THE BALKAN LEAGUE
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TRANSLATED BY
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LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET
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FIFTY years ago my father, a merchant of Philippopolis (Bulgaria), settled in Manchester with the double object of carrying on business there and of giving me an English education. I was then a lad of sixteen. After a year spent with a private teacher, I entered Owens College, now Victoria University. And writing from that excellent institution, I sent on September 18, 1866, the following letter to *The Pall Mall Gazette*:

*To the Editor of "The Pall Mall Gazette"

SIR,—In your edition of Saturday, in the beginning of the article "The Language Question in the Tyrol and Istria," after touching upon the much-disputed ground of the test for determining the race of any given people you illustrate your opinion, that the will of a nation must be considered as the definitive test of this determination, by the case of the Bulgarians, to whose will, you say, appeal must be made for determining their nationality, as some of them think of themselves as Russians, others as Servians, and others as of something standing by itself. Now, sir, allow me to correct a statement which is apt to cast disrepute upon our already sufficiently disreputed nation. No Bulgarian, in the present state of our national advancement, will think of himself as Russian or Servian—nationalities whose language and history are wholly distinct from ours. And, of course, the mere supposition that there are Bulgarians who think of themselves as
Greeks is an anachronism. In proof of this, I beg to state that those Bulgarians who were and are educated in Russia, Servia, and Greece, and who naturally ought to have some tendency towards these countries and their nationalities, are the boldest champions of the claim to our being a separate nationality—speak and write much more purely the Bulgarian than any others. As to your saying that the Bulgarians are in a fluid state, which admits of their moulding themselves into some other kindred race, I must say that there is no necessity and no will on their part for this moulding. What motive, indeed, could induce a nation of 5,000,000 to mould itself into another—a nation whose intellectual and material development, so much neglected under the double yoke of the Turks and the Greek clergy, is rapidly progressing, whose language is one of the sweetest of the Slavonian dialects, whose commercial activity in the interior of Turkey and the banks of the Danube, scarcely inferior to that of the Greeks, is spreading even to this city, whose industry, moral qualities, and claim to a better position among the more favoured nations of Europe are justly acknowledged by all travellers, and whose, at last, future is one of the brightest?

Apologising for occupying so much of your valuable space, I have the honour to be, sir,
Your obedient servant,

A BULGARIAN.

Manchester,
September 18, 1866.

So far as I know, this letter was the first political utterance of a Bulgarian, addressed in English to a newspaper. It appeared in The Pall Mall Gazette of September 26, 1866. Lord Strangford, who had written the article "The Language Question in the Tyrol and
Istria,” published it with a long commentary, from which I extract the following passages.¹

We willingly give insertion to our Bulgarian friend’s letter. It forms an important and authentic standard of appeal; one far from unnecessary at the present moment, when the great mass of our contemporaries are actually letting themselves imagine that the destruction of the Turkish power in Europe would both of necessity and of justice restore the Greeks, not to autonomy only, but to Imperial dominion. It is most astonishing that they should still so imagine, but there is no use in remonstrating with them, as it is not likely to lead to anything in practice. Still, it must be hard, from a Bulgarian point of view, to have to read through article after article of trash about the new Byzantine Empire being a “bulwark” of Europe against Russia, vice Osman, dead from over-doctoring. The last new clever thing about the Greeks is that they are to be the soul of the new Eastern body of rising nationalities. How does the Bulgarian like the prospect of a Greek soul? What does he think about his likelihood of having one, if it comes to that? He seems to think he has had enough of one already and is glad enough to have got rid of it. But we forget. He is to have a Wallachian soul, for it is the Danube which unites him to Wallachia, and the Balkan which separates him from that part of himself which is south of the Balkan; a view which our Bulgarian may see if he should happen to fall in with last Saturday’s Spectator as he should try and do at once, like a good, thoughtful Bulgarian as he doubtless is. The next time the Danubian theory turns up, or our old and eloquently advocated friend, the great Jugo-slavic

theory, we hope our Bulgarian will speak up stoutly for his own people.

Lord Strangford did not live to see how I followed his advice. Four years after my return to Philippopolis, the Bulgarian insurrection of 1876 broke out. And I did my best to enlighten those who brought about or took part in Mr. Baring's inquiry into the "Bulgarian Atrocities," made famous by Mr. W. E. Gladstone's pamphlet. On the eve of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, I wrote in *The Times* a series of seven letters, in which I voiced the sufferings and hopes of my people and for which I was imprisoned by the Turks and sentenced to death. In 1879, after the Treaty of Berlin, again in 1885, after the Union between Bulgaria and East Roumelia, I was sent to England to plead the cause of my country. And after speaking up stoutly for Bulgaria in different capacities, I was appointed in 1911 to the post of its Prime Minister. And it fell to my lot to inaugurate that Balkan Alliance which was to solve the Balkan problem. Events having given in 1913 a wrong solution to that problem, I trust the English public will not find fault with me if, in the present crisis of the Near East, I venture to raise again my voice and tell the truth in a matter of supreme moment to my people, more sinned against than sinning, and to the Balkan Peninsula, more distracted than ever.

I. E. Gueshoff.

Sofia,  
August 1915.
On September 30, 1912, Europe was startled by an epoch-making event. The Christian States in the Balkan Peninsula, which had hitherto been disunited, appeared for the first time in the character of allies and ordered simultaneously a general mobilisation of their armies with a view to solving a time-worn problem. Standing shoulder to shoulder, they tried to induce Turkey to help them in that task by conferring on her European provinces the boon of ethnic self-government, so indispensable to Balkan peace. But all their efforts proved of no avail. And on October 18, after the Sublime Porte had declared war on them, they in their turn had recourse to armed force.

Then a miracle took place for which few were prepared. Within the brief space of one month the Balkan Alliance demolished the Ottoman Empire, four tiny countries, with a population of some 10,000,000 souls, defeating a Great Power whose inhabitants numbered 25,000,000. The alliance and its victories were greeted with enthusiasm by all the friends of peace and freedom. Millions of European people were being liberated and the world would be spared a frightful night-
mare. Once the Turks were driven back to Constantinople and Asia Minor, the Eastern Question would cease to be a source of troubles and dangers.

On May 30, 1913, this solution of the problem was consecrated by the Treaty of London. The Balkan war thus ended as it had begun—by a miracle. More territories were being reclaimed from Turkish hands than in the case of the most victorious war ever waged by a great Power against the Sultan.

But when the time came for determining the fate of these liberated territories, the Balkan Alliance perished, thanks to narrow-minded people among the allies, in the throes of an impious fratricidal struggle. And those whom the successes of the alliance had cowed immediately began to recover breath. They ceased to be pacific and grew warlike. The revelations of Signor Giolitti prove that as early as August 10, 1913, Austria was proposing to Italy a war against Serbia; while on November 22, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, wrote to his Government that the German Emperor “was no longer a partisan of peace.”

Since the Balkan Alliance was destined to have such terrible consequences, it seems to me that its authors owe both to their own countries and to humanity at large the full truth on this subject. The treaties on which the Balkan League reposed having already been made public, there is no longer any reason why secrecy should be observed
on the motives which inspired those treaties, the negotiations which preceded their signature, and the causes which brought about their disruption. And as the treaties in question were concluded in Sofia, Bulgaria standing at the head of the Balkan Alliance and making for it during the war against Turkey greater sacrifices than all the other allies put together, it is only right that the Bulgarian statesman who conducted the negotiations should be the first to break silence and tell what he did for that alliance, how hard he tried to save it from destruction, and how little was the Bulgarian nation responsible for its downfall.

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THE BALKAN LEAGUE

CHAPTER I

THE CONCLUSION OF THE BALKAN ALLIANCE

Summoned on March 24, 1911, to fill the post of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, my first task as leader of the Bulgarian policy was to deal with the unfortunate problem of Macedonia and Thrace, which had been tormenting Bulgaria ever since the Congress of Berlin. People still remember the verdict of Prince Gortchakoff on that Congress. The Chancellor of Alexander II described it as the darkest page in his life. The Congress proved no less gloomy a page in the history of the Bulgarian nation. United in bondage from which Russia liberated them, the Bulgarians saw their emancipation ratified by Europe at the cost of their unity. The Treaty of Berlin tore the Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano into three parts: a vassal Principality of Bulgaria, an autonomous Eastern Roumelia, while Macedonia and Thrace were replaced under the Turkish yoke. After the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria, the latter
had no other ideal except to restore her San Stefano frontiers, or, if that should prove impossible, to obtain for Macedonia and Thrace an autonomous government which, by guaranteeing to their inhabitants a bearable existence, would relieve Bulgaria of the cares and dangers due to the chronic anarchy in those provinces. The dangers in question were so numerous that they not only compromised the security and progress of Bulgaria, but threatened her very future. For a Bulgarian Prime Minister there could exist no more imperative duty than to discover means of solving a problem which weighed so heavily on the fate of the Bulgarian State and race.

Having been an eye-witness of the horrors which accompanied the Bulgarian insurrection in 1876 and the Russo-Turkish war in 1877–78, some of which I described in my reports to the British or American representatives and in letters to the English press, to say nothing of my *Notes of a Condemned Man*; being a convinced believer in the doctrine of the French publicist that the best policy consists in being guided by "an ardently pacific patriotism and by a prudently patriotic attachment to peace," I remained until 1912 the most fervent partisan of peace in Bulgaria. By speech and by pen I preached extreme caution and studious avoidance of all adventures which could land Bulgaria in a war with Turkey. In a Memoir which I addressed to Sir Edward Grey towards the end of 1906, I praised my country
for being the only Balkan State that had not disturbed the peace in the Balkans. I did not despair even when the Young Turkish revolution in 1908 had rendered difficult the realisation of the cause for which I pleaded in the said Memoir, and the thought of a direct understanding with Turkey continued to occupy my mind for a considerable time before and after my advent to power.

But the new regime in Turkey soon began to cause us disappointment. As regards the extermination of the alien nationalities in the Empire, the Young Turks showed no improvement on the Old Turks, or even on Abdul Hamid. The revolting massacre at Adana and the scandalous impunity accorded to its intellectual authors came as a shock to all those who had hoped for a peaceful solution of the bundle of ethnic problems, summed up under the name of Eastern Question. Even then I kept thinking that after the disinterested assistance rendered by the Macedonians to the Young Turks during the counter-revolution in April 1909, my Cabinet was justified in expecting from Turkey an attitude in harmony with our desire for a sincere understanding between the two countries, the more so as I had again renewed my pacific assurances.1

1 My first declaration on the Bulgarian policy towards Turkey was made at Rustchuk about a month after our advent to power, and ran as follows:

"Our policy is sincere, and as we are anxious that it should not prove the ephemeral policy of our Cabinet, but should become the permanent policy of Bulgaria, we hope that the neighbouring
I discussed these matters at great length with the late W. T. Stead, the well-known peace propagandist, whose bust was unveiled last year in the Palace of Peace at The Hague. He was a warm friend of Bulgaria and a great admirer of Mr. Gladstone, being entrusted with his papers on the massacres in 1876. From a determined enemy of will facilitate our task by responding to our invitation to eliminate the causes that are at the bottom of our misunderstandings, and the motives which irritate public opinion in our country. In a parliamentary country, no Government can march against public opinion. It will be a misfortune if our pacific policy fails under the pressure of public opinion for whose excitement we are in no way responsible. Where we fail, it is hardly likely that any other Bulgarian Government will succeed."

On November 24, 1911, I made the following statement in the National Assembly on our relations with Turkey:

"I have been asked by the Opposition to say on which side we are. My reply is that we are with those who sincerely wish for peace and who, as partisans of peace, favour those conditions without which peace cannot be maintained. These people think that the Balkan Peninsula ought to belong to the Balkan nations; they wish that whatever be the Balkan country where these nations live they should enjoy the blessings of freedom, justice, and constitutional rights. We are with those who are friends of this sort of peace. If the Turks desire such a peace, and can make peace such as we want it, then we are with the Turks also. Their neighbours for many centuries, connected with them by many economic ties, we are anxious to live with them on friendly terms. We are the more anxious to pursue this policy, because it is dictated to us by the vital interests of the Bulgarian nation in the kingdom and outside its frontiers. Nothing has happened thus far to shake our confidence
Abdul Hamid, as I knew him in 1879 when we first met in London, Mr. Stead had become a partisan of the Young Turks, and during the summer of 1911 visited Constantinople and Macedonia to study the Turkish problem with a view to advocating their cause. Although at the outbreak of the Turco-Italian war Mr. Stead took the side of Turkey, when he came to Sofia in August 1911 he greatly surprised me by advising us not to hurry with our understanding. He had already begun to lose his illusions in the in this policy, or to undermine our hope that our neighbours also will realise their interest to observe the same friendly policy towards ourselves. We hope that, taught by past and recent trials, from which we wish them to emerge successfully, they will understand the need of introducing in their European provinces conditions of life which will induce our co-nationalists to stay where they are, instead of flocking to our territory. The present emigration means misery to the Bulgarian nation and causes harm to the Turkish Empire. It is in the interest of both countries to arrest this emigration which threatens Macedonia and Thrace with depopulation, and inundates some of our frontiers with restless and embittered elements, thus creating a Macedonian problem in our own midst. If conditions of life are introduced which shall put an end to a state of things so pregnant with dangers; if our repeated proofs of peaceful intentions are met with deeds that would satisfy some legitimate demands on our part, we may be certain that a great step will have been made towards pacifying the provinces, inhabited by our co-nationalists. And no one wishes more passionately for such a pacification than the sober and industrious Bulgarian nation which, six weeks ago, met with such dignified calm the disquieting reports of a certain mobilisation along our southern frontier."
Young Turks, and the same disenchantment spread later on among many European statesmen, Count Aehrenthal and M. de Kiderlen-Wächter being of that number. In the course of a conversation with the latter early in June 1912, I was struck by his scathing criticisms of the Young Turkish regime. All through the summer of 1911 I continued my talks with the Turkish Minister in Sofia on the subject of a possible understanding between Turkey and Bulgaria. Assim Bey pretended to agree with me, blaming the policy of the Turkish Government and meditating on a round of visits to Monastir, Salonica, and Adrianople in order to impress on the local Turkish authorities the need of change in their attitude towards the Bulgarians. He was, however, recalled to Constantinople before carrying out his intention and became Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the meantime Italy had declared war on Turkey, who now had every reason to be on friendly terms with Bulgaria. In these circumstances, no one need be surprised that before his departure from Sofia Assim Bey made to my substitute M. Theodoroff—I was at that time absent in Vichy—the most categorical declarations in favour of a Turco-Bulgarian agreement. Unfortunately, with the exception of a still-born proposal for an understanding, the Minister did nothing to inaugurate a new policy towards Bulgaria.¹

¹ This is the text of the letter and instructions sent by Assim Bey to Naby Bey:
call the proposal still-born because it was entirely unacceptable to us, especially its second point, and also because neither Assim Bey nor the new Turkish representative in Sofia, Naby Bey, ever referred to it again. On the contrary, the frontier incidents which exasperated public opinion in Bulgaria be-

"The common interests of Turkey and Bulgaria have for a long time been seriously occupying my deep attention. Among the ideas for which I am working, there is none that is nearer my heart than the improvement and the consolidation of the Turco-Bulgarian relations.

"I, therefore, request Your Excellency to ask M. Gueshoff, in one of your private conversations, to define and detail the points which will have to be discussed between us in connection with this matter. Being acquainted with my views, His Excellency will know what I expect from his political tact, foresight, and friendly disposition. You may once more assure him that his friendly disposition will always find me ready to meet him in the same spirit."

The instructions given to Naby Bey ran as follows:

"1. Assim Bey will do everything possible for the satisfactory settlement of the questions now pending between the Kingdom and the Empire, so as to reduce the points of friction.

"2. Assim Bey lays it down as an indispensable condition that there shall be no intervention by either party into the internal administration of the other party.

"3. Concurrently with this, and also as an indispensable condition—each party will so settle its internal government as not to give its neighbours any reasons for complaining, but, on the contrary, to satisfy them.

"4. An engagement by both parties for a fixed term—ten years, for example—not to undertake any action having for its object the increase of their present frontiers."
came more frequent; while massacres like those at Shtip and Kotchani, murders, pillaging, tortures, and persecutions, the systematic ill-treatment of the Bulgarians in the Turkish army, so increased the number of refugees from Macedonia and Thrace that the most peaceful Bulgarian statesmen were aroused and began to ask themselves if all this was not the result of a deliberate plan on the part of the Young Turks to solve the Macedonian and Thracian problem by clearing those two provinces of their Bulgarian and Christian inhabitants. These suspicions were intensified by the perusal of official documents like the report of the Bulgarian Consul at Monastir, according to which Dr. Nazim Bey, the ideologist of the Young Turkish party, had promised to the notables at Vodena, in a speech overheard by M. Wigand, engineer on the Salonica-Monastir railway line, that if the Young Turks were supported at the coming elections there would be no Christians left in Macedonia in 30–40 years. Those who were acquainted with the rapid decrease of the Bulgarian population in Macedonia during the first decade of the present century knew that this was no idle threat. M. Shopoff, Bulgarian Consul-General in Salonica, writing as early as September 1910, had stated it to be an indisputable fact that "we have already lost one-fourth of what we had fifteen years ago." The Bulgarians in Macedonia who formerly numbered 1,200,000 (Le Temps, No. 15,950, February 1905) were estimated in a report
DEPOPULATION OF MACEDONIA

from the same Consul-General, under the date of April 19, 1911, at only 1,000,000. It is true that these figures were questioned in certain quarters, especially after M. Pantcho Doreff, a prominent member of the Young Turkish party, had been accused by his opponents that in a speech before the Turkish Parliament he had intentionally minimised the importance of the Bulgarian nationality in order to facilitate the "Ottomanising" task of the Young Turks. Anxious to ascertain the truth, I sent to Constantinople M. Cyril Popoff, Director of the Statistical Department, and M. D. Misheff to inquire into the matter at the Bulgarian Exarchate. When I read their report I could not help coming to the melancholy conclusion that the Bulgarian population in Macedonia had, beyond all doubt, been considerably reduced. This gradual extermination of the Macedonian Bulgarians had so discouraged them that, according to a report of M. Shopoff from March 13, 1912, they openly expressed their preference for any alternative that promised them relief from their unbearable lot. "Let whoever likes come, provided he puts an end to our sufferings. Things cannot be worse than they are."

