarian people and establish the ideals Bulgaria should pursue.

The sympathy with which the league was viewed in Bulgaria is demonstrated by the fact that committees were formed in the larger towns to collect subscriptions for it, and that the town of Varna alone within the brief space of two months contributed some 35,000 fr. to the funds.

In order to counter the efforts of this patriotic society, the Germans and their sympathizers proceeded to establish a rival association aiming at a cultural *rapprochement* with Germany. Most of its members were naturally Government deputies or State officials, and K. H. Kaltchev was elected president. The latter is well known to be a *persona grata* with Tsar Ferdinand, by
whom he was employed to negotiate with Turkey behind the backs of Bulgaria's allies in December 1912. This German society was placed under the high patronage of the heir apparent, Prince Boris. The Agrarian deputy, Stoyan Omartseski, (who had been excluded from Draghiev's party), Professor Mollov, a Democrat, and Peev-Platskov, a Nationalist, were apparently the only members of the Opposition who adhered to it.

An Austro-Bulgarian society on similar lines was also founded, and, under the auspices of the pro-German leagues, a series of lectures have been delivered in Sofia by German and Austrian professors and prominent politicians, with the object of popularizing the idea of a closer alliance with the Central Powers and of familiarizing the Bulgarian public with German culture.

The outbreak of the Russian Revolution was greeted with immense enthusiasm as a portent of an early peace with Russia and with the Entente. Russophil politicians began to recover their old self-assurance, which was further intensified by the declarations made by Milyukov, and published in the Utro (April 25, 1917).

1 Milyukov was reported to have said: "The views which I upheld for fifteen years with regard to the rights of Bulgaria I still support as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Bulgarian cause was and is dear to me. In spite of the circumstances which compelled the Bulgarian army to act against us, I cannot help acknowledging that it has shown much bravery and valour. The men who are now guiding Russia's destinies are keeping in mind
The excessive optimism that ensued alarmed Government circles, and they did their utmost to discourage it by decrying Russia’s past conduct, and trying to rouse suspicion. These attempts, however, do not seem to have had any effect on the Opposition. The *Mir*, on May 2, 1917, urged the newly formed league of authors to take the initiative in bringing about a *rapprochement* between Russia and Bulgaria. “The moment is propitious. Why should not the old misunderstanding between Bulgaria and Russia, due to the autocratic régime, be removed, since the cause itself has been removed?” The fury that this proposal aroused among the Government parties may best be depicted by the articles that appeared on the following days in the *Narodni Prava* (May 5 and 11, 1917):

We knew very well that many members of the League have become the unwilling tools of a few well-known politicians, who will not renounce their political views and who will impose them on the members. The programme of this society is political, and it will put obstacles in the way of any Government which does not follow a policy agreeable to it. It is simply masquerading under the veil of literature. The *Mir* has now thought fit openly to disclose the aims of the society. Now is the time to raise anew the cherished Russo-phil traditions! The time has come for the rats to emerge from their hiding holes! There is a revolution in Russia, the errors of their predecessors, and for this reason they are resolved not to enter into any compact contrary to the spirit of justice and international morality. At this moment I can tell you one thing with assurance, and that is, that Bulgaria will emerge from this war united: Bulgaria will receive Macedonia I have nothing further to add.”
and all fables about Russian magnanimity towards Bulgaria may prove valuable! It is time to sow corruption again among the Bulgarian nation! Of what advantage can a telegram of thanks to the Den prove in the war? The writer knows it will be useless, but his object is to create a certain frame of mind in Bulgaria which may be taken advantage of for furthering the policy of the Russophils. He wishes to make use of the League in order to promote his political views and his party's aims.

It is the Government which should look after the nation's interests, or at least the Chamber and the political parties. They are responsible bodies, and they have a right to take interest in questions concerning the nation and to state their views. It should not be allowed to prominent members of political parties to expose their views under the guise of literary societies; they should make them known on the responsibility of the party they belong to, for secret activity implies that ugly schemes are being hatched. No Bulgarian political party can so far forget itself as to ask the Bulgarian people to address telegrams to a country from which troops are being sent for the destruction of Bulgaria, but prominent men of these parties do this through a society of authors. Through this society they aim at spreading demoralization and leading astray the Bulgarian people by dangerous exhortations. And these men now begin to shout: "Hasten on a pilgrimage to Russia!" simply because the Den has written something about Bulgaria. But what about the Russian troops at Galatz and in Macedonia? Because one Russian journal has written something in our favour, our learned men and our authors are asking us to jump into the Russian sea and drown! Is not this absurd on their part? We reject with contempt the efforts of some hardened partisans of dangerous political dogmas to exploit for party uses some words said in favour of Bulgaria. And this under the cloak of some society of authors and learned men.

Such a society ought to know its business and not to meddle in the Government's, and especially now when it is necessary we should safeguard the nation from the deceit of those men who by their appeals to Tsar Ferdinand during 1914 and 1915 did their utmost to lead Bulgaria to destruction.
In the suggestion put forward [of sending congratulations to the Petrograd Den] one cannot help detecting the purpose of those connected with the Mir to lead back the Bulgarian people to the path which brought only misfortunes, as in 1913. But it is too late now for such criminal designs. The time when the cause of nations was won or lost in the Press is over, and even if it were to return it is not astronomers, mathematicians, and writers who will carry on the fight, but our diplomatists, who know how to retort. Let those others keep silent, as they did when great events were taking place [the conquest of Macedonia and the Dobrudja]. It is not the generous donors of funds who have encouraged the League on this path. They imagined that their donations would be used for the country's welfare and not for an evil purpose. Such an evil purpose exists; those connected with the Mir are endeavouring to throw Bulgaria at all costs into the arms of regenerated Russia, which remains, as before, exceedingly dangerous to our nation. Enough blood was shed in 1913 to dispel once for all the myth of Russian goodwill towards Bulgaria, but to all appearance the persons about the Mir desire once more to expose the Bulgarian people to a new trial at a moment when, thanks to the powerful co-operation of her allies, Bulgaria is so happily realizing her unification.

There were good reasons indeed for the Government to look with dismay at this revival of Russophilism. Dissatisfaction with its policy had been steadily growing, and although every display of it was ruthlessly repressed, yet the free tribune of the Sobranje remained, whence the representatives of the nation gave uncontrolled vent to their pent-up anger and dismay. The stenographic reports of the Sobranje of this period would without doubt prove extremely interesting reading, not only to the historian, but also to the psychologist; unfortunately they are
not yet available. The speeches of Opposition members were so mutilated and distorted by the censor before publication that they convey anything rather than the original thoughts of the speakers, and the Bulgarian Government may have been wise in thus distorting the speeches, as publication in their original form would have done more to inflame public opinion against Bulgaria's rulers than the most virulent Bolshevik propaganda. One may judge of the accusations levelled against the Government by the following speech of Radoslavov delivered in the Sobranje on March 31, 1917:

Gueshov and Tsanov have complained that the relations between the Government and the Opposition were strained, that we have not kept them informed of the course of events, that we have taken everything on ourselves, and that we are engaging the responsibility of the nation and the army in spite of their opinions and their political convictions. They have further argued thus: "Since we do not hinder you in your foreign policy, we do not assume any responsibility for it. We shall vote for the war credit for 350,000,000 fr. because it is for the army and not for you (the Government). In you we have no confidence whatever. You, who are guiding Bulgaria's destinies, are weakened among yourselves, you are divided as to the internal policy you should follow [refers to Apostolov's recent withdrawal from the Cabinet], there is something which has undermined your authority, something rotten, making a breach in your position, only there is nobody to capture it. Therefore, you have no right to ask for our support, and we are astonished that you can still retain your ministerial seats and manage Bulgaria's affairs." Such has been the tone of all speeches coming from the Opposition, and when I declared that Bulgaria is in an excellent situation as regards her foreign relations, many members of the
Opposition derided me. But at this moment, when we are defending our frontiers, when we declare that Bulgaria has realized her ideal, that we mean to stick to those frontiers in spite of everything, because we know we shall be able to maintain ourselves there, and when we desire that this should be heard on the battlefield, how could you refuse to vote the credits for the support of the Bulgarian army? Parliament was bound to support the present Government if only from the Opposition’s point of view. In the same way as the Opposition supported the Government in 1913, you are bound to support this same Government, which has the situation in hand and is realizing the ideals of the Bulgarian nation. It is thus that all of us who are representing the Bulgarian nation should have done, in order that it might be heard and that others should see that the Bulgarian Parliament is united and strong. But to some of you the Russian Duma is more important. The Sobranje ought to have been represented as strongly united, and the Opposition should not have insinuated in these very precincts that the Government is weak and tottering, that the Government machine is creaking and that some strong action is needed, but that Parliament is too apathetic to take it. For such is the inference from Malinov’s speech.

I do not know how far g. Gueshov’s assertion, that with the occupation of Macedonia and the Dobrudja we have completed our task and should retire, is serious. This is said with another object. g. Gueshov is reserving also the right to ask us when the war is over, “whether our policy has been the best.” The meaning of all this may well be found in the opinion expressed in October 1915, by the Serbian paper Odjek, when it warned the Russian Ambassador, Troubetzkoy, not to trust the Bulgarian Russophils, that they are deceiving Russia, and that if any misfortune happens to Germany they will be the first to crawl before Russia, and throw the blame on Tsar Ferdinand and his Government. Are you, members of the Opposition, not repeating now this very same thing, even after the unparalleled successes of Bulgaria? Should such language ever have been used? In 1915 the Opposition went to the Palace, and after making use of the most bitter words, threatened the King; but what a difference from that time and now. Sazonov will not again speak as he did,
nor will the Russian Government threaten us as it did in 1915; they will acknowledge their error. When this is so, how is it possible that regrets and lamentations over Bulgaria should be heard in the Bulgarian Chamber, and that the situation should be represented as so desperate that there was nothing to do but come to blows among ourselves. After all the sacrifices made by the Bulgarian nation for its independence and its honour such a sort of patriotism should not be advocated by anybody, more especially any one in the Sobranje. It may be supposed that the motive of those speaking against our policy is to represent the situation as it is described by some Bulgarian deserters or foreign agents in circulars, which are occasionally dropped from enemy aeroplanes. Here are some quotations from these proclamations: “Do not obey your bribed leaders and rulers any further, greet the Russian troops with tears in your eyes, with warm and brotherly cordiality. Do not fire against the sons of those who liberated you or you will meet with no good either in this world or the next. You have suffered enough. Bulgarians! Cease hesitating and fearing. Take a resolution and act. Act bravely and heroically, and drive out the traitors. Hasten and come to your senses and surrender your destiny to Russia, in order to escape from the approaching disaster which is going to overwhelm you. Look at the abyss yawning at your feet. Russia leads you to life and liberty, Germany to bondage and shame. Choose to-day, because to-morrow will be late.” I have read this in order that you might see that some of its phrases are similar to those spoken in the Sobranje. Has not g. Tsanov declared that we are leading the nation to destruction on the steep incline of an abyss? If you begin with the report of the Provident Committee, study the telegrams and letters in it, and finish with this enemy appeal, you will see one tendency throughout, that of compromising the alliance between Bulgaria and Germany and Austria-Hungary. The speeches of the members of the Opposition have been recorded, and one day they will make their authors blush.

Capital has been made out of the reported smuggling by German soldiers. Because some German soldier tried to smuggle two pigs to Germany g. Christov [Opposition
deputy] shouts that this cannot be allowed, that we are being deprived of our pork supplies. Because in a consign-ment of ore from Eliceïna [a copper mine near Vratza] to Germany some bags containing hams, cheese, and eggs were found, the Provident Committee protests that this is a crime committed by our Allies, and demands how the Government can countenance it? But, of course, the Government knows all about it, for it assists the Germans! The tendency is clear, it is to compromise our Allies. Another insinuation, much more terrible. Somebody promised to export 300,000,000 kg. of cereals but the Provident Committee stopped it. (A voice from the ranks of the Opposition: "And 600,000 head of cattle.") This service of the Provident Committee in having stopped the export is great, it is invaluable, and certainly it is not the only service rendered! We are members of a strong alliance. A most loyal alliance, which is historic. Not only now, but also in the future, we shall remain Allies of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Since the war is not finished our soldiers are fighting shoulder to shoulder with those of our Allies. Armies have similar needs: these armies need a postal service, a telegraph service, such as our armies have at Tultsa, at Bucarest, and elsewhere. Therefore it is not right; there is no foundation for saying and shouting: "These Germans, they have taken over our posts, our railways; they have taken the very air we breathe, and now they are carrying off our bacon and our eggs, and they leave us to die of hunger! Let nothing more be given to our Allies, let us look first after ourselves and then after the others." The Opposition has a right to hinder our understanding with the Germans and Austrians, but in such a case let it come to an understanding with them. I repeat, let it do so because it is for the Opposition to repent, and not for the Government.

But the existing dissatisfaction turned to exasperation when the attitude of the German and Austro-Hungarian Socialists towards Bulgarian aims became known. At the Stockholm Conference the Austro-Hungarian Socialists pro-
posed a compromise on the Macedonian question, which would have proved fatal to Bulgarian hopes. This proposal, as might have been foreseen, evoked the most bitter comment in Bulgaria, and to the suggestion of Bulgarian and Serbian Socialists coming to terms on the Macedonian question the Bulgarians retorted that the Transylvanian question should be likewise settled by a conference between Hungarian and Rumanian Socialists. The Bulgarians were furious against the German authorities for the tacit support they gave to the views of their Socialists, and the Mir (June 22, 1917) voiced the displeasure of the public in the following characteristic terms:

The Germans say: "Alsace and Lorraine are old German countries, and no plébiscite can be allowed to be taken there. As for the Balkans, we adhere to the declarations of our Austro-Hungarian comrades." The inference is clear. Ours is unquestionably ours. There in the Balkans let them settle matters among themselves. There are many ways and means, perhaps by a plébiscite. . . . Fine phrases on somebody else's account may be all very well, but not on one's own. Why should Bulgarian Socialists have to come to terms with the Serbians as to Macedonia, and German and French Socialists not have to do likewise in the case of Alsace and Lorraine? Is not Macedonia, after all, more indisputably Bulgarian than Alsace-Lorraine is German?

These misgivings naturally increased when articles of quite a pro-Serbian character began to appear in the German and Austrian Press. The articles of the German Socialist, Wendel, and his advocacy of Serbian views, were evidently
inspired, and aimed at enticing the Serbians to conclude a separate peace with Austria. The Bulgarians fully realized this, and being of a suspicious disposition made the most sinister deductions from the tolerance exhibited by the censorship in the Central Empires. The following quotation from the Kambana, June 29, 1917, illustrates the exasperation prevailing at the time:

The attitude of the Hungarian Socialists assumes even a more repulsive aspect when we consider that while they oppose the emancipation of Macedonia they absolutely refuse to enter into a discussion concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina. This attitude lacks both sense and morality.

The Arbeiter-Zeitung, the organ of the Austrian Social Democrats, treats the Bulgarian demands as exaggerated, if not as impudent, but the impudence is all on the side of the leaders of the Austrian Social Democrats. Tsarism is dead, but it appears that its criminal policy as regards Serbo-Bulgarian disputes has been adopted by the Austro-Hungarian Socialists. This is shameful and infamous for a party in allied Austria, a party which pretends to aim at the triumph of liberty and that of the rights of nations. If any opposition to our national claims was to appear in Central Europe, it might perhaps have been expected from the extreme Imperialists, who, together with Russian Tsarism, used to scheme for the partitioning of the Near East. Even the conscience of these last has awakened, and they have admitted our rights; therefore the part the Austro-Hungarian Socialists are endeavouring to play in the Balkan question appears all the more contemptible, senseless, and criminal.

So serious was the apprehension excited that even Radoslavov found it necessary to seek an explanation in Berlin. On his return he convened a meeting of Bulgarian journalists, and
made the most reassuring communications as to the state of relations among the Allies. But no sooner had this controversy subsided than a dispute arose concerning the Dobrudja question. The Bulgarians had long felt it a grievance that they had not been allowed to establish their own administration in that province, and the efforts made by the Central Empires to conciliate Rumania could not but aggravate the existing irritation between the Bulgarians and their allies, especially when the latter began to realize that Austria was unwilling to countenance the aggrandizement of Bulgaria. In this connexion the repeated visits of the Rumanian politicians, Carp and Marghiloman, to Vienna and Germany did not fail to excite the over-suspicious Bulgarians. Hostility to Bulgarian ambitions was shared not only by Count Czernin, owing to his advocacy of a peace without annexations, but by the majority of the Slav elements in the Dual Monarchy, who could ill disguise their hatred of the Bulgarians for the latter's desertion of the Slav cause. Thus the Jugo-Slav deputies on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Austrian Delegations proposed through their spokesman, Korocek, the wholesale rejection of the Bulgarian annexationist programme, which proposition the other Austrian delegates for manifest reasons declined to accept. The Czechs also, who had taken a prominent part in organizing Bulgarian
administration, and a large number of whom had settled in Bulgaria, more than once manifested their hostility to her.

Such a state of affairs could not but endanger the smooth working of the alliance, and the Kaiser’s visit to Sofia early in October 1917 must largely be ascribed to his desire to placate the Bulgarians and to soothe their feelings by flattery. The attention paid to them by the Kaiser greatly gratified their _amour-propre_, for they saw in it a mark of appreciation on the part of their ally, all the more since it was the first visit the head of a powerful State had ever paid to the Bulgarian capital. Although the declarations the Kaiser made in Sofia were not as explicit as the Bulgarians would have liked, it was possible to interpret them as favourable to Bulgarian aims, and this helped to strengthen the position of the Cabinet and to reconcile the Opposition to its pro-German policy. Henceforth we hear very little of the activities of the League of Authors and Professors, and a great effort was evident on the part of the Opposition to demonstrate its solidarity with the Government on the occasion of the convocation of the Sobranje a few days later, “so that all agitations and all rumours of a nature to encourage the enemy to continue the war, in the hope that the fortress will surrender from within, would cease.” The _Mir_ even went so far as to declare that the
Opposition had drawn from historic facts a logical conclusion, and that it was determined to help in bringing the enterprise that had been taken in hand to a happy conclusion.

