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AND ITS SUCCESSORS

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During the four centuries of Ottoman domination in the Balkans, many Christian warriors found refuge and served in the armed forces of the surrounding Christian powers. In Central Europe, Grenzer regiments composed of South Slavs provided the backbone of the border defences in the Habsburg crownlands, while in Dalmatia the South Slavic Schiavoni, Ottramarini, and Croati a Cavallo units served the Venetian Republic. Likewise, military companies of Greeks and Christian Albanians served Venice and Spain in the Balkans and Italy. During the Turco-Venetian wars of the fifteenth century, large numbers of soldiers who had served the last Christian states in the Balkans found employment in the Venetian holdings in Greece and Dalmatia. Known as stradioti (from the Byzantine term stratštēs, meaning soldier or wayfarer), these troops were light cavalrymen who used the spear, long saber, and mace as weapons and were attired in a mixture of oriental and Byzantine martial garb.

Throughout the sixteenth century stradioti served in the armies of Venice, Genoa, France, England, and the Holy Roman Empire. A number of contemporary memoirists and historians described the activities of the stradioti in Western Europe and have attributed the reintroduction of light cavalry tactics to them. As their clients began forming native light cavalry units, such as the later hussars and dragoons, the employment opportunities of the stradioti became limited to Italy and the Near East. They continued to be garrisoned in the Levant and took part in
the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century wars against the Ottomans. Their main stations of service were the Venetian-held areas of Nauplion, Korone, Methone, and Monemvasia in the Peloponnesus; such towns as Troig, Sibenik, Herceg Novi, and Zadar in Dalmatia; and the island possessions in the Ionian and Aegean seas.3

Naples, under both the Spanish Habsburgs and the Bourbons, remained another center of military activity and colonization for Balkan peoples abroad. In the fifteenth century, large numbers of Christian Albanians, refugees from Skenderbeg’s wars, were settled in Calabria and Sicily, and in both the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, many Greek and Albanian stradioti and their families from the Peloponnesus settled in Neapolitan lands. Later refugees from the autonomous warrior communities of Cheimarra and Mani formed colonies in Apulia and elsewhere. Most of these settlements had military privileges and responsibilities, but by the eighteenth century these conventions had fallen into decline.4

As they became hereditary units, the military prowess of these older stradioti companies declined, but in the eighteenth century new military institutions arose which prolonged the tradition of Balkan legions in Venice and Naples. The two major formations comprised of Balkan troops were the Venetian Reggimento Cimarriotto and the Neapolitan Reggimento Real Macedone. The Reggimento Cimarriotto was organized during the Candian and Morean wars by the Venetians, while the Reggimento Real Macedone was formed soon after the founding of the independent Kingdom of Naples in 1734.

These new troops were armed in what was known as the “Albanian” manner. Their chief firearm was a long musket known as a toupheki, or karyophyli. A set of pistols supplemented the rifle, and a powder case (patrona) with shot (phousekia) was carried for all firearms. Hand weapons included a sword, either a large oriental saber known as a yatagan or a traditional Balkan long-knife of archaic style known as a pala, which had a shape similar to a gurhka knife. These arms were complemented by a least one dagger.5 The distinctive costume of these troops consisted of a white pleated kilt (phoustanella) or a long, dark colored tunic (phermelé), long stockings (kalites), moccasins (tsarouchia), and a shepherd’s cloak (kapà). This attire was based upon peasant dress and was decorated with embroidery and silvered arms, symbols of the warrior’s
profession. Because of their long tunics or kilts, those troops in Neapolitan service were nicknamed *camiciotti* by Italians. Like the *klepthes* and *hajduks*, these Balkan troops practiced a style of fighting which entailed swift movements, sharpshooting, and hand-to-hand fighting. Ambushes and skirmishes were the rule in their combat, and due to their ability as marksmen, the Balkan recruits were often used as marine riflemen in naval campaigns.

The area of Cheimarra (Himarë) provided the bulk of the manpower for the *Reggimento Giarritoto* and a major component of the *Reggimento Real Macedone*. Like Mani, Montenegro, and Souli, Cheimarra was one of those Balkan regions whose inhabitants were able to maintain their self-rule by virtue of their tribal or clan organization, the inaccessibility of their mountainous homelands, their proximity to Venetian controlled areas, and the prowess of their arms. Located along the coastal promontories of the Acroceraunian mountains between Agia Saranta (Sarandë) and Avlona (Vlorë) in present-day southern Albania, the warrior society known as Cheimarra arose during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Initially this group of about fifty villages was a center of resistance to Ottoman conquest during the wars of Skenderbeg. It became a refuge not only for remnants of Skenderbeg's forces under his son John Kastriotes, but also for Peloponnesian Greeks and Albanians under Korkodeilos Kladas in the 1470s. In the ensuing years Cheimarra participated in the wars of Venice and of other western powers against the Porte.