No Bulgarian statesman, responsible for the future of the Bulgarian nation, could remain indifferent to such a condition of things, or ignore the open threats of the Turks to aggravate the measures aiming at the annihilation of the Bulgarians in Macedonia. My manifest duty was to examine
how Bulgaria could best be enabled to stop these excesses. Among the various methods that suggested themselves, the most important consisted in an understanding, not with Turkey who had rejected our advances, but with our other neighbours. Such a policy was greatly facilitated by the unanimity with which public opinion in Bulgaria had recently greeted the meeting of the Serbian and Bulgarian economists and the visit of the Bulgarian students to Athens in April 1911. Matters were further simplified by the fact that in 1904 a secret agreement had been signed with Serbia, and that the latter country had since made repeated efforts, both while the Democratic party was in office and during the first six months of our administration, to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Bulgaria.

I. The Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty

I spoke of these efforts on the part of Serbia to M. Rizoff, who had signed the treaty of 1904 in his capacity of Bulgarian representative at Belgrade. Our conversation took place early in September, while he was on leave in Sofia. We agreed that he should arrange with M. Milovanovitch, at that time Serbian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, an interview between the two Balkan Premiers which was to take place on my return from Vichy, where I proposed to go after the general elections in Bulgaria.

The elections were held on September 17,
and three days later I left for Vichy. On my arrival there I was startled by the critical turn which relations between Italy and Turkey had suddenly taken. The situation grew rapidly worse, and on September 29 the war broke out. I immediately telegraphed to my colleagues in Sofia that I was returning, but that I considered it necessary to stop in Paris and Vienna in order to meet the French and Austrian Foreign Ministers. I give below the record of those interviews as I drafted it at the time:

M. de Selvès received me on Wednesday, October 4, at 2.30 p.m.; Count Aehrenthal on the following Saturday, at 3 p.m. To both of them I put these two questions: (1) Will the war be localised and will it be short? (2) Do they apprehend complications in Turkey, as the result of fanatical excitement, chauvinistic passions, or a movement against the Young Turks, followed by a counter-revolution like that of April 1909? To my first question they both replied in the affirmative. Yes, the war will be localised; yes, it will end quickly. M. de Selvès believes that Italy will consent to pay an indemnity for Tripoli. She may also recognise the suzerainty of the Sultan, but about this he was not so positive. At all events, he believes that Italy will show herself very conciliatory if the Turks begin negotiations immediately after Tripoli is occupied. Of course, Italy cannot negotiate until the occupation has taken place. Count Aehrenthal had not yet read the interview of Hilmi Pasha on the duration of the war. When I drew his attention to it and told him that according to Hilmi Pasha the war will be a long one, Count Aehrenthal interrupted me with the words: "But where do they propose to fight? On land or on sea? Neither of
these things is possible, and I therefore hope that the Turks will agree to peace.” As regards the conditions of the latter—whether there will be compensation or whether the suzerain rights of the Sultan will be respected—Count Aehrenthal could say nothing.

Respecting my second question—the risk of complications from the Turkish side—M. de Selves admits the danger, Count Aehrenthal does not. The latter is of opinion that the Young Turkish Committee constitutes the only organised force in Turkey, that it will gain rather than lose by the present crisis, and that it possesses power enough to impose its will. To this I replied that the Committee had lost much ground before the war, and that I doubted whether its prestige would be sufficient to surmount the passions excited by this new failure of the Young Turkish regime. In reply to his remark, hoping that we would follow the example of the Great Powers and do everything to preserve peace, I observed to him, as I had previously done in the case of M. de Selves, that the danger in the Balkans does not come from Bulgaria but from Turkey. The Powers knew that our policy was pacific; and although the Young Turks had done nothing to help us, we shall not depart from that course if the interests of Bulgaria do not render a change imperative.

I told M. de Selves that during my two previous diplomatic missions to France I had learned to value the enlightened and sympathetic counsels which the French Government had so generously lavished on our country. I explained to him the object of those missions in 1879 and 1885. In the course of the second one, I had the honour to be received by M. de Freycinet and to treat with him the important question of our union with Eastern Roumelia. M. de Selves assured me that he shared the Bulgarian sympathies of his uncle and declared
himself an admirer of the Bulgarian King. During our conversation he inquired whether a small matter, involving the indemnity of a Frenchman, had been settled. I replied in the affirmative.

Count Aehrenthal mentioned our commercial negotiations and expressed the hope that they will soon be concluded. He also referred to the projected visit of our King in the following terms: "In the course of the visit which His Majesty paid us this summer something was said about his visit to H.M. the Emperor. I promised to take the latter's orders and to inform him of the result. The health of our Emperor requiring care, I had to wire to Count Tarnowski in Sofia to inform M. Dobrovitch that the visit cannot take place this autumn.

In Vienna I was met by M. Rizoff who, after receiving fresh instructions from my substitute, M. Theodoroff, had gone to Belgrade and settled the details of my interview with M. Milovanovitch. I also found there M. Stancioff who told me that the King, then on a visit to his Hungarian property, knew about our project and wished to see me before my departure. I had several consultations with the two ministers. After M. Rizoff had given us a full report of his conversations in Belgrade, we established the principles which should regulate our understanding with Serbia, embodying them in a memorandum. I may mention that the points dealing with an attack on Serbia and Bulgaria by a third party, particularly by Austria, were drafted by M. Rizoff himself. Neither is it superfluous to point out that by adopting the boundaries of the sandjak of
Uskub as the future line of demarcation in Macedonia we were conceding to Serbia the caza of Veles, the latter forming part of the sandjak of Uskub. There was then no question of arbitration.

Memorandum

1. The renewal of the treaty of 1904, mutatis mutandis: instead of reforms, we shall ask for autonomy; if that should prove impossible, we shall divide Macedonia.

2. Our maximum concessions in case of partition:
   
   (a) The river Pchina, to the east of Vardar, all the way to its source;

   (b) The boundaries of the sandjaks of Prizrend and Uskub, to the west of Vardar.

3. Determination of casus fœderis:
   
   (a) Attack on Serbia and Bulgaria, from whichever quarter it may come;

   (b) Attack by Turkey on any one of the Balkan States;

   (c) Eventual attempt on the part of Austria to occupy Macedonia or Albania;

   (d) Internal troubles in Turkey, threatening the peace and tranquillity of the Balkan Peninsula;

   (e) When the interests of Bulgaria and Serbia demand that the question should be settled.

4. The participation of Russia to be a conditio sine qua non for the conclusion of a treaty on the above lines.

5. The participation of Montenegro.

After the King had approved this scheme, in the course of an audience in the train between Oderberg and Vienna, I left the
latter place on October 11, and that same night met M. Milovanovitch. I subsequently read to the King and before the Ministerial Council the following report on the conversation which we had:

We, M. Milovanovitch and myself, left Belgrade on October 11, at 11.30 p.m. and at 2.30 a.m. reached Lipovo, where the Serbian Ministerial carriage was detached and we had to part company. During the three hours which we spent together, we touched on all the questions affecting the interests of our countries, beginning from the Turco-Italian war and the Young Turkish regime.

Speaking on the latter topic, M. Milovanovitch said that Count Aehrenthal had despaired of the Young Turks being able to regenerate Turkey. A few months ago—last spring—he had spoken in favour of an autonomous Albania which would help to solve the great Balkan question. M. Milovanovitch again dwelt on the dangers which such an Albania, stretching to the Bulgarian frontiers and including the vilayets of Monastir and Uskub, would present for the Balkan Slavs. In his opinion the Albanians, most of whom are Mohammedans and afflicted with the common Moslem incapacity to form a civilised State, were condemned to the fate of the other Moslem nations—the fate of Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, and Tripoli. The only possible solution, when the time comes for a final settlement with Turkey, would be found in the annexation of northern Albania by Serbia and of southern Albania by Greece.

The liquidation of Turkey being mentioned, M. Milovanovitch entered into a long discussion on the present and the future of our two countries. He thinks that nothing can be done at this juncture, all the Powers being determined to localise the war
CONCLUSION OF BALKAN ALLIANCE

and not to tolerate any Balkan complications. We must, therefore, remain quiet. Serbia will under no circumstances stir, the more so as he thinks that a war between Turkey and one of the Balkan States will consolidate rather than weaken the Young Turkish regime. We must wait until the end of the war, trying meanwhile to secure the support of Russia. Without such support nothing can or ought to be undertaken. But before turning to Russia we must come to an understanding among ourselves and conclude a treaty in three copies, one of which will be handed to Russia.

The main provisions of the *casus foederis* should be as follows:

1. An absolute defensive alliance against whosoever attacks Bulgaria or Serbia;

2. A defensive alliance against whosoever attempts to occupy those parts of the Balkan Peninsula which shall be specifically mentioned: Macedonia, Old Serbia, etc.;

3. An offensive alliance against Turkey with the object: (a) of liberating Macedonia and Old Serbia in circumstances deemed favourable to both countries; (b) of putting an end to the anarchy or massacres in the Turkish provinces where the vital interests of either contracting party are at stake.

When I remarked to M. Milovanovitch that if our attempt at liberating Macedonia and Old Serbia takes the character of annexation, our task will be greatly complicated, owing to the touchiness of our neighbours, he agreed that it would be better to ask for autonomy, although that solution did not particularly appeal to him. He kept insisting on a partition of the territories liberated and said that for some of them there could be no discussion between us. Adrianople must revert to Bulgaria, in the same way as Old Serbia, to the north of Shar Mountain, must belong to Serbia. As regards
Macedonia, the greater part of that province will fall to the Bulgarians. But a section of northern Macedonia must be given to Serbia, and the best way would be to reserve the partition for the arbitration of the Russian Emperor. Let us draw no dividing line at present, he added. By adopting that course you will spare yourselves the criticisms of having consented to a preliminary repartition of Macedonia. Later on, when your compatriots have secured the lion’s part, no one would think of protesting that a small part of Macedonia has been awarded to Serbia by the Russian Emperor, under whose patronage and high sense of justice this great work will have been accomplished. Ah, yes! If the “winding-up” of Turkey coincides with the crumbling of Austria-Hungary, matters will be enormously simplified. Serbia will get Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Roumania receives Transylvania, and we shall then have no reasons for apprehending a Roumanian intervention in our war against Turkey.

Both the King and the Ministerial Council sanctioned the principles which M. Milovanovitch and myself had established as a basis of the impending discussions, and empowered me to begin official pourparlers for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance with Serbia. I lost no time in taking the necessary steps, the more so as the situation which I found in Sofia on my return from Vichy was very disquieting, not to say critical. My colleagues had been greatly perturbed by reports from Adrianople that the Turks were mobilising against us, and talked seriously of ordering a Bulgarian mobilisation against Turkey.
This bellicose spirit on their part was to me a revelation. Impressed by it, I began to ask myself: if my friends, who are usually so cautious and thrifty, can no longer stand the Turkish provocations and are ready to spend millions of francs in order to teach Turkey a lesson, what must I expect from my other compatriots and from Bulgarian public opinion? As a matter of fact, this last was already so excited, all the newspapers, including the semiofficial Den and Retch, were so warlike, that a well-known foreign correspondent pronounced me to be manifestly unfit for my post because, instead of profiting by the crisis, I was doing my best to dissipate it. I do not deny that I did so, by my representations to the Great Powers, but at the same time I irrevocably resolved to conclude alliances with Serbia and Greece, bearing in mind that the Turco-Italian war, whose early stage had so strained our relations with Turkey, might keep some fateful surprises in store for Bulgaria. The most elementary prudence demanded that, as leader of the Bulgarian policy, I should secure the co-operation of these two countries, as being indispensable to us for repelling a Turkish aggression—after the fall of Abdul Hamid, what Prince Bismarck used to call a preventive war was by no means impossible on the part of Turkey—and for protecting our own interests, as well as those of our co-nationalists in Turkey, in the event of a catastrophe in Turkey. Another imperative reason for concluding such alliances was
our uncertainty that some agreement, like that announced in August 1910, did not exist between Turkey and Roumania; to say nothing of the danger that Serbians and Greeks might intervene in a Turco-Bulgarian war, under conditions far less favourable to us than if we had previously come to terms with them. Deeply convinced, at the same time, that the Macedonian question ought to be taken out of the hands of the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee, as Cavour took the question of Italian unity out of the hands of the Italian revolutionists, I hastened to open the negotiations. Serbia appointed as her delegate M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister in Sofia, while the King and the Ministerial Council entrusted to me the task of representing Bulgaria, it being agreed that while the pourparlers lasted I should consult M. Daneff, as spokesman of the second party forming our Coalition Government, together with M. Theodoroff and General Nikiphoroff, as Ministers of Finance and War. The original proposals of the Serbians were not calculated to inspire us with great confidence in the moderation of the Serbian Government. Contrary to the assurances of M. Rizoff, they began the conversations in a somewhat raised tone. By article 3, paragraph 3, of their project the Serbians were reserving for themselves the right to declare war without our consent; while article 4 not only said nothing of Macedonian autonomy, but actually proposed that the two vilayets of Salonica and Monastir should
be reserved for the arbitration of the Russian Emperor. The said articles ran as follows:

Article 3. Should one of the contracting parties propose to the other that actions be commenced for the liberation of the Bulgarians and Serbians under Turkish yoke, esteeming that the situation in Turkey makes this imperative and that the general conditions in Europe are favourable, the party invited must at once respond and immediately enter into an exchange of views.

If an agreement be reached favourable to action, the latter will commence as settled by the agreement; and where the agreement is not complete, the parties will be guided in all things by the sentiment of friendship and solidarity of interests. In the opposite case, the opinion of Russia will be invoked, and, in so far as Russia shall express her opinion, it shall be binding on both parties. If, Russia having declined to express an opinion and the contracting parties still failing to agree, the party favourable to action declares war against Turkey on its own responsibility, the other party is bound to maintain a neutrality friendly to its ally, immediately ordering a mobilisation, in the limits fixed by the military convention, and coming with all its forces to the assistance of its ally in the event of a third party taking the side of Turkey.

Should one of the parties decide to declare war on Turkey with the object of putting an end to the anarchy or massacres in the adjoining Turkish territories where vital State and national interests of the party are at stake, it being manifest that Turkey cannot herself stop this state of things, the other party, on receiving a reasoned invitation from its ally, must simultaneously with the latter declare war on Turkey.

Article 4. All territorial acquisitions which either party, or the two parties together, shall have
SERBIAN PROPOSALS

won as the result of a war against Turkey in any of the cases provided for by articles 1, 2, and 3 shall constitute common property of the two parties.

Serbia recognises now and in advance the complete and exclusive right of Bulgaria over the territories in the vilayet of Adrianople, while Bulgaria recognises the corresponding right of Serbia over the vilayet of Scutari and that part of the vilayet of Kossovo which lies to the north of Shar Mountain.

As regards that part of the vilayet of Kossovo which lies to the south of Shar Mountain, and the vilayets of Salonica and Monastir, the two parties agree to request H.M. the Emperor of Russia, acting as supreme arbitrator, to decide what part of those territories shall be given to Bulgaria, and what part to Serbia.

In reply to the objections which I raised, M. Spalaikovitch proposed on November 7, 1911, the following modifications of articles 3 and 4:

Article 3. In the case of internal troubles arising in Turkey so as to endanger the State or national interests of the contracting parties or one of them, as also in the case of internal or external difficulties befalling Turkey which shall reopen the question of the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula, that contracting party which shall first arrive at the conclusion that military intervention is indispensable addresses a reasoned proposal to the other party which is bound to enter immediately into an exchange of views, returning to its ally a reasoned reply in case of disagreement.

If an agreement for action be attained, it shall be communicated to Russia and, if the latter raises no objections, action will be commenced in accordance with the agreement, the parties being guided
CONCLUSION OF BALKAN ALLIANCE

in all things by the sentiment of solidarity and community of interests. In the opposite case, where such an agreement cannot be attained, the parties shall appeal to Russia for her opinion, which, in so far as Russia shall declare herself, will be binding on both parties. If, Russia declining to state an opinion and the parties still failing to agree, the party in favour of action begins war against Turkey on its own responsibility, the other party is bound to observe a neutrality friendly to its ally, immediately ordering a mobilisation within the limits fixed by the military convention, and coming with all its forces to the assistance of the allied party in the event of a third party taking the side of Turkey.