This apparent reconciliation, however, was shortlived, for in the debates that followed in the Sobranje, Opposition members hastened to attack the Government for allowing the exercise of their functions to be governed by their pro-German sympathies, and Government adherents were branded as traitors and brigands. The following outburst of the *Narodni Prava* (April 9, 1918), against the seditious attitude of the Opposition, demonstrates how slender were the hopes for conciliation and union evoked for a moment by the Kaiser’s visit:

They [the Government adherents] are great heroes. They stood firmly and without flinching at their parliamentary posts, unmoved by the storms let loose by intemperate and foolish Opposition deputies. The majority endured long hours of speeches, that aimed at undermining, compromising, and destroying the only true policy for Bulgaria’s unification. The speakers knew their speeches were criminal, but they nevertheless persisted in delivering them in order to provoke disturbances. There, in the Chamber, the majority had even to listen to shameless speeches in defence of the bitterest enemies of Bulgaria.

Though a lull in the anti-Government agitation prevailed until the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and the preliminary treaty with Rumania, Radoslavov’s failure to secure the allocation of the entire Dobrudja to Bulgaria
kindled anew the anger of the Opposition and the distrust of the public. The non-settlement of the Dobrudja question revealed to the Bulgarians the fact that Turkey was demanding as compensation for the military help she lent in the campaign against Rumania the retrocession of the territory along the banks of the Maritsa, which she had ceded to Bulgaria in September 1915. This discovery as to the intention of their eastern ally produced the most deplorable effect on the Bulgarians, who had not forgotten that the dispute among the Balkan Allies in 1913 likewise arose through a similar demand for a revision of a treaty on the plea of rebus sic stantibus. The formal signature of the Treaty of Bucarest (1918) dispelled the slight hopes that remained of an early solution of the Dobrudja question, thus keeping alive the controversy with Turkey. The Bulgarians remarked bitterly that Austria-Hungary had annexed an area almost as great as that of the Dobrudja, containing mineral and timber resources estimated at over 5,000,000,000 fr., and that, although she had received Turkish assistance to a much greater extent than Bulgaria, no mention was made of establishing a condominium in the territory she had acquired from Rumania. Germany, it was pointed out, had acquired political and economic concessions rendering her mistress of the Rumanian railways, the oil-springs and the
Danube waterway. She had secured for her own use the Rumanian grain crops for a number of years at ridiculously low prices, which, computing the annual yield at 2,000,000 tons, would benefit her to the extent of at least 5,000,000,000 fr. annually. Bulgaria had not demurred to the principle of self-determination being extensively applied at Brest-Litovsk for the satisfaction of German aims, and Germany had created for her own benefit a whole group of buffer states more or less subservient to her. Turkey, in accordance with the same principle, was allowed to annex the Caucasus, and to put forward claims to the Crimea and Central Asia. Even Rumania was requited for her “treachery” to the Central Powers by the gift of Bessarabia, but, when it came to Bulgaria, the Allies refused to apply the same measure, and would not even grant her what ethnically, geographically, and historically was Bulgarian, territory she had won by her own efforts at the cost of some 60,000 casualties. No wonder the Bulgarians felt sore at the treatment meted out to them, and they must have vowed not to enter into an alliance again after such an unfortunate experience. The Bulgarians indeed have an extreme dislike for association in business, and they naïvely point out that if partnership were a good thing, God would surely have taken a partner.

Public dissatisfaction was echoed by the Press;
and the following remarks of the *Dnevnik* (April 18, 1918) may be taken as generally expressive of the views prevailing:

We have done everything possible for the Alliance and have borne everything ungrudgingly, and now they want to impose on us this ransom! Without this we can see that treachery is requited, as in the case of Rumania, who obtains Bessarabia, so that there is no need for them to rub salt into our wounds. If we do not react against our Allies, out of regard for them, we at least have the right to demand that our feelings should be respected. Otherwise we do not understand what is our position and rôle in the Alliance. Have they invited us to the feast merely that we should serve the guests?

The bitterness of the disappointment caused by the Turkish demand may be realized if it be remembered that the territory required in exchange for the recognition of Bulgarian rule in the Dobrudja constituted the firstfruits of the pro-German policy, and its possession had been virtually guaranteed to Bulgaria by Germany, under whose auspices the arrangement had been carried out. The cession of this territory to Bulgaria had been accomplished twenty-four hours after the Bulgarian mobilization order had been decreed, and after the Bulgarian Government had furnished proofs of its willingness to co-operate with the Central Powers. It really constituted the price paid by Turkey for the purchase of Bulgaria's intervention, so that the demand for its restitution was rightly regarded in Bulgaria as nothing short of blackmail. Turkish
appetite had so inordinately developed at the time that the Constantinople politicians were actually hinting that they would not be satisfied even with this, but that if Bulgaria were to acquire the Morava district, or Greek Macedonia, Turkey would demand from Bulgaria all the territory she had ceded to the latter by the Treaty of Constantinople, which comprises the entire Bulgarian seaboard on the Ægean Sea. It is easy to imagine the sense of bitter disillusionment caused by the Germanophil policy hitherto pursued. Even the Press did not disguise its resentment. "We had a foretaste of what the treaties between Bulgaria and Germany contain, when the Dobrudja was ceded to the Allies before passing to us. We also know that all the war expenses will lie on our back. The deputies have had the opportunity of grasping German etymology, and no doubt now understand what is meant by \textit{finanzielle Beihilfe,}" remarked the \textit{Preporets}. "Bulgaria should be so treated that she need not look to the south for mercy and protection, but should be made to fix her eyes on the north. She is not in the same position as Rumania, for she has an outlet on the sea, by which the vessels of the Entente may freely reach her," said the Socialist \textit{Narod}. "It is only for the sake of this outlet on the Ægean that we agreed to defend the Straits for the Turks. Our intervention would be senseless if after seven years of
war and a national debt of several milliards we returned to our previous position and permitted our trade to depend on the goodwill of our Turkish allies. In such a case we fail to understand why we fought against Russia, and what significance a political and economic alliance with the Central Powers can have for us,” added the Germanophile Dnevnik. And Gueshov’s organ commenting on Von Kühlmann’s speech in the Reichstag as to the advisability of readjusting the present Bulgaro-Turkish frontier, which he considered had been drawn too hastily, caustically remarked:

Von Kühlmann states that the treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey was hasty! The inference is clear: The Bulgarians should not insist too much on a hastily concluded treaty, and should give in to the Turkish demands.

It appears, therefore, that the validity of a treaty depends on its not being hastily concluded! What is then to happen if another “Von” should think fit to declare that the treaty between the Central Empires and Bulgaria was also hastily concluded? We do not see where we should draw the line between hastily concluded and therefore inoperative treaties and valid treaties, all the more since the treaty with Turkey is the basis on which our alliance with the Central Powers was built. How is the structure to be saved when its foundation collapses? We await Radoslavov’s explanation as to how he interprets the treaties, in which according to Kühlmann he hastily engaged Bulgaria, and whether it is true, as the Turkish papers assert, that they simply made concessions in order to involve us in the war, with the intention not only of getting back subsequently what they then gave, but also of asking for something more. We are awaiting these explanations, and we reflect: Is it not hasty to think that Bulgaria intervened hastily in the war on the side of the Central Powers?
We can better grasp the meaning of the covert threat contained in the above remark if we take into consideration that Hussein Djahid, the influential Young Turk, Vice-President of the Turkish Chamber and editor of the Tainin, plainly declared in his paper that if Bulgaria would not cede amicably what Turkey demanded, the latter would conclude an alliance with Rumania, Greece, and Serbia when the present war was over, and take by force what was not ceded voluntarily.

Turkey is not a particularly pleasant neighbour for a weaker country; this is the general experience of all the Balkan States. And Bulgarians must have rued the day when they were decoyed into saving Turkey, and indirectly contributed to the rebirth of the wild Pan-Islamic ambitions then freely proclaimed by the Turks, which could not have failed to excite the gravest apprehensions in Bulgaria, owing to her large Moslem population. The more successes the Turks obtained in the Caucasus the more arrogant and domineering they became. The Bulgarians were well acquainted with Turkish psychology and would harbour no illusions about the future, when they, being Turkey’s weakest neighbours, would have become the main object of her bullying.

This was only too well understood in Bulgaria, and was the main cause of Bulgaria’s insistence on obtaining the town and fortress of Adrianople
in 1913. All Bulgarians whom I questioned at the time as to why they insisted so much on getting Adrianople, which they themselves admitted was not a Bulgarian town, unanimously answered: “Hitherto all the Balkan States had a common frontier with Turkey, and therefore the danger of a Turkish attack weighed equally on all, and made them more disposed to lend each other mutual support, but henceforth Bulgaria will be alone to face the Turks. We know them too well not to insist on obtaining a safeguard against their future insolence. We shall be alone almost at the muzzle of the Turkish cannon; we therefore must have Adrianople, which will serve as a shield against their aggression.” Nothing had occurred to allay these fears; on the contrary, Turkish ambitions had been reawakened, and according to the wild talk of Turkish politicians embraced the restoration of an empire surpassing even that of Suliman’s in splendour. If we were to judge from Constantinople papers, Central Asia, the entire Black Sea seaboard, the Crimea, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Crete, and the Dodecanese were some of the objects of Turkish megalomania. They seemed to have lost all sense of proportion, and showed no regard for their Bulgarian allies. Thus they made no secret of their desire to get back the whole of Western Thrace, where there is a Moslem population of some 200,000, more than
half of whom, however, are Pomaks, or Moslem Bulgarians.

It was only natural for the Bulgarians to look with consternation at this Pan-Islamic agitation. They opposed the most resolute non possumus to the Turkish demands, all the more since they were uncertain as to whether they would be allowed to retain Greek Eastern Macedonia with the port of Cavalla. Their ally, Germany, maintained a very dubious attitude on this point, and cunningly fostered the belief among the Greeks that she would return this territory to them if they did not support Venizelos. The Bulgarians, therefore, refused to yield to the Turks their railway line to the Ægean, for they prize it too highly, as it renders them independent of the Power possessing the Straits. They even prefer to forgo their rights to Northern Dobrudja rather than lose their door to the Ægean and to the outer world.

The readiness with which the Bulgarian Socialists approved the resolutions of the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference in London becomes therefore intelligible, and in spite of subsequent denials made through Government channels must be taken as characteristic of the chastened views that were prevailing throughout the country. Through their party organ the Bulgarian Socialists declared that "that part of the programme which refers to general principles is
quite acceptable, and an agreement would be very easily reached. Every Social Democrat will support these general principles as advocated by the Entente comrades." Naturally the Inter-Allied proposal to grant local autonomy to Macedonia and the recommendation to incorporate that province in Serbia could scarcely meet with the approval of any Bulgarian, but the retort it evoked was significant in its moderation. "The Conference," the Bulgarian Socialists argued, "ought to have offered us a mode of settlement which we, the parties most directly concerned in the matter, might have been able to accept without any extraordinary difficulties."

The interpretation which Reuter gave to the article in the Narod—namely, that the Bulgarian Socialists were inclined to accept autonomy for Macedonia, was not altogether erroneous, as may be inferred from the Narodni Prava, June 11, which, commenting on Reuter's message, practically confirms its standpoint. It says:

Such are the views of the Social Democrats. They do not even dare admit that Macedonia is a Bulgarian country: they want autonomy for Macedonia. Was it for this that we made so many sacrifices? Is it for this that so many brave sons of Bulgaria are perishing? Is it for this we are spending milliards; for the sake of autonomy for Macedonia?

In spite of the fact that both Von Kuhlmann and the Emperor Charles visited Sofia with the
object of composing existing differences, the tension between Bulgaria and her allies did not relax, but on the contrary increased, as another cause for friction arose in the form of Germany’s relations with Greece.

Although diplomatic relations between Greece and the Central Powers had been severed on July 2, 1917, Germany continued to maintain in appearance a friendly attitude towards Greece. M. Venizelos’ return to power was ascribed to foreign interference, and German official circles were lavish in demonstrations of sympathy with the Greeks, the “victims of Entente brutality.” As long as the Greek forces on the Macedonian front were insignificant in number, the Bulgarians, out of deference for their allies, suppressed their ill-humour, and generally restricted themselves to criticizing the Grecophil policy of Germany as senseless, for according to them, Greece, by her geographical situation, was bound to remain under the influence of the Entente.

The German attempts to represent the Greek mobilization as a failure, and the various rumours as to revolts and mutinies in Greece, found willing listeners in Bulgaria, where they were sedulously re-echoed and magnified by the Government Press. The gradual and continual arrival of Greek troops on the Macedonian front, however, and the increased activity which resulted, began to alarm the Bulgarians, who came slowly
to realize the unpalatable truth, that they would have to reckon with a fresh adversary. This revelation was doubly unpleasant, because it disclosed even to the most unwary that the war would be further prolonged. These pessimistic inferences increased the annoyance already felt by the Bulgarians at the patronizing air with which the Germans were treating the Greeks. German papers, in fact, began espousing the cause of Greece and advocating the maintenance of Greece's territorial integrity, as having been guaranteed by Germany, while other papers, such as the Berliner Tageblatt and Frankfurter Zeitung, lent the hospitality of their columns to various Greeks among the adherents of King Constantine, who endeavoured to demonstrate that Greece was not at war with the Central Powers, that King Constantine's deposition was an unconstitutional act, and that he was still de jure King of Greece. The acts of the Venizelist Government, it was alleged, which was imposed by force on the Greek nation and was maintained in power by foreign pressure, could not be considered as binding on Greece. If these views were to prevail in Berlin, it was evident that at the termination of even a victorious war the Bulgarians would have to evacuate the towns and districts of Seres, Drama, and Cavalla, and the exasperation of the Bulgarian public at the attitude of their ally may be easily imagined,
Such was the irritation of the public that Radoslavov felt bound to make a reassuring statement, and affirm that "there is no ground for any anxiety as to our rights to Seres, Drama, and Cavalla, and to all the territories which Greece secured by the treaty of 1913. According to our treaty with our allies, in the event of Greece, without any provocation on our part, declaring war against us, we have a right to annex all the territories which Greece acquired by the Treaty of Bucarest in 1913. This condition was fulfilled when Greece declared war last year." Radoslavov's utterances, however, failed to impart the requisite confidence. He had too often abused the credulity of the public, and as he had been caught lying in a most brazen manner on the question of the Dobrudja, little credence was given to his official assurances.\(^1\)

An indication of the dangerous pitch to which public indignation had been roused was furnished by the attitude of the Gueshov and the Social Democrat parties. In contravention of the prescriptions of the Bulgarian censor, they published in their organs, the Mir and the Narod, two violent articles on Radoslavov's administration. Both papers were suspended, but from the tenor of the replies they evoked in the Narodni Prava,\(^1\)

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\(^1\) He had addressed a telegram to the Dobrudja National Council to the effect "that the Dobrudja was free and that it had not been divided" (May 11), when he was aware that the contrary was true.
an idea may be formed of the virulence of their attacks. The Government organ replying to the *Mir* wrote:

Unfortunately, there are people in Bulgaria who have never felt as Bulgarians. Of late they have become mentally unhinged and have lost all feeling of patriotism, because Bulgaria is advancing safely towards the realization of her most cherished ambitions. This greatness towards which Bulgaria is advancing is maddening to traitors. They cannot bear the idea of it. What is to become of them? Foreign gold is burning their hands, and through their Press they are endeavouring to spread discord and to undermine the morale of the public, so that the strong Bulgarian rock may be sapped and destroyed by the enemy. Those inspiring the *Mir* have published one issue of this paper teeming with innuendoes and scurrilities against our Allies and the Government. This, for those who compassed Bulgaria's ruin in 1913, is a glorious deed. To these people, with their criminal past towards Bulgaria, our Allies are evil, because our Allies are helping us to realize our unification. The Government is likewise evil because it did not agree to throw Bulgaria on the side of Russia, because it is doing its duty by the various measures it has adopted, and because it will not take advice from bankrupt politicians and quondam traitors, but moves on courageously along the path it has traced. By insinuating that the food-supply is badly arranged, they think they will be able to discourage the people. But who is mad enough to lend an ear to the treacherous opinions of the inspirers of the *Mir*?

No conscientious Bulgarian can ask for agreeable food during the last month before harvest, and the Government is accused on this head because those behind the *Mir* believe that our people, influenced by their stomachs, will compromise their high aims. But the people will not follow the advice of these notorious political marauders, and will not lend an ear to these despicable politicians, *who persistently demanded of the Entente that it should occupy Macedonia, and who used to threaten that if we did not join Russia they would instigate disorders in the country*. Our people will pay no attention to these non-Bulgarians,
who for the sake of Serbia and Russia divided Macedonia into various zones, to these criminals who obeyed the orders of the Russian Tsar, who not only did not acquire any territory for Bulgaria, but gave the whole of Macedonia to the Serbians and the Greeks. The successes which have been obtained and those which will be obtained the persons connected with the Mir desire to compromise. In their base calumnies they go so far as to say that the Government deputies form a black majority of doubtful origin, and all this out of envy, because this majority has helped Bulgaria to include within her frontiers the whole of Macedonia, the Morava, the Cavalla and Drama districts, the valley of the Maritsa, and the Dobrudja.

The answer to the article of the Narod, which was in the form of an open letter to Radoslavov, was couched in the following terms:

In its content, the message is a feeble collection of street rumours by which those incapable of serving the nation are endeavouring to destroy what others have created. In the threats it contains it does not differ from all those open and veiled menaces which have been addressed to Radoslavov, and even to a higher personage since he assumed power in 1913. These provocations, however, will not frighten the Prime Minister, although a price may have been set on his head, and his bones would probably be angrily thrown to the dogs for "audacious treachery to the Slavo-Russian cause" and for having followed a policy "foreign to Slav Bulgaria." Whence do the authors of the message derive the courage to affirm that "the country was forced into the war against the will of the nation and only by agreement with the Crown?"