In 1537 the Ottomans mounted an expedition that destroyed or captured many of the villages of Cheimarra, but did not totally subdue the area. Indeed, the victors found it necessary to compromise with the inhabitants of Cheimarra by granting them the following privileges: local self-government, local administration of justice, the right to bear arms, and exemption from the *harac* and *dzizije* ("head tax") in exchange for a yearly tribute. These conditions were negotiated in 1519 through the offices of Liaz (Elias) Pasha, an Islamized local figure representing Sultan Selim I. When renewed during the sultanates of Murad IV and Suleiman II, these conventions were modified to provide that the Cheimarriotes render service in time of war and to expend the maritime privileges of Cheimarra.
In spite of these privileges, the Cheimarriotes rose against Ottoman authority on a number of occasions, notably during the third Turco-Venetian War (1537-40), the War of the Holy League (1571), and the Morean Wars (1684). Ottoman reprisals somewhat depopulated the region and led to a certain amount of forced Islamization which, coupled with voluntary conversions to Islam, limited the area’s Christian population by the eighteenth century to the town of Cheimarra and six other large villages. Despite the diminution of its size, the community of Cheimarra retained its privileges into the twentieth century, although these were often violated by local Muslim officials.

In the meantime, the strategic position of Cheimarra near the Straits of Otranto (separating Italy from the Balkans and the Adriatic from the Ionian Sea), along with its proximity to Italy (100 kilometers from Apulia) and to Venice’s Ionian possessions (35 kilometers from Corfu), had attracted the interest of the Venetian Republic and the Kingdom of Spain (later Naples). These powers saw strategic advantage in the preservation of Cheimarra’s autonomy and the maintenance of their influence in the region. Through the use of trade, military aid, arms shipments, missionaries, and agents, Venice and Naples derived, in turn, two important assets from Cheimarra. Besides its uprisings during the western powers’ wars against the Ottoman Empire, Cheimarra provided soldiers for the armies of Venice and Naples. During the earlier centuries of Ottoman rule, it had been a recruiting ground for stradioti, whereas by the eighteenth century it was supplying the aforementioned light-infantry bodies for Naples and Venice.

Following the 1685 uprising, many Cheimarriotes joined Venetian ranks and were later organized into a two-thousand man Reggimento Cimarrioto. This regiment distinguished itself in the last years of the Morean wars, and in the ensuing years of peace its companies were deployed in the Ionian Islands and other garrisons in the Levant. The regiment was mustered in full only for infrequent inspections by Venetian authorities.

The gross irregularities that plagued the Reggimento Cimarrioto are evidence that the Venetians and the Neapolitans were rivals in the recruitment of the Cheimarriotes. In an inspection of the fortress at Corfu in 1745, Venetian officials found that the two companies of the Reggimento Cimarrioto serving in the Corfiote garrison were absent en masse.
Two of their officers, a Major Bitsiēs and a Captain Polimeros, were present only to collect pay for their troops. The bulk of the soldiers were in Cheimarra and received their pay there. Some, indeed, were collecting pay from both the Venetian Republic and the Kingdom of Naples, as they were also in active duty with the Reggimento Real Macedone.¹⁴

This latter unit had its antecedents in a military unit founded soon after the Neapolitan kingdom became independent under its own branch of the house of Bourbon. Initial organization and recruitment were directed by Athanasios Glykēs, an Epirote merchant living in Naples, and Count Stratēs Gkikas, a veteran stradioto from Cheimarra in Neapolitan service. In 1735 these two men organized a small unit of troops, no doubt Cheimarriotes, for service as guards for King Carlos. This unit had increased to battalion size by 1738, but in that same year problems erupted within the ranks, supposedly due to the intrigues of Venetian agents. The Venetian interference was probably a consequence of the recruitment competition mentioned above.¹⁵

As a result of this discord, the Neapolitan unit was reorganized under a new command in 1739. The new commander was the Cephalonian Count Geōrgios Choraphas, a former officer in the Venetian army. Under his leadership, the battalion-sized unit was eventually expanded into a full regiment that, in 1754, comprised two battalions of thirteen companies each. The initial commander, Stratēs Gkikas, had the rank of lieutenant colonel and was second in command. This organization, known as the Reggimento Real Macedone, remained basically intact until the 1790s.¹⁶ Choraphas exercised command over the regiment until 1775, when he died with the rank of lieutenant general. Stratēs Gkikas succeeded him as regimental leader until his death in 1784 when he, in turn, was provisionally replaced by a Colonel Vlasēs. Soon afterward, Athanasios Gkikas, the son of Stratēs, assumed command and led the regiment until the eve of the French invasion of Italy in 1798.¹⁷