Article 4. All territorial acquisitions which either party, or both parties together, shall have won as the result of a war against Turkey, in the cases provided for by articles 1, 2, and 3, shall constitute common property of the two parties.

Serbia recognises now and in advance the complete and exclusive right of Bulgaria over the territories of the vilayets of Adrianople and Salonica, while Bulgaria recognises the corresponding right of Serbia over the vilayet of Scutari and that part of the vilayet of Kossovo which lies to the north of Shar Mountain.

From the Serbian side, it is declared that Serbia has no pretensions beyond a line which, starting from Golema Planina, on the Turco-Bulgarian frontier, follows the course of the river Bregalnitza to the point where it flows into Vardar and, crossing on the right bank of Vardar, immediately turns to the south of Prilep and reaches the lake of Ochrida, between Ochrida and Strouga, leaving Prilep, Kroushevo and Strouga to Serbia and Ochrida to Bulgaria.

From the Bulgarian side, it is declared that Bulgaria recognises the right of Serbia on a frontier
which, starting from the mountain of Dovalitza (Ojegovo), on the Turco-Bulgarian frontier, follows the river Valna to the point where it flows into the Vardar, then the boundary of the sandjak of Uskub as far as the mountain of Karadjitza, from where it goes by the shortest line between Kitchevo and Kroushevo to the lake of Ochrida, in such a way as to leave Kitchevo and Strouga on the Serbian side, and Ochrida on the Bulgarian side.

Both parties will request H.M. the Russian Emperor graciously to examine their respective standpoints before pronouncing a decision in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2, of the present treaty.

As the reader will observe, we were obtaining some satisfaction as regards article 3, but article 4 still said nothing about autonomous government for Macedonia, and proposed to create in that province three zones: an uncontested Serbian zone, a contested zone to be reserved for the arbitration of the Russian Emperor, and an uncontested Bulgarian zone. I protested both against the proposed partition and the systematic boycotting of the principle of Macedonian autonomy. My new objections were transmitted to M. Milovanovitch, but did not meet with a prompt reply on his part. As he was then on the point of starting with King Peter for Paris, I commissioned MM. D. Stancioff and D. Rizoff, with whom I had originally established the main principles of the future Serbo-Bulgarian understanding, to meet M. Milovanovitch and persuade him to accept our conditions. The following re-
PORT WILL SHOW HOW THEY PERFORMED THEIR MISSION:

PARIS,
November 20, 1911.

PERSONAL, CONFIDENTIAL

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT,

We have the honour to acquaint you with the manner in which we have accomplished the mission entrusted to us—to meet M. Milovanovitch, Serbian Prime Minister, and speak with him on the subject of the Serbo-Bulgarian understanding which is now in the process of negotiation.

At our first meeting with M. Milovanovitch, which took place on November 18, during the Gala performance at the Opera in honour of H.M. the Serbian King, M. Stancioff informed him that our King and M. Gueshoff, the Prime Minister, were greatly disappointed [désolés] with the proposals which M. Spalaikovitch had brought from Belgrade on the pending Serbo-Bulgarian agreement. They were amazed at the modifications which Serbia proposes to introduce into that agreement, by rejecting all principle of Macedonian autonomy and by altering the geographical boundary of her Macedonian claims. She substitutes the river of Bregalnitza for that of Ptchina as her frontier to the east of Vardar, reserving for herself the town of Veles, with the corresponding line to the west of Vardar, including the towns of Prilep, Kroushevo, Kitchevo and Strouga, in lieu of the present boundaries of the sandjaks of Uskub and Prizrend. The Bulgarian King and his Prime Minister are of opinion that these modifications render an understanding between Bulgaria and Serbia impossible.

M. Stancioff stated this in a very concise form, the Cercle offering no opportunity for a longer conversation without arousing suspicions among the
diplomatists who were present. M. Stancioff, however, succeeded in impressing on M. Milovanovitch that the matter was extremely serious and deserved a fresh and careful examination by Serbia. The declaration of M. Stancioff startled M. Milovanovitch, who asked for an interview where they might again discuss the affair. M. Stancioff thereupon informed M. Milovanovitch that M. Rizoff had arrived from Rome for that very purpose and that it would be better if the exchange of ideas took place "between the three," as the Bulgarian Government considered M. Rizoff exceptionally competent on all questions affecting Macedonia. Besides, such an exchange of ideas would form a continuation of the talks which M. Rizoff had already had with M. Milovanovitch in Belgrade, on October 2 and 3, the latter in the presence of MM. Pashitch and Stoyanovitch, leaders of the two wings of the Radical party. M. Milovanovitch then agreed to call at our Legation on the following day, November 19, at 10 a.m., for a longer "conversation."

At this point it is necessary to place on record parenthetically a characteristic phrase uttered by M. de Selves, French Minister of Foreign Affairs. While M. Milovanovitch and M. Stancioff were talking, M. de Selves happened to be passing and said to them with a smile: "Je passe à coté de vous, non pour vous désunir." M. Stancioff completed the thought of M. de Selves by adding: "Mais pour nous unir et bénir." The French Minister rejoined: "Oui, oui, pour vous bénir; vous faites, vous taillez de la bonne besogne." Later on, M. Milovanovitch explained to us the meaning of these words by saying that he had spoken with M. de Selves about an understanding between Bulgaria and Serbia, whose 400,000 soldiers would form a barrier against all foreign aggression in the Balkans. M. Milovanovitch had
found that his thesis met with the full approval of M. de Selves.

Yesterday M. Milovanovitch visited our Legation and we had the following conversation, which M. Stancioff opened with the words:

"The original Serbo-Bulgarian conversation on the subject of the understanding, for which the two countries are equally anxious, laid down that the arbitration of the Russian Emperor will bear on the following geographical boundary which represented the utmost concession on the Bulgarian side:

The river Ptchina as frontier to the east of Vardar; the southern boundaries of the sandjaks of Uskub and Prizrend as frontier to the west of Vardar, on condition that recourse will be had to partition only after events had established that Macedonian autonomy is either impossible or cannot last long.

The proposals which M. Spalaikovitch has brought from Belgrade, on the contrary, reject the principle of autonomy and lay down that the arbitration of the Russian Emperor shall bear on a new geographical frontier of the Serbian claims in Macedonia, running to the east of Vardar, along the river Bregalnitza and to the west of Vardar, along a line corresponding to it and reaching the lake of Ochrida near Strouga.

Further than this: the Serbian modifications claim for Serbia, *ab initio* and without arbitration, not only the geographical frontier indicated by Bulgaria, but also the territories in the triangle formed by a straight line from the mountain of Karadjitza to Strouga.

Of course, concluded M. Stancioff, such modifications cannot be accepted by the Bulgarian Government which might make a last concession, by agreeing to the frontier already mentioned and the triangle now claimed by Serbia, but on the following two preliminary conditions: that this Bulgarian concession shall be submitted to the arbitration of the
Russian Emperor, it being understood that the line indicated by Bulgaria constitutes the utmost Bulgarian concession, while the triangle represents the utmost Serbian pretension; and that the question respecting Macedonian autonomy shall not be prejudiced.

M. Stancioff added that there could be no question about any concessions ab initio, and that the arbitration of the Russian Emperor ought to be obligatory.

M. Rizoff, in his turn, added that the arbitration of the Russian Emperor is equally indispensable to both Governments, as a screen against public opinion in their countries which are in direct opposition and not easy to reconcile on this question. The arbitration must bear both on the principle at stake and on its practical application.

M. Milovanovitch replied that the modifications proposed by M. Spalaikovitch were inspired by the following motives: firstly, the natural presumption that the Russian Emperor will adopt neither the Bulgarian nor the Serbian standpoint, but will seek for an intermediate term between the Bulgarian concessions and the Serbian claims in Macedonia, so that neither the Serbian line of demarcation nor the Bulgarian will be the one finally adopted; secondly, the belief that the river Ptchina is too small for a frontier line, and that a watershed should be taken instead; thirdly, the fact that the villages in the nahié of Preshovo have for a long time been Serbian and that it would be unfair if they were to remain on the Bulgarian side; fourthly, the conviction that the Serbians had already made very great concessions.

M. Rizoff undertook to answer the objections of M. Milovanovitch, and he did so in the Serbian language, remarking that his explanations will thus assume the tone of their former conversations in Belgrade and will recall to the memory of M. Milovanovitch parts of them in their original form.
M. Rizoff first mentioned the important circumstance that during their former conversations in Rome and Belgrade M. Milovanovitch had more than once agreed to the principle of Macedonian autonomy, provided the Serbian and the Bulgarian spheres of influence in Macedonia were determined in advance, so that if autonomy should prove impossible or of short duration, Bulgaria and Serbia would have their definite frontiers when the moment for annexation came. So that, M. Rizoff observed, the formula which Bulgaria now proposes is in reality the formula of M. Milovanovitch himself. It is, therefore, strange that M. Milovanovitch should now abandon it, the more so as this same formula was again discussed during their recent conversations in Belgrade. Besides, continued M. Rizoff, in the event of a war with Turkey, Serbia and Bulgaria could find no more acceptable, more justifiable, and less provocative platform than the principle of Macedonian autonomy. Another no less important consideration is that the final settlement of European Turkey can hardly take place—especially after the loss of Tripoli—without the question passing through a preliminary stage, and that stage can only be autonomy for Macedonia. It is superfluous to add, said M. Rizoff in concluding his remarks on this topic, that no Bulgarian Government could be found to sign with another country an understanding on the Macedonian question whose stipulations proscribed the principle of Macedonian autonomy.

Concerning the new Serbian frontier, M. Rizoff reminded M. Milovanovitch that during their conversation in Belgrade on October 3, at which MM. Pashitch and Stoyanovitch were present, after M. Rizoff had replied to the objections of the former on this same subject, M. Milovanovitch had remarked: "Evidently we must give up Veles and even sacrifice the native town of our King Marco. . . ." On that occasion the future of Veles, Prilep, and Krou-
shevo was settled in favour of Bulgaria. The only question left open was the fate of Kitchevo. As for Strouga, no one even mentioned that place, for the very good reason that Strouga was the birthplace of the brothers Miladinoff and no Bulgarian would even hear of sacrificing it.

The objections of M. Milovanovitch to the river Ptchina as a frontier line, continued M. Rizoff, are not convincing, since the Bregalnitza river which Serbia now proposed as a substitute is no bigger. With respect to Veles, M. Rizoff had already explained in Belgrade that this town was the place where the Bulgarian nationality in Macedonia first affirmed itself and that it formed the centre of the only Bulgarian diocese which figured in the Firman creating the Bulgarian Exarchate. It was, therefore, impossible for a Bulgarian Government to commit the sacrilege of abandoning it to others. Speaking of the villages in the nahié of Preshovo, M. Rizoff said that M. Milovanovitch has evidently been misled by somebody, for they are all on the right bank of the river Ptchina, and the Bulgarian line leaves them in the Serbian sphere.

As for the great concessions of Serbia, M. Rizoff remarked that one can talk of them only in jest. Most sensible Serbians have, since the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, restricted their pretensions in Macedonia solely to the sandjak of Uskub. During the negotiations which preceded the Serbo-Bulgarian understanding of 1904, even M. Pashitch, whose parsimonious disposition makes him a hard bargainer and who never ventures to make concessions to Bulgaria because of his Bulgarian origin, had rallied to M. Rizoff’s proposal in favour of Macedonian autonomy, on condition that the sandjak of Uskub should be considered as forming part of Old Serbia; but this condition was not accepted by the Bulgarian delegates. Where must one look for the vaunted concessions by Serbia when she now
claims not only Veles—which town was annexed to the sandjak of Uskub only a few years ago, owing to its proximity to Uskub, and in consequence of the insistence of Hafiz Pasha, the notorious Vali of Kossovo and a pronounced enemy of the Bulgarians—but also Prilep, Kroushevo, Kitchevo, even Strouga, all of which form part of the vilayet of Monastir?

At this point of the conversation M. Stancioff intentionally left the room for a few minutes during which M. Rizoff, in an intimate tête-à-tête (they have been for a long time on terms of personal intimacy), made the following important declaration to M. Milovanovitch:

"You know that my devoted attachment to the idea of a definite understanding between Bulgaria and Serbia has put me under a cloud of suspicions in my country. You will, therefore, believe in my absolute sincerity and frankness on this occasion. Well, I assure you on my honour and in the name of my country that this is our last effort to arrive at such an understanding, and that Serbia will never again find a Bulgarian Government so well disposed and willing to conclude an agreement. I need hardly tell you that no Bulgarian Government will venture, even if it felt disposed, to conclude with Serbia an understanding which does not provide for Macedonian autonomy. If you, M. Milovanovitch, agree with all this, you must realise what a terrible responsibility you are assuming before your own people and before the entire Slav world should our present initiative meet with failure. You know as well as anybody that we must not waste time, or events might anticipate us. As your old friend, I implore you to associate your name with this great enterprise. Have the courage to surmount the obstacles in the way, even when they come from your political friends. That is how great deeds in this world are done. You have more than once told me
that the first and most important object of the Serbian foreign policy ought to be an understanding with Bulgaria. If you are convinced of this, you must attain that object even at the risk of exposing yourself to the temporary abuse of your short-sighted compatriots. Bear in mind, M. Milovanovitch, that this is the last opportunity for concluding the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement on behalf of which we have both so much pleaded, and that no such opportunity will recur again."

As these words were being uttered, M. Stancioff returned, and realising the purport of the conversation, dealt M. Milovanovitch the final coup de grâce by adding:

"Do not forget that the entire responsibility before the Macedonian public opinion for the territorial concessions which we are making to you in Macedonia has been placed on M. Rizoff, both by the Bulgarian King and by the Bulgarian Government."

All this impressed M. Milovanovitch so much that he could find nothing to reply, merely contenting himself with the words that he still remained convinced—more so than ever before—of the paramount importance for Serbia of arriving at an understanding with Bulgaria. But for that very reason it was desirable to enlist the support of all decisive factors in Serbia. He was sure that we could not doubt his resolution to settle this matter à tout prix, and trusted that we would rely on his promise to do his utmost, when back in Belgrade, in order to persuade the remaining Serbian factors—MM. Pashitch and Stoyanovitch, leaders of the two branches of the Radical Party, and General Stepanovitch, the War Minister—to meet the Bulgarian wishes.

After that he would summon M. Spalaikovitch from Sofia to supply him with fresh instructions.

This declaration of M. Milovanovitch bore every trace of sincerity, and prompted M. Stancioff to
facilitate his task in Belgrade by submitting to him your formula on the subject of Macedonian autonomy, which ran as follows:

"If after a war waged in common by the two parties—Serbia and Bulgaria—it should be found necessary to end the war with an autonomous government for the provinces inhabited by Serbians and Bulgarians, the two parties will agree to conclude peace guaranteeing autonomy to the said provinces."

M. Milovanovitch took a copy of this formula and asked us to excuse him, as the time for the interview had expired and he had appointments with MM. Delcassé and Barrère. On departing he again promised to do everything so as to meet the Bulgarian wishes. As he took leave of M. Stancioff, who as host had accompanied him to the door, M. Milovanovitch requested him to inform our King that his great desire was to see this matter through, being anxious to please His Majesty, "who reposed such hopes on him."

On this our interview with M. Milovanovitch ended. It now remains for you to carry the question to a happy ending. We do not consider it superfluous to warn you against M. Spalaikovitch, who until quite recently used to be one of the most crafty and dangerous foes of our cause in Macedonia. His mind is not yet ripe enough to get the better of his chauvinistic obstinacy, and you will do well to be on your guard while treating with him. Of course, it would have been much better if your pourparlers with M. Milovanovitch had not taken place through him as intermediary. You will also pardon us for recalling to your memory the words of M. Hartwig, in answer to M. Rizoff's complaints of the exaggerated claims of the Serbians: "Do not pay much attention to that. They will bargain with you, but in the end they will content themselves only with the sandjak of Uskub." And who
knows better than M. Hartwig the innermost thoughts of the Serbians?

We flatter ourselves with the hope that you will rely on our accuracy and accept the present as a faithful record of the words of M. Milovanovitch and of our own, and trust that our report may prove of considerable use to you during the negotiations on this momentous question.

We have the honour, etc.,

STANCOFF,
RIZOFF.

After his return to Belgrade, M. Milovanovitch informed me about the beginning of December, through M. Spalaikovitch, that he would again examine the question with MM. Pashitch and Luba Stoyanovitch, leaders of the two Radical groups, and would submit to me fresh proposals. On December 28 M. Spalaikovitch communicated to me the new Serbian proposals. They practically accepted my formula on the subject of Macedonian autonomy, and agreed that the two zones of which I have already spoken should be merged into one contested zone. But the new zone was so wide that I found it impossible to acquiesce in the Serbian proposal. Long discussions on this point followed between M. Spalaikovitch and myself, in which M. Nekludoff, Russian Minister in Sofia, and Colonel Romanovsky, Russian Military Attaché, more than once took part. The intervention of Russia sometimes took the form of advices to show ourselves moderate and accommodating so as to hasten the success of the good cause; while
on other occasions we were given to under­stand that if we failed to come to terms, Russia would reserve for herself the right to act as her interests dictated.