"The need for a more complete unity of the national forces calls for a radical change in policy," says the message, but in what sense is this change desired by the Socialists? Is it in the sense of the speeches made by the Opposition leaders in the Sobranje during 1914 and 1915? Is it in the sense of the manifestoes published by the Opposition leaders before mobilization? Or is a change in the Russian manner desired?

We cannot believe that any politician in Bulgaria would
undertake to carry through a change along the lines indicated above. This shows that the attacks on the Prime Minister are not serious. At the present moment, however, in the present oppressive atmosphere, the smallest causes may create dangerous currents, and for this reason such attacks are a premeditated crime against the State.

The brilliant successes of Radoslavov's policy have temporarily subdued the envy of the Opposition leaders and have forced them to change their tactics. But their submission is only apparent. They have not repented, nor have they returned to the right path. Under their new disguise they lie in ambush to seize power and realize their infernal plans. If they do not succeed in this they are ready to go to extremes. They have taken Bolshevik Russia for their model.

According to the Socialists, the Bulgarian Government is corrupt, because it has allowed its partisans to accumulate untold riches.

The Bulgarian Government is tyrannical because it allows the censorship to stop gossip tending to undermine the basis of society. It is usurping power, because it will not permit our Bolsheviki to plunder our citizens as was attempted in Philippopolis, where the Socialist mob broke into the mayor's house, not for the purpose of demanding rights and defending its usurped power, but for loot.

The Opposition leaders trade on the food shortage and ascribe it to the smuggling of food to Germany. This is a shameful misrepresentation of the case, for if there is a small shortage this is entirely due to the unsatisfactory harvest. Owing to the measures taken, the Prime Minister is convinced that Bulgaria will not succumb by famine. And if God safeguards her from the dreadful results of the agitation of envious partisans, she is sure of the success of her high cause.

Criticism of the Government is apparently the prerogative of Socialists in all countries. But to pretend that they exercise this in the name of morality and in the interest of army discipline—the discipline of a bourgeois army!—which they profess to save from evil influences, is criminal hypocrisy.

You want peace. But is this the way you will obtain it? Does the obstacle to peace come from us or from our
Allies? Was it not we who, although victors, first tendered our hand for peace and found no one to clasp it?

Will your platonic desire stop the French and British troops from exterminating us at the smallest sign of weakness, and from restoring the Morava and Macedonia to Serbia, Drama and Cavalla to Greece, and the Dobrudja to Rumania, while they divide our country among themselves?

The Prime Minister and the Government will not betray the Alliance, nor will Bulgaria forgive any one for such a betrayal.

Your fear, gentlemen of the Socialist party, that we have endangered the unification and independence of the Fatherland is nothing but the sham fear of men who have no country and who declare themselves to be against the unification of the Bulgarian people. Our acquisitions and independence are endangered only by you and by such agitation as yours.

Our foreign policy is said to be servile, shortsighted, pusillanimous, prejudicial, and anti-national. Woe to Bulgaria if she were forced to hand over the direction of her foreign policy to the Socialists, who have arranged affairs so well in Russia, or to their bourgeois supporters, the Ententists, the authors of the pogrom of 1913! The Socialists declare that externally Bulgaria has been humbled, insulted, and subjected to unprecedented extortion, and that internally she has become disorganized to an appalling extent.

Never was Bulgaria in such a splendid position as at present. It is in vain that the condominium in the Dobrudja alarms our Socialists; this is merely a temporary measure; only the Socialists can believe it to be a fiasco. The Government of Bulgaria does not depend on the wishes of the microscopic Socialist minority in the Sobranje, which must be impudent indeed to assume the right of speaking "in the name of the entire nation."

The internal ferment which had been prevailing for the past months, and which found expression in the violent diatribes of the Mir and Narod, was bound to end in Radoslavov's resignation. He failed in his attempt to suppress dissatisfaction by his favourite methods of force, and even
found that some of his supporters had abandoned him at this critical moment. The two Stambulovist Ministers in the Cabinet tendered their resignations on May 30, owing to their disapproval of the way in which Radoslavov had handled the Dobrudja question. If to the political difficulties be added those arising from the unsatisfactory condition of the food supply, and the exasperation and anger aroused by the various exposures of the corrupt practices of Radoslavov's administration, it is easy to understand why Tsar Ferdinand considered that pressure had risen to a dangerous point, and that the moment had come to let off a little steam in the form of a change of Cabinet.

The selection of Malinov as Prime Minister was inevitable. After the politicians of the "Liberal" groups he is the most amenable to Court influence, and for this weakness of his the Bulgarians have dubbed him "The Lackey." Though less subservient than Radoslavov, he has proved docile enough to satisfy Ferdinand, for has he not professed his devotion to the latter in the memorable phrase, "For you, with you, and always by you?"

Malinov, who owed his nomination to the servility he displayed, was far from enjoying the full confidence of the nation. It was mainly for this reason that he failed in his efforts to form a broad coalition Cabinet. The Social
Democrats abstained from entering the Cabinet, because they “did not desire to be employed as a label for the carrying out of a policy that they disliked.” ¹ The Agrarians refused to participate, because certain guarantees they demanded concerning the administration, especially the removal of all foreign (German) interference, Malinov could not or would not grant. In all probability they asked also for the acquittal of their imprisoned leader Stamboliski, which Ferdinand would certainly have disapproved. The Doctrinaire Socialists acted according to their principle of “no co-operation with the bourgeois.” The reasons which led Gueshov’s party to refrain from accepting ministerial posts are obscure, but they must be of the same nature as those enunciated by the Agrarians and the Social Democrats. For the party leaders, in spite of the tone of their organ edited by the pro-German ex-Minister Peev-Platchkov (pro-German, not by conviction, but from personal animosity, because he has lost four brothers fighting against us), must still retain their old sympathies for the Entente. As for the presence of the two Radical Ministers in the Cabinet, it was due to their patriotic wish to help their country in its difficulties, and not to any pro-German sympathies. ²

¹ Narod, June 22, 1918.
² Eloquent testimony of the views of Minister Kosturkov is furnished by his organ, the Radical, July 4, of which he
The Malinov Cabinet did not possess any liberty of action. It had to conform strictly to royal wishes. It may be taken for granted that it did not even enjoy the unlimited confidence of the Crown, for Ferdinand had entrusted the War Ministry to his old Court Marshal, General Savov,¹ instead of giving the post to General Paprikov, the nominee of the Democrats.

The course taken by Malinov—namely, the continuation of the policy hitherto followed—was not approved either by Radicals, Social Democrats, or Agrarians. The Radicals insisted on the Government pursuing a policy "more inclined to the Left, so that it may be better able to rely on the support of the broad masses." This demand had found a ready response among the Social Democrats and Agrarians. The views of the former are best illustrated by a perusal of the resolutions passed at a congress of their party used to be editor. In spite of his own consciousness of patriotic responsibility and the vigilance of the censorship he yet managed to express his opinion as follows: "The methods of settling inter-Allied disputes among the Entente countries is the opposite of that of the Alliance. While in the latter there is one absolute arbiter, among the Entente all members have equal rights and all disagreements are settled by friendly negotiations based on justice without any reference to the material strength of each individual Ally.”

¹ Whose name should not be mistaken for that of General Michael Savov, the commander of the Bulgarian army during the war against Turkey.
which met in Sofia early in September 1918. According to Reuter:

The meeting rigorously condemned any Imperialistic aims, and declared that the principal part of democracy at the present moment was to work to bring about a democratic peace with the Entente on the basis of the principle of nationality. The resolutions adopted emphasized the necessity of creating a League of Nations as the condition of a permanent peace and the establishment of an international régime based on the principle of the free determination of peoples.

Though these resolutions are expressive of the general views prevailing in Bulgaria, the Malinov Cabinet could not let itself be influenced by them, for it was bound to humour the Liberal groups which are pro-German and which enjoy a majority in the Chamber. The most it could attempt was to follow a middle course until such time as the popular cry of "bread and peace" became too insistent and threatening to be ignored.
CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

If ferment was rife in the towns, where the arrogant demeanour of Bulgaria's allies had sown the seeds of discontent in the hearts of the public, already disaffected by reason of hardships and privations greater than those prevailing even in Austria, tranquillity and contentment seem to have been prevalent until quite recently in the country districts.

The industry and frugality of the Bulgarian peasant are proverbial. His wants are modest, and he generally contrives to supply most of his needs from the produce of his farmstead. About 80 per cent. of the total population are peasants, of whom some 933,000 are landed proprietors.\(^1\) The peasants being more or less

\(^1\) According to a statistical table published in 1911 the land was parcelled out as follows:

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self-supporting, hardly experienced any of the sufferings to which the urban population was subjected. Their chief requirements, such as salt, petroleum, soap, sugar, and hides—their clothes are usually homespun and home-made of the wool of their own sheep—were, it is true, scarce, but the capitulation of Rumania had solved the problem of supply of the first two of these commodities, and what does a shortage or even an absence of the others mean to the avaricious peasant, when he is offered the opportunity of disposing of his produce at rates which may be estimated at three to ten times those of pre-war days.

According to the Bulgarian Statistical Bureau, the price of wheat in 1917 was 207.1 per cent. dearer than in 1905, maize 267.6 per cent., beans 450 per cent., potatoes 558.3 per cent., cabbages 682.9 per cent., onions 417.2 per cent. Other vegetables 981.8 per cent. Rice 377.3 per cent. Meat 389.6 per cent. Fruits 465.2 per cent. Butter 554 per cent. It is the peasantry who have profited by this rise in the prices of agricultural produce.

"The peasants have reaped enormous profits, each family having realized from 15,000 to 30,000 fr. from the cultivation of tobacco alone,"

1 In 1918 the price of wheat was fixed at 1 fr. per kg., which represents an increase of 500 per cent. on the prices ruling in 1905. All other food-stuffs likewise increased in proportion.
said the Minister of Agriculture in an interview with the representative of a Sofia daily in June 1917. It may be interesting to note the enormous strides made in the cultivation of this profitable crop. In 1915 the tobacco acreage amounted to 18,000 hectares, while in 1917 it had extended to 30,000 hectares. It was expected to reach 50,000 hectares this year, with a yield of 40,000,000 kg. The home consumption amounted roughly to 3,000,000 kg., but owing to the doubling of Bulgaria's population and the needs of the army, some 8,000,000 kg. should be set apart for local requirements, releasing 32,000,000 kg. for the export trade. Tobacco used to fetch 1 to 2.50 fr. per kg. in pre-war times, while now it has risen to the fantastic figure of 36 fr. per kg. Thus the Bulgarian peasantry will realize from the sale of its tobacco crop alone over one milliard of francs. A true appreciation of this figure will be formed if it be remembered that before the war the total value of Bulgarian exports seldom reached 200,000,000 fr. a year.

In an interview published at the end of April 1918, the Prefect of the Adrianople Department, speaking on the situation in his district, the greater part of the population of which is composed of Bulgarian refugees from Turkey and Macedonia, stated that the inhabitants were much pleased with the economic conditions and
their work, as their produce fetched very remunerative prices, and that they had become economically independent. "Even sorghum grain," he added, "which a few years ago was worthless, to-day brings in thousands of francs to those who cultivate it."

A good criterion of the consequent prosperity is furnished by the returns of the savings banks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deposits</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>4,140,000</td>
<td>7,790,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>5,700,000</td>
<td>10,370,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>6,280,000</td>
<td>11,380,000</td>
<td>17,879,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>3,190,000</td>
<td>10,870,000</td>
<td>16,953,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3,720,000</td>
<td>12,720,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total deposits during 1917 amounted to 127,891,064 fr. as against 55,108,211 fr. in 1916. The receipts of 1917 almost equalled the total of the preceding twenty-one years that the savings banks had been in operation.

The State Agricultural Bank announced in its half-yearly report, published in September 1917, that most of its farmer-debtors had paid off their debts, and that it had received deposits of upwards of 168,000,000 fr.

Tontchev, the late Finance Minister, in introducing the Budget for 1918, stated that deposits in the three State banks (the National Bank of Bulgaria, the Agricultural Bank, and the Co-operative Bank) had increased at the following rate:
While loans made by these banks to private debtors had been refunded to the amount of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>382,254,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>365,559,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>327,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>255,152,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further indication of the apparent economic prosperity is furnished by the balance-sheet of the National Bank of Bulgaria during 1917. Its net profits for the year amounted to 40,000,000 fr.

This Government institution has a share capital of 20,000,000 fr. and a reserve fund of 10,000,000 fr., and has the exclusive privilege of issuing notes. The law required that a third of their value should be covered by gold. The bank collects and manages all necessary payments to the Government account, and places at its disposal in case of need all its circulation media. It is intended to increase the capital of the bank to 100,000,000 fr.

Every effort was made by the Government to remove any cause of dissatisfaction among the peasants and the poorer classes. Remembering the bitter experience of the Balkan War when, owing to the penury of resources, no assistance was granted to the dependents of soldiers, a
neglect resulting in widespread suffering among the poor and discontent among their mobilized relatives, the Government proceeded to grant allowances on an adequate scale to the families of mobilized soldiers.

The amount of pecuniary assistance distributed to the families of indigent soldiers from the beginning of the war and up to the end of April 1918 had reached the sum of 160,872,156 fr., the number of families in receipt of assistance being 180,580, with a total of 550,000 members. A vote was passed by the Sobranje in May 1918 doubling the amount of these allowances, so that the monthly outlay was estimated to attain 9,611,784 fr.

In order to placate the peasantry further, and to ensure, as far as possible, the regular cultivation of the fields, the Government, in co-operation with the German authorities, imported a number of motor-ploughs, and arranged to till the farms of those peasant families whose men were at the front. In order to facilitate communications and for strategic purposes, roads and railways were constructed. This was also to the advantage of the peasants, who were thus enabled to market their produce more easily. The amount of railway construction undertaken and completed is truly amazing if we take the existing difficulties into consideration. The following lines have been opened for traffic:
Silistra–Kaspitsan.
Tserven Bregh–Orechovo (only the section Tserven Bregh–Kneja had been completed by February 1918).
Zimnitsa–Bukovnik.
Radomir–Dupnitsa–Levunovo. This line was being extended to Demir Hissar.
Prilep–Gradsko.
Uskub–Tetovo–Gostivar. The construction of a further section to Ochrida had been voted by the Sobranje on November 1917.

The construction of the following lines has also been sanctioned and probably begun:
Ghiushevo–Kumanovo.
Shumen–Karnobat.

The Government did not forget either the civil functionaries or the State pensioners, and war bonuses were duly awarded to them. The condition of the labouring classes was also improved. Commissions were appointed in all towns to fix new and higher rates of pay, while at the same time bread and meat were provided for the indigent at half the statutory prices fixed for the well-to-do. All these measures testify to the anxiety of the Bulgarian Government to satisfy the poorer classes in order to avoid discontent among the masses.
The enforcement of these measures entailed a large expenditure by the State, but was rendered feasible by German assistance. German financial help to Bulgaria was in fact nominal, and the munificence she displayed did not cost her much. Credits, estimated at 50,000,000 fr. per month, were opened at Berlin, and on this guarantee the National Bank of Bulgaria issued corresponding amounts of bank-notes. According to its balance-sheet published on April 22, 1918, the gold reserves totalled 62,986,000 fr. Funds abroad (German paper credits), 1,227,928,000 fr., and the fiduciary circulation 1,607,296,000 fr. The State indebtedness to the Bank was estimated at 611,442,406.30 fr. This great increase of paper money has caused depreciation, and the Government hit upon a plan for stopping its increased circulation by supplying a competing medium in the form of treasury bonds, and by instructing the National Bank to accept deposits with 4 per cent. interest. These measures were resorted to in November 1917, and by June 15, 1918, the amount of treasury bonds sold was reported to be 347,688,000 fr., and the deposits in the National Bank (at 4 per cent.), 87,688,000 fr.

It may be interesting to note that several

1 A comparison with a balance issued on July 7, 1918, is not without interest as it shows to what an extent the State indebtedness to the State Bank is increasing. The sums were respectively 63,757,000 fr., 975,203,000 fr., 1,877,341,000 fr., and 1,102,546,576 fr.
other provisions of a financial character were sanctioned by the Sobranje early this year for the purpose of placating the army. Thus all soldiers are to be exempted from the obligation of paying interest on existing loans for the duration of the war and for six months after the demobilization. For the first three years after the conclusion of peace no creditor will be entitled to take legal proceedings for recovery of his debts from any person who has served as a soldier. These measures were to apply to all soldiers whose families had not realized a profit exceeding 7000 fr. during the war. Yet another law was voted, by which mobilized workmen and employees were entitled to receive 50 per cent. of their salaries from their late employers during the duration of war.

The prosperity of the country districts goes a long way to explain the comparative absence of dissatisfaction in Bulgaria. The bulk of the population was more or less contented, and the soldiers, receiving such encouraging news from their homes, had not much cause to grumble at the undue prolongation of the war.

The unsatisfactory harvest of 1917 not only proved insufficient to cover the requirements of the country in cereals, but even left a deficiency of over 100,000 tons, and this led the Radoslavov administration to adopt last spring some very rigorous measures in order to make good the short-
age. Requisitioning commandoes were formed of Albanian brigands, and these were employed to search for and seize any concealed stocks of bread-stuffs over and above the requirements of each farmstead. These peculiar Government agents seem to have distinguished themselves by their violent methods, and although they apparently succeeded in their mission, and have unearthed considerable quantities of grain, they have excited much indignation among the country folk.