The Reggimento Real Macedone was one of the most highly regarded units in the Neapolitan army.¹⁸ The record of the regiment and its later sister units was, according to their historians, quite distinguished. In the War of the Austrian Succession the regiment acquitted itself well against Habsburg forces, taking over four hundred of the enemy prisoner. It continued campaigning in 1745 and 1746 with other Neapolitan regiments that were consolidated into a Macedonian brigade in the regiment’s
honor. Although its men were taken prisoner as a result of the general
defeat of Neapolitan forces, the regiment maintained one of the best
reputations in the campaign.\textsuperscript{19}

Later, detachments from the \textit{Reggimento Real Macedone} served as
marines aboard vessels of the Neapolitan navy in expeditions against
the Barbary pirates. Since marine service then entailed sniping from
atop the rigging against the crews of enemy warships, as well as amphib-
ious operations, the troops of the regiment, with their renowned marks-
manship, were well suited for this duty. The Tripolitanian operations
of the 1750s, for example, found over three hundred of the regiment’s
men involved in marine service.\textsuperscript{20}

In peacetime, the Macedonian troops were often used in the suppression
of brigandage and uprisings in southern Italy and Sicily. Their mode of
fighting, being similar to that employed by the bandits of the Balkans,
made them ideal for dealing with Italian outlaws, while their foreign
origin kept them aloof from any local sympathies in the quelling of
insurrections.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1793 the advent of revolutionary France as a threat to the European
status quo marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the
regiment. The Kingdom of Naples joined England and other allies in an
attempt to stifle the burgeoning power of France, employing one batta-
lion of the Macedonian regiment as marines in an abortive expedition
against the French at Toulon.\textsuperscript{22} As the French military involvement
in Italy grew in the 1790s, there were moves to augment the regiment
with new units.

In 1786, the eve of a new recruiting effort in Epirus under the officer
K\textsuperscript{\textregistered}onstantinos Kasnets\v{s}, the regiment had a numerical strength of 2,012
officers and men.\textsuperscript{23} After the Toulon campaign, recruits appeared in
such numbers that it was necessary to form a second regiment, which
together with the original \textit{Reggimento Real Macedone} was consolidated
into a new, homogeneous Macedonian brigade (\textit{Brigata Macedone}) under
the command of Prince Ludwig Adolf of Saxony.\textsuperscript{24} In 1797-98, when
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was desperate for troops in the face
of an impending French invasion, another active recruitment campaign
in Epirus mustered a new six hundred-man force. This unit was organized
into the \textit{Battaglione dei Cacciatori Albanesi} under the command of K\textsuperscript{\textregistered}onstantinos Kasnets\v{s}, who was chiefly responsible for its recruitment.\textsuperscript{25}
In the 1798 campaign against the French in the Papal States, the *Brigata Macedone* and the *Battaglione dei Cacciatori Albanesi* took part in the actions in and around Rome. In battles and skirmishes at Civita-Castellana, Caiazzo, San Giovanni Laterano, and Capua, the two Balkan forces put up a resistance to French forces which was more effective than that of the other Neapolitan units and thus distinguished themselves in an otherwise disgraceful campaign.26

Following the defeat of Naples's forces at the hands of the French, the Balkan units were the main contributors to the two-day defence of Fort Carmine and other sections of Naples. The *Battaglione dei Cacciatori Albanesi* and elements of the *Brigata Macedone* were eventually holed up in the Carmine fortress and negotiated a surrender. This agreement was not respected by the French, who held the troops prisoner in the San Francesco prison and gave them small rations. The imprisoned troops received necessary foodstuffs from Greek merchants and Neapolitans.27 While the troops of the *Battaglione dei Cacciatori Albanesi* remained prisoners of war, the two Macedonian regiments were disbanded. Their personnel either scattered to the homes of friends and to the neighboring islands of Procida and Ischia, or returned to their homelands by obtaining passports under assumed names from the Ottoman consul.28

Under the short-lived Republic of Naples, some Balkan officers entered the service of the French and two of them attained the rank of brigadier general.29

Within six months of the French victory, the Neapolitan republic fell and the kingdom was restored by Anglo-Russian forces and the military movement of Cardinal Ruffo. Two reconstituted units were formed under the titles *Battaglione dei Cacciatori Macedoni* and *Reggimento Albania*. With the return of the French in 1805, these units were transferred to Sicily and served together with allied forces in the exile army of the Neapolitan kingdom.30 These diminished forces were maintained on Sicily until 1812, when both were discharged. A number of officers accepted positions in other military units or assumed Neapolitan consular or intelligence posts in the Levant.31

After a five-year hiatus the tradition of Macedonian forces was revived in 1817 by Lieutenant General Richard Church, military commander of Apulia. Previous to his accepting a Neapolitan commission, Church had seen service as an English officer in Egypt, Italy, and the Ionian Islands.
He had acquired the reputation of being an expert at training and commanding foreign troops in British service. In 1805 he made a study of the military uses of Calabrian brigands, and from 1805 to 1808 he led a unit of Corsican Rangers on reconnaissance missions in French-occupied Italy. From 1809 to 1814, he was organizer and a commander of the Duke of York's two Greek Light Infantry Regiments on the Ionian Islands.32