A communication from Colonel Romanov­sky to General Fitcheff proved the more disquieting, as it was made just when the press and our own diplomatic representatives abroad were reporting that M. Tcharikoff, Russian Ambassador in Constantinople, had opened negotiations for an understanding with Turkey. No one could be blind to the dangers which would threaten our national aspirations if Russia were to conclude a double agreement with Austria and Turkey, such as we then apprehended. My colleagues in the Ministerial Council more than once urged on me the necessity of frustrating at any cost a Russian understanding with the latter country. The only way in which we could do this was by signing our treaty with the Serbians. After much insistence on our part, the latter had accepted our conditions regarding the frontiers of the contested zone, but still differed from us on the subject of Strouga and the shore of the lake of Ochrida, between the latter town and Strouga. Long arguments ensued and, in the end, these localities also were ceded to us, a protocol being drafted to that effect. This protocol was signed on March 7, 1912, and seven days later we signed the treaty with Serbia. It would have been very risky to protract the negotiations any further, as the Turks might have got wind of them, concluded peace with
Italy and attacked us, or entered into some agreement to our detriment. I may add here that as early as December 28, 1911, we had agreed with the Serbians to detach from the treaty and embody in a secret annex the clauses dealing with our offensive alliance against Turkey, the stipulations affecting Macedonia, and all matters connected with those two articles.

About a month after we had signed the treaty and its secret annex, the pourparlers over the military convention provided for by article 4 of the treaty were begun. The Minister of War and the Head of the General Staff were appointed to examine the project and report on it to the King. The latter consented to sign the convention, with its provisions against an eventual attack on the part of Austria and Roumania, because he was acquainted with the text of the Austro-Roumanian military convention of September 1900, concluded after the acute Bulgaro-Roumanian crisis over the assassination of Michaleanu, the preamble of which declared that Roumania is justified in aspiring to increase her possessions by annexing part of Bessarabia and securing the fortress of Silistria, if possible with Rustchuk, Shumen, and Varna. The existence of this Austro-Roumanian agreement, and the persistent rumours that Roumania had also signed a convention with Turkey, imposed on us the duty to provide in our military convention with Serbia against a possible aggression by Austria and Roumania. After General Niki-
phoroff and General Fitcheff had made their report to the King, and explained that if the Austrians occupy the sandjak of Novi-Bazar they will invade Macedonia and come into conflict with our interests, His Majesty gave his approval, the more so as on June 13, 1902, General Paprikoff had signed with Russia a military convention, in reply to that between Austria and Roumania. By article 3 of this Russo-Bulgarian military convention—about which I sent so many telegrams to M. Bobtcheff, our Minister in Petrograd, during the winter of 1912-1913, when the Roumanians were threatening us with invasion—Russia had undertaken to defend with all her forces the integrity and the inviolability of the Bulgarian territory. In view of this promise on the part of Russia, it was only natural that we should place our treaty with Serbia under the ægis of the Empire which had guaranteed the integrity and the inviolability of Bulgaria. It was no less natural that we should reserve for Russia the right to pronounce on the fate of the contested zone, and to arbitrate on any disagreements concerning the interpretation and application of the treaty, its secret annex and the military convention.

II. GRECO-BULGARIAN TREATY

As early as May 1911, or two months after my advent to office, the question of an understanding with Greece had been raised
by Mr. J. D. Bourchier, the well-known friend of Bulgaria and correspondent of The Times in the Balkan Peninsula. Mr. Bourchier wrote to me a letter from Athens in which he informed me that the Greek King and the Greek Government were anxious to arrive at an agreement with Bulgaria. The visit of the Bulgarian students to Athens, in the spring of 1911, the friendly reception which was accorded to them in Greece, had created an atmosphere highly propitious to an exchange of ideas, paving the path for an understanding, if not an alliance, between the two countries. Mr. Bourchier was given to understand that the Bulgarian Government was in no way opposed to such an exchange of views. Matters, however, remained at a standstill until the Turco-Italian war and the conduct of the Young Turks towards us, more especially their unprovoked mobilisation against Bulgaria at the beginning of October 1911, forced us to commence negotiations with Greece.

The first step in that direction was taken immediately after the said Turkish mobilisation. On October 16, 1911, M. Panas, Greek Minister in Sofia, came, as he expressed himself, to make an important communication on behalf of his Government. After recapitulating the history of his various conversations with me, before I left for Vichy, and with M. Theodoroff, while the latter was acting as my substitute, M. Panas concluded that if I could assure him of our willingness to intervene in the event of a Turkish aggres-
In view of the critical state of our relations with Turkey at the beginning of October 1911, this communication was of capital importance to us. Before Serbia had promised to fight on our side in the event of a war with Turkey, we were receiving such an assurance from Greece. The Greek proposal was communicated to the King and the Ministerial Council and accepted by them, I being authorised to tell M. Panas that Bulgaria will assist Greece in a war with Turkey, on conditions which must be specified in a defensive treaty. M. Panas agreed to that.

No project for such a treaty was, however, prepared, while our negotiations with Serbia went on. After we signed the treaty with Serbia, I had another conversation with M. Panas, and on April 27, 1912, received from him a note, enclosing the draft for a defensive alliance between the two countries.

In this preliminary project not only was nothing said about autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace, but even those privileges which had been granted to the Christian provinces of European Turkey by various international acts, particularly article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, were passed over in silence. I told M. Panas that we could not accept their project so long as Greece did not declare explicitly that she would raise no objections
to autonomy. With that object in view, I submitted to him the following formula:

Greece undertakes not to offer any opposition to an eventual demand by Bulgaria of administrative autonomy for Macedonia and the vilayet of Adrianople, guaranteeing equal rights to the nationalities there.

My suggestion, however, was not adopted. I again made it clear that it was impossible for me to sign a treaty which did not at least recognise our obligation to fight for those rights of the Christians in Turkey which were based on treaties. M. Panas replied that I was trying, in a roundabout way, to get back to autonomy, since I had in my mind article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, about the application of which numerous meetings were just then being held throughout Bulgaria. People still remember the movement which spread rapidly all over the country, after the example was set by Sofia, where, on May 12, an imposing demonstration took place, under the chairmanship of Dr. Stambolski and the patronage of MM. Ivan Vazoff, Professor Iv. Shishmanoff, Dr. S. Saraoff, Iv. Grozeff, G. Gueorgoff, Stanisheff, and many others. I did not disguise from M. Panas that I aimed at the carrying out of this article 23, but that in order to spare the susceptibilities of Greece I proposed to use in the preamble of our treaty and in article 2, which dealt with the rights of the Christian nationalities, the words
conceded” (by the Sultans) and “deriving from the treaties.” Thereupon M. Panas entered into an excited discussion with me, and tried to convince me that, as I had in view article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, my proposal would not be accepted. For a considerable time Athens remained silent. M. Panas came frequently to see me, under the pretext of telling me that he was still without instructions, his real object being to induce me not to press my formula. But I remained unmoved. Finally, about May 23, he informed me that the Greek Government had agreed to my formula concerning the privileges secured by international treaties. It being already decided that the King and the Queen would start on June 1 for Vienna and Berlin, where they were paying their first official visit, I hastened to sign the treaty with Greece before our departure. This was done by M. Panas and me on May 29, 1912. The ratification of the treaty by the two rulers followed after our return from Berlin. As for our military convention with Greece, its examination was entrusted to Generals Nikiphoroff and Fitcheff, but its signature was deferred until September 1912. I may mention at this place that, owing to lack of time, we were unable to conclude with Greece an agreement with respect to the future frontiers in Macedonia. Among the various other things, M. Panas had told me that Greece refused to treat with Austria because the latter had made it clear that she wanted Salonica for herself.
III. BULGARO-MONTENEGRIN AGREEMENT

No written treaty was signed by us with Montenegro. The first exchange of ideas for a common action between Bulgaria and Montenegro took place in Vienna. It will be remembered that the Austrian Emperor received the King of Montenegro during the first half of June 1912, immediately after the visit of our King. I found in Vienna MM. Daneff and Theodoroff, the first on his way back from Livadia, and the second returning from Paris. I availed myself of this opportunity to summon M. Rizoff from Rome, so that the four of us might examine the question of a war with Turkey, imposed on us by the latter or rendered inevitable by some military action of Italy in the Balkans. Their Majesties left for Berlin on June 19, before the arrival of M. Rizoff. On my return from Berlin to resume the discussions with my colleagues, I learned that M. Rizoff had utilised his acquaintance with the Montenegrin Prime Minister to arrange a meeting between the latter, M. Daneff, and himself, the interview taking place at the Hoffbourg Palace, where the King of Montenegro and his suite were stopping. Our representatives had derived from this meeting the impression that Montenegro was quite ready to act with us.

Shortly afterwards, during the month of July, I received from M. Kolousheff, our Minister at Cettigne, a communication to the effect that the Montenegrin King had made
a proposal for common action. This suggestion was examined by us, and we decided to summon M. Kolousheff, so that I might personally settle the matter, as I had already done in the case of the Serbo-Bulgarian and the Greco-Bulgarian negotiations. In order to avoid all semblance of scheming with Montenegro, I intended to meet M. Kolousheff in Munich. But the rapidity with which events were marching prevented me from leaving Sofia, and M. Kolousheff had to come to Bulgaria. On August 28 he started back for Cettigne in order to conclude with Montenegro an oral agreement. The archives of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry contain a report from M. Kolousheff, giving particulars about this agreement.

As the conditions of our verbal understanding with Montenegro have not yet been published, I shall not dwell on the various phases through which the question passed, as I have done in connection with our written treaties. The text of these treaties was first published by the Paris newspaper *Le Matin*, in November 1913, and by other newspapers subsequently. I, therefore, reproduce them as appendices to the present volume.
CHAPTER II

THE EVE OF THE BALKAN WAR

After the conclusion of our alliance with Serbia, it became my duty, according to article 4 of the secret annex, to transmit a copy of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty to the Russian Emperor. This had to be done with the least possible delay, as the Turco-Italian conflict and the internal condition of Turkey might give rise to fresh complications dragging us into a war. Our interests required that before intervening we should secure the approval of the treaty by the Emperor and his acceptance of the part of arbitrator which the treaty reserved to him. The arrival of the Russian Imperial family at Livadia during the spring of 1912 afforded a convenient opportunity for sending a complimentary deputation on behalf of the Bulgarian King and Government. M. Daneff, President of the National Assembly, was appointed as head of the deputation, and entrusted with the mission of handing to the Emperor copies of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, its secret annex, and the military convention. The other members of the deputation were General Marcoff,
Colonel Loukoff, and M. Miltcheff. They left on May 4, reaching Yalta two days later. The Emperor received the deputation on May 7, and on May 9 it started back for Sofia, with the exception of M. Daneff, who on May 14 left for Petrograd. At the latter place he continued his interviews with M. Sazonoff, saw the other Russian Ministers, and, after passing through Berlin, joined me towards the end of May in Vienna, where I had gone in connection with the visit of the Bulgarian King and Queen to the Emperor Francis Joseph. I have already mentioned that while in Vienna I had consultations not only with M. Daneff, but also with M. Theodoroff, Minister of Finance, and M. Rizoff, our representative in Rome.

M. Daneff had communicated to me from Petrograd his impressions of the audience with the Russian Emperor, and of his conversations with the various Russian Ministers. He now gave us fuller particulars on these matters. According to his account, which was corroborated by other reports, the reception of the Bulgarian delegates had been of the heartiest character, especially at the final dinner in which the entire Imperial family was present. The Emperor had expressed his joy at our understanding with Serbia, fully approving the treaty and its annexes. He had also spoken in favour of a similar agreement with Greece. Both he and the Russian Ministers promised us their assistance to meet the material requirements of the Bulgarian army and to place a Bulgarian loan
in Paris and London. As might have been expected, the most important conversations of M. Daneff were with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. At a later date, M. Sazonoff remarked that they were begun in a "somewhat raised tone" on the part of M. Daneff. The main object of the principal Bulgarian delegate had been to impress on the Russian Foreign Secretary the hardships of the position in which Bulgaria was placed owing to the necessity of always keeping ready for a war, since peaceful methods have failed to turn even the present difficulties of Turkey to any appreciable advantage. Besides, it was to us of urgent importance that the Macedonian question should be settled at the earliest possible moment, in view of the fact that the Bulgarian population in Macedonia was being gradually reduced by the oppressive policy of the Turkish authorities. This intolerable situation had forced many Bulgarians to ask themselves whether the moment had not arrived to seek for remedy in armed force. In one word, M. Daneff had not disguised from M. Sazonoff that Bulgaria was only waiting for an opportunity to cast the die.

In reply to all this, M. Sazonoff had counselled a cautious policy on our part. He emphasised the fact that a Bulgarian intervention, and the Balkan complications which must follow such a step, would not meet with the approval of the Russian Government and Russian public opinion. Neither was he so sure that a general conflict would prove profitable to Bulgaria.
M. Sazonoff admitted that at the subsequent interviews he had found M. Daneff more reassured in this respect. When they approached the subject of the Russo-Bulgarian relations and the possibility of a Russo-Bulgarian military convention, M. Daneff pleaded in favour of including the vilayet of Adrianople in the sphere of Bulgarian influence. To this M. Sazonoff had replied that the said province was left outside the frontiers of San Stefano Bulgaria, and that when we realised our national aspirations Adrianople would lose its present importance as a Turkish advance post, because Turkey would have become a secondary Power.

After discussing the abolition of the Capitulations, our relations with the other Balkan States, and the right of Bulgaria to be represented on the Danubian Commission, to which claim Austria had already agreed, a few words were said on the invitation addressed to the Russian Emperor, through M. Daneff, to attend the consecration of the Cathedral Church of Saint Alexander Nevski in Sofia. M. Sazonoff expressed the hope that, in view of the arrangements already made for the whole summer, the negative reply of the Tsar will not have come altogether as a surprise to M. Daneff.

The subject of a military convention between Russia and Bulgaria was also discussed with General Souhomlinoff, the War Minister. M. Daneff had agreed with the latter that the question should once more be examined by General Paprikoff, our Minister
in Petrograd, and General Souhomlinoff, after which a project would be submitted to Bulgaria. I may add here that no such project was received by us before the Balkan war, and that the Russian Government never again mentioned the subject either in Petrograd or in Sofia. The Russians were evidently not in a great hurry to conclude such a convention with us, fearing perhaps that it might further accentuate the warlike disposition which they had noticed in M. Daneff and in other allied statesmen.

MM. Daneff, Theodoroff, Rizoff, and myself remained in Vienna until nearly the middle of June. After supplying M. Rizoff with instructions on the important matter which had brought him to Vienna, we left for Bulgaria, where I undertook a short journey in the southern departments, resuming my work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards June 20. Not long after my return, we were startled by those fateful events in Turkey which forced the allies to mobilise their armies, and finally precipitated the Balkan war.

It was not in vain that the late Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter warned me to expect the early fall of the Young Turkish regime. The new Turkish crisis was accompanied by such violent disturbances that our allies were no less impressed than ourselves, and proposed the adoption of measures which should guard the Christian nations in the Balkans against the cataclysm with which Turkey was threatened. *Cataclysm* was the term
employed by M. Maioresco, the Roumanian Prime Minister, when in June 1912 he for the first time mentioned to our Chargé d'Affaires in Bucharest the desperate condition of things in the Ottoman Empire. I seized this opportunity to reply that we were ready to come to an understanding with Roumania in the event of a Turkish catastrophe. M. Maioresco, however, declined to enter into my views, even after M. Kalinkoff, our Minister in Bucharest, had renewed my offer, contenting himself with the vague assurance that if matters reached a climax, Bulgaria and Roumania would easily come to an agreement. He also declined to say what the territorial demands of Roumania would be in such a case.

I need not dwell at great length on the first symptoms of the coming crash: agitations throughout Turkey against the Young Turks, the circular letter of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha forbidding the officers to occupy themselves with politics; the revolt of the garrison in Adrianople; the pronunciamento at Monastir; the revolt of the Albanians; the fall of the Young Turkish Cabinet; the battle near Mitrovitza after which the victorious Albanians became masters of the sandjaks of Ipek, Prizrend, and Prishtina; the Albanian ultimatum; the massacres at Kotchani and Berana; the occupation of Uskub by the Albanians. All these events, especially the last three, awoke a resounding echo in Sofia, Athens, Belgrade, and Cettigne, and it required no prophetic gift to foretell that
they would not pass without far-reaching consequences. The European Chancellories were no less impressed than the Balkan Governments by what was happening, and on August 14 the Austrian Government, which was most amicably disposed towards Turkey, stepped forward with the famous proposals of Count Berchtold in favour of administrative decentralisation in European Turkey. If Austria was driven to such radical measures, was it likely that the Balkan States would remain indifferent to the fate of their co-nationalists? To this preoccupation in Athens and Belgrade was added the anxiety caused by the Albanian claims on Greek and Serbian districts, the Albanians openly demanding the entire vilayets of Uskub and Monastir. No such fears were entertained in Sofia as regards the Albanian danger, but in Bulgaria the massacre at Kotchani had produced even a deeper impression. What reason had we for being over-punctilious with an Empire already exhausted by the war with Italy, torn by internal feuds, with an undisciplined army and an empty treasury? On August 14 an impressive meeting was held in the Bulgarian capital, and ten days later the various brotherhoods, representing the Macedonian and Thracian districts, opened their congress. Both the meeting and the congress voted resolutions to the same effect: Bulgaria must immediately mobilise her army and demand autonomy in favour of Macedonia and Thrace, failing which, she must declare war on Turkey. Otherwise the
country was threatened with troubles, bringing in their wake incalculable consequences. The moment was one of solemn gravity and the pressure on the part of public opinion had become well-nigh irresistible. In the midst of the crisis arrived M. Kolusheff from Cettigne, with an offer on the part of the Montenegrin King of immediate action. We had either to accept this proposal or to decline it. On August 26 MM. Daneff, Theodoroff, General Nikiphorooff, and myself, with the consent of the Ministerial Council, met the King at Tzarska Bistritza, near Tcham Kourya. I reported on the situation, after which followed prolonged deliberations on the most difficult problem which had confronted any Bulgarian Government since the country was liberated. The unanimous decision at which we arrived did not differ from that already taken by the Ministerial Council—and was to accept the offer of Montenegro and to arrange with Greece and Serbia for an immediate intervention on behalf of the Christian populations in European Turkey.