This will explain the sudden recrudescence of discontent which proved too much for the already overstrained administration of Radoslavov. The conditions prevailing in towns were the reverse of those in the country. Everything to which a Bulgarian town-dweller had become accustomed was unobtainable except at a price he could not possibly afford. A suit of clothes cost 500 fr., a shirt 50 fr., and a pair of boots 200 to 250 fr., and these were only obtainable after the applicant had satisfied a committee appointed specially for the purpose that he had no other clothes, and that those which he was actually wearing were in rags. The following humorous anecdote of two friends bent upon obtaining new clothing was published by a Sofia paper during the summer of 1917:

The two friends presented themselves at the office of the Provident Committee to seek a written authorization for
renewing their wardrobe. They found in the anteroom a crowd of ragged people, wearing old overcoats without sleeves, trousers in shreds, boots without soles or with their feet bandaged in dirty linen. Their surprise was great when they recognized among the ill-clad crowd some of their own acquaintances.

In answer to their question as to the purpose of masquerading in such attire, the two friends were told that if they did not furnish the Provident Committee with cogent proofs of their need no permits would be given them. They therefore returned home, and managed to borrow from some beggars a few ragged clothes. After making themselves unrecognizable, they went again the following day to the Provident Committee, hoping to obtain tickets for clothes and shoes. But to their dismay they learnt that the Provident Committee was now engaged in more important business, and were obliged to return home once more empty-handed.

The cost of living had increased to such an extent that functionaries, even with the bonuses voted by the Government, were unable to live on their salaries. The Mir (July 15, 1918), for instance, referring to the prevailing dearness said: “In the most modest of restaurants 900 fr. at least are required per month for food only. How then are officials to meet their expenses?” while the Dnevnik (August 6, 1918) affirmed: “Many families in Sofia eat only once in twenty-four hours, for the price of food-stuffs does not permit them to make more than one meal.” The price of meat and bread had increased fourfold, that of eggs fivefold, of fat and butter tenfold, of vegetable and fruit three to fifteen-fold, of fuel sixfold, of soap twenty-fold, of boots eightfold. Textiles were unobtainable, a metre of common
cotton calico fetched 28 to 30 fr., while a bobbin of cotton thread of 1000 yards was sold at 80 fr. Farmers no longer brought their produce to the town markets owing to the shortage of labour, and because they could dispose of it to local collecting committees, so that the townsfolk had to content themselves with the meagre rations fixed by the Government. A Sofia daily gave a narrative of some of the tricks that were resorted to by the Sofians to supplement their rations:

It has scarcely dawned, and I am hurrying towards the end of the town in the hope of meeting some villagers, because experience has taught me that it is difficult to find anything in the market. There are many other householders on the same quest. I catch one up and ask him: "Whither bound, friend?" "On a walk," is the reply. Yes, indeed, a walk! and we endeavour to outstrip one another, until at last we simply race. The races are most interesting on Fridays. If you go in the direction of the cemetery you will see a rare sight—perfect races, not between horses, but between men.

The supply of fuel had been so curtailed that many towns had not received anything like an adequate provision for their requirements. For the winter of 1916 it had been arranged to supply each family in Sofia with at least three-quarters of a ton of coal, but the amount actually delivered did not amount to more than 400 kg., and one may imagine what sufferings must have resulted for the civil population in a rigorous climate like that of Bulgaria. Discontent could not but
grow when it was found that the Radoslavov Government showed itself too benevolently disposed towards the Germans, and allowed them to export commodities which were badly needed at home. Several deputies belonging to the Radoslavov party were permitted to smuggle large quantities of flour and sugar abroad. Manufacturers of woollen cloths who were supplied with certain quantities of wool for the requirements of their mills bribed Government partisans and exported the wool given to them to Germany, finding this more lucrative than weaving woollen stuffs for the needs of the country. It was found that a prominent Government deputy, Dr. Chr. Gheorghiev, had sold a large quantity of quinine to the Turkish Government from the already inadequate supplies possessed by Bulgaria. The brother of the late Minister Dintchev, was permitted to smuggle into Turkey 50,000 lambs from the Burgas district, by means of which transaction he is said to have realized a profit of over 1,000,000 fr.¹

¹ A very amusing anecdote is related in connexion with this transaction. It had been arranged to transport a large number of these lambs by steamers from Burgas to Constantinople. In order that the inhabitants of the former town might not witness the wholesale smuggling, the authorities at the time prearranged for the shipment announced through the town-criers that hostile aircraft were about to bombard the town, and that every one ought to seek shelter within doors for a few hours. Naturally the population obeyed the order, and during those hours the lading of the cargo was effected without attracting undue attention.
Yet another deputy (Altimirski) was found to have offered large quantities of grain to the Germans, and when in the spring of this year the Government demanded a loan of grain from the German authorities in Rumania, the latter pointedly retorted that since grain had been offered to them by Bulgarians, the Bulgarian authorities would do better to requisition local stocks, and not seek allied help when it was not indispensable.

The unexampled corruption which was rampant in the public offices and the illicit methods resorted to by prominent adherents of Radoslavov in accumulating huge fortunes proved too much even for German equanimity. We see a member of the German military mission in Sofia publishing a pamphlet in which the prevalent abuses are exposed, and some of the leading partisans of Radoslavov violently taken to task. Von den Steinen, its author, was naturally removed; but the similarity of his name with that of the German War Minister led the Bulgarian public to believe that the exposures were made by the latter. These revelations, coming at a time when the Dobrudja negotiations had reached a deadlock, provoked such a wave of indignation throughout the country that it was no longer possible for the Radoslavov Cabinet to continue in office. "Out with them" was the universal cry, and it became so threatening that Tsar
Ferdinand had to comply with the nation's desire and part company, much to his regret, with his subservient Ministers.

Von den Steinen's criticism will perhaps repay quotation, and the following excerpt from his pamphlet on the characteristics of Radoslavov's followers is not devoid of piquancy if it be remembered that it is mainly owing to the efforts of the men he so scathingly condemns that Bulgaria's adherence to the Central Alliance was rendered feasible. Describing the various types of people met in Bulgaria, Von den Steinen says:

There is also the person thoroughly versed in graft, who in Bulgaria is particularly unscrupulous and disloyal. This person foists himself on the foreigner and perverts relations between peoples. For this reason it is a misfortune with regard to the cultural relations between Germany and Bulgaria that at this very moment those parties which have practised the most repulsive form of graft should be in office. It is for this reason, and not on account of their foreign policy, that Radoslavov and his party are unanimously execrated by the Bulgarian people. It is most deplorable and very important with regard to our cultural influence that these parties have no connexion whatever with the Bulgarian intelligentsia. The intellectuals look down with scorn on the followers of Radoslavov and abstain from all intercourse with them, lest their honour should be tarnished. As Radoslavov's partisans have everywhere foisted themselves on us [Germans], as they have consciously and systematically isolated the Germans from everything not pertaining to their band, a situation most detrimental to our prestige has resulted. Firstly, owing to a great number of capable and active Bulgarians remaining out of touch with us [Germans], and secondly, because our cultural activity has come to naught and has been compromised by the incapacity and disloyalty of the persons belonging to the governing parties. At the next elections,
the parties who pretend to monopolize German friendship, and who aim by their cultural relations with the Germans at obtaining bribes and decorations, will simply be uprooted. Then we shall be placed in a very unfortunate situation if we have not formed any other ties with the Bulgarian people.

The systematic spoliation in which the partisans of the former Government coalition indulged was phenomenal. Prefects and high officials would commit such gross abuses that in many cases the military authorities had to intervene, and Radoslavov, in order to extricate these pillars of his party from the heavy hand of the law, was obliged in many instances to pretend that he needed their presence in Sofia, or to send them on missions abroad. To what extent corruption was rife may be gauged from the fact that Takev, the new Minister of the Interior, not only relieved all these gentry of their functions, but ordered that most of them should be impeached for the illegalities they had committed. As an example it may be stated that the late mayor of Sofia is shortly to answer a charge of appropriating 120,000 kg. of sugar.¹

The organ of the Agrarians, the Zemledelsko Zname (July 3, 1918), published the following appreciation of the Radoslavov régime:

It will remain for ever memorable for its robberies, peculations, embezzlements, and corruption. The new

¹ He has since been condemned to two years' imprisonment and the loss of his civil rights for a period of five years.
Government would indeed compromise itself if it did not take measures to satisfy the revolted national conscience. Impeach them at once!—the entire Radoslavov gang of marauders and plunderers, who at the expense of the whole nation and while it was rotting in the trenches, has been accumulating inestimable riches by the most dishonourable means. All their fortunes must be confiscated by the State.

The Radoslavov administration has proved destructive in every branch of the administration. From the financial point of view it has completely wrecked the country, and it may be stated without exaggeration that the situation is desperate. The total indebtedness of the country is rapidly reaching the total of the estimated national wealth. Bulgaria entered the war with a debt estimated at from 1,000,000,000 to 1,500,000,000 fr., of which 610,000,000 fr. were consolidated. Up to the end of April 1918 the total war expenditure which had been incurred amounted to nearly 7,000,000,000 fr. in round numbers, and the total national debt must have attained, therefore, 8,000,000,000 fr. The national wealth was reckoned at 10,000,000,000 fr. before the war, and it may be added that this was a generous estimate, seeing that the main purpose of the computation was to give confidence to Bulgaria's foreign creditors. The sole aim of the late Finance Minister and his partisans was to line their pockets before their race was run. Taxation on anything like an adequate scale was carefully avoided so as not to cause
restlessness; it would, moreover, have opened the people's eyes to the ultimate consequences of the policy followed. The Bulgarian's pocket is his most sensitive point, and if the average Bulgarian had had any inkling of being called upon to pay in the future eight to nine times as many taxes as before the war (which, by the way, is altogether beyond his power), we should have long since been gratified with comforting news from Bulgaria. Tontchev, the late Finance Minister, conducted his Department in an altogether haphazard manner. This cannot possibly be termed a system or a policy, and his attitude on the introduction of a Bill for the taxation of war profits may be cited as typical of his methods. This measure was strongly advocated by all the Opposition, but as the persons the Bill aimed at were mostly partisans of the coalition at the time in office, to whom all war and Government contracts had been given, Tontchev did his utmost to prevent the passing of this measure. As the Opposition, however, returned repeatedly to the charge, and as, moreover, the Finance Minister could not pretend to make his budget estimate for 1918 balance without some drastic increase in taxation, he let the tax on war profits figure in his estimate for revenue to the amount of 120,000,000 fr. But though the Budget was voted, nothing has been decided yet as to this new tax, and it consequently remains inopera-
tive. As some critic justly remarked, by the time the tax becomes law, those aimed at will have spent their profits.

The Budget for 1918 estimated the revenue at some 478,400,000 fr. and the expenditure at the same. But Tontchev's estimates have never come up to expectation. Every Budget he framed has closed with a deficit amounting to a total of over 110,000,000 fr. for the quinquennial period of his stewardship. In the present Budget no provision is made for war expenditure, while interest on the public debt and a sinking fund are only partially provided for. These last items alone involved an expenditure of some 40,000,000 fr. in pre-war times, when Bulgaria's consolidated debt figured at 600,000,000 fr. in round numbers. If we take the national debt at 8,000,000,000 fr., Bulgaria on this basis would have to provide 530,000,000 fr. for her public debt service. In reality, however, a much higher figure will be required owing to the great depreciation of Bulgarian currency and to the fact that interest will necessarily have to be remitted abroad, whence the money was borrowed, so that for a correct computation at least 30 per cent. more should be added. Even this figure may be regarded as too low, for the present rate of exchange is much higher, 100 Swiss being equivalent to 210 Bulgarian francs.
Bulgaria

Budget for 1918

Expenditure

1. Civil List (expenses of the Court, etc.) fr. 6,441,500
2. Audit Office fr. 619,000
3. National Debts 128,178,173
4. Ministry for Foreign Affairs 7,320,176
5. Ministry for the Interior 17,818,000
6. Ministry of Education 37,102,002
7. Ministry of Finance 13,840,990
8. Ministry of Justice 9,477,070
9. Ministry of War 104,600,050
10. Ministry of Commerce 23,235,280
11. Agriculture 9,172,000
12. Ministry of Buildings 10,210,320
13. Ministry of Railways:
   (a) Railway Administration 41,177,529
   (b) Post and Telegraph 12,780,220

Total 421,972,310

Revenue

1. Direct taxes 228,000,000
2. Indirect taxes 116,000,000
3. Government monopolies 12,000,000
4. Taxes and dues 13,400,000
5. Fines and confiscations 300,000
6. Revenue from railways, ports, Post Office, telegraphs, and telephones 57,000,000
7. Revenue from Government land, capital, etc. 26,900,000
8. Revenue from municipalities and district administrative bodies for teachers' salaries 10,500,000
9. Sundry revenues 14,300,000

Total 478,400,000

Another item which also must be provided for is that of pensions to disabled soldiers, which will
entail an annual outlay of 66,000,000 fr. according to the ex-Minister Todorov, although others contend that 90,000,000 fr. will not be too much. The present expenditure, as provided for in the new budget, is by no means on an adequate scale for peace conditions, when a tremendous outlay will be necessary for the development of Bulgaria's new provinces and for the work of reconstruction. Tontchev estimated that the first Bulgarian peace Budget would amount to 1,000,000,000 fr., while the ex-Minister Todorov calculated that expenditure would come to 1,300,000,000 fr. How will such a stupendous sum be raised from an impoverished and exhausted country, when from 150,000,000 to 200,000,000 fr. were the utmost that could be annually squeezed out of the tax-payer? The problem was undoubtedly occupying the minds of all Bulgarian politicians who had their country's interests at heart, and who dreaded to see Bulgaria falling into the economic bondage of Germany. The economic question was Bulgaria's nightmare, and provided us with a fulcrum which we could have set ourselves to use to great advantage, for nothing is more distasteful to the Bulgarian mind than the idea of his country being farmed by the foreigner, and he himself turned into a helot. A close economic alliance with the Central Empires, such as was contemplated in the Central Europe scheme, was bound to prove most detrimental to
Bulgarian interests. If import duties on German and Austro-Hungarian wares were to be reduced, Bulgaria's budding industry, some 75 per cent. of which is founded with native capital, would be jeopardized. On the other hand, Bulgaria's exports are mostly agricultural, and, as both Germany and Austria-Hungary would have continued of necessity to protect their own agriculture, Bulgaria could hope to get little in return, and the bulk of Bulgarian produce would have continued to find its way to the Entente States, to Turkey, Greece, and Egypt, as was the case before the war.

The Bulgarians have fully realized what such a commercial dependence on the Central Powers would imply, and the lesson they have had recently is not likely to be forgotten. Of late there had been much talk in Germany of the bad quality of the tobacco supplied to the German troops. The cause was not due to any shortage of tobacco in the countries of the Central Alliance, but to the measures adopted by the Central German Buying Department. Wishing to force down the prices of Bulgarian tobacco, it prohibited all imports into Germany of tobacco costing more than a statutory price. The Bulgarian producers, unable to export anywhere except to the Central Powers, or through them to the few neutral countries in Europe, were faced by the dilemma of either accepting the
price offered by the Germans or keeping their tobacco. The Bulgars, who are exceedingly tenacious in money matters, decided for the latter alternative, stored their tobacco and spitefully allowed their beloved allies to smoke the poisonous substitute mixture so violently decried in the Reichstag. If the Germans had been content with this self-denying measure, the Bulgars would have had no cause of complaint, for their allies were entitled to protect their economic interests as they thought best. The Germans, however, who aimed at bringing the Bulgarian exporters to their knees, were not content with fixing a maximum price for tobacco imported into Germany, but took the extreme step of prohibiting the transit of Bulgarian tobacco through the Central Empires to Switzerland and Scandinavia, where it would have found an easy market. This step served as an eye-opener to the Bulgars, and he is too cute a person to be taken in twice. In fact, he was never deceived by German promises, and if it were not for the abject venality displayed by the corrupt members of the Radoslavov Cabinet, who were openly bribed by Germany, even the last Bulgarian loan, by which Bulgaria became economically dependent on Germany, would never have been concluded. The scant regard thus shown by Germany for Bulgarian interests caused tremendous excitement in Bulgaria, and the
virulent attacks upon the Radoslavov administration which appeared in the *Mir* and the *Narod* were largely prompted by the embargo which Germany placed on Bulgarian tobacco exports. In fact, such was the anger aroused that the Teutons themselves became alarmed, and after Radoslavov's fall allowed the transit of a limited quantity of tobacco through their territories to Switzerland, a concession they had already made, though they had hitherto withheld it under various pretexts.

The above case was not the only one in which the Germans had made themselves obnoxious. The Bulgarians complained that their allies would not send them certain items of machinery for their textile mills which they had ordered in Germany. And they accused the Germans of holding these back with the deliberate intention of compelling the Bulgarians to close their mills and export their wool to Germany instead of working it in Bulgaria.

Such friction, it must be admitted, was scarcely conducive to a lasting understanding, and if the Bulgarians put up with it, it was simply because they had to make a virtue of necessity. They must have surely been mentally repeating one of the verses of their popular song, "Brigands, Allies," which runs as follows:

We keep a good account of everything  
And shall fiercely retaliate.
Bulgaria aims not only at her national unification, but at remaining politically and economically independent, and this has been more than once emphasized by Malinov in his speeches in the Sobranje. He even pointedly remarked on the occasion of a speech by the German Ambassador in Sofia, in which the latter expressed his wish for a "united Bulgaria," that this ought to have been supplemented by a wish for a politically and economically independent Bulgaria. The Social Democrats also have lately formulated a demand for complete freedom from foreign interference in the administration, and have asked that the exploitation of railways and mines in Bulgaria should be carried out by Bulgarians.

The German object was to farm Bulgaria, and this was utterly incompatible with the Bulgarian point of view. Ilia Yanoulov, a leading Socialist, stated in the Sobranje in December 1917, that land and all natural resources must be in the hands of the Bulgarians, and that high taxes must be imposed to support the native industry, which must not be allowed to perish as it constitutes the main guarantee of the nation's economic and political independence. I. E. Gueshov affirms that a nation is politically independent only as long as it is economically so, and strenuously advocates the idea of making Bulgaria as self-supporting as possible. A noted economist,
Professor B. Boev, declares: "In order to be economically independent, Bulgaria must not hand over her natural wealth to foreigners," while yet another distinguished writer, Professor D. Mishaikov, opines: "An economic alliance between ourselves and other States involving the removal or reduction of import duties on industrial articles imported into Bulgaria would considerably prejudice home industry, and would impede the establishment of new industries. In short, every tariff agreement between two or more States is unprofitable to the State which is industrially the weaker." It is true that some adherents of Radoslavov, like the deputy Keortchev, Chr. Gheorgiev, etc., are advocates of the Central Europe scheme, but we know whence they derive their inspiration. It had the same source as the *Kambana*¹ shout: "If Germany should perish, Bulgaria does not deserve to live."