Following the defeat of Napoleon, the Greek regiments were dissolved and Church transferred to the Kingdom of Naples. As military governor of Apulia, he was able to organize a new Battaglione dei Cacciatori Macedoni that included not only veterans of the old Neapolitan units but also former members of the Ionian Islands regiments.33 This battalion participated actively in Church's internal campaigns against brigandage and popular uprisings until June 1820, when it was disbanded after less than three years of service. This was the last Balkan unit to serve the Kingdom of Naples.34

In the eighty odd years during which Naples employed light infantry from the Balkans, the troops of the regiment and its successors were known popularly under three names in addition to the aforementioned caniciotti: the seemingly national names of Greci, Albanesi, and Macedoni. These names did not, however, have their later ethnic connotations but were instead stylized terms that described the soldiers' general origins or mode of fighting. The term Greci was religious, denoting Orthodox faith and not necessarily Greek nationality. The term Albanesi was used because that nation had achieved fame for its style of fighting as mercenaries of the Ottoman Empire. Muslim Albanians had become a mainstay of the sultan's armies and were given the nickname "the Swiss of the Near East" by Europeans. The third epithet, Macedoni, which was used in the title of the regiment, indicated not only inhabitants of the area of Macedonia (as understood in either ancient or modern terms) but also applied to all peoples living in the areas once under the sway of Alexander the Great. This usage in effect made virtually all of the Balkan peninsula, as well as the Near East, a potential recruiting ground for these troops.35

Recruiting records from the 1740s and 1750s indicate that Naples levied men for the Regimento Real Macedone from such distant centers as Tinos, Dubrovnik, Smyrna, Constantinople, Messolongi, Mani, the
Peloponnesus, and Montenegro. Another source cites recruitments from the Peloponnesus and the islands of the Aegean and Ionian Seas. Recruitment among the South Slavs caused friction with the Venetian Republic. Venetian authorities maintained intelligence on the recruiting activities of agents and officers from Naples, not only among Venetian subjects in Dalmatia, but also among Montenegro and other Turkish subjects. They attempted to restrict the Neapolitan recruitment activities in Dalmatia and Montenegro (along with Cheimirra) because these areas were also recruiting grounds for Venetian schiavoni, morlachi, and Cimarroti troops. Recruitment of South Slavs for the Macedonian regiment continued nonetheless, particularly among Serbs from Montenegro, Bocca di Cattaro, and Paštrovići.

In the 1760s, a dispute concerning the South Slavic troops arose between the Neapolitan general staff and the commander of the regiment, Georgios Choraphas. The polemic was over whether “Illyrians” (Slavs) could serve in the Reggimento Real Macedone along with “Greeks” (Greeks and Christian Albanians). At various inspections the regiment had been found to include categories of men which had been excluded by the recruitment agreements of 1739 and 1754—agreements that forbade the levying of troops from areas of the Venetian Republic. These strictures had been violated both with regard to the Cheimarriotes serving on the Ionian Islands (1740s) and the Serbs in Venetian-held Bocca. In addition, it was found that a number of former Grenzer troops from Austrian service had been serving in the Reggimento Real Macedone since the 1740s. Initially these men were deserters from the Habsburg army that fought against Naples in the War of the Austrian Succession. Between 1744 and 1768 these troops numbered between 50 and 200 of the regiment’s men.

There were instances when Italians joined the regiment, as well. One attraction was that the pay of the camiciotti was considerably higher than that of other units in the Neapolitan army, although the former troops had to provide their own uniforms, accouterments, and weapons. According to an English observer, the pay of Macedonians was twice that of Italian troops.

The inclusion of troops in the Macedonian regiment from areas not included in its recruitment regulations was basically a jurisdictional problem. The commander of the regiment, in defending his recruitment policies,
used not only jurisdictional evidence, but also cited historical and ethnic reasons for maintaining the "Illyrian" troops. Colonel Choraphas argued in favor of their inclusion on the historical grounds that their homelands had been in Alexander the Great's realm. Although this argument is tendentious in light of modern scholarship, it was persuasive in a period when ancient claims still took historical precedence.46

More significant were the points that Choraphas made regarding the ethnic composition of the regiment. He distinguished the troops of the regiment by their native language and area, calling them Illyrians and Greeks. Among troops of these two "nations" he made regional distinctions but affirmed their attachment to their respective "nations." He thus considered Dalmatian, Montenegrin, and Grenzer troops generically Illyrians, and argued for their inclusion in the regiment on these grounds. Also, he emphasized that in religion, customs, dress, and modes of fighting "the Illyrians were related to the Greeks."47