In accordance with this decision, M. Kolusheff at once returned to his post at Cettigne, having full powers to conclude with Montenegro an oral understanding to which I have referred elsewhere. We also got in touch with MM. Spalaikovitch and Panas, the representatives of Serbia and Greece, the former leaving for Belgrade, whence he returned on August 31, followed by M. Tosheff, our Minister in Serbia. While we were negotiating with the latter country through our
diplomatic agents, similar pourparlers went on between Sofia and Athens by means of the telegraph. On September 21 M. Daneff went to Nisch in connection with the Serbian fears of an attack by Austria. These apprehensions were not altogether groundless and deserved to be examined with the same seriousness which we bestowed on the repeated counsels of M. Sazonoff not to push matters to extremes. After prolonged discussions, we were gradually coming to an agreement among ourselves, when suddenly the report reached us from Constantinople that Turkey had ordered a general mobilisation. The four allies replied to this measure on September 30, by ordering in their turn a mobilisation of all their forces.

This done, we next broached the capital question of the reforms which we were to demand from Turkey in favour of our co-nationalists in her European provinces. After the mobilisation, the Great Powers had also begun to talk of reforms, but the highly unsatisfactory answer of the Sublime Porte to their representations made it clear that Turkey was resolved on war. She soon precipitated the conflict by arbitrarily stopping the Serbian munitions at Uskub, placing an embargo on the Greek steamers in Constantinople and recalling her representatives in the Balkan capitals, and formally opened hostilities.

I reproduce the various diplomatic notes which were exchanged at this stage of the crisis, most of them being fully published now for the first time.
I. Note to Bulgaria, handed in on October 10, 1912

The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments declare to the Balkan States:

1. That the Great Powers strongly deprecate all measures that are likely to cause a disturbance of peace;

2. That basing themselves on article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin and acting in the interest of the populations, they take in their hands the execution of the reforms in the government of European Turkey, it being understood that the reforms do not infringe the sovereignty of H.M. the Sultan or the integrity of the Turkish Empire. This declaration reserves for the Powers the liberty of examining in common these reforms;

3. That if, notwithstanding all this, war should break out between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, they will tolerate at the end of the conflict no modifications of the present territorial status quo in European Turkey.

The Great Powers will collectively make to the Sublime Porte the representations entailed by the present declaration.

II. Note handed in at Constantinople on October 10, 1912

The undersigned Ambassadors of Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany have been instructed by their Governments to inform the Sublime Porte that the five Powers take note of the intentions which the Turkish Government has publicly announced of introducing reforms, and will immediately examine with the Sublime Porte, in the spirit of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin and the Act of 1880, the reforms which the situation in European Turkey necessitates and the measures for guaranteeing their execution in the interest of the populations. It is understood
that these reforms will not infringe the territorial integrity of the Empire.

III. Reply of the Turkish Government

In reply to the communication of October 10, 1912, which the Ambassadors of Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany were instructed by their Governments to make to the Sublime Porte, the undersigned Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs has the honour to remind them that, as they themselves admit, the Sublime Porte had spontaneously recognised the necessity of introducing reforms in the administration of the European vilayets. The Ottoman Government takes this matter the more to heart, as it proposes to carry out the said reforms without any interference from outside. It considers that on this condition alone will their realisation contribute to the happiness and economic development of the country, by ensuring in the liberal spirit of the Turkish constitution concord among the various nationalities composing the population of the Empire. It should be added that if its past efforts to ameliorate the internal conditions of these provinces have not produced the expected result, one of the principal causes for this will be found in the disturbed state and insecurity, due to the outrages of revolutionary organisations whose real purpose is not difficult to divine. The Imperial Government none the less values the friendly intention of the step which the Great Powers have deemed it desirable to take with a view to the present circumstances. It fully sympathises with their efforts to obviate the danger of a conflict, with its inevitable calamities, which the civilised world must try to prevent by every method of conciliation. In this respect the Imperial Government is convinced that it has facilitated their humanitarian efforts to solve an arduous pro-
blem. Without wishing to lay too much stress on the fact that many of the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin have never been applied in the spirit which prompted them, Ottoman interests thereby seriously suffering; without stopping to discuss how far article 23 could, more than other articles of the same treaty, retain its binding force, the Ottoman Government declares that, acting on its own initiative, it has decided to submit the Bill of 1880 to the approval of the Parliament in the course of its next session. The Great Powers may rest assured that the Imperial authorities will scrupulously watch over its application, after it has been promulgated in accordance with the constitution of the country. It would be highly unjust to infer from the procrastinations and negligence of the preceding regime that the present Constitutional Government will follow those same habits, or to suppose that it will allow itself to be influenced by any doubts which may still linger on this point to adopt any measures except those which are alone in conformity with the well-understood interests of the empire and its populations.

IV. Note of Bulgaria to the Great Powers, October 13, 1912

The Bulgarian Government, after taking into consideration the declaration of the six Great Powers, made through the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Russia, and acting in concert with the Governments of the remaining Balkan States, begs to express its appreciation of the interest which the six Great Powers take in the populations of European Turkey and to thank them for their promise to "take in their hands" the execution of the administrative reforms, in conformity with article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin. The Bulgarian Government, in agreement with the Governments of Serbia and Greece, nevertheless considers that after so many former
promises, solemnly made by Turkey and confirmed by international treaties, it would be inhuman on their part not to attempt to obtain for the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire more radical and better defined reforms which, if fully and conscientiously applied, would not fail to improve their present miserable lot. For this reason, they feel constrained to address themselves directly to H.M. the Sultan, and to indicate the principles on which those reforms must be based, as well as the guarantees which must be given for their sincere execution. They are convinced that if the Turkish Government accedes to their demand, order and tranquillity will be restored in the provinces of the Empire, and a lasting peace will be ensured between Turkey and the Balkan States, which have in the past so often suffered from the provocative and arbitrary conduct of the Sublime Porte.

V. Note of Bulgaria to Turkey, October 12, 1912

The undersigned President of the Ministerial Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cults has the honour to request the Ottoman Chargé d’Affaires to transmit to the Imperial Government the following communication, together with the explanatory note which accompanies it:

“Notwithstanding the declaration of the six Great Powers, made through the Governments of Austria and Russia, promising to take in their hands the execution of the reforms in the administration of European Turkey, the Governments of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia consider it their duty to address themselves directly to the Government of H.M. the Sultan and declare that only radical reforms, sincerely and completely carried out, can ameliorate the miserable condition of the Christian populations in the European vilayets of the Empire and ensure
peace between the latter and the Balkan States, towards which the Sublime Porte has so often maintained a provocative and arbitrary attitude which had no justification.

"The Governments of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, while regretting that recent events prevent Montenegro from joining in the present representations, invite the Sublime Porte to take, in concert with the Great Powers and the Balkan States, immediate measures for the elaboration and introduction in European Turkey of the reforms laid down in article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, adopting as a basis the principle of ethnic nationalities (administrative autonomy of the provinces, Belgian and Swiss governors, elective local assemblies, gendarmerie, educational liberty and local militia), and entrusting their application to a Superior Council which will consist of an equal number of Mahommedans and Christians and will act under the control of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers and the Ministers of the four Balkan States.

"They hope that Turkey will be able to reply favourably to this demand, undertaking to introduce the reforms described in this communication and in the explanatory note within a period of six months, and consenting to give as proof of her acquiescence the order for the demobilisation of her army."

The undersigned avails himself of the present opportunity to renew to the Ottoman Chargé d'Affaires the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) I. E. Gueshoff.

Explanatory note, accompanying the communication of October 13, 1912

1. Confirmation of ethnic autonomy in favour of the nationalities in the Empire, with all its consequences;
2. Proportional representation of each nationality in the Imperial Parliament;
3. Admission of Christians to all the public employments in the provinces inhabited by Christians;
4. Recognition of all the schools of the Christian communities on a footing of equality with the Turkish schools;
5. Undertaking by the Sublime Porte not to alter the ethnic character of the provinces of the Turkish Empire by introducing Mahommedan settlers;
6. Local military service, with Christian cadres. Pending the formation of these cadres military service to be suspended;
7. Reform of the gendarmerie in the European vilayets, under the effective command of Belgian and Swiss officers;
8. The appointment of Swiss and Belgian governors for the vilayets inhabited by Christians, who will be confirmed by the Powers and will be assisted by elective local councils;
9. The formation at the Sublime Porte of a Superior Council, composed of an equal number of Mahommedans and Christians, to supervise the application of the reforms. The Ambassadors of the Great Powers and the Ministers of the four Balkan States will have the mission to exercise control over the work of this council.

VI. Note of Bulgaria to Turkey, October 18, 1912

The undersigned Representative of H.M. the King of the Bulgarians, acting on orders from his Government, has the honour to communicate to H.E. the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs the following:
The Sublime Porte having failed to reply to the identical note of the Governments of Bulgaria,
Greece, and Serbia, addressed on October 13, 1912, and the situation, which was already critical owing to the arbitrary detention of the Serbian munitions at Uskub and the embargo on the Greek steamers, having been further aggravated by the unlawful attacks on the Serbian and Bulgarian posts by Turkish troops, and by the interruption of diplomatic relations, through the recall by the Sublime Porte of its representatives, the Government of H.M. the Bulgarian King, is, to its deep regret, constrained to have recourse to the force of arms. It leaves to the Ottoman Government the entire responsibility for this interruption of relations between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. The undersigned has the honour to inform the Imperial Government that, from this moment forward, Bulgaria considers herself in a state of war with Turkey, and my mission having ceased, I propose to leave Constantinople within the shortest possible time. The Turkish subjects residing in Bulgaria are at liberty to quit that country if they should feel so inclined. Those who prefer to remain there may count on the protection of the laws.

(Signed) M. C. SARAFOFF.

VII. Circular note of Bulgaria on the commencement of hostilities, October 18, 1912

The Royal Bulgarian Legation has been instructed by the Bulgarian Government to communicate to the Government of .......... the following:

The anarchy in Turkey which so deeply disturbs the tranquillity and security of the neighbouring States having lately assumed more threatening proportions, the Great Powers deemed it imperative to take in their hands the execution of the reforms promised by article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin. In replying to this latest expression of the collective
will of Europe the Sublime Porte once more had recourse to methods which have so often been employed in the past. It announced its intention to introduce serious reforms in the European and Asiatic vilayets of the Empire, declaring at the same time that it considered all foreign intervention detrimental to their success. This promise on the part of the Ottoman Government has everywhere been met with the incredulity of which Count Andrassy spoke in his note of December 30, 1875, in the following terms: "One of the explanations of this deeply rooted mistrust will be found in the fact that more than once measures, such as are mentioned in the recent rescripts of the Sultan, had been previously announced without the lot of the Christians being in the slightest degree improved." Events during the last thirty-seven years have abundantly demonstrated the justice of this verdict. For this reason the Governments of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, refusing to tolerate any longer the sufferings of their co-nationalists in Turkey and to endure a state of things full of dangers for their own future, had determined to insist upon an effective control over the preparation and execution of the reforms which alone can improve the condition of the Christian peoples of the Empire and pacify the Balkan Peninsula.

This last effort, whose moderation stood in striking contrast with the provocative attitude of Turkey and her unwarranted mobilisation against the Balkan States, having failed and all diplomatic relations having been interrupted by the Sublime Porte, the Governments of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia are, to their great regret, obliged to have recourse to armed force. Considering herself in a state of war with Turkey, Bulgaria has addressed to the latter a formal declaration to that effect, in conformity with article 1 of the Convention on the opening of hostilities, of October 17, 1907.
The Royal Bulgarian Government believes that the end which it pursues by declaring the war coincides with the interests of all civilised countries. The foreigners living in the territories whose permanent pacification is the aim of the war cannot but benefit by the attainment of that object. Under a rule of order, freedom, and progress, the interests of the subjects of all countries will be better protected, the material prosperity and the moral advancement of the population will receive constant and enlightened encouragement. The Bulgarian Government, therefore, ventures to count on the sympathies of all friendly countries and addresses an urgent appeal to the Government of ........ for its benevolent neutrality in the arduous task which it has undertaken.
CHAPTER III
THE RELATIONS OF THE ALLIES DURING
THE BALKAN WAR

By dint of hard work and unwearying patience we succeeded in coming to an agreement with our allies as to the object which the Balkan Alliance was to pursue—ethnic autonomy for the Balkan nations, with all its attending consequences. At the cost of immense sacrifices and through matchless heroism, our armies were able to crush Turkish despotism, the worst enemy of that Balkan ideal. But after its overthrow, during the first month of the Balkan war, we obtained documents and received information in Sofia which disclosed on the part of our allies sentiments and purposes entirely at variance with the object which we had set before ourselves, and with the letter and spirit of our treaties of alliance. It is true that we had no agreement with the Greeks regarding the future delimitation in Macedonia. But our understanding on that subject with the Serbians was as clear as it was categorical. Such being the case, we could not help experiencing a painful surprise when, after the outbreak of the war, we received a copy of the
circular letter of M. Pashitch, No. 5669, dated September 28, 1912 (two days before our mobilisation), by which Serbia was giving her diplomatic representatives abroad entirely false information about our agreement in regard to the future fate of Macedonia, signed barely five and a half months previously. Discussing the proposal of Count Berchtold in favour of decentralisation in European Turkey, M. Pashitch instructed the Serbian diplomatists and consuls to support the cause of reforms in Old Serbia and to demand the following frontiers for that province:

The geographical frontier of this territory must start from Pateritza, on the Turco-Bulgarian boundary, and turn to the south in the direction of the watershed of Vardar, thence continuing towards Babouna, in such a way as to include within the scope of Old Serbia the towns of Prilep, Kitchevo, and Ochrida, together with their surroundings.

In other words, on March 13, 1912, M. Milovanovitch concluded with us a treaty which left the towns of Prilep and Ochrida in the uncontested Bulgarian zone; while on September 28 of the same year M. Pashitch included both those towns with their surroundings within the frontiers of Old Serbia! Such conduct was bound to produce on our mind a most disagreeable impression and our protest was proportionately energetic.

Soon after the reception of this document in Sofia, the incredibly rapid advance of our
army towards Constantinople and the decisive battles fought with the main Turkish forces sealed the fate of European Turkey. In view of the Turkish collapse, not only our allies, but the Great Powers themselves, began to talk of a final settlement of the problem by a repartition of European Turkey. On October 31, 1912, a member of the British Cabinet told our Minister in London, M. Madjaroff, that European Turkey must be divided, and that he would compliment us on our wisdom and moderation if we contented ourselves with Adrianople and did not ask for Constantinople. Two days later M. Sazonoff was addressing a circular telegram to the Russian Ambassadors abroad, extracts of which were afterwards published in the Russian Orange book (No. 40). In that document he declared that "the territories which the allies have conquered belong to them by right of occupation and should be partitioned by friendly agreement. In that way alone can a lasting peace in the Balkans be assured." Everybody thought of a lasting peace then, and the idea of creating autonomous provinces was abandoned. The only exception allowed was concerning Albania. The intention of our allies to divide that province between them met with determined opposition on the part of the Triple Alliance. In consequence of this opposition M. Sazonoff wired to us on November 9, 1912, that we Bulgarians,

Who had stood at the head of the Balkan Alliance, must explain to the Serbians that necessity obliges
them not to seek any territorial acquisitions on the Adriatic coast. The Triple Alliance had definitely decided the question, and after our great gains we must not start a fresh war for a harbour. Obstinance on the part of Serbia might give rise to very serious complications. And we Bulgarians, as wise leaders of events, had more reasons than anybody to prevent words and deeds on the part of our allies which might jeopardise our great victories.

Not long afterwards the Serbians themselves had to bow their heads before the inevitable. But having done this without even informing us, they began to complain that we had not supported them in securing a footing on the Adriatic coast. The truth is that when we conveyed to them the urgent counsels of Russia, we invariably declared that we should do everything humanly possible to perform our duty under the treaty of alliance.