The prolongation of the war constituted a great peril to Bulgaria. Not only were her financial resources in danger of exhaustion, but her material reserves were being drained to a dangerous extent. This year she experienced an acute shortage of food-stuffs, and had it not been for the stocks she obtained from the Ukraine by

¹ The *Kambana*, according to the *Zemledelsko Zname* (July 10 and 17, 1918), is "the organ of political marauders and agents-provocateurs."
way of the Black Sea, from Bessarabia, and even from Germany, Bulgaria would have been forced to capitulate. The present harvest is a failure, and it is doubtful, in spite of official assurances to the contrary, whether it will prove sufficient for local requirements. But even if it should, this will not bring much consolation to Bulgaria, who is dependent on foreign countries for a certain quantity of indispensable commodities, which she can only obtain by offering food-stuffs in exchange. These articles are of vital importance to the economic life of the country, and their absence is bound to affect the national economy most adversely.

In this respect the interview with the Bulgarian Food Controller which the Zaria published on August 13, 1918, is extremely important, as it makes little attempt to conceal the anxiety with which the situation is viewed in responsible quarters. Among other things he said:

For the moment the most important object is the supply of the army and the civilian population with articles of prime necessity. The country is practically left to herself, and for the present it is not possible to say what will be the mutual help given among the Allies, as the agreement with the Central Powers concerning compensations expires on November 1. Negotiations for a new treaty have begun, but a final decision has not yet been reached.

Amongst the most important articles are food products. This year’s harvest has really been good in Macedonia and the Morava, but in Bulgaria it has not been particularly so. The harvest of the Morava and Macedonia will suffice to cover the requirements of the army, and with proper
organization it should be possible to satisfy the civilian population also. We shall be unable to export. An increase in the bread ration has been decreed, but it is too early yet to say whether this ration will remain in force or will be altered. Last year we obtained not less than 11 million kg. of milk products, such as butter, cheese, etc., but unfortunately the production has decreased, and I do not reckon that the output this year will surpass 6 million kg.

The Food Controller's statement to the effect that Bulgaria would be unable to export was of the greatest significance, for if hitherto Bulgaria had been able to supply some of her requirements from amongst her allies by offering food-stuffs in exchange, though with great difficulty, what was she likely to do in the future?

The expected yield of cereals is estimated this year at 2,073,958,650 kg. Consumption calculated at an average of 200 kg. per head (the rural population and the soldiers are allowed 230 kg. while others receive 170 kg. per head per annum) for a total population of some 9,000,000 would

1 Complaints against Bulgaria's allies for not keeping their pledges were occasionally met with in the Press. Thus the Radical (July 7, 1918) writes: "According to an agreement we concluded with them we ought to have received 500,000 metres of cloth, but we have not yet obtained a single one; they were to send us also 1000 truck loads of iron goods, of which, however, none have yet arrived."

2 Surface. Population. sq. km.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>1916, Bulgaria (frontiers of 1913)</th>
<th>1917, Bulgaria (plus Southern Dobrudja)</th>
<th>1917, Macedonia, in Bulgarian occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>116,177</td>
<td>123,702</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,095,700</td>
<td>5,517,700</td>
<td>1,269,400</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
amount to 1,800,000,000 kg.\textsuperscript{1} There is also seed to be set aside for the next harvest, and if we assume that the same area will be brought under cultivation as last season, namely, 3,175,322 hectares, another 500,000,000 kg. at the very least must be reserved for this purpose. The cattle still remain to be provided for, and owing to the extremely poor hay and straw yield, due to the prolonged drought of this summer, a more liberal allowance than formerly will have to be made. The Food Bureau has decreed that 50 kg. of cereals per head of cattle are to be allowed per annum for all cattle, including pigs more than two years old, and 6 kg. per head for sheep and goats. These quantities are altogether inadequate for the upkeep of the cattle, but we shall base calculation on them.

In 1917 it was reported that within the old frontiers of Bulgaria there were 1,485,354 horned cattle and horses. The number of sheep in 1918

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
Census of 1917, Morava, in Bulgarian occupation & Surface & Population \\
& sq. km. & \\
1917, Dobrudja (Northern) & 24,258 & 1,229,100 \\
1917, Drama district (plus Cavalla and Seres) & 15,536 & 380,400 \\
& 7,500 & 325,000 \\
\hline
Total (Census of 1917) & 200,996 & 8,721,600 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{1} This is an under-valuation, for the Narodni Prava (June 15, 1918) affirmed that 2,600,000,000 kg. were the annual grain requirements of the army and of the civilian population.
was 10,650,562, so that computing at 50 and 6 kg. we obtain a total of 138,171,072 kg. of grain. But besides the above there are the pigs and the goats as well as the cattle in the occupied territories, which have also to be fed. So that an estimate of 200,000,000 kg. of grain for fodder must be considered as the minimum even on the basis of the meagre rations decreed. It may be incidentally remarked that the Agrarians are demanding an increase of the rations, and are insisting upon a quantity of 200 kg. of grain per head of cattle. Adding up the various items we get a total of 2,500,000,000 kg.,\(^1\) representing the minimum needs, as against 2,073,958,650 kg., the estimated yield of the total harvest. Can Bulgaria hope to supplement her scanty resources from any of her equally hard-pressed neighbours? This is very doubtful, and the uncertainty no doubt contributed to the inclination of the Bulgarians to consider peace terms.

The clothing of the Bulgarian army also constituted another anxious problem. For months past this question had been engaging the attention of the authorities. The Bulgarian soldiers were clothed in rags, affirmed the Greek papers. This was admitted months ago by the Bulgarian deputies who visited the Front. Evidently

\(^1\) After Bulgaria's capitulation this computation no longer holds good, for a much smaller population will have to be provided for.
Bulgaria could no longer provide adequate clothing for her army. The production of wool in Bulgaria amounts to some 12,000,000 kg., corresponding to 1½ kg. per head annually, obviously an amount entirely inadequate to satisfy the requirements of both the army and the civil population.

A recent appeal by the War Ministry to the population asking it to surrender all its superfluous clothing and underclothing enlarged on the hardships endured by the soldiers owing to the great scarcity of underwear. This should not be surprising if it be remembered that the import of textiles into Bulgaria had been greatly curtailed since 1912 by the Balkan Wars and the subsequent closing of the Straits; whatever stocks there may have been, have long since been exhausted. The fact that a metre of common calico was fetching as much as 30 fr., is a sufficient testimony to the existing scarcity.

Bulgaria, in proportion to her population, has sustained exceedingly heavy losses. The late Minister for War, General Naidenov, admitted last March that she had lost some 53,000 in killed alone. If to these be added the losses incurred during the Balkan Wars it will be seen that Bulgaria’s man-power also must be very seriously depleted. In spite, however, of the excessive drain on her financial resources and the diminution of her man-power, Bulgaria, being mainly
an agricultural country, will soon recover some of her former prosperity, owing to the thriftiness and industry of her population, especially if there is a sequence of good harvests. Bulgaria's international trade was not large, and consequently little attention was paid to it by British business men. Thus we see that British exports into Bulgaria increased from 18,000,000 fr. in 1886 to 31,000,000 fr. in 1912, while German and Austro-Hungarian exports increased from 2,000,000 and 17,000,000 fr. to 31,000,000 and 51.4 million respectively for the same period.

German and Austro-Hungarian exporters enjoy a great advantage over their British rivals in that they can make use of the Danube waterway and thereby forward their goods to Bulgaria more rapidly and at less cost. But this is far from being the chief cause of the trade supremacy the Central Powers have secured in Bulgaria. It is to be attributed to the careful study of the Bulgarian market by the Germans, and their endeavour to meet the wishes of Bulgarian customers. The local banks, also, being wholly or partly German or Austro-Hungarian establishments, greatly facilitate the trade of their compatriots by granting various financial facilities to those of their customers who purchase their goods from the Central Empires. Up to the present the few British manufacturers who traded with Bulgaria entrusted the conduct of
their business to Austro-German agents, who naturally endeavoured to divert British custom to Germany. In order to further trade with Bulgaria, the Germans have recently founded a company entitled the "Bulgarian Lloyd," which, *inter alia*, proposes to deal in manufactured articles and to open stores in all parts of Bulgaria. From this it is obvious that British trade, if it is to maintain even its modest pre-war position, will have to reform its methods. The first years after the war will provide a good opportunity to British manufacturers to secure a trade opening, for most of the German industries, owing to their lack of raw materials, will be unable to cater for the Bulgarian market. If this space of time be made use of to inaugurate a vigorous trade offensive, and methods be adopted to consolidate the position thus won, there is little doubt that British commerce will be able to capture a great share of Bulgarian import trade and successfully hold its own against the Central Powers. This is all the more desirable because the purchasing power of the rural population has greatly increased during the war, and the improvement of the means of communication will in the future very favourably affect agriculture, which constitutes the principal occupation in Bulgaria. The extensive subdivision of the land has hitherto proved a serious bar to improvement in agricultural methods and to the extensive use of
agricultural machinery, but the activities of the co-operative peasant societies, of which there are over 1000, will do much to remedy this evil by familiarizing the peasantry with modern methods, and by supplying it with up-to-date implements for field work.

In order to foster commercial relations with Bulgaria, British manufacturers and exporters ought to co-operate and establish in that country a permanent exhibition of British products. Such an establishment could be entrusted with the task of booking orders, effecting sales, and getting into touch with prospective customers.

British manufacturers have been content up to the present to leave to the export merchants the care of finding a market for their goods, and the wholesale merchants in Bulgaria were quite satisfied with this arrangement until German commercial travellers appeared on the scene. German manufacturers desiring to increase their sales began transacting business with retailers also, with the result that the turnover of the wholesale merchant was greatly reduced. This had its repercussion on British trade, for British goods were mostly or solely imported by the wholesale firms. Many instances could be cited of British goods, both cheaper and superior in workmanship to corresponding German articles, having been excluded from the Bulgarian market because they could not be supplied direct to the
retailer at a competitive price, since by passing through different hands their selling price had increased to more than the initial cost of similar German products.

As is known, the Germans have established several organizations to further their export trade not only in the Near East but all over the world, and it will be essential, especially in Bulgaria, a country which was economically dominated by Germany, that some such rival scheme should be evolved to enable British trade to develop or even to maintain its old position. The creation of a sample dépôt in one of the chief commercial centres of the country would be of the utmost value. Such an enterprise is all the more to be recommended, since it can be made self-supporting; for, by levying a very small commission on the sales—a fraction of what is usually charged by an agent—all expenses incurred would be readily defrayed. It is obvious that the co-operation of British manufacturers is indispensable for the success of such an enterprise, and the danger of one firm being favoured at the expense of another would be easily obviated if the organization were placed under the control of the Board of Trade. The adoption of such a measure would confer inestimable advantages on British industry, as the person or persons entrusted with this task would not only aim at obtaining orders, but would help to
enlighten the manufacturers at home on the requirements of the clients, and supply every information as to the articles sold by their foreign trade rivals.

The establishment of a British bank in Bulgaria would also confer many advantages on British exporters, and might conduce to the placing of many Government and municipal contracts with British manufacturers. Such an undertaking, however, is not likely to prove very remunerative to its initiators owing to the plethora of banks already existing in the country.

In conclusion, reference may be made to the question of financing the Bulgarian customer. Credit is essential for the sale of goods in Bulgaria, as customers, though extremely honest, are very short of capital and cannot pay in cash. If the sale of goods were entrusted to an organization controlled by the Board of Trade, manufacturers could be confident that their interests would be properly attended to, and consequently would feel more inclined to comply with this indispensable condition.
CHAPTER VII

BULGARIAN CLAIMS TO THE MORAVA AND MACEDONIA

Before the Balkan Wars, the chief claimants to Macedonia were Bulgaria and Greece. Serbian pretensions were not taken seriously, even in Serbia, for the Serbian Government readily waived its claims to this region as soon as the Bulgaro-Serbian Treaty afforded it the opportunity of acquiring territory in another quarter. Greece was the only party which might have challenged Bulgarian predominance in Macedonia with some apparent justification, if we are to judge from the arrangement concerning the election of deputies in the Ottoman Chamber which was arrived at between the Greek and Bulgarian communities a year before the outbreak of the Balkan War. Thus in the vilayet of Uskub two seats were allotted to the Bulgarians, in the vilayet of Monastir two seats to the Bulgarians and five to the Greeks.

In the elections for the first Ottoman Parliament after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the total number of electors in the vilayets of Salonica, Monastir, Uskub, and the sanjaks of
Seres and Drama was 197,530 Patriarchists (adherents of the Greek Patriarchate, among whom, however, figured some Bulgarians) as against 290,348 Bulgarian Exarchists. These figures substantiate the Greek claim to a share of Macedonia, which could not be disregarded, more especially in the case of the region of Monastir. But well-founded as these Greek pretensions may have been, Greece, by her alliance with Serbia, voluntarily waived her rights in Central Macedonia in favour of the latter. The Serbians, on the other hand, failed to elect a single deputy of their own nationality, and this to some extent lends support to the contention that the Serbian title to Central Macedonia is based purely upon the successful issue of the second Balkan War. Before 1878 the Serbians openly acknowledged in their writings that Macedonia was a Bulgarian country, and it was only when they lost hope of realizing their national aspirations in Bosnia and Herzegovina that they cast their eyes on Macedonia.

In corroboration of this statement we may quote the words of M. Milovanovitch, the late Serbian Premier, who, writing in the Serbian review, the Delo (No. xvii, p. 300, 1898), declared: "Serbia only began to think about Macedonia after 1885." If Macedonia were Serbian such a delay would have been incomprehensible, and

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1 The Greeks of this region are mostly Hellenized Vlachs.
the belated concern of the Serbians for Macedonia can only be explained by the fact that hitherto their aspirations were directed to another quarter, and that they only turned to Macedonia when convinced that it constituted the line of least resistance to their territorial aggrandizement. Had the Bulgarians indeed proved less stubborn and tenacious, this new orientation of Serbia's policy might have brought all the advantages its initiators expected from it.

That Serbian rights to Macedonia were not taken very seriously even in Serbia before 1912 may be seen from the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty concluded in February 1912, in anticipation of the war against Turkey, when the two contracting parties agreed that all territories east of the Struma should revert to Bulgaria, and those west of the Shar Mountains to Serbia, while the territory between these two limits, comprising the entire basin of the River Vardar and the greater part of Macedonia was to form a province with an autonomous Government. If this arrangement, however, proved impracticable, it was agreed to divide this territory into two zones by a line running generally north-east from Lake Ochrida to the point of intersection of the ancient Serbo-Bulgaro-Turkish frontiers. The zone south-east of this line was to revert unconditionally to Bulgaria, while that comprised between this line and the Shar Mountains, in
which the important town of Uskub was situated, was to be divided. If no agreement could be arrived at as to this partition, the two contracting parties agreed to submit their difference to the arbitration of the Tsar of Russia.

Thus it is evident that Serbia was quite content to leave the major part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, for she evidently did not feel entitled to press her ethnical claims further. If she subsequently altered her mind and demanded a revision of this treaty, thereby indirectly provoking the second Balkan War, her pretensions must be ascribed to the attitude of Austria, who prevented Serbia from obtaining an outlet on the Adriatic. Baffled in her aims, Serbia naturally turned once more to the Ægean, and, as was to be expected, came into conflict with the Bulgarians, who could hardly be expected to view these Serbian ambitions good-humouredly.

It will be remarked that although in the treaty the greater part of Macedonia was recognized as incontestably Bulgarian, no mention was made of an incontestably Serbian zone.

Historical claims concerning Macedonia are utterly worthless, for it will be found that every interested party can advance some thesis to validate its contention. The testimony of unbiased explorers who visited the country while it was still under Turkish rule is of much greater value. The evidence found in Serbian news-
papers and books of that period is likewise of paramount importance, and fully corroborates the Bulgarian argument that Macedonia was, and therefore still is, Bulgarian in population. Serbian writers even went so far as to admit that the district of the Morava, with the towns of Nish, Vranya, Pirot, and Lescovatch, was peopled by Bulgarians, so that we need not be at all surprised at the Bulgarian claim to the Morava district. Historically the claim is perfectly sound. But forty years of Serbian rule have succeeded in thoroughly Serbizing the population, and a few years ago an inhabitant of this district would certainly have been annoyed if he had been told that he was a Bulgarian.¹

The Serbians themselves often taunted the inhabitants of Nish with their Bulgarian origin. While travelling through Serbia in 1915, I remember overhearing some Serbian fellow-travellers who complained of the avarice and greed displayed by the inhabitants of Nish towards those of their countrymen who, fleeing before the Austrian invaders, had sought shelter in that town. The concluding comment of the Serbians was: "What else could be expected from the inhabitants of Nish? Are they not Bulgarians?"

But, however convincing the arguments advanced in support of the Bulgarian claim to the

¹ The Bulgarians themselves admit it. See Vazov's "Under Quarantine."
Morava district, the fact remains that the local population considers itself Serbian. It is not so much race or language that distinguishes one nation from another as ideas, affections, interests and hopes held in common. It is mainly these last which constitute nationality. The Bulgarian jingoists being aware of the sentiments prevailing in the Morava district departed from their customary line of conduct, rather than compromise their claim to this region. Previously Bulgarians were at one in their readiness to hold a plébiscite in the territories they claimed. Not only did they advocate the consultation of the Macedonian population, but even that of the Dobrudja. Since the annexation of the Morava district was mooted, Bulgarian journalists have betrayed their repugnance to this measure. They declare that the inhabitants of the district claimed by Bulgaria expressed their views as to their nationality when they were consulted as to whether they desired to remain under the authority of the Greek Patriarchate or that of the Bulgarian Exarchate, and that since they expressed themselves in favour of the latter a fresh consultation would be superfluous.