Colonel Choraphas also cited language as a criterion for maintaining Illyrians in the regiment. He recounted the case of an Italian, Giovanni Bonifacio, who was allowed to remain in the regiment because he knew the Greek and Illyrian languages.48 This precedent indicates that the commander considered language a basic prerequisite for service in the regiment. It also implies that a certain number of men, probably commissioned and noncommissioned officers, were obliged to know both Greek and Serbo-Croatian and that bilingualism or even multilingualism (if one includes Italian or Albanian) existed in the regiment. It is clear that Choraphas's view regarding the Illyrians prevailed, for South Slavs served in the Regimento Real Macedone and its successors into the nineteenth century, as is seen by a number of Serb and Croat officers and men cited for distinguished service.49

Cheimarra remained the chief source for the manpower needs of the regiment, over and above other regions, as is evidenced by the great number of officers from notable Cheimarriote families such as: Andrić, Đules, Gikas, Gkinä, Kostas, Lekas, Melios, Panos, Vlasē, and Zachos, as well as other sources listed below.50 This participation was no doubt due to Cheimarra's proximity to the Neapolitan state and to the special relations maintained between them over the years.

An indication of the extent to which Cheimarriotes served the Macedonian regiment and its successors is given in the account of William
Leake, who traveled to Cheimarra in 1805. There he found about one hundred veterans of Neapolitan service living on pensions, several soldiers on leave, and three or four officers recruiting their countrymen for service in Naples.51

Since Cheimarra has been part of the disputed border region of Greece and Albania in this century, the question of the nationality of the Cheimarriotics has prompted much discussion. From a linguistic standpoint, the issue is not clear, but there is some trend toward the Greek language. William Leake observed in 1805 that the male population of Cheimarra spoke Greek as well as Albanian, while most women spoke only the latter language. This observation, if correct, would indicate that Hellenization had occurred either as a result of their mercenary service with Greek speakers or through the work of a school that had operated in Cheimarra since the seventeenth century. A number of scholars, however, maintain that Greek is the autochthonous language of the area, some claiming that the dialect spoken there is akin to the Greek of the southern Peloponnesus or to that of the Greek-speaking villages of Apulia in southern Italy.52 In an ethnological gazetteer of 1857, a Greek author claimed that both Greek and Albanian were spoken in all of the villages of Cheimarra. An Italian scholar, who visited the area at the turn of this century, observed that five of the seven villages were bilingual and commented that the population, although of “pure Albanian origin,” was of Greek sentiment.53 A German geographer and a British archeologist, who both visited Cheimarra in the interwar period, came to the conclusion that most of the area's villages were Greek-speaking.54 Finally, a Soviet study of the Albanian language and its dialects published in 1968 reported that three of the seven villages, including the town of Cheimarra, were wholly Greek-speaking but “considered themselves Albanians.”55

Leaving conflicting linguistic evidence aside and using the modern criteria of nationality, one cannot label the Cheimarriotics as either Greeks or Albanians. In a narrow sense their allegiances were to their respective clans and areas, and in a broader sense to their religious and cultural heritage. This latter allegiance to Orthodox Christianity would seem to indicate closer ties to their Greek coreligionists than to the Muslim Albanians.56 These ties are seen in the participation of many Cheimarriotics, including a number of veterans of Neapolitan service, in the Greek War
of Independence. Their contributions in that conflict, although less well known, can be compared to those of the Souliotes on land and the Hydriotes and Spetsiotes at sea. These people, like the Cheimariotes, were known to be Albanian-speaking or bilingual, yet they identified themselves wholly with the Greek national cause.\textsuperscript{57}

In the decade following the disbandment of Naples's last Macedonian military formation, Cheimariote veterans played a significant role in the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1830. Among those who became officers in the Greek insurrectionary forces were: Lt. General Kostas Kaznezēs, Chieftain Giannēs Köstas, Colonel Nikolaos Mēlios, General Spyros Mēlios (Spyromēlios), Colonel Zachos Mēlios, Lt. General Chrēstos Mpekas, Colonel Georgios Mpenas, Major P. Strakēs, Major Chrēstos Varphēs, and Lt. Colonel Spyros Varphēs.\textsuperscript{58} The most notable of these officers was General Spyromēlios. In the course of more than fifty years he served in the Light Infantry Battalions of the Greek state, as the commandant of the National Military Academy, and had a political career first as minister of war and then as both deputy and president of the parliament.\textsuperscript{59}

Aside from these and other chieftains, many Cheimariotes came to fight in insurgent Greece via Hellenic committees on the Ionian Islands.\textsuperscript{60} They served both in several Epirote corps and in units made up of Cheimariotes alone. One Cheimariote unit of 250 men under the Mēlios brothers participated in the famed defense and sortie of Messolongi and came out with ten survivors.\textsuperscript{61} Another Cheimariote unit later served in the last campaigns in West Central Greece in 1828-29.\textsuperscript{62} In addition to these Cheimariote contributions, there were other significant ways in which the \textit{Reggimento Real Macedone} and its successors had an impact on the development of the Greek movement for independence.