From a telegram of M. Sazonoff, reproduced at the end of this chapter, it will be seen that the Serbian chauvinists began to speak of compensations in Macedonia even before Serbia had definitely renounced her claim on an Adriatic port. At the same time reports began to reach us from various sources, confirming a dispatch from M. Hadji-Misheff, our Minister in Athens, that efforts were being made to conclude, if not a regular alliance within the existing one, at least an understanding directed against Bulgaria. We also learned how badly the Greeks and the Serbians were treating the Bulgarian priests and teachers, old and young
Bulgarian patriots, in Macedonia. Thoroughly reliable and scrupulously verified information on this subject will be found in the Report of the Carnegie Commission of Enquiry ¹ which forms a most valuable com-

¹ Report of the International Commission to inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, D.C., 1914.—Enquête dans les Balkans. Rapport présenté aux Directeurs de la Dotation par les Membres de la Commission d’enquête. Paris, Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, 24, rue Pierre Curie, 1914.—It is not without interest to recall the names of the members of this Commission. Placed alphabetically, according to the names of their countries, they are: Austria—Dr. Joseph Redlich, Professor of Law at the University of Vienna. England—Mr. Francis W. Hirst, Editor of The Economist, and Mr. H. N. Brailsford, Publicist. France—Baron d’Estournelles de Constant, Senator, and M. Justin Godard, Advocate and Member of the Chamber of Deputies. Germany—Dr. Walther Schücking, Professor of the Law Faculty of Magdeburg University. Russia—Professor Paul Miliukoff, Member of the Duma. United States—Dr. Samuel T. Dutton, Professor of Columbia University. The Commission took special care to verify the excesses committed during the two Balkan wars and proved the emptiness of the accusations charging the Bulgarians alone with cruelty. It also established that the Bulgarian Headquarters and the commanders of the Bulgarian Army were the only ones among the belligerents who had issued orders to their officers to observe the Geneva Convention, and not to tolerate any crime or violation of the laws and customs of war among the troops. M. Miliukoff, in a series of articles published in the newspaper Rietch during second half of last year, more than once lays stress on the fact that in this respect the Bulgarian officers were more far-sighted than those of some States of the Triple Alliance, and even of other Powers.
pendium of facts concerning the conduct of the Greek and Serbian authorities in that province. Whoever sits down to write about these matters without first having mastered the contents of that volume lays himself open to the suspicion that the truth is not his strongest preoccupation.

And this truth was in every respect a most lamentable one. While in front of Tchataldja and at Bulair the ranks of our brave soldiers grew thinner, fighting in the cause of the Balkan Alliance against the main Turkish armies, discredited champions of old feuds in Macedonia were trying to fan into flame the ethnic passions we had just laid to rest. Helped, I regret to say, by chauvinists in our own ranks, they gradually created an atmosphere most unfavourable to the consolidation of those feelings of brotherhood and friendship among the Balkan nations which alone could have rendered an amicable settlement of their quarrels possible.

In order not to excite passions which have already wrought so much harm to the Balkan peoples and filled their friends abroad with sorrow, I abstain from quoting even the carefully verified proofs, collected by the Carnegie Commission, about the physical and moral ill-treatment to which the Bulgarians in Macedonia were subjected. Neither do I propose to enter into the arcana of our diplomatic struggle with the other allies over the application of the treaty, regulating the fate of Macedonia, which was opened by the circular letter of M. Pashitch. The full
story of these events cannot be written until all the Governments involved in that quarrel have published the materials bearing on it. In the absence of such data I can only use those documents which have already seen the light, especially the reports and telegrams reproduced in the Russian Orange book and the Roumanian Green book. I shall, in the first place, give one of my own telegrams, addressed on April 26, 1913, to M. Bobtcheff, our Minister in Petrograd. My reason for doing so is that the document in question sums up all those destructive tendencies which were at work among the allies and ended by ruining the alliance itself. Of these negative factors the most important consisted in the extravagant pretensions of extreme nationalists, clamouring for the biggest possible territorial gains. As a sample of these exaggerated claims I may mention the Greek proposal for the repartition of the conquered territories which the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs submitted to M. Hadji-Misheff, our Minister in Athens, on October 25, 1912. According to the estimate of MM. Shoppoff and G. Radeff, two of our most competent judges on Macedonian affairs, the scheme of M. Coromilas reserved to Greece a population of 2,000,000, magnanimously leaving us territories inhabited by only 1,300,000! In vain did we try to show the manifest unfairness of such a repartition, and insist that, in the absence of a preliminary agreement, the most elementary rules of justice pointed to the re-
spective forces and sacrifices of the two allies as the best criterion for determining their shares in the profits, as the well-known French economist M. Paul Leroy Beaulieu had proposed. And since we had opposed to the Turks an army of 563,000, as compared with the Greek force of 215,000 (figures established by the Carnegie Commission), while our casualties were three or four times more numerous than theirs, it would have been easy to determine approximately what part of the conquered territories should fall to our share and what part should go to Greece. But M. Coromilas showed himself intractable. He more than once threatened that Greece would never sign a treaty of peace with Turkey so long as we declined to conclude a preliminary agreement on the territorial repartition. As a matter of fact, Greece refused to sign the armistice, the chauvinistic press in Athens greeting this decision with shouts of joy. We only heard on December 1 that the Russian Minister in Athens had at last succeeded in persuading M. Venizelos not to insist on settling the future Greco-Bulgarian frontier before formulating the conditions of Greece for the coming peace negotiations. In London M. Venizelos proposed orally to M. Daneff, our principal peace delegate, a new project for fixing the boundaries. After the failure of the London peace conference, M. Venizelos visited Sofia on February 6, 1913, but on my requesting him to formulate in writing the proposal which he had made to M. Daneff
as a basis for future negotiations, he promised to do so only after his return to Athens. He, however, delayed matters, probably under the influence of M. Coromilas, in much the same way as, later on, Greece did with other promises, such as the appointment of a delegate to fix the positions of the Greek and Bulgarian armies and the question of demobilisation. The Russian Orange book contains several complaints on the part of Russia in connection with these subjects (Nos. 138 and 183). When at last the Greek proposal arrived, it was discovered that M. Coromilas had once more gained the ascendancy and the frontiers were not those of which M. Venizelos had spoken in London. In April 1913 we offered to send M. C. Sarafoff to Athens in order to negotiate on this question of frontiers, but M. Coromilas did not respond to our suggestion, and in this way powerfully assisted our own jingoes who, in opposition to my opinion and that of the entire National Party in Bulgaria, declared against all idea of arbitration on our dispute with Greece. Finally, the principle of arbitration was adopted by the Cabinet of M. Daneff in which our party had a majority, but as M. Daneff was on the point of starting for Petrograd for the definite settlement of the question, war broke out among the allies and dealt the Balkan Alliance a mortal blow.

After the Greeks came the turn of the Serbians to formulate demands outside the scope of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. On
January 23, 1913, M. Pashitch first spoke to our representative about some rectification of the frontier fixed by the latter act. At the very beginning of March M. Spalaikovitch handed to me on his behalf a note officially asking for compensations not mentioned in the treaty. Long discussions followed with the Serbian Minister in Sofia on the subject of these new Serbian demands in the course of which he declared that, as we could not agree, the entire question ought to be referred to the arbitration provided by the treaty. In view of the unambiguous terms of our agreement and its secret annex, it appeared to us that no conflict could possibly arise between Serbia and ourselves. But this was not the opinion of Serbian extremists. Russia was the first to condemn their exorbitant claims, and continued to manifest her disapproval of the Serbian policy to the end, as is proved by the numerous telegrams of M. Sazonoff from the middle of December 1912 to the close of June 1913. Even after we had rejected the Serbian demand for a revision of the treaty, M. Sazonoff kept pressing the two sides to give their consent, so that Russia might play her part of arbitrator. These documents, which had not been published when the Carnegie Commission was preparing its report, establish beyond dispute:

1. That after we had accepted the invitation of Russia to submit our dispute to her decision, Serbia continued until the very last moment to insist on revision of the treaty.
for which the latter offered no excuse or justification;

2. That the Greeks and the Serbians were negotiating an alliance against us, counting on the co-operation of Roumania and Turkey;

3. That in London they delayed signing the Treaty of Peace with Turkey in order to exhaust and weaken our army, until at last they obliged Sir Edward Grey to offer them the choice between signing the treaty and leaving London.

Before giving these documents I will reproduce my telegram of April 26, 1913, to our Minister in Petrograd:

By telegram of the 24th instant, M. Sazonoff informed M. Nekludoff that they are greatly pre-occupied with the extreme tension between Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia over the question of delimitating the future frontiers; that they did not wish to admit the possibility of fratricidal strife, and that while addressing urgent counsels of moderation to Athens and Belgrade, they wish to draw our attention also to the incalculable calamities which a conflict among the allies will bring on Bulgaria. There was danger on the part of Roumania and Turkey. Russia had done everything to protect the Bulgarian flanks, but, in the event of a fratricidal war, public opinion in Russia would be against Bulgaria. Russia would remain a passive spectator of the ruin of the Bulgarian cause and would only safeguard her own interests. The Bulgarians were advised not to lose sight of the fact that a conflict with Serbia would render nugatory the treaty of 1912 on which they based their claims to Macedonia. Such an event would also compromise their financial plans by closing the door
for a Bulgarian loan. In conclusion M. Sazonoff presses us to bridle our press and meet M. Pashitch. Please call on M. Sazonoff and, while conveying to him our gratitude for his continual solicitude on behalf of Bulgaria, express our deep sorrow that he should appear to place us in the same category with our allies as regards the Macedonian crisis. We deny having done anything to bring about the present tension. An impartial inquiry will establish the fact that it was not the Bulgarian press which first began the discussion, but the Greek and Serbian newspapers. M. Sazonoff knows that it was not the Bulgarian Government, but M. Pashitch who, by his letter of March 1, raised the question of a revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. M. Demidoff will tell him that it was not the Bulgarian Government, but M. Venizelos, who after proposing both to M. Daneff in London and to M. Demidoff himself in Athens a definite line of demarcation, now goes back on his word and offers us a vague line, which withholds from us all Greek districts to the west of Cavalla. It was not the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, but the Serbian who solemnly declared in Parliament that there could be no talk of demobilisation so long as the question of the future frontiers remained unsettled. It was not the Bulgarian, but the Serbian Chief of the General Staff who went to Salonica, where Greek and Serbian officers fraternised and visited Monastir by special train, returning to Uskub by way of Tetovo. It was not we, but others who went to seek an alliance against those of their allies who had made sacrifices twice or three times as great as they had done for the common cause. Finally and above all, while we are draining the strength of both nation and army, and unaided are holding back the great Turkish forces behind Tchataldja and Bulair, Greeks and Serbians are massing troops not against the common enemy, but against us. There are seven
Greek divisions round Salonica, two Serbian divisions which recently returned from Adrianople are kept at Pirot ready for a war with Bulgaria, while the remaining Serbian army is concentrating against us from Koumanovo to Monastir. If M. Sazonoff should ask for further proof that we are not responsible for the present acute tension, but are on the contrary sincerely desirous of a peaceful settlement of the dispute, we are in a position to give it him. For this purpose and in order to seek an issue out of the present difficulty, I authorise you to propose to him that, in conformity with article 2 of the secret annex, Russia should settle our dispute with Serbia. The Serbian case will be found stated in the above-mentioned letter of M. Pashitch. We entirely reject the Serbian thesis, and as M. Pashitch wishes to meet us for the same purpose, all interviews are useless, because the Ministerial Council esteems it absolutely impossible to negotiate on such a basis. We insist that the treaty should be carried out. As M. Sazonoff himself knows, our contention that a strict observance of all pledges is necessary for the future of the Balkan nations meets with approval in the highest quarters. There being an open dispute between us and Serbia, and this dispute falling within the scope of the said article 4, we most urgently request that the Russian Government should undertake its settlement, inviting the two sides to state their cases in order to enlighten the arbitrator. Let me add that when M. Spalaikovitch handed to me the letter of M. Pashitch, he himself admitted, in reply to my declaration that we could not consent to a revision of the treaty, that there was no other way of settling the matter than by recourse to the stipulated arbitration. The prompt announcement that Russia agrees to settle the dispute without any delays will exercise that calming influence on public opinion which M. Sazonoff so much desires. We are now
examining our dispute with Greece, and I shall soon wire to you in what sense you must speak to M. Sazonoff for the settlement of that question also. We most urgently request M. Sazonoff to re-sur both Serbia and Greece with respect to our intentions and to induce them to stop the massing of troops and to abstain from all acts which might have fateful consequences for the Balkan nations.

Gueshoff.

I will add that a month after the date of this telegram we agreed to the meeting with M. Pashitch which M. Sazonoff had recommended, and I saw the Serbian Prime Minister on June 1, 1913. In the course of the interview, I asked in the first place that our treaties with Serbia should be published, so as to enlighten public opinion in Serbia, which had been misled by the spreading of false reports regarding their contents. Serbia, however, refused to comply with my request. Nothing was said on this occasion about the revision of the treaty. On that subject we replied by our note of June 18 and in the Memorandum of June 25, part of which will be found at the end of the present volume.

I now propose to reproduce the Russian and Roumanian documents to which reference has already been made and which will be found in the Russian Orange book (Nos. 131, 135, 138, 140, 141, 160, 161, 163, 166, 181, 233, 235, 241, and 253) and in the Roumanian Green book (Nos. 107, 116, 130, 134, and 137).
The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister in Belgrade

Petrograd,
December 16, 1912.

In his conversation with our Ambassador in Paris, M. Novakovitch said that in the event of non-compliance with the Serbian demand for sovereign ownership of an Adriatic port, Serbia would be forced to look for compensation beyond the frontiers fixed by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. On the other hand, our latest information speaks of a considerable change in the tone of the Turkish plenipotentiaries, thus indicating the danger which might result from disagreements among the allies.

We think that the vital interests of Serbia and of all the allies demand the speediest conclusion of peace.

It is equally important that complete unity should continue to reign between Bulgaria and Serbia. A violation of the territorial understanding between the two countries, which has been attained at the cost of so much labour, can find in us neither sympathy nor support.

We consider that it is in the interest of the allies not to raise the subject of the delimitation so long as the principal question with reference to the negotiations in London remains unsettled.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister in Belgrade

Petrograd,
March 10, 1913.

Referring to my telegram to our Minister in Sofia, of March 8, we cannot help regretting that, without waiting for the conclusion of peace, the Serbian Government should raise a question with which
we can have no sympathy, because it is in contradiction to the obligations assumed by the Serbian Government.

SAZONOFF.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister in Belgrade

PETROGRAD,
April 17, 1913.

The Bulgarian Minister, acting on instructions from the Sofia Cabinet, has drawn our attention to the dangerous under-currents which threaten the existence of the Balkan Alliance. For instance, not long ago the Serbian Finance Minister asked for supplementary military credits for a period from the conclusion of peace until the final repartition of the conquered territories among the allies. The Greek and Serbian armies are being reinforced against the Bulgarian troops. Besides, it appears that special negotiations have been opened between Serbia and Greece, it being seriously rumoured that an alliance between those two countries has been concluded. Please point out to the Foreign Minister how serious and regrettable are all these measures, which can only lead to a disruption of the Balkan Alliance.

SAZONOFF.

From the Russian Minister in Sofia

April 19, 1913.

The enmity between Bulgarians, on one side, and Greeks and Serbians, on the other, assumes threatening proportions. The Serbians are fortifying themselves at Monastir and are massing troops at Veles. The Greeks have sent reinforcements towards Negrita and other places. The Bulgarian press, especially the Opposition newspapers, are
full of accusations and attacks upon the allies. People openly talk of an inevitable conflict with them, and confidence is expressed that the Bulgarians will in a few days defeat the allies, taking Salonica and southern Macedonia. The Bulgarian Headquarters are taking measures in the event of the outbreak of a fratricidal war.

Nekludoff.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ministers in Belgrade and Sofia

Petrograd,
April 30, 1913.

The daily growing tension in the relation between Bulgaria and Serbia fills us with the most serious apprehensions.

Russia, who worked so hard for a reconciliation between Bulgaria and Serbia, and followed with joy their successes, hoping that they would consolidate the Balkan Alliance, sees with real sorrow the change in their relations which threatens the results already attained with ruin at the hands of the allies themselves and to the manifest triumph of their common enemies, who had hitherto been powerless to spread discord in their ranks.

In view of all this, and without entering into any discussion as regards the substance of their quarrel, on which we are anxious to preserve the most absolute impartiality towards either side, we deem it our duty to remind them of a stipulation in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty which cannot lose its force, whatever system of interpretation be adopted, viz. that every dispute concerning the interpretation or the application of the treaty and the military convention must be submitted to the arbitration of Russia, as soon as one of the sides declares that it
is impossible to attain agreement by direct negotiations.

Without waiting for the request of either party, which would denote an extreme tension between them, Russia leaves it to the two allied Governments to inform her in due time that all disagreements will be settled in the way indicated by the treaty and not by armed force.

We instruct you to make a declaration in the above sense to the Government to which you are accredited.

Sazonoff.

From the Russian Minister in Sofia

May 2, 1913.

I had a conversation with M. Gueshoff on the subject of your telegram of April 30. He asked me to inform you that Bulgaria is in sympathy with your proposal that all disputes between Bulgaria and Serbia should be settled in the way indicated by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. M. Gueshoff is wiring to the Bulgarian Minister in Petrograd to repeat this to you, and to express in advance the confidence of Bulgaria in the equity and impartiality of the arbitration verdict of the Russian Government.

Nekludoff.

From the Russian Minister in Belgrade

May 2, 1913.