It is interesting to note that the most strenuous efforts were being made by the Bulgarians to awaken the slumbering national consciousness of their "brothers" on the Morava. At the instigation of the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior a
National Educational Committee for the Morava had been formed. Its objects were:

(1) To attach the inhabitants of the Morava to Bulgaria by kindness and acts of affection, and to take an active part in everything relating to their cultural needs;

(2) To influence them by word of mouth, by literature, by education, and by information, allowing them freedom of conscience.

The headquarters of the Committee were at Sofia, and it was intended to open branches in the Morava district. (The president, Datsov, is a well-known citizen of Sofia, and a native of the Serbian territories claimed by Bulgaria.)

Cultural societies were established, and reading-rooms, lecture-halls, and schools were opened with the object of winning over the local population to the Bulgarian cause. The Narodni Prava, commenting on a literary entertainment given at Nish on December 18, 1917, remarked: “The entire audience felt that it had emerged from the deep lethargy of the Serbian yoke, and that it had never lost its Bulgarian consciousness.”

One may well smile at this reassuring statement of the chronicler, for if it was found necessary to convince the population of its Bulgarian nationality, it may be inferred that it regarded itself as Serbian. This is all the more apparent when the Bulgarians proceed to claim even M. Passitch as a Bulgarian, owing to his having
been born of Bulgarian parents at Zaitchar, one of the towns claimed by Bulgaria. However true this statement may be, no one can entertain any doubts as to the nationality of the venerable Serbian Prime Minister, and from this particular instance it is easy to see why the Bulgarians were so averse from the holding of a plébiscite, for there is little doubt that most of the inhabitants of the Serbian districts claimed by Bulgaria would object to passing under Bulgarian rule as strongly as would M. Passitch.

That the Bulgarians themselves discriminate between the Macedonians and Dobrudjans on the one hand, and the inhabitants of the Morava district on the other, and treat the former as thorough Bulgarians while the latter are looked upon more as lost brethren, is evident from a recent speech by Radoslavov (April 1918), in which he referred to the inhabitants of the Dobrudja as "the good, brave Dobrudjan Bulgarians," while the inhabitants of the Morava district were styled "former Bulgarians."

A Sofia daily as lately as June 1918 was discussing quite frankly the question as to what were the feelings of the inhabitants of the Morava district as regards their nationality. As the article throws much light on the subject and is written in an ingenuous and artless manner, even admitting the excesses committed by the Bulgarians, we may consider it as an approxi-
mately true appreciation of the state of mind prevailing in the region:

**IMPRESSIONS FROM THE MORAVA**

**Serbians or Bulgarians?**

How does the local urban and rural population feel? Does it feel as a member of the Bulgarian nation, or is it attached to Serbia? In our endeavour to find an answer we are met by conflicting evidence. It is difficult to penetrate the secret recesses of the people's heart, and on this occasion the question is more complicated, because the heart of the Morava population is double.

We should not seek a Bulgarian consciousness among the Serbian immigrants from Western Serbia, who settled in the district with the object of creating a firmer foundation for Serbian authority, and these immigrants are numerous. They are Serbians in body and soul, and will remain so for ever. The rest of the population, however, spiritually belongs to Bulgaria. It is attached to the Bulgarian race, and if it does not demonstrate its attachment noisily, this is solely due to the fear lest Serbian rule should be re-established. The population dreads reprisals in such a case. It unanimously considers that it will be better off in Bulgaria than in Serbia, and it desires to remain under Bulgarian rule. It is not disillusioned by the incidents which have occurred, nor by the high taxes it now pays, for it knows that war brings in its wake many sorrows, alarms, and even illegalities. The Morava population looks to Bulgaria as to its motherland, but secular servitude has frightened it and confirmed its belief that Bulgaria's greatness is transient, because Bulgaria has always had big and powerful enemies and few loyal friends. We heard this opinion expressed by a Moravan notable, an intellectual. He speaks Serbian, but he knows that his forefathers were pure Bulgarians, as he himself is.

The authorities should try to increase their *prestige* in the Morava district. Every failure in the diplomatic field must be avoided as carefully as failure on the battlefield, for it greatly impresses the people.
But if Bulgarian claims to the Morava and Timok districts may be scouted, such claims to Macedonia were and remain irrefutable. Even the Serbians have not deemed it politic to claim the Macedonians as their co-nationals; they have evolved the theory that the Macedonians are an amorphous mass, devoid of all national consciousness, and capable of being assimilated without much ado either by Bulgaria or Serbia.

To one who has witnessed the continuous immigration of the Macedonians into Bulgaria, and who has been a spectator of some of their sufferings, the falsity of this contention appears in all its crudity. It may well be asked of the supporters of this ingenuous theory: Why have the Macedonians, when fleeing before Turkish oppression, persistently sought shelter in Bulgaria and not in Serbia? Since they were Slavs they might have expected as warm a reception in Belgrade as in Sofia. The Macedonians, however, persisted in flocking by thousands to Bulgaria because they considered that country as their own, and no similar exodus from Macedonia either in the direction of Greece or of Serbia has ever been noticed. And it is not only Turkish persecution which drove these unfortunate Macedonian peasants to abandon their homes and seek protection among their liberated brethren in Bulgaria, for this migratory move-
ment, far from ceasing after the Turks had been finally driven out of Macedonia, was, on the contrary, intensified when this hapless land passed under Serbian and Greek sovereignty as a result of the second Balkan War. It was then that migration reached its climax, and any unbiased observer passing at the time through Bulgaria would have been convinced that the Macedonians, far from being devoid of a national consciousness, are on the contrary deeply conscious of their Bulgarian nationality, for the sake of which they willingly sacrificed all their belongings, and even risked their lives, dreading nothing so much as the danger of forcible denationalization at the hands of Greeks or Serbians. What huge proportions this Macedonian immigration into Bulgaria attained may be gauged from the fact that merely in the territory Bulgaria had obtained from Turkey by the Treaty of Constantinople (1913) some 150,000 Macedonian refugees settled. The number of Macedonian immigrants in Bulgaria before the Balkan Wars had reached 300,000, while after 1913 their number increased to 500,000. Radoslavov even affirmed that it had reached 600,000.

But some light may be thrown on the controversy as to whether the Macedonians are Bulgarians or Serbians by the admissions made by the Serbians themselves before the time when Serbian politicians, under the influence and
inspiration of Austria, began to cast longing eyes on Macedonia.

The Serbian writer, Dim. Davidovitch, in his "History of the Serbian Nation," published first in 1821 in Belgrade, enumerates the lands peopled by Serbians, but does not mention Macedonia among them. In the accompanying map, which is a reproduction of the one contained in the above work (edition of 1848), and shows the southern limits of the Serbian lands, even the Morava district and Nish are not included within the ethnic boundaries of the Serbian race. At the same time the two streams which form the River Morava bear their proper original appellations, the eastern tributary being styled the Bulgarian Morava, owing to the fact that it traverses a Bulgarian country, while the western is designated as the Serbian Morava for a similar reason. In his beautiful poem, "Djatski Rastanak," the founder of the new Serbian school of poetry, Branko Raditchevitch, enumerates all the lands peopled by Serbians, but likewise omits Macedonia from the list.

The Serbian newspaper, *Serbske Narodne Novine* (Year iv, pp. 138 and 141-43, May 4 and 7, 1841), described the towns of Nish, Lescovatch, Pirot, and Vranya as lying in Bulgaria, and styles their inhabitants Bulgarians.

In an article entitled "General Geography of Turkey in Europe," the same paper (Year vii,
Nos. 33 to 43, 1844) refers to the inhabitants of Macedonia as Bulgarians, and further affirms: "Serbia has never firmly extended her frontiers to the south, while the Bulgarians have pene-
trated in masses even as far as Macedonia. The Serbians only once brought under their rule the southern and mountainous district of Macedonia, while the Bulgarians settled there and have kept the country for good."

According to the Serbian authors Iankovitch and Gruitch, the following districts were deemed Serbian:
(1) The Voivodina (Banat, Syrmia, and Batchka); (2) Slavonia; (3) Dalmatia; (4) Istria; (5) Ragusa (Dubrovnik); (6) Cattaro; (7) Montenegro; (8) Metohia; (9) Bosnia; (10) Herzegovina; (11) Serbia (then a principality). (See "Slaves du Sud," by the above authors, published in Paris, 1853.)

The Serbski Dnevnik (June 23, 1855), dilating on the situation in Bulgaria, said, among other things: "Not only the inhabitants of Nish, who are nearer to the Serbians both geographically and linguistically, but also the real Bulgarians of Sofia, Philippopolis, Seres, etc., very readily read our paper."

About the middle of the nineteenth century the Serbian Government dispatched S. Berkovitch, one of its officials, on a tour of investigation through Macedonia and Old Serbia. In 1860, soon after his return, Berkovitch published a selection of national songs collected from various places throughout Macedonia under the title "National Songs of the Bulgarian Macedonians." The book was printed by the Belgrade Government Press, and the author gave the following reasons for designating the songs as "Bulgarian" and not "Slav": "I call these songs Bulgarian and not Slav, for whenever I asked a Macedonian Slav what he was, he answered, 'I am a Bulgarian, and my tongue is Bulgarian.'" The author was candid enough to
fix the Shar Mountains as the ethnographic boundary between the Bulgarians and the Serbians.

In 1867 negotiations were initiated between the Serbian Government and Bulgarian patriots who had assembled in Bucarest to plan the liberation of their country from the Turkish yoke. There were delegates from various Bulgarian towns, and a memorandum was drawn up and dispatched to the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Garashanin, advocating a close union with Serbia. The memorandum began as follows:

"As present circumstances force all oppressed nationalities in Turkey to seek means of liberating themselves, we Bulgarians living in Bulgaria, Thrace, and Macedonia came together to consider how to liberate our dear motherland."

An agreement between the Bulgarians and the Serbian Government was finally reached according to which a federal Jugo-Slav State was to be created, incorporating all Bulgaria and Serbia. The term Bulgaria was explicitly explained as designating Bulgaria proper, Thrace, and Macedonia. Garashanin replied on May 22, 1867, that he fully agreed to the Bulgarian propositions.

According to the Serbian paper, Vidov Dan (No. 38, March 29, 1862), the Bulgarian national frontiers extended "from the Danube to the Ægean, and from the Black Sea to the lower Morava and the Black Drin. The population was said to number 5,000,000."
Bulgaria

In February 1868, the Vidov Dan published an article on Bulgaria and the Bulgarians (Nos. 33, 34, 38, February 13, 14, and 18), the following extracts from which may be quoted:

Bulgaria comprises the greater part of ancient Moesia, Thrace, and Macedonia. The Bulgarian language is spoken from the mouth of the Danube as far as Salonica and the lake of Kastoria, and from Jelegrad to Ochrida. The line formed by the ancient Roman highway, the Via Egnatia [the same opinion is also expressed by G. M. Mackenzie and A. P. Irby in their "Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey in Europe"], between Salonica and Ochrida, may be taken as an ethnographic frontier between Greeks and Bulgarians, although it leaves a portion of Bulgarian territory to the south and a few Greek localities to the north of it. Among the 5,000,000 Bulgarians inhabiting Turkey 300,000 are Moslems (Pomaks) and 60,000 Roman Catholics; the others are all Orthodox.

The Bulgarians are surrounded by Rumanians, Greeks, Albanians, and Turks, who are all hostile to them. They are persecuted by the Greek clergy and oppressed by the Turkish garrisons of Vidin, Nish, Sofia, Varna, Shumla, and Rustchuk. Hence they have lost much of the old martial spirit which animated them in the first centuries of their national existence. This is not because Bulgarian mothers are incapable of rearing brave men, for in Bulgaria also the blood of heroes has been shed for the cause of liberty. Botsaris [the legendary hero of the Greek war of independence] and many other Bulgarians fought for the Christian faith during the Greek insurrection, and others struggled for the liberty of Rumania and Serbia. Lastly, in 1835, 1840, 1844, and 1866 Bulgarian insurrections occurred, but these were isolated cases. The Bulgarian is, in general, peaceable and gentle; he has a clear intellect and a quick imagination; in short, he is capable of great deeds both physical and moral. Unfortunately these excellent qualities are not fully developed, because it is impossible to train them properly under present conditions. He is hospitable as are all Slavs, modest, pious, and neither insensible nor
fanatical. Above all, he loves his dear, beautiful, and unfortunate country.

Similar comment may be quoted from the Serbian Press of the period *ad infinitum*. Austrian diplomacy had not yet succeeded in infusing the venom of hatred and envy into the soul of the two kindred peoples. Both Serbians and Bulgarians, mindful of the past, sought to realize their emancipation in close union with one another, and Balkan solidarity became an established fact. Never were Serbo-Bulgarian relations more cordial than towards the middle of the nineteenth century, and the reason is easy to find; each party respected his neighbour's domain. Serbians were not asked to look for their co-nationals in Macedonia, but on the contrary respected Bulgarian susceptibilities, and far from seeking aggrandizement at the expense of their eastern neighbours, laboured wholeheartedly to assist them.

The first estrangement between Serbia and Bulgaria occurred when Russia, as a recompense for the assistance Serbia had rendered her during the Russo-Turkish War, ceded to her the Bulgarian towns of Nish and Lescovatch. At the Congress of Berlin, Austrian support enabled Serbia to acquire the remaining portion of the Morava district, with the towns of Vranya and Pirot, which consummation was arrived at by Serbia's renunciation of her claim to the sanjak
of Novi-Bazar in deference to Austrian wishes. It was thus that Serbia initiated her ill-starred policy of claiming and annexing territories alien to her in population.

Satisfied with the results obtained in 1878,

1 The Narodni Glasnik, October 3-15, 1879, wrote: "Serbia has acquired more than Kossovo, more than Sarajevo. She has acquired a veritable political Eldorado in the valley of the Morava. . . . She has acquired Nish!" The jubilation of the paper is easily explained if one remembers that the Morava Valley may be considered the gate of Macedonia. But even among the Serbians, farsighted men were found to deprecate the manifest injustice done to the Bulgarian people, and to predict the ruinous consequences of such a policy. In 1880 Vasha Pelagitch, an eminent Serbian politician, published a history of the Balkan conflicts of 1875 to 1878, in which he expressed himself against the incorporation into Serbia of the districts of Nish, Pirot, Lescovatch, and Vranya, which were then Bulgarian in population, and warned his countrymen of the dangers their annexationist policy was likely to evoke. Referring to the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, as a result of which Serbia acquired the above-mentioned districts, he wrote: "The local population [of those districts] greeted the coming of the Serbian army and of the administrative authorities in a becoming manner, but the greater part of the urban population was dissatisfied. The citizens of Pirot plainly intimated that they did not wish for a Serbian administration, nor to be incorporated in the Serbian State, but that they desired to remain under Bulgarian rule. The Serbian authorities silenced this desire of the local inhabitants in their fashion. Many prominent persons in Serbia did not approve of this attitude of the authorities; they wished and still wish that the desires of the population should be taken into consideration, namely, that those who wish to join the Serbians should be received by us, and that those who do not desire it should be allowed to join freely those whom they consider nearer to them. No State has a right to force men to become its subjects contrary to
she did not hesitate to sign a convention with Austria in 1881, by which she undertook not to stir up trouble in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria offering in return not to hamper Serbian expansion to the south. The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 was a logical consequence of the new orientation of Serbia's policy. King Milan fell on the Bulgarians to prevent the union of Northern with Southern Bulgaria, lest Bulgaria, grown strong, should bar the Serbian advance to the south.

In spite of the disastrous outcome of this war, Serbia persisted in her ill-advised policy, and in 1889 concluded a treaty with Austria, waiving her claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina, in exchange for which Austria was to lend her support to Serbia and facilitate the latter's penetration of the valley of the Vardar.

This sinister policy was persisted in until at the inspiration of Russia the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 was concluded, and Serbia was once more prevailed upon to renounce her their will. Only by following such principles can we hope to live in peace and amity with neighbouring peoples. By our appropriation of the Pirot district we incurred the enmity of the Bulgarian people, with whom we ought always to live in brotherly love and in an ever closer alliance.” The same writer also scathingly condemns the decisions taken at the Congress of Berlin, and makes no secret of his indignation at the decision of the diplomatists to dismember Bulgaria, which dismemberment he rightly prophesied would lead to endless strife in the Balkans.
Macedonian ambitions in favour of a more practical scheme of territorial expansion. Unfortunately when this statesmanlike plan was about to attain full fruition Austria vetoed the project and blasted the hopes for a permanent settlement in the Balkans by insisting on the creation of an Albanian State, thereby depriving Serbia of her just gains in her campaign against Turkey. Austria’s object was to sow discord among the Balkan States and to divert Serbia’s attention to the East, thus bringing her once more into conflict with Bulgaria.

It is customary to blame Bulgaria for the outbreak of the fratricidal war among the Balkan States, but this is to fail to associate cause with effect. The instigator of Bulgaria’s attack on her quondam allies was Austria, and it was the pusillanimity and pacifism manifested by some of the representatives of the Entente Powers at the conference of Ambassadors in London (1913) which enabled Austria to execute her underhand designs. Instead of championing Serbia’s manifest right to obtain free access to the sea, instead of allowing the union of Northern Epirus\(^1\) with

\(^1\) The Greek character of this region has been sufficiently demonstrated in M. René Puaux’ "La malheureuse Epire." In order further to emphasize this point, it would be well to mention that at a time when Athens consisted of hovels inhabited by a few hundreds of Greeks and Turks, the town of Moschopolis had a population of 65,000 and was the torch-bearer of Hellenic culture during the eighteenth century. It possessed a printing-press erected in 1720, which
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Greece (deputations from all the larger towns had come to London at the time to carry through the annexation to Greece), European diplomacy agreed to the adoption of a solution which was bound to cause the disruption of the Balkan Alliance, and eventually to facilitate the realization of Teuton ambitions.