In the late eighteenth century, the \textit{Reggimento Real Macedone} began to be supplanted and overshadowed by new formations recruited and organized by the major European powers that were becoming involved in the Mediterranean. In the founding of some of these Russian, French, and British units, the Neapolitan regiment's traditional manpower sources were tapped and its organization used as a paradigm. These later legions provided much of the rank and file of the Greek War of Independence.

As early as 1759, negotiations between the Cheimariotes and the Russian Empire were undertaken for the raising of one to two regiments.\textsuperscript{63}
These contacts did not bear fruit, but during the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1769-74 over three thousand Greeks and Orthodox Albanians served as marines on the ships of the Russian fleet that operated in the Eastern Mediterranean after the uprisings in Cheimarra, Mani, and other areas of Greece. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1787-92, over eight hundred warriors were again recruited by Russian agents for marine service in the privateer flotillas of Lampros Katsonēs and Guilielmo Lorenzi. Veterans of both these wars emigrated to Russia and formed the basis of two regular units in the Southern Ukraine: the Grecheskii pekhotnyi polk (later the Balaklavskii grecheskii pekhotnyi batal'on), formed in the Crimea in 1775, and the Odesskii grecheskii division, founded in Odessa in 1795.65

It is significant to note that two of the most active recruiting agents for these troops had some connection with the older Balkan military units of Venice and Naples. Major Panos Bitsilēs, the main recruiter in Cheimarra and later Russian consul in Albania and Cheimarra, was the scion of a well-known Cheimarriote family that had provided officers for the Reggimento Cimarrioto of Venice and was the first Cheimarriote clan to offer its services to the Russian Empire. Another member of this family, Kōnstantinos Bitsilēs, was the initial commander of the Odesskii grecheskii division. There is evidence that Panos Bitsilēs or a later namesake was a member of the secret Greek revolutionary society, Philiki Hetaireia.65 The other important recruiter, Major Ludovikos Sōtērēs, who was instrumental in recruiting many troops from Epirus and Central Greece during both Russo-Turkish wars, was a Lefkadian Greek who was a doctor in Naples for a number of years and no doubt had contact with many members of the Reggimento Real Macedone during his stay there. This experience, together with his residence in Ioannina, made him an effective recruiter for Russia. Indicative of his contact with Balkan troops in Naples is the fact that he called the troops that he recruited Makedones.66

The Napoleonic wars brought about a proliferation of Greek units serving European powers which included veterans of the Neapolitan armed forces. During their occupation of the Ionian Islands, the Russians organized units of Greek mainlanders, either under the sovereignty of the Septinsular Republic (Pichetti Albanesi, Corpo Macedone), or under direct Russian control (Legion legkikh strelkov, Osobyi grecheskii
During the French occupation of the Ionian Islands, these units were transformed into *Le Régiment Albanaise* and *Les Chasseurs à pied Grecs*. Later, the English, struggling with the French over the Ionian Islands (1809 to 1814), organized two Greek Light Infantry Regiments from the earlier Russian and French formations.

All of the above Russian, French, and English formations had some elements that had previously been in Neapolitan forces. There is evidence that whole companies transferred their service from Naples to the Septinsular Republic in the early years of the Russian occupation. For example, there was a Major Stratës Gkikas, probably a descendant of one of the founders of the *Reggimento Real Macedone*, commanding a company on Zakynthos for the Ionian Republic in 1802. This company still bore the nomenclature of its former Neapolitan service, being the first company of the Macedonian regiment (*Reggimento Macedonia -Piedalista-Prima Compagnia*). Major Gkikas later held a commission in the Russian *Legion legkikh strelkov* and was subsequently an officer in French and British service as well. During the Greek War of Independence, he served as an officer in the revolutionary forces of Western Greece.

Another individual from the Neapolitan officer corps was Kônstantios Androuetsës, who entered the service of the French during their occupation of Naples in 1799. He acted as commander and instructor of one of the Neapolitan Republic’s civic guard regiments in that year, but the allied restoration of the Kingdom of Naples forced him to return clandestinely to his homeland of Cheimarra. He remained in Cheimarra until 1806, when he was assigned by the French to scout out the Russian *Legion legkikh strelkov* and to recruit Cheimarriotes and others for French service instead. While on this mission on Corfu, he was arrested and imprisoned by Septinsular authorities in November 1806 for pro-French activities, but was able to escape to Cheimarra. With the cession of the Ionian Islands to the French he was given the command of one of the battalions, of the *Régiment Albanaise*. He later became native adjutant commander of the regiment with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

The English, in organizing the Duke of York’s Greek Light Infantry, recruited not only from among those men who had served in previous Russian and French sponsored organizations, but also from the veterans of the *Reggimento Real Macedone*. Indeed, each of the three powers
maintained a section of the Greek regiments with Cheimarriotics, many of whom were no doubt Neapolitan veterans. The Russians, in their Legion legkikh strelkov, had a Cheimarriotic legion of four companies on Corfu, while the French later had a battalion of six Cheimarriotte companies in the Régiment Albanaise.  