M. Pashitch categorically assures me that not only does Serbia harbour no aggressive intentions against Bulgaria, but that, on the contrary, he values as before a sincere friendship with her. An acceptance of the principle of a revision of the treaty, which could not have anticipated all the events, does not signify its violation. M. Pashitch pointed out that
if the allies would only conscientiously and impartially consider the achievements of each party, they could easily arrive at an understanding, and that if the disagreements should prove insurmountable, there is an issue out of the difficulty—the supreme arbitrament of Russia. As far as is known, Greece looks at this question in the same way. M. Pashitch denied that Serbia has concluded any separate agreement with Greece, but that might be done as a means of self-defence against an aggression on the part of Bulgaria. M. Pashitch is ready to start immediately for a neutral place in order to have a friendly consultation with the allied Prime Ministers.

HARTWIG.

From the Russian Minister in Belgrade

May 4, 1913.

I spoke to M. Pashitch on the contents of your telegram of April 20.

He said that Serbia continued to be in favour of the alliance with Bulgaria and did not intend to destroy it, but only maintained that in view of what has happened the treaty of alliance must undergo an amicable revision. He still hopes that the two countries will arrive at a friendly understanding. Should this, however, prove impossible, the Serbian Government is always ready, in accordance with the treaty, to submit its claims and interpretation to the arbitrament of the Imperial Government.

HARTWIG.

From the Russian Minister in Belgrade

May 8, 1913.

M. Pashitch is profoundly grateful to the Imperial Government for its benevolent attitude towards
Serbia and its appreciation of the Serbian efforts to guide the policy of Serbia in accordance with the friendly counsels of Russia. As already reported in my telegram of May 4, he has expressed his willingness to conform himself to the advice of Russia in the matter of the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute. But in order to make clear the character of the dispute which has arisen; to give a moral satisfaction to the Serbian army; to calm the political excitement in the country; to preserve ties with Greece, who has identical interests with Serbia, and in that way to facilitate the task of the arbitrator—M. Pashitch considers it absolutely necessary that there should be a preliminary friendly exchange of views between the allied Premiers, or at least between their plenipotentiaries.

HARTWIG.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ministers in Belgrade and Athens

Petrograd,
May 27, 1913.

It looks as if the Serbian and Greek Governments are playing a dilatory and dangerous game, professing to us their peaceful intentions, but at the same time avoiding clear and definite replies to our proposals and getting ready for a common war against Bulgaria.

We must warn the two Governments against the ruinous consequences of such a policy, and therefore instruct you to make the most serious representations to that effect to the Foreign Secretary.

SAZONOFF.
The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister in Belgrade

Petrograd, June 18, 1913.

Please use your influence in order to obtain a reply from M. Pashitch about his consent to arbitration as soon as possible. All further resistance or delay might have the most disastrous consequences.

We learn from a most reliable source that the present situation cannot last more than a few days, after which there are grounds for fearing the most serious complications.

Sazonoff.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister in Belgrade

Petrograd, June 19, 1913.

The information received from various sources confirms the growing agitation in the Bulgarian army in favour of immediate war or demobilisation. If Serbia does not accept the arbitration of Russia without reservation, as Bulgaria has done, the Bulgarian Government refuses to wait any longer, and the proposed meeting of the Premiers will not take place.

An unconditional acceptance by Serbia of Russian arbitration can in no way be considered as a concession to Bulgaria.

The consent of Serbia for the purpose indicated is indispensable not only to Bulgaria, but to us also, because without an assurance that the two sides will accept arbitration unconditionally we cannot fulfil our mission as arbitrators.

Please invite M. Pashitch to give us a clear and definite reply without delay, and use all your influence.
for the purpose of obviating another ruinous conflict among the allies.

Sazonoff.

From the Russian Minister in Belgrade

June 21, 1913.

I have received your telegrams of June 18 and 19. Following your instructions, I am using all my efforts to persuade the Serbian Government to accept our arbitration without reservations, but for the time being am meeting with great difficulties. The general impression here is that we want to force Serbia to accept all the demands of Bulgaria, and against this impression I am struggling with all my energy. All the same, I have not lost hope of a satisfactory settlement.

Hartwig.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister in Sofia

Petrograd, June 25, 1913.

... We blame Serbia also for not having given us a definite answer whether she will submit to the arbitration of the Imperial Government.

Sazonoff.

The Roumanian Minister in Belgrade to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest

Belgrade, March 8, 1913.

I have learned from several places that Serbia is negotiating with the Greeks for the purpose of concluding a defensive alliance against Bulgaria. Both the Serbian Government and the Greek
Minister here are impenetrable. The latter spends daily several hours in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

FILALITY.

The Roumanian Minister in Belgrade to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest

... General Radko Dimitrieff has been sent to Petrograd in connection with the fixing of the boundaries between the allies, who evidently are no longer able to agree among themselves. All those with whom I have spoken tell me that, from the general to the last soldier, the Serbians under arms refuse to abandon Monastir and the other towns claimed by the Bulgarians in virtue of the treaty of alliance, and would rather be killed by Savoff than give up what they have conquered.

FILALITY.

Report to H.M. the Roumanian King by the Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Bucharest, April 19, 1913.

This morning at 9 o'clock I was visited by M. Ristitch, the Serbian Minister, who spoke to me about the disagreements between Serbians and Bulgarians. He told me that the Bulgarians have not fulfilled the treaty obligations towards Serbia, etc. During these preliminary remarks, in the course of which I was informed of the mutual engagements of the allies, M. Ristitch told me that M. Pashitch was still in favour of a friendly understanding with the Bulgarian Government, but that, should a conflict become unavoidable, he has instructed him to ask us what our conduct would be
and whether we were inclined to conclude with Serbia a purely defensive alliance against Bulgaria.

I answered that I must first report on the proposal which has been made to us to H.M. the King, and will reply later on. It is possible that my reply might be delayed pending the result of the intervention in Petrograd.

Bearing in mind that the King of Greece, in the course of the audience given to our Minister towards the end of March, also spoke of an alliance between Greece and Roumania against the Bulgarian pretensions, it is possible that the Greek Government will, in its turn, make us proposals similar to those of Serbia. Given the firm attitude of H.M. the King, it is only natural that I should reply to the Greek Government in the same evasive manner. There is always a danger that before matters come to a head between the allies and Bulgaria and war breaks out, all negotiations for an alliance with us might only serve to render the Bulgarians more conciliatory towards the claims of Greeks and Serbians and help to consolidate their alliance, to the detriment of Roumania.

We cannot intervene except when war breaks out between Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians. At that moment our hands must be free, so that we shall be able to impose peace.

T. MAIORESCO.

Report to H.M. the Roumanian King by the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs

BUCHAREST,
May 15, 1913.

At 11 o'clock this morning the Greek Minister, M. Papadiamantopoulos, visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, acting on instructions from his Government, made me the following oral communication:
GREEK PROPOSALS

1. The Greek Government will grant to all the Macedonian-Roumanian churches and schools in the territories annexed by Greece full liberty to carry on their work and to use the Macedonian-Roumanian language.

I replied that we expected that much after the declaration made by M. Venizelos to M. Take Ionesco in London, and requested him to give me the same declaration in writing and to add that Roumania will be allowed to subsidise these churches and schools, as under the Turkish rule, and that in accordance with the Eastern Orthodox canons the said Macedonian-Roumanian church will be entitled to have its own episcopate.

M. Papadiamantopoulos added that:

2. The Greek Government wishes to know whether we are prepared to conclude an alliance with Greece in view of the fact that the demands of Bulgaria are becoming more threatening.

I replied to him that I could not answer such a question before reporting the matter to H.M. the King and to the other Ministers, and that in my view Parliament must first finish with the question of the intervention in Petrograd, after which we could decide what conduct Roumania must follow in the event of a new Balkan crisis.

T. MAIORESCO.

Report to H.M. the Roumanian King by the Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Bucharest,
Sunday, June 9, 1913.

At 10 o'clock this morning the Greek Minister, M. Papadiamantopoulos, again called on me to speak about an alliance with Greece against an excessive expansion of Bulgaria, adding that Turkey also might participate in such an alliance. I replied to him that as far as Turkey was concerned, it
RELATIONS OF THE ALLIES

would be wiser to wait until her internal condition had been consolidated. With respect to a rapprochement with Greece, I postponed my reply until a later moment, when the friction between the allies should become greater.

T. MAIORESCO.

While these efforts were being made to enlist fresh allies against us, everything was done to delay the signature of the peace treaty with Turkey, which had been drafted in London as far back as May 2, 1913. The negotiations carried on with third parties were, naturally, not a matter of public knowledge. But the efforts of the Greek and the Serbian Government to retard the conclusion of peace in London could not remain a secret. The excitement which these delays caused in our army and throughout Bulgaria was very great. Nothing was so much exploited against our allies as these unfortunate tergiversations. More than once I drew the attention of the allied Governments and of the Great Powers to the dangerous consequences which such a procrastinating policy might produce. But all was in vain, and there was worse to follow. According to a telegram from one of our peace delegates in London, "the Serbian and the Greek delegates, before signing the treaty, visited Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, and asked him to wire to Constantinople in order that instructions should be sent to Osman Nizami Pasha to delay the signature of the treaty, promising Turkey as compensation a Thracian frontier to the
west of Adrianople, when the war between Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece breaks out. But Tewfik Pasha, who is an experienced statesman of the old school, did not accede to their offer, and even refused to wire to Constantinople.”

Indignant at such conduct, every detail of which he probably knew, Sir Edward Grey was at last driven to the necessity of taking the action which he described in the following telegram to the British Ambassadors abroad:

**London, May 28, 1913.**

Sir Edward Grey has told the Balkan delegates that those of them who are willing to sign the preliminary treaty without any alterations should do so immediately. Those who are not disposed to sign had better leave London, as it is useless for them to remain and continue to engage in discussions of which the only result is indefinite delay. Those who do sign will have our moral support.

At the same time Reuter’s Agency announced that “the declaration of Sir Edward Grey was causing great surprise in certain Balkan circles which see in it an open intervention instead of mere mediation.”

Two days later the treaty was signed by all the delegates. This success of the Balkan Alliance was greeted with enthusiasm by all the friends of the allies. The only discordant note came from an allied quarter. By a telegram dated May 30, the day on which the treaty of peace was signed, M. Sarafoff, our delegate in Salonica, informed
me that M. Venizelos had complained to him of "the Great Powers having imposed on them the signature, without even taking into consideration the reservations which the allies had made."

But this jarring voice did not spoil the triumph of the Balkan Alliance. The latter had not only overcome the armies of Turkey, but also the petty schemings of the Greek and Serbian chauvinists, of whose agitations both MM. Pashitch and Venizelos had complained, but whose nefarious pressure they could not resist. Unfortunately, there were among our allies, as in our own midst, both civilians and soldiers who had embraced the principles of nationalism in their most exaggerated, exclusive, and aggressive form. I am certainly not insulting them, or doing them any injustice, in attributing to them what they, no doubt, consider to be a virtue. But I hold it my duty to recall the fatal part which they played in the dramatic days ending with the signature of the Treaty of London and during the four tragic weeks which followed that event and marked the interval between the apotheosis and the downfall of the Balkan Alliance.
CHAPTER IV

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE BALKAN ALLIANCE

When the Serbo-Bulgarian and the Greco-Bulgarian treaties of alliance were signed in Sofia, MM. Milovanovitch, Venizelos, and myself were Prime Ministers respectively of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. The former met with an early death on July 1, 1912, being succeeded on September 12 by M. Pashitch. Between us three we prepared, began, and finished the Balkan war which Turkey imposed on us. My two colleagues were destined to see their countries through the war between the allies also. I sent in my resignation a month before it broke out.

Why did I resign my post? That is no longer a secret in Bulgaria. When my opponents reproached me for taking that step and accused me of mistakes made during the Balkan war, I was forced to publish a whole book ¹ to clear myself of the

¹ Criminal Folly and the Parliamentary Inquiry, Sofia, 1914. In this book, written in reply to bitter criticisms of my policy, I proved that I was against the attack on Tchataldja; against the plan of entering Constantinople; against the resumption of hostilities at the beginning of 1913 which was forced on us by the coup d'état of the Young Turks on January 23, 1913.
accusations heaped on me and show my countrymen who was really responsible for the misfortunes of our nation. From this book is taken the following letter of resignation:

M. Sazonoff's communication advising us against resumption reached M. Daneff late, and it was M. Daneff to whom we had given the order to break off the negotiations with the consent of the representatives of the Great Powers. I cannot be accused of having wished to turn the War of Liberation into a War of Conquest, as many of our nationalists, together with the Serbian and Greek chauvinists, desired to do. On January 18, 1913, I told M. Miliukoff that I was of opinion that Salonica should be ceded to Greece, which statement he published in his organ Rietch on October 17, 1913. At the Ministerial Council, presided over by the King on April 3, 1913, I insisted that our differences with Greece should be submitted to arbitration. My book shows, with documentary evidence, that neither I nor my party was guilty of altering the decision taken by the Council, which we supported to the end. The accusation of hesitancy and temporising brought against our policy is unfair. In no case could we have consented to discuss with the Serbians the subject of a rectification of the frontiers upon which the two sides had agreed. Although the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty allowed us the right to wait until the end of the war with Turkey before proceeding with the repartition of the new territories, and Russia advised us to wait until that moment, we invited Russia as early as April 1913 to assume her part of arbitrator. The Russian Orange book explains why this proved impossible. In a time of national excitement, when after the brilliant victories of the Bulgarian army it was not easy to be moderate, I endeavoured to practise that moderation which, in my opinion, was the only wise policy for Bulgaria to follow. If extremists advised and accomplished the criminal folly of June 29, 1913, not a word nor an act of my policy gave them any excuse for their conduct,
YOUR MAJESTY,

To-day we have received news by telegraph that the treaty of peace with Turkey has been signed. This ends a war which has brought dignity to the Bulgarian name and glory to Bulgaria. But at the same time it marks the beginning of the clearing up of the results gained by the allies against Turkey. Your Majesty may think it needful to confide the government of the country to a great Cabinet. In order to facilitate the formation of a new Ministry, I have the honour to beg of Your Majesty to accept the resignation of the Cabinet over which I preside.

Thanking Your Majesty in the name of the Cabinet and in my own, etc., etc.

IV. EV. GUESHOFF.

SOFIA,
May 30, 1913.

As to the motives of my resignation, they were well known to every one concerned. My policy of coming to an understanding with our allies without bloodshed, of keeping the Balkan Alliance intact, of having recourse to arbitration with Serbia and Greece, did not meet with approval. For this reason I thought it my duty to leave the head of the State to decide whether it would be necessary to call in fresh politicians for the settlement of our differences with the allies. I had been the first artificer of the Balkan Alliance and I became its first victim, not so much on account of the sacrifice I made in resigning the Presidency of the Ministerial Council, but because of the criticisms to which I exposed myself for leaving my post at a critical moment. But I was obliged to
resign because I was not in unity with the Crown, and because I was of the opinion that such a critical situation imperatively called for a coalition Ministry on the broadest possible basis. I had a deep-rooted conviction that none of the other parties, once they were in office, would have undertaken the heavy responsibility of a second war. And as a matter of fact, M. Daneff's Cabinet which assumed office after the failure of an effort to form a large concentration Government, and which included members of two political parties, decided unanimously on June 22, 1913, that M. Daneff should go to Petrograd, and that our differences with Serbia and Greece should be submitted to arbitration.

Contrary, however, to the unanimous decision of the Bulgarian Government and without the knowledge of the Cabinet, on June 29 the Second and the Fourth Bulgarian armies, acting on order from the Headquarters, attacked our allies. Those who advised and ordered these attacks have been blamed by no one more implacably than by me. The text of the orders was published by the Carnegie Commission which, in its report, rightly qualifies them as shifty and childish. But however much History may condemn this criminal act, she must acknowledge that the Bulgarian nation is not responsible for it. Every one knows how Bulgaria entered the Balkan war. After a mobilisation, approved by the Ministerial Council, the National Assembly was called
to vote the war credits. The Sobranjé approved of the mobilisation and voted the credits. After the Turks had declared war, a manifesto to the nation was issued, bearing the signatures of the King and the Ministers. Is it possible to make this same nation answerable for a coup d'état, a criminal folly, accomplished without the consent of the legislative body and even without the knowledge of the responsible Government? Bulgarian courts of law have publicly established that the Bulgarian Government did not decide to declare war on the allies. On January 21 last the Bulgarian publicist M. D. Misheff was tried for libel. He produced in court a certificate of the Secretary of the present Ministerial Council which, as is well known, is a sworn enemy to the Progressists and Nationalists who were Ministers on June 29, 1913. This certificate, bearing the date of January 20, 1915, No. 66, ran as follows:

The Secretariat of the Ministerial Council certifies by these present that the reports of the Ministerial Council contain no minute ordering the opening of hostilities against the Greeks and Serbians, on June 29, 1913.

This certificate is given to M. D. Misheff of Sofia for presenting to the Departmental Court of Sofia, in connection with the criminal proceedings, No. 2865/1914.

(Signed) M. Arnaoudoff, Secretary.

The only constitutional body of the Bulgarian nation, the Cabinet, therefore knew
nothing of the order given to attack certain of the troops of the allies; it even countermanded the movement, which had evidently been made against its will. It appealed to the Russian Government to intervene and stop hostilities both on the side of the Serbians and of the Greeks. Our former allies categorically refused and declared war on Bulgaria. The text of the Serbian proclamation declaring war proves beyond doubt that it was no mere irresponsible factors but the Ministers themselves, who had decided to seize the first opportunity to declare war on Bulgaria. They thus completed the harm begun by the orders of June 29. The Balkan Alliance was at an end.