The Bulgarian claim to Macedonia has been sanctioned by international acts, and cannot be lightly dismissed. Bulgaria’s rights have been publicly acknowledged by the very party which will be called upon to contest them, and this places Entente diplomacy at a great disadvantage.

At the Constantinople Conference of 1876 the Ambassadors of the European Powers drew up a programme of reforms for Turkey, with the object of checking Turkish misrule by introducing self-government in those districts where the majority of the population was Bulgarian. Dis-

was the only Greek printing-press in existence at the time save that of the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople. The town was famous for its academy, in which some of the most renowned Greek scholars were trained. Subsequently it lost much of its splendour, and in 1916 it was completely ravaged by Albanian brigands under the chief Sali Butka. The last remnants of its once famous library were then destroyed. This incident shows what is likely to be the fate of the other Greek communities of Epirus if left to the tender mercies of the Albanian hillmen.

Several of the most distinguished Greek families, such as the Capodistrias, Averoff, Sinas, Zapas, Arsakis, Zographos, etc., are of Epirote origin,
Districts in which Turks and Greeks, taken together, outnumbered the Bulgarians, were not included within the proposed administrative units. The Conference decided on the formation of two Bulgarian provinces. The eastern was to have Tarnovo for its capital, and to include the sanjaks of Rustchuk, Tarnovo, Tultcha, Varna, Sliven, Philippopolis (without Sultan-Yeri and Achir-Tchelebi), and the cazas of Kirk-Klisse, Mustapha-Pasha and Kizil-Agatch; while the western province, with Sofia for its capital, was intended to comprise the sanjaks of Sofia, Vidin, Nish, Uskub, Monastir (except two cazas on the south), a part of the sanjak of Seres (the three northern cazas), and the cazas of Strumitsa, Kukush, Tikvеш, Doiran, Veles, and Kastoria.\textsuperscript{1}

This conclusively proves that forty years ago European statesmen considered not only Macedonia but even the Morava district and the entire Dobrudja as predominantly Bulgarian in population.

The Bulgarian claim received further confirmation in the Treaty of San-Stefano (February 19, 1878),\textsuperscript{2} by which a Bulgarian principality with even wider frontiers than those drawn up by the representatives of the European Powers

\textsuperscript{1} Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d'Orient, 1875–6–7, Paris, 1877, annexe iii au compte rendu No. 8; also Blue Book, Turkey, No. 2, 1877.

\textsuperscript{2} As regards this Treaty, it is of the greatest importance that the view of an eminent American authority should be
at Constantinople in 1876 was created. It may well be asked also whether the Entente has not yet further validated Bulgaria’s titles to Macedonia by offering her the cession of this made known. The late Dr. George Washburn, director of Robert College, wrote as follows in his “Fifty Years in Constantinople”:

“The Treaty of San-Stefano was, of course, a hard one for Turkey, but it would have been better for England and for all the peoples of European Turkey if it had been allowed to stand.

“The Sultan himself had no reason to thank England or Austria for their intervention. The secret convention by which England acquired Cyprus was little better than a theatrical trick of Lord Beaconsfield’s. The Treaty of Berlin, which was signed July 13, 1878, was one of the most important events of the nineteenth century in European history, but it was not made in the interest of any one in the Turkish Empire. I do not know that it professed to be, although Lord Beaconsfield congratulated himself on having ‘consolidated’ the Empire, a euphemism for having reduced the size of it. Each Power sought only to further its own interests and ambitions, and for the people chiefly concerned the result has been a succession of wars, revolutions, and massacres down to the present day.

“. . . This is not the place to discuss the Treaty, but we may take a single illustration from the people in whom the College was most interested at that time, the Bulgarians. The Treaty of San-Stefano had created a Bulgaria essentially on the lines agreed to by the Powers at the Conference of Constantinople. The Treaty of Berlin divided the Bulgarians into five sections, giving one part to Serbia, one to Rumania, one to an autonomous province called East Roumelia, one to Turkey (Macedonia), and one to constitute the Principality of Bulgaria under the suzerainty of the Sultan; and it was England especially that insisted upon this, and also upon the right of Turkey to occupy and fortify the range of the Balkans, all with the object of making it impossible for the Bulgarians to form a viable State which might be friendly to Russia. The Englishmen who knew
province as recently as 1915 in exchange for her military assistance.

The attribution of Macedonia to an autonomous Bulgaria as outlined in the scheme of 1876 drew no protests from the Serbian Government. Neither did the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870. With regard to the latter, it is now alleged that the Macedonian population sided with the Exarchate, not on account of its Bulgarian nationality, but in order to have a religious service in a Slav tongue, and to protect itself against exploitation by the Greek clergy.

We are entitled to accept this explanation with some scepticism, for at the moment the Serbian Government was perfectly aware that the movement against the Greek Church was a movement distinctly Bulgarian in character; at least this is the view any unbiased person would

Bulgaria, all our friends, understood the folly and wickedness of this at the time. All England has learned it since.

"Thus far the results have been the revolution of 1885, which resulted in the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, the war with Serbia, the insurrection in Macedonia and province of Adrianople, and all the massacres and unspeakable horrors of the last thirty-nine years in Macedonia, to say nothing of what Bulgaria has suffered from the intrigues of foreign Powers ever since the Treaty of Berlin. The awful massacres and persecutions from which the Armenians have suffered since 1886 have been equally the result of this Treaty."

And if my revered master were alive, he would further have ascribed to the annulment of the Treaty of San-Stefano some of the causes which brought about the present world-war.
form from a perusal of the following passage in the Serbian semi-official paper, the Redin-stvo, April 23, 1871, in which the obstacles in the way of a compromise between the Bulgarians and the Greek Patriarchate are discussed:

The greatest obstacle to such an understanding is the question of the dioceses of Thrace and Macedonia. According to the Imperial [Turkish] firman, the dioceses of these provinces where the majority is Bulgarian will be placed under the jurisdiction of the Exarchate, and if there are doubts on this point the question will be resolved by a plébiscite. At the beginning the Greek Patriarchate did not wish to allow the creation of any Bulgarian diocese in Macedonia or Thrace, but now it seems inclined to come to an understanding. This is the main question which separates the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarians.

The reader will readily admit that if Slav interests had been at stake, the paper would have shown more ardour in its advocacy of them, and would not have hinted that this was a purely private question between the Bulgarians and the Greek Patriarchate. On this particular point the valuable testimony of Lord Strangford may be adduced. Writing at a time when controversy over the Bulgarian ecclesiastical movement was at its height, he said:

To the eye of the Turk and the conservative diplomats who stand on antique ways, to the tourist and the trader, the Bulgarian is merely a Greek Christian like another, only with a vernacular patois of his own; he is one of the Rum Milleti or "Greek nation" spiritually and intranationally administered by the Patriarchate and nothing more. Yet it is antipathy to that Greek spiritual administration which has called his sense of nationality into existence, and which is as the very breath of its life. He
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insists on having bishops and clergy of his own race and speech; he will not tolerate an alien priesthood, who are too often both the originators and the instruments of oppression and tyranny; he seeks to obtain the established use of his language as an instrument of prayer and education, and rather than be deprived of this he will go over to the Church of Rome. He has his own newspaper, the Tsarigradski Vestnik, at Constantinople, advocating his own views, and both the capital and the great towns south of the Balkans, such as Adrianople and Philippopolis, where the Christian population is partly Greek, partly Bulgarian, have been set in a ferment by a war of pamphlets and leading articles waged between him and the Greeks. ("The Shores of the Adriatic," 1863.)

It is indeed strange that practically all writers on Macedonia have omitted to make any allusion to the alleged "Serbian" inhabitants of that country. They unanimously refer to the majority of the Macedonian population as Bulgarian. The latter have, in fact, demonstrated on innumerable occasions that they are Bulgarian in sentiment as well as in language by the untold sufferings they have readily undergone for the sake of their nationality.¹ Long before the awakening of the national consciousness in Bulgaria, and before the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate and of the Bulgarian Principality, it was the Macedonians who initiated the movement for the emancipation of the Bulgarian nation. Owing to their travels in Austria and

¹ In 1885, during the Serbo-Bulgarian War, the Macedonians formed a legion of volunteers and fought against the Serbians. In 1913 they again sided with the Bulgarians, and some 20,000 of them fought against the Greeks and the Serbians.
Serbia, and their intercourse with more advanced communities, the Macedonian merchants acquired a desire for learning, and for the improvement of the lot of their co-nationals. Thanks to the generosity and self-sacrifice of the Bulgarian communities in Macedonia, Bulgarian schools were opened in the early part of the nineteenth century in Uskub, Veles, Kratovo, Kriva-Palanka, Ishtip, Gostivar, etc.—at a time when such Bulgarian towns as Tarnovo, Sofia, Vidin, Svichtov, Philippopolis, and Sliven had only Greek schools maintained by the Greek clergy.

Dissatisfaction with the domination exerted by the Greek clergy over the Bulgarian population likewise first manifested itself in Macedonia. Thus it was in Uskub towards 1830 that the local population demanded of the Turkish Government the appointment of a Bulgarian instead of a Greek Bishop. The intensity of the friction this demand caused between the population and the Greek Patriarchate may be gauged by the fact that four bishops in succession were nominated, and finally the Patriarchate was obliged to appoint a bishop who could speak Bulgarian.

Not to mention the monk Paisi, the earliest modern Bulgarian writers are Macedonians. Among these the educationist, Hadji Yakim, may be cited as having first published books in the language he himself styles “plain Bulgarian.” The first books were printed in
1814–19 in Hungary, and the cost of publishing was covered by subscription among Bulgarian merchants belonging to various towns in Macedonia. Another writer was the monk Cyril Peitsinovitch of Tetovo, who also published books in the "Bulgarian language," one of which appeared in 1816 in Hungary, while a subsequent treatise was printed in Salonica in 1840. Nor can the names of the first Bulgarian folk-lorists, the brothers Miladinov; of the poet Zinzifov, of Veles (1839–1877), who was a regular contributor to the Russian newspapers Den and Moskovski Vyedomosti; and of the poet Grigor Perlitchev of Ochrida (1830–1892), be passed over in silence. The latter completed his studies in Athens and was awarded a prize by the Greek Academy for his poem, "Armatolos," which was published in Athens in 1860. It is noteworthy that Perlitchev, who, owing to his education, considered himself a Greek and made no secret of his phil-Hellenic sentiments in his Greek poems, later became one of the foremost defenders of the Bulgarian cause. It may be remarked incidentally that his contributions to Bulgarian literature did not equal his Greek poems in merit. His chief Bulgarian work is a translation of the Iliad, which was not a success.

To what extent the Macedonians were determined to go in order to safeguard their Bulgarian nationality may be seen from the fact that the
inhabitants of Kukush, Enidje-Vardar, and Monastir took the extreme step of adopting the Roman Catholic faith with the sole object of preserving their mother tongue, as may be inferred from the appeal the inhabitants of Kukush addressed to Pope Pius IX in 1859. This separatist movement, which began in 1859, continued until some tens of thousands of Bulgarians passed over to Catholicism. It was also in Macedonia, at Salonica, that the first Bulgarian printing-press was erected. Its director, the Bulgarian priest Theodosius Sinaitski, was a native of Doiran, and the language employed was styled either Slaveno-Bulgarian or simply Bulgarian. At the death of Theodosius the printing-press was closed, and owing to the opposition of the Greek clergy the printing of Bulgarian literature was discontinued until 1852, when a native of Vodena named Kiriak Dergilen obtained permission to reopen the printing-press on condition of his using Greek instead of Bulgarian characters.

It was mainly as a result of the struggles of the Macedonian Bulgarians for the opening of Bulgarian schools and for the creation of a national Bulgarian Church that finally the Turkish Government was prevailed upon to sanction the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870. It may seem strange that most of the pioneers of the Bulgarian national
movement should have been educated in Greece. Such leading Macedonians as the brothers Miladinov, Gr. Perlitchev, Dr. Michaikov, Dr. Tsomakov, the brothers Robev, etc., were all graduates of Greek colleges or of the University of Athens. The elder Miladinov was the soul of this Bulgarian Renaissance; it was he who organized most of the Bulgarian schools in Macedonia, and incited his co-nationals to revolt against the ecclesiastical yoke of the Phanar. And it was chiefly the insistence of the Macedonians on being included within the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Church that brought about the schism between the latter and the Greek Patriarchate, which had finally professed willingness to acknowledge the independence of the Bulgarian Church on condition that the Bulgarians should renounce their claims to the Macedonian dioceses. Bulgarians contributed but little to the awakening of the dormant national consciousness of the Macedonians; it may indeed be asserted that the contrary was true. The case of the Macedonian, Neophyte Rilsky, who organized the first school in Bulgaria—namely, that of Gabrovo (1835)—sufficiently proves this.

All unbiased writers who have visited Macedonia have admitted that the country is Bulgarian: Pouqueville, Ami-Boué, Cyprien Robert, Lejean, Ubicini, Hilferding, Emile de Laveleye, and Victor Bérard are unanimous in their
verdict. Even the Greek author P. A. Aravantinos, in his treatise "Annals of Epirus and other Neighbouring Greek and Illyrian Lands," published at Athens in 1856-7, says: "Bitolia or Monastir has a population of 20,000; most of its Christian inhabitants speak Bulgarian. Prilep is now inhabited by some 1200 families, Moslem and Christian; the latter are either Bulgarian or Vlach.

"Tikvesh. This town and district are inhabited by the Bulgarian race.

"Niaoussa. A new town with a Bulgarian population of 2000."

It would also be relevant to cite Mackenzie and Irby, "Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey in Europe" (1867), who refer to Prilep and its district as Bulgarian (p. 83). This town was indeed a strong centre of Bulgarianism in Macedonia; its public school, which had been opened in 1843, was one of the most renowned of Bulgarian educational establishments in that region.

These authors were so much impressed by the Bulgarian character of the country they traversed that they referred to Macedonia as "Southern Bulgaria," and they even described Nish as a Bulgarian town, at which we should not be surprised, for the population had not yet been Serbized.

The following quotation from Lord Strang-
ford's book is certainly as apposite to-day as at the time when it was written:

The entire mass of the rural and non-Mussulman population of Turkey in Europe, with the exception of Bosnia, Thessaly, Albania, the Chalcidic peninsula, and a very narrow belt of sea-board, consists not of Greeks and Sclavs, but of Bulgarians. They are not true Sclavs, nor do they as yet think of themselves as such, whatever they may end by doing under strong influences, but we are never safe from having them passed off upon us as an identical part and parcel of the south Sclavonian.

The opinion of M. Louis Léger, the eminent Professor of the Collège de France, on Macedonia fully corroborates the evidence which has already been furnished. In his important treatise, *Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), this distinguished scholar states:

The Bulgarians have sided with our enemies and we have no particular reason for being tender to them, but the duty of scholars is primarily to seek and proclaim the truth.

The Bulgarians have entered into an alliance with the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in order to avenge themselves on the Serbians. Well, what was the initial cause of the conflict? The Macedonian question. Setting actual passions aside, let us examine this question from a purely scientific point of view. This is what I was writing in 1888 for the *Grande Encyclopédie*, at a moment when people were far from foreseeing that the Franco-German conflict would have its repercussion in the Balkan peninsula.

Macedonia, in spite of the affirmations of Greeks and Serbians to the contrary, is almost entirely peopled by Bulgarians. The Greek and Serbian claims could not stand before the precise verifications made by Rittich, Grigorovitch, Hilferding, Mackenzie. In truth, the Shar Mountains form the boundary between the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalities. The Macedonian Slavs consider themselves Bulgarian, and speak a Bulgarian dialect.
It was only after the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin, when Serbia perceived that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been definitely lost to her, that some of her statesmen thought of seeking a compensation in Macedonia, and of imagining Serbs in a country peopled by Bulgarians.

M. Victor Bérard, the author of several treatises on Macedonia, pronounces a similar verdict on the Serbian claims to that country. He writes as follows:

It is quite certain that Serbian pretensions to the whole of Macedonia only date from a few years back. Before the Congress of Berlin, the Serbians used to talk of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as their brethren, and named the region Prizrend-Pristina, Old Serbia. They designated the Adriatic on the west, the Shar Mountains and the upper Drin to the south, as the limit of their ambition. In short, the Bulgarian frontier traced by the Treaty of San-Stefano from Katchanik to the Black Drin, seemed in no wise to modify the grandiose dreams of a future Serbia. The idea of the conquest of Macedonia only arose in Serbian imagination when Austria laid hands on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Wishing, no doubt, to make up for that imaginary loss by an imaginary right to annex, the Serbs have in their maps extended the limits of their nationality to the south of the Shar Mountains, and even to the archipelago and mountains of Thessaly. In exchange for Fiume, Ragusa, and Cattaro, irrevocably lost, they dream of taking Salonica.

The impartial testimony of American missionaries as to the nationality of the Macedonian population may also be quoted. The members of these religious and educational missions have acquired such a thorough knowledge of local conditions that their opinion on the subject may be reckoned as most authoritative. The following memorandum addressed in 1913 on behalf of these missions to the Foreign Ministers of all the
Powers will be found most conclusive in the evidence it furnishes.

**Your Excellency,—** It is a well-known fact that for more than fifty years American Protestant missionaries have carried on religious and educational work in various parts of the Balkan Peninsula. In this work they have been without political purposes or political alliances, and, on principle, have consistently avoided all interference in political affairs. In view of these facts, a brief statement as to the places where this work has been conducted, the people among whom it has been conducted, and the manner of conducting it, may be of value at this time when the fate of large portions of the Balkan Peninsula is about to be decided.