In the initial organization of these units, the precedent of the Reggimento Real Macedone was kept in mind. In 1802, when the Septinsular Republic institutionalized the irregular Pichetti Albanesti ("Albanian detachments") into a single unit, the named the five hundred-man unit the Corpo Macedone. Among the officers and men of the corps who later served in the Greek War of Independence were: Georgakes Grivas, Velisarios Kalogerios, Giannes Kavadas, and Theodoros Grivas.  

It is also evident that the founding of the Legion legkikh strelkov was effected by the Reggimento Real Macedone, since the first men to offer their services to the Russians on the Ionian Islands in 1804 were Cheimarriotics, who wanted conditions of service similar to those they had enjoyed in Neapolitan service. Likewise, the French, one year before the organizing of the Régiment Albanaise, had considered the feasibility of raising a new Reggimento Real Macedone for the French sponsored Kingdom of Naples, ruled by Joseph Murat. There is also little doubt that Richard Church had encountered Macedonian troops in Italy before he had organized the Greek Light Infantry on the Ionian Islands.

After the defeat of Napoleon and the cession of the Ionian Islands to England, the Duke of York's Greek Light Infantry Regiments were fully disbanded in 1817. Some of the discharged warriors were able to find service in the Battaglione dei Cacciatori Macedone with their old commander, Richard Church, and there is evidence that he recruited from among his most trusted officers. Others went to Russia and sought patents of commission for service with the tsar, but were turned down. Russian Foreign Minister Iōannēs Kapodistrias, who knew these troops well from his service in the Septinsular Republic, feared that their unemployment would lead them into the ranks of the secret Greek revolutionary society, Philikē Hetaireia. He attempted, through letters to the Neapolitan ambassador in St. Petersburg, to persuade the king of Naples to reactivate the Reggimento Real Macedone with the bulk of these Ionian veterans as its rank and file. His efforts did not produce the expected
results and the Neapolitan Balkan forces were limited to the one battalion under Richard Church.\textsuperscript{79}

Those officers that had gone to Russia (Anagnostēs Papageοrgiou, Ėlias Chrysospathēs, Christophoros Perraivos, and others) did join the Philikē Hetaireia and became among its most active members, initiating their former comrades-in-arms from service in the Ionian Islands.\textsuperscript{80} The leadership of the Philikē Hetaireia had taken the Neapolitan forces into account in its plans for the Greek struggle. It was planned that Christophoros Priniāres, a member residing in Italy, would arrange for the recruitment and transport of the Macedonian troops to Sparta.\textsuperscript{81}

Although this particular plan was never realized, a number of veterans of the last Battaglione dei Cacciatori Macedoni, including Souliotes and others, were involved in the rebellion of Ali Pasha in 1820-21 and later made their marks in the Greek campaigns in Central Greece.\textsuperscript{82}

Besides these Cheimarriotes and other former soldiers of Neapolitan service who participated in the Greek War of Independence, the members of those Ionian formations that rivaled the Reggimento Real Macedone in its last years constituted a significant part of the forces of independent Greece.\textsuperscript{83}

The legacy of the Reggimento Real Macedone and its successors was of two-fold importance for the development of modern Greece. The units provided an important number of trained officers and seasoned troops for the forces of the Greek Revolution. Indirectly, the Neapolitan formations acted as models and as recruiting grounds for later Russian, French, and English units on the Ionian Islands that likewise provided an even greater number of chieftains and soldiers for independent Greece.

This study, based upon published sources, has only briefly recounted the history of the Balkan forces of the Kingdom of Naples and their impact upon the formation of their foreign counterparts and upon the Greek national movement. It has also touched upon the ethnic and regional composition of these units. Nevertheless, these and other subjects need further systematic study, using available archival materials in Italy and elsewhere. Investigation into the recruitment policies and the internal
organization of Naples’s Balkan legions, along with their relation to Venetian and Russian rivals, may provide further insights into the development of Balkan military institutions in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

NOTES


7. Vakaëoulos, Ta hellënikà stratëumata tou 1821, pp. 139-46.


16. Lehasca, pp. 16-18; and Manselli, pp. 157-58.

17. Buti, p. 155; and Lehasca, pp. 30, 32.


22. Buti, p. 155; and Lehasca, p. 32.

24. D'Ayala, p. 75; and Lehasca, p. 33.

25. D'Ayala, p. 77; and Lehasca, pp. 35-36.


28. Lehasca, p. 45.


30. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

31. Ibid., pp. 55-56.

32. E. M. Church, Sir Richard Church in Italy and Greece (London, 1895), pp. 1-20; Douglas Dakin, British and American Philhellenes during the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1833 (Thessaloniki, 1955), pp. 10-16; and Stanley Lane-Poole, Sir Richard Church (London, 1890), pp. 9-30.