About the middle of last century the attention of the American missionaries in Constantinople was attracted to the Bulgarian peasants in and about that city, and the impression made by them was so favourable that it was decided to investigate the region from which they came. The investigation was made in the late 'fifties, and its result was that religious societies in Great Britain and the United States of America decided to inaugurate missionary work in the Balkan Peninsula mainly among the Bulgarians. The Methodist Episcopal Church of North America took as its field the region between the Danube and the Balkan mountains, and began its work in 1857, while the region south of the Balkans was assigned to the Missionary Society of the Congregational Churches of America, which society sent out its first missionaries in 1858.

These missionaries located at Adrianople. Others followed them, and in turn Stara Zagora, Philippopolis, Sofia, and Samokov were occupied before 1870. The work was extended to the Razlog district, and in 1871 the first Bulgarian Protestant Church was organized in Bansko.

In 1873, after a tour of investigation, the city of Monastir was selected as the most favourable centre for work in Macedonia, and in the fall of that year two missionary families were located there. From this centre the work was extended all through Macedonia, and churches or preaching-stations were established in Monastir, Ressen,
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Prilep, Vodena, Enidje Vardar, Kafadartsi, Velles, Skopia, Prishtina, Radovish, Murtino, and Monospitovo. In 1894, after the opening up of the railway lines which converge upon Salonica, that city was made a new centre of work with supervision over the outlying districts, from Mitrovitsa on the north-west, and Mehomia on the north, to Drama on the east. New preaching-stations were established in Koleshnitsa, Doiran, Koukoush, with its villages Todorak and Mezhdurek, Gurmen (Nevrokop district), Drama, Tetovo, and Mitrovitsa.

Although it was originally the plan of the Mission to work among the Mohammedans of European Turkey as well as among the Bulgarians, as a matter of fact the work has been confined, with the exception of the recently established Albanian branch, almost exclusively to the Bulgarians. The Bible was translated into modern colloquial Bulgarian, and has been circulated all through Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Thrace. Over six hundred hymns and sacred songs have been prepared in Bulgarian for the use of the religious communities connected with the Mission in Bulgaria and Macedonia. The literature of the Mission is prepared in Bulgarian. The language of preaching in all the places of assembly except Prishtina and Mitrovitsa, where Serbian is used, is Bulgarian. Schools of gymnasium rank have been established in Samokov and Monastir, and an Agricultural and Industrial Institute in Salonica. Primary schools have long been maintained by the Mission in many cities and villages in Bulgaria, and in the following places in Macedonia: Monastir, Todorak and Mezhdurek (Koukoush district), Enidje Vardar, Koleshino, Monospito and Strumitsa, Drama, Bansko, Banya, Mehomia, and Eleshnitsa in the Raslog district. In all these places the language of instruction has been and is Bulgarian, although English has also been introduced of late years in the Girls' Boarding-School of Monastir.

After years of acquaintance with Macedonia, either through residence or travel, or both, mingling with the people and living in their homes, we are fully convinced that the great bulk of the population in the region which we have indicated as the Macedonian field of our work, is Bulgarian in origin, language, and customs, and forms an integral part of the Bulgarian nation.
We desire to call your Excellency's attention to this simple statement of facts with the hope that it may be of some assistance in securing a just and righteous solution of the momentous problem of Macedonia's future, and we also hope that whatever the solution may be, the necessary measures will be taken to guarantee full religious liberty for all under the new administration of the country, and to insure the same freedom to carry on religious and educational work which has been enjoyed in the past.

A statement identical with this has been sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of all the Great Powers.

(Signed) J. F. Clarke, D.D., Missionary in European Turkey for fifty-four years.

J. W. Baird, Missionary in European Turkey for forty years.

Robert Thomson, of Edinburgh, Missionary for thirty years in Constantinople and European Turkey.

Samokov, Bulgaria, August 5, 1913.

The treatment meted out to the Macedonians by the Serbians is yet another proof that they do not consider them as their co-nationals. As soon as they occupied Macedonia they proceeded to close all the Bulgarian schools and churches, and all persons professing pro-Bulgarian sympathies were ruthlessly persecuted. On February 24, 1913, the Bulgarian Bishop of Veles was dragged out and chased from his residence as a common criminal. At about the same time the Bishop of Uskub was cast into prison, while the Bishop of Deber was forced to quit his see. All this was done while the Bulgarians were still fighting the Turks at Tchataldja. What occurred later may be better learnt by a study of the
notorious decree of October 4, 1913, which established a veritable reign of terror in Macedonia, and conferred on the most insignificant Serbian functionary full powers to dispose of the life of the local inhabitants. It must not be thought that the policy of forcible Serbization was applied exclusively to the Bulgaro-Macedonians: it was likewise applied to the Greco-Macedonians, and the Greek community of Monastir has much to say on the subject.

Even the American missions were subjected to annoyance. One day in the autumn of 1913 Mr. W. P. Clarke, the Director of the American College in Monastir, was visited by the Serbian commander of that town, who intimated to him in the name of King Peter that the establishment would have to close if the teaching was not carried on in Serbian instead of Bulgarian. To the remonstrance of Mr. Clarke that he could not adopt Serbian because there were no Serbian students in the college, the commander curtly replied, "Whether there are or are not, such are my orders."

We do not wish to imply that the Serbians are singular in their intolerance and intemperance, and that the other Balkan nationalities show more amenity in their dealings with subject nationalities. The Greeks, for instance, did not treat the Bulgarian inhabitants of Kukush any better, and the latter, in order to escape persecu-
tion, emigrated *en masse* to Bulgaria. Nor were the Bulgarians slow in devising reprisals against the Greeks of Western Thrace. For, according to the Bulgarian census taken after the last parliamentary election in Bulgaria, the number of Greeks in the Bulgarian Ægean Coast district was reported to be 9600, though before 1913 their number must have certainly exceeded 50,000.¹

¹ As this statement is liable to misinterpretation it is necessary to elucidate the subject. After the signing of the Treaty of Bucarest, the Greek troops which were in occupation of Western Thrace withdrew, and the Greek inhabitants, fearing that the Bulgarians on their return would retaliate by massacres for the "Bulgarochtonean" campaign of King Constantine in the valley of the Struma, fled to Greece. For several months complete anarchy prevailed. The local Moslems, who form the majority of the population, refused to submit to Bulgarian rule, and attempted to set up an autonomous administration. Finally the Constantinople Committee of Union and Progress cajoled them into accepting Ferdinand as their ruler, after the latter had submitted to all its demands concerning the retrocession to Turkey of Adrianople, Kirk-Klisse, part of the Maritsa valley, etc. When order was at last re-established, the Bulgarians refused to readmit the Greeks, and settled in their stead Bulgarian refugees from Macedonia.

As the most is made in the Greek Press of Bulgarian misdeeds, with a view to preparing public opinion in Allied countries to countenance the definite outing of Bulgaria from the Ægean Sea coast, it is necessary to cite certain figures which substantiate Bulgaria's rights to the territory she possesses.

According to the last Bulgarian census, the population of the district comprised 136,776 Turks, 127,736 Bulgarians, 72,846 Pomaks or Bulgarian Mohammedans, 30,374 Bulgarian Patriarchists (these may be taken as being mostly Greeks or Hellenized Bulgarians), 9600 Greeks, 4900 Jews and 6310 various.
The Rumanians are not more humane. The woes of the Bulgarians of the Dobrudja were pertinently

Since the Greeks are now laying claim to this territory, which is and ought to remain Bulgarian—the majority of the inhabitants being of Bulgarian race—it may be permissible to mention that a compact Bulgarian population of some 200,000 was included within the Hellenic Kingdom—namely, in the regions of Florina, Vodena, and Enidje Vardar. However, this part of their patrimony the Bulgarians were ready to renounce in favour of Cavalla and its district, to which they have no ethnic rights, the Bulgarian element extending in a solid mass only northwards of the line Seres-Drama.

Concerning Greek Eastern Macedonia it is well to remember that the Greek element is not in an absolute majority. Out of a total of 369,429 there were: 168,290 Greeks, 145,857 Turks, 33,255 plus 16,627 Slavs or Bulgarians, the last number figuring under the quaint title of non-Greek-speaking Greeks, and 4400 Jews (Greek census of 1915). It may be surmised that besides the 49,882 Bulgarians whose existence the census admits, there are others, for the Greek authorities must have represented all the Bulgarian Patriarchists as Greeks, and all the Pomaks as Turks, so that the attribution of Greek Eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria would not be at such absolute variance with the principle of nationality as it seems at first sight. (Before the Balkan wars the Bulgarian, Greek, and Turkish elements were practically equal.)

Of course if Bulgaria is to be maintained within the frontiers traced at Bucarest in 1913, there is no need to raise the question of the future status of Greek Eastern Macedonia, but if according to the principle of nationality she is awarded Macedonia, then it will be an imperative economic need for her to obtain an outlet on the Ægean farther west than the one she already possesses.

However, these Bulgarian aspirations can only be realized if we first satisfy our Balkan Allies, and unfortunately our politicians do not manifest any desire to do so. The Greeks are not allowed to voice their indisputable rights to Western Asia Minor, where there was a solid Greek
exposed in an article published in the *Contemporary Review* (July 1914). No better illustration of the

population of over 800,000 in the vilayets of Aidin and Konia alone; they are asked to renounce their secular aspirations to Constantinople and the shores of the Propontis, which are more Greek than Attica itself; and they must keep silent over Epirus and the Ægean islands, while, on the other hand, they are incited to claim the Bulgarian sea-board on the Ægean. A truly bewildering policy! That this is so, readers may deduce from the following article in the *Nea Hellas* (October 17, 1918):

"At last the signal has been given for proclaiming Greek rights, but only as regards Thrace. God forbid that anything should be mentioned about Asia Minor, the Dodecanese, and Cyprus! The Italian Press is allowed to advertise the Italian claims to . . . Smyrna! But we here are not allowed to state even what we have a right to."

Plain men fail to comprehend the wisdom of such a policy, for it can scarcely be conducive to reconciliation among the Balkan peoples, and is in direct contravention of the ideas and principles for the triumph of which the best part of humanity has been bleeding for more than four years. Obviously the *Manchester Guardian* (May 18, 1918) was right when it said: "Diplomatists are men who seem to specialize in ignorance of foreign countries." The Allied peoples indeed must thank Fate that at the coming Peace Congress the businesslike and altruistic Americans will make themselves heard, for there is a grave danger that through the incapacity of our politicians the following lines of Byron may come true:

*The desolated lands, the ravaged isle,*
*The fostered feud encouraged to beguile,*
*The aid evaded and the cold delay,*
*Prolonged but in the hope to make a prey,*
*These, these shall tell the tale and Greece can show*
*The false friend worse than the infuriate foe.*

It is imperative that the British public should realize in time the anguish with which the Greek nation views the future, lest the Allies in their magnanimity should permit
intolerance of the Balkan peoples can be furnished than the following act of M. Take Jonescu, who is supposed to be among the most enlightened of Rumanians. In the autumn of 1913 he spoke thus to the Notables of the Bulgarian town of Dobritch, which had just been annexed by Rumania: "If you have any common sense, if

the perpetuation of Turkish misrule and allow Greeks to remain under Turkish tyranny. The President of the Asia Minor Greeks, speaking at a meeting of unredeemed Greeks, convoked in Athens on October 27, 1918, pathetically declared:

"We are entitled to shout aloud to the civilized world and to our great Allies, from whom our tyrants are begging mercy: For God's sake don't grant mercy to these hangmen! There are already enough victims. Grant us liberty. We are worthy of it, more worthy than any other subject race. For five centuries we have been waiting for the sun of liberty. At last we see it rising for us also. For God's sake don't cover it with a black veil again." (Allytrotos, November 3, 1918.)

And to an article in New Europe, advocating the retention of Constantinople by Turkey, the Nea Hellas (November 5, 1918) retorts as follows:

"We published the article from New Europe yesterday merely to show the ignorance of Near-Eastern problems existing in circles professing knowledge of the subject. It is unnecessary to point out how ridiculous it is to insist on respect for the tombs of the Sultans in Adrianople and the shades of Turkish conquerors when this implies sacrificing the living to the dead. The maintenance of Turkish rule at Constantinople is advocated on the ground that Mussulman communities throughout the world would regard the expulsion of Turkey from Europe as a mortal blow. But the writer forgets that during the European War Turkey was absolutely cut off from the Moslem races, that even Arabia raised the standard of revolt, that all the endeavours of German agents to proclaim a holy war failed, and that
you possess any sense of reality, forget that you were Bulgarians, for otherwise Rumania will not be a fatherland to you, but a place of exile.”

These facts demonstrate conclusively that the Balkan peoples cannot be expected to deal justly with alien populations under their rule, and that

the overthrow of Turkey was brought about largely by Moslem armies fighting for the Entente! In face of this, how can Turkey be considered the guardian of Mohammedan traditions? Why this reverence for the shades of a few conquerors, who ground down the Christian races and hindered the development of civilization in the Near East? And what about the traditions of rule of another race in these cities, and the fact that present conditions support its claims, owing to the existence in Constantinople and its neighbourhood of a large and compact Greek community? Moreover, while the bounds of Armenia, Georgia, Arabia, etc., are being drawn, the writer would appear to be ignorant that in Asia Minor all these races are in a minority as compared with the Greek. The Hellenism of the Black Sea coast is light-heartedly parcelled out among different Powers, and the shores of Asia Minor, peopled solely by Greeks, are allotted to Turkey! And this solution is said to be just, and to guarantee lasting peace in the Near East!”

Would that these Greek apprehensions were unfounded! It is really unthinkable that the maintenance of Turkish rule, after their record of incapacity, should even be contemplated in the interest of the lower class Turks themselves. The perpetuation of this misrule is so contrary to the elements of common sense that, if in spite of all it were allowed, people would rightly despair of the progress of humanity. In such a case we might well exclaim with Alfred de Vigny:

_A voir ce que l'on fait sur terre, et ce que l'on laisse,
Seul le silence est grand, tout le reste est faibless._
from a mere humanitarian point of view it is imperative that the principle of nationality should be strictly observed.

The remarkable development of Bulgarian educational activity in Macedonia can only be interpreted as another proof of the close kinship which exists between Macedonians and Bulgarians. Bulgarian schools were more numerous and more fully attended than the Greek and Serbian schools. The Macedonians preferred the first because there they were taught in a language they considered their own, which was not the case in the other schools. Such were the notable achievements obtained by the educational efforts of the Bulgarians in Macedonia that they elicited the following tribute from M. Victor Bérard, the well-known French writer:

Had the European Powers made as many efforts for the advancement of learning as the Bulgarians in Macedonia, not a single illiterate would have remained in the world.

According to statistics compiled by the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1911-12, the number of Bulgarian schools in Macedonia was 1081, with 1763 teachers and 56,440 pupils, and the number of churches was 1139, with 1132 priests. The total population, according to a census taken in 1917, was 1,269,400.

A statistical table which must refer to pre-war conditions, declares that there were in Bulgaria 9.3 pupils per hundred inhabitants. In Serbia
the percentage was 4, in Greece 3.7, and among the Bulgaro-Macedonians 5.2. If these statistics are reliable, we may infer that the number of Bulgaro-Macedonians towards 1912 was about 1,085,000. This figure in comparison with the total seems exaggerated, but it should be remembered that the total pre-war population was considerably larger than that of the present.

It cannot be gainsaid that the dialects spoken in Macedonia differ from the Bulgarian language, but it is hardly permissible to conclude from this that these dialects are equally akin to Bulgarian and to Serbian. There are so many common particularities in the Bulgarian and Macedonian speeches that the latter can only be described as Bulgarian dialects. An enumeration of some of the details which characterize the Bulgarian tongue, and which also distinguish the various Macedonian dialects from other Slav tongues, may be necessary in order to show the close linguistic relation between the Macedonian and the Bulgarian idioms:

(1) The Bulgarian language makes use of an affixed article (post-vocal).

(2) It is analytic as regards declensions.

(3) It forms the comparative and superlative of adjectives by prefixing the particles po and nai to the adjectives.

(4) The infinitive mood is absent.

Besides the above four points which charac-
terize both the Bulgarian and Macedonian dialects, it may be stated that there is a much greater lexical unity between them than between the latter and the Serbian.

In conclusion, what was written on the subject by Lord Strangford more than half a century ago deserves to be reproduced, as it is still very much to the point:

The Servians, or certain parties in Servia, believe and wish us to believe that they have both the power and the moral right to annex to their own rule some, if not all, of the country inhabited by Bulgarians. They are sparing no effort to work on the Bulgarians, and induce them to see the fitness of things in the way they do themselves. It is possible, nor is it undesirable, that with time and trouble they may succeed in so assimilating them, but, in the meanwhile, they seek to represent the relationship of the Bulgarians with themselves as a ready-made kinship already existing, and amounting to virtual identity. The Bulgarian is not akin to the various fragments of the Illyrian, Servian, or true South-Slavonic family in the same degree that they are connected with one another. In origin and descent he is different from them, though on this no stress need be laid, so long as the ethnologists know nothing of his first forefathers, and, even if they did, are all conjecture, and no fact as regards the precise nature and value of hereditary transmitted aptitudes. In condition, habit, and character he is widely different, and he is hardly less so in language. He speaks a Slavonic dialect, it is true, which according to modern German criticism is one of the two sole living descendants of the old Cyrillian tongue.

But it is not the Servian’s Slavonic dialect; it stands apart from it, it has lost its declensions, it has a different phonetic character, partly by corruption, partly by archaic retention. It uses a definite article, and postfixes it to its noun, and its structure is more analytic than the synthetic structure which made Niebuhr call the Servian the "honestest language in all Europe." In fact, his language
differs from the Servian in nature as well as in analogy—though hardly so much in amount—exactly as the Danish differs from German. As Denmark and Germany are within the pale of our knowledge and common sense, we have been spared from having a rigmarole about their original Teutonism thrust into the history of their differences. The ethnological case is as though we were to have the Fleming and the Hollander and the Frisian and the Sleswicker all joined together under some such name as Netherdutchland, or Nordo-Germania, with the Dane or Swede kneaded up with the mass, the whole being then paraded before the acquiescent eyes of some remote part of Europe, as a real bona fide nationality for the purpose of producing a certain effect on the opinion of that country.
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