33. D'Ayala, pp. 32-33; Lane-Poole, pp. 40; and Lehasca, pp. 58-59.

34. Butl, p. 157; and Lehasca, p. 59.


37. Chasiotēs, Scheseis hellēnōn kai hispanōn, p. 45.


41. Dissertazione, pp. 201-3, 262.
42. On the rivalry between Venice and Naples over recruitment of Cheimarriotes, see: Buti, pp. 152-53; *Dissertazione*, pp. 205-9; Manselli, pp. 144-47; and Mutinelli, pp. 159-60.

43. *Dissertazione*, pp. 216, 233; and Lehasca, p. 22.

44. *Dissertazione*, pp. 190-95.


47. Ibid., pp. 261-63.

48. Ibid., p. 265.

49. Lehasca, pp. 38-39. In addition, a list of 41 veterans who received last rites in the Greek church in Palermo, Sicily, indicates that two were South Slavs—Jovan Gravic (ex *Illyrico delle Boche di Cattaro*) in 1810, and Jovan Markovic (*Illyricus Dalmatinus*). Sciambra, p. 104.


55. Desnitskaia, pp. 353-54.


58. Angelos Papakōstas, Agones kai thyes Boreioēpeirōtōn sto Eiko-
siena (Athens, 1945), pp. 23-27; Nikolaos V. Petselēs, Hē Boreios Ēpeiros kai ta physike tēs synora (Athens, 1946), pp. 100-1; Spyrou, p. 78. On Cheimarra during the Greek War of Independence, see Spyros Stoupēs, "Hai diekdikēsis mas en Epeirō kai hē stasis tēs Cheimarras kata tēn Epan-

59. Spyromēlios, Apomnēmōneumata, pp. 92-108; Spyrou, pp. 78-
85.


61. Spyromēlios, Apomnēmōneumata, pp. 97-100.


64. On these units, consult: "Albansko voisko," Voennyi entsik-
lopedicheskii leksikon, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1911), 239-41; Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii (Moscow, 1972), pp. 130-32, 135-38, 144-
549, 602-4; S. Safonov, "Ostatki grecheskih legionov v Rossii ili nyne-
shnee naselenie Balaklavy: Istoričeskii ocherk," Zapiski odeskago ob-
shchestva istorii i drevnostei, vol. 1 (Odessa, 1844), 205-38; T. I.


69. On the Duke of York’s Light Greek Infantry Regiments, see E. M. Church, pp. 17-20; “Copy of Extracts from any Correspondence which may have taken place between the commander of forces during the occupation of Sicily by the British forces and the Home Government, relative
to the Attack which led to the Capture and Subsequent Occupation of the Ionian Islands," Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1864, vol. 66, no. 3, enclosures 1-15, pp. 1-28; Dakin, pp. 1-28; Lane-Poole, pp. 9-25; Rados, pp. 81-96.

70. Roll call for the Macedonian Regiment-Infantry-First Company-Zante, November 1802, Genika Archeia tou Kratos (General State Archives), Athens, Greece. Vlachogiannēs Collection, folio G37 (1802). Gkikas and his troops were not the only veterans of Neapolitan service to join the Ionian armed forces. Other former veterans of the Macedonian regiments were: Colonel Nikolaos Pierēs, commander of Septinsular regular forces on Corfu and Cephalonia from 1800; Colonel Lavrentios Pierēs, Stepinsular Battalion Commander from 1803; and Colonel Andreas Garzonēs, Garrison Commander on Zante from 1802. Nikolaos Pierēs later served in the Greek War of Independence as a commander of artillery and regular infantry. Roll of Officers not only company rolls on Zante, n.d., Genika Archeia tou Kratos, Vlachogiannēs Collection, folio G37, nos. 42-44 (1802); Gerasimos Mavrogianēs, Historia ton Ioniotēn Neōn archomēnē to 1797 kai lēgousa to 1815, vol. 1 (Athens, 1889), 379; E. R. Rhangave, Livre d'or de la noblesse ionienne, vol. 1 (Athens, 1925), 136-37; Savant, "Soldats grecs," pp. 285-86, 376-77; Savant, Sous les aigles impériales: Napoléon et les Grecs (Paris, 1946), pp. 317-18; Chrestos Vyzantios, Historia tōn kata tēn Hellēnikēn Epanastasin ekstrateiōn kai machōn ōn symmeteschen ho taktikos stratos apo tou 1821 mechi tou 1833, in Apomnēmoneumata agōnistōn tou Eikosiena, vol. 10 (Athens, 1956), 291, n. 27; and Leonidas Zōēs, Lexikon historiōn kai laographikōn Zakynthou, vol. 1 (Athens, 1963), 116-17.


74. Boppe, p. 242; and Stanislavskaya, p. 314.


81. Philemon, *Dokimion historikon peri tēs Hellēnikēs Epanastaseōs*, vol. 1, 56.


83. Boppe, p. 219, and Rados, pp. 31-33, 113.