I shall certainly not undertake to appportion the responsibilities for this calamity. But as I am responsible to History for the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance, I do not think that I have fulfilled my duty unless I record everything needed by the future historian in order to form a definite judgment on this affair.

I. The First Serbo-Bulgarian War

Twice in twenty-eight years the Serbians have declared war on us.

The first time was November 14, 1885. King Milan wished to frustrate the union of Bulgaria with Eastern Roumelia, the very union which had raised enthusiasm in England and France, and of which the Emperor Alexander III had said to the
Bulgarian delegation, sent to Copenhagen to solicit his approval, that "there could be no question of disunion." I heard these words myself, being a member of the deputation. From Copenhagen I was ordered by the Bulgarian Government to proceed to London and plead the cause of union against King Milan. On October 16, whilst calling on Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I chanced to meet in the waiting-room of the Foreign Office M. Chedomil Mijatovitch, the Serbian Minister in London. The latter wished to justify the policy of King Milan, and from his defence I saw with horror what futile motives had induced the Serbian ruler to involve two kindred nations in war. After the interview I wrote to the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

M. Mijatovitch admits that the Serbians have let slip the right moment for an invasion of Old Serbia, and that if they now attacked Turkey they would be beaten, and for this reason King Milan, who must take some action, will probably invade Bulgaria. "It is very sad," said M. Mijatovitch, "and I hope that at the last moment some way may be found of avoiding this danger. But what is one to do when for the last three years your Government has behaved so badly to us? Why did you take Bregovo from us? Why did you promise to intern Pashitch and Pavlovitch and then allow them to plot? Why did you make the present revolution without first consulting us? Why, even now, do you not come to a brotherly understanding with us?" Such are the principal grievances of M. Mijatovitch. I answered them and brought
him to recognise that it would be very dangerous for them if their thoughtless aggression provoked complications and interventions whose consequences their narrow-minded selfishness disregarded. In my opinion, only one of M. Mijatovitch's observations deserves attention: it would be better to arrest the Serbian agitators, and if the Government has not done so already, to approach the Serbian Government with a view to a direct understanding.

I must say that before receiving my report the Bulgarian Government had sent the late M. Grecoff to Serbia, but he was not received. Had he been granted an audience, he would have disproved the assertions of King Milan's advocate that we had taken possession of the insignificant little island of Bregovo, and that we had interned M. Pashitch. The irony of fate decreed that M. Pashitch, then a Bulgarian functionary, should afterwards become Prime Minister of Serbia and that M. Mijatovitch should undertake the defence of his anti-Bulgarian policy.

The policy of King Milan did not meet with any approval in Western Europe. In England it was the object of general repro­bation, which found vent in the following letter which I then received from Mr. Gladstone:

HAWARDEN CASTLE, CHESTER,  
October 15, 1885.

DEAR SIR,

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter and need scarcely assure you of the interest I take in the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula, and especially of Bulgaria.
I was astonished to see in the newspapers a private letter of mine to M. de Laveleye, or at least the greater part of it, which I suppose has been translated and retranslated. However that may be, I hope it will do no harm if it is understood simply to say that I am in favour of recognising the accomplished fact, that I hope the union will be real, and that I do not at all approve of such movements as those threatened by Serbia and Greece, whose right to interfere with countries beyond their boundaries I cannot recognise.

I do not think that I ought to say more, as in these tangled affairs it is easier to do harm than good. In any case, I shall certainly not fail to give the greatest attention to any letter I may receive from you.

I remain, dear sir,
Your truly,
W. E. Gladstone.

But despite the indignation of public opinion in Europe, King Milan, at the instigation of the Austrian Government, declared war on us in terms that present a striking analogy with the proclamations of certain Great Powers during the present European war. Here is an extract from the communication addressed to us on November 14, 1885, announcing the declaration of the war:

The commander of the First Division and the frontier authorities simultaneously announce that to-day, November 13, at 7.30 in the morning, the Bulgarian forces attacked the positions occupied by a battalion of the First Infantry Regiment, on Serbian territory in the neighbourhood of Vlassina.
The Royal Government regards this unprovoked aggression as a declaration of war, and I instruct you to notify the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs that Serbia, accepting the consequences of this attack, considers herself in a state of war with the Principality of Bulgaria, beginning from Saturday, November 14, at 6 o'clock in the morning.

As a matter of fact, there had been no Bulgarian attack whatever. The war was thus begun without plausible motives against a kindred country, which had sent all its available troops against the Turks. People remember how that war ended. In less than a fortnight King Milan was beaten and the Bulgarian army, on its way to Nish, was stopped by Count Khevenhüller, the Austrian Minister in Belgrade. On February 1, 1886, a conference met in Bucharest to draw up a treaty of peace between victorious Bulgaria and vanquished Serbia. Sent thither as representative of my country, by a strange coincidence I met the same M. Mijatovitch, whom I had seen in London, as Serbian delegate. An event unparalleled in the history of conferences then took place. We had already come to an agreement with M. Mijatovitch about the first two articles of the treaty—concerning the re-establishment of peace and friendship between the two countries, and the granting of amnesty—when a message arrived from King Milan, saying that he would accept no other treaty than the following single article: “Peace is restored between Bulgaria and Serbia, beginning from the day of the signature of
the present treaty." We signed the treaty of peace, consisting of this single article, and did not take an inch of territory from Serbia.

It goes without saying that impartial history will not hold the Serbian nation responsible for the acts of King Milan. But we have also the right of hoping that neither will it hold the Bulgarian nation responsible for the partial attack of June 29, that fatal act of irresponsible agents of which the Serbian Government took advantage to rob us of wide provinces that by the treaty of March 13, 1912, it had acknowledged to be Bulgarian.

II. THE SECOND SERBO-BULGARIAN WAR 1913

Here also, as in the examination of the relations between the allies during the Balkan war, I shall make use, where possible, of foreign documents.

On June 29, 1913, the attack took place. On the following day the Bulgarian Government gave orders to stop military operations and requested M. Nekludoff to telegraph to Petrograd and urge the intervention of Russia with Greece and Serbia to prevent hostilities. M. Nekludoff sent the following message (Russian Orange book, No. 271):

According to news received to-day serious conflict has arisen between the Bulgarian troops and the Serbian and Greek troops. In view of his immediate departure for Petrograd, M. Daneff begs you to
take steps at Belgrade and Athens to prevent further fighting.

**NEKLUDOFF.**

M. Sazonoff at once dispatched this pressing request to the Russian representatives in Greece and Serbia. At the same time he sent a reassuring telegram to Sofia. The reply from Athens was conciliatory, but at Belgrade he met with a downright refusal. All these telegrams will be found reproduced in the Russian Orange book, under Nos. 274, 276, 278, and 279.

*The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister in Sofia*

*June 30, 1913.*

Explain to M. Daneff that any frontier incidents will, by causing fresh excitement, make it more difficult to induce Serbia to hand in the Memoir, and will place M. Pashitch in an impossible position. We are of opinion that if M. Daneff does not wish for war, he should take decisive measures to re-establish tranquillity in the front ranks of the army.

**SAZONOFF.**

*The Russian Minister in Athens to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*June 30, 1913.*

Owing to simultaneous Bulgarian attacks on the Serbian and Greek frontiers, the King is starting for Salonica to take command of the Greek army. The fleet has received orders to start at once for Eleftheris, where according to official information, the Greek troops have cut off the advancing Bul-
garian forces. M. Venizelos thinks that although war is not declared, the Greek Government is bound to take the necessary measures for defence. He is ready to conclude an armistice if the Bulgarian Government officially declares that the advance of the Bulgarian troops is due to a misunderstanding.

DEMIDOFF.

The Russian Minister in Athens to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs

July 1, 1913.

The Minister regards the forward march of the Bulgarian troops as an attempt to produce an accomplished fact, and to consolidate by violence the Bulgarian right to occupy Greek territories.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible for him to start (for Petrograd) without receiving from the Bulgarian Government a formal repudiation of its last acts: the Bulgarian troops must retire to the line of demarcation, established by protocol, and Bulgaria must officially announce that she is willing to accept an obligatory arbitration, if not conjointly, at least simultaneously with the Serbo-Bulgarian arbitration. The situation is critical.

DEMIDOFF.

The same day M. Hartwig telegraphed from Belgrade that "no peaceable measures would have any effect on the Government, because of the general excitement which has become extreme." And indeed, despite M. Hartwig's great influence in Belgrade, they would have been perfectly useless, for Serbia had declared war by the following proclama-
tion before ever his dispatch reached Petrograd:

Order of the Commander-in-Chief, given in Belgrade on July 1, 1913

Soldiers,

By my order of October 6 of last year, I summoned you to fight against Turkey for the liberation of our oppressed brothers and to reconquer and consecrate the fatal Field of Kossovo. In less than a month, thanks to your bravery, your unexampled heroism, and your self-sacrifice, you vanquished the enemy and freed Kossovo.

Soldiers,

The Balkan war is finished. Our brothers are free. Peace is made with Turkey. Now you ought to return to your work, to your homes, to your families, to those who are dear to you and who wait you impatiently.

To my great regret, my dear soldiers, you cannot as yet return home; you cannot yet go to see your dear ones and rest from your hard toil. The Bulgarians, our allies of yesterday with whom we fought side by side, whom as true brothers we helped with all our heart, watering their Adrianople with our blood, will not let us take the Macedonian districts that we won at the price of such sacrifices. Bulgaria doubled her territory in our common warfare and will not let Serbia have land not half the size, neither the birthplace of our hero, King Marco, nor Monastir where you covered yourself with glory and pursued the last Turkish troops sent against you. Bulgaria is washed by two seas and grudges Serbia a single port. Serbia and her makers—the Serbian army—cannot and must not allow this. They must defend their own conquests, gained with their life's blood, against all who would
touch them, even against their Bulgarian allies of yesterday.

In the war with the Bulgarians we shall have with us our Greek allies, whom the Bulgarians want to rob of their conquests, and our Montenegrin brothers, who also wish to defend the land of Serbia.

Soldiers!

Forward, in the name of God and of our just cause.

Unfold once more the victorious Serbian banner and bear it in triumph across the ranks of our new enemy, as you bore it in triumph across the Vardar to Salonica, to Prilep and Monastir, at Kossovo and Prizrend.

Forward, soldiers! God upholds those who love their country and righteousness.

Peter.

This order must be communicated to all the soldiers.

Chief of the Staff at the Headquarters, Honorary Aide-de-Camp of H.M. the King,

Voyvode R. Putnik.

8th Infantry Regiment, II Class, National Army.

No. 222, July 1, 1913.

To the commander of the 1st Battalion, to be communicated in a solemn manner to the troops of the Battalion.

Commander: Lt.-Col. Simeon Yovanovitch.

Orach, July 1, 1913.

It will be seen that this Manifesto does not contain a word on the subject of the Bulgarian attacks of June 29 which, according to M. Hartwig, had produced such excitement in Belgrade. Evidently, the proclamation had been prepared before the
attacks; otherwise, it could not have reached the Commandant at Orach, Lieut.-Colonel Simeon Yovanovitch, on July 1, the day of its alleged issue in Belgrade. Besides, in the original document, which was published in facsimile by the Mir of July 8, 1913 (whence I reproduce it), the date “July 1” and the words “given at Belgrade,” in the title, are inserted in handwriting.

Greece followed the example of Serbia. On October 27, 1912, as is clearly established by the Carnegie Commission, King Constantine had started for Salonica, carrying in his pocket the proclamation of war against Bulgaria. To the terrors of the Balkan war were now added the horrors of a war among the allies. The curse of Cain was once more branded on the forehead of nations who had won the sympathies of the civilised world by their determination and bravery in the struggle for liberty. The newspapers, which later on used all their influence on the side of the Serbians and Greeks, at this time announced that all the allies were equally responsible for the new war. The Rousskoïé Slovo maintained that if Serbia and Greece did not stop military operations the heavy responsibility for this fratricidal strife would fall on the politicians of Belgrade and Athens. “If they reject the proposal of M. Daneff to cease hostilities,” the newspaper continued, “they will prove the duplicity and turpitude of their policy.” Le Temps of Paris wrote in the same sense on July 4: “Although it appears that the Bulgarians began the attack,
the Serbians at once showed that they only waited for an excuse to develop what had been mere frontier skirmishes into a regular war," adding that if the Greeks had had reason to complain of cannon-shot directed at their fleet by the Bulgarians at Cavalla, they had equally disgraced themselves by the systematic killing of twelve hundred Bulgarian soldiers at Salonica.

History will, I believe, correct this judgment; for while among the Bulgarians irresponsible factors alone were guilty, with the other allies responsible Governments regarded treaties bearing their signatures as mere scraps of paper. These treaties were trampled under foot without scruple or ceremony. Who can tell whether those that most ardently desired open rupture with Bulgaria will not be the first to repent of it? The downfall of the Balkan Alliance and the present great war may have in store for them surprises and disappointments.

A martyr to the high ideals which it had set before its eyes, the Balkan Alliance died a martyr's death. Nothing could be more distressing than the engagements between the allies, such as the one at Salonica to which Le Temps refers, and the battles which stained the plains of Macedonia and Thrace that had just been rescued by bloodshed in common. And nothing could be sadder than the burial at Bucharest, that Calvary of the Balkan Alliance, of the ethnic autonomy of the Balkan peoples which the latter had with one accord named as the
object of their league and the excuse for their mobilisation. Not only were incontestably Bulgarian territories divided among those who had brought about the dissolution of the alliance, but the most essential principles of ethnic autonomy were denied to the Bulgarian populations of the ravished districts.1 The victors in the Roumanian capital not only overlooked the primary conditions of Balkan peace, but also forgot the eternal truth that force should never be misused. "C'est au moment ou l'on veut redoubler de force," says Edmond Rostand, "qu'on doit redoubler de grâce." Those to whom Bulgaria had rendered such great and valuable services had no mercy on her, they showed no magnanimity towards the country by whose superhuman sacrifices and efforts Turkey's might was broken and the task of the other allies rendered an easy one. Bulgaria was despoiled, ruined, disgraced, and humiliated.

There are sorrows that are dumb. Silence is best suited to griefs that are ineffaceable. If, broken by these sorrows and sufferings, to-day I find strength to speak, I do so because I feel it to be my duty, before the end of the present bloody conflict, to make public

1 Nothing is more instructive on this subject than the Report of the Carnegie Commission. The treatment now meted to the Bulgarian Macedonians is dreadful, and so is the way in which they are deprived of all educational and ecclesiastical autonomy.
what I know of the responsibilities for the breaking up of the Balkan Alliance, which plunged the Balkans into a fresh chaos and powerfully contributed to the outbreak of the present great war. If judging the actions of private individuals is the most difficult and exalted function of man, to judge nations is a yet more difficult and higher mission. Before the civilised world condemns the Bulgarian nation for the dissolution of the Balkan Alliance, I think it should have the patience to examine the documentary evidence of those Bulgarians who were the faithful defenders of that alliance and the irreconcilable opponents of its real enemies.

The most redoubtable of these enemies were not to be met with in Bulgaria, nor are they there to-day. After the war among the allies, it was in the Bulgarian Parliament that the first voice was raised in favour of a re-establishment of that friendship among the Balkan peoples, the lapse of which brought innumerable evils on themselves and on the whole world. This reconciliation can be attained by satisfying Bulgaria, since no vital interest of Serbia and Greece require the maintenance of the Macedonian settlement as established by the Conference of Bucharest. Otherwise Serbia would never have recognised, in the treaty of March 13, 1912, Bulgaria's right to what was called the uncontested zone, and Greece would not have proposed through the mouth of MM. Venizelos and Gennadius to accept
as the future Greco-Bulgarian frontier the line of lakes which form the base of the Chalcidian Peninsula, in exchange for Salonica.¹

¹ I give here the text of a letter received by one of the best-known foreign journalists in Sofia a little before this time from a trustworthy person in London, commissioned to sound the Greek Minister in London, M. Gennadius, the second Greek delegate at the Peace Conference, on the concessions which the Greek Government was ready to make in our favour:

London,
April 26, 1913.

Dear Sir,

I have just seen Gennadius—he tells me:

(a) There is no written agreement between Serbia and Greece.

(b) Daneff declined, when in London, to arrange frontiers with Venizelos.

(c) Venizelos has told Sofia that the Greeks will retire from Salonica only as the result of a disastrous war.

(d) The Greeks are perfectly willing to constitute Salonica a free port under their sovereignty, and will agree not to fortify it.

(e) They want the line of the lakes across the top of the Chalcidice and just enough behind Salonica so that it shall not be actually under Bulgarian guns.

(f) They would like an immediate agreement with Bulgaria on this point.

(g) If they can reach a definite and absolute Treaty with Bulgaria, they will be perfectly prepared to take no further interest in the Serbo-Bulgarian question about Monastir.

(h) They are afraid at present that if they do not back Serbia against Bulgaria, Ferdinand will first take Monastir, etc., from the Serbs, and then come and fight them (the Greeks) for Salonica—and naturally—if there is to be fighting—they prefer to have an ally against Bulgaria.
No one disputes the heroism with which the Serbian nation is now fighting on the side of the Triple Entente against a Great Power, but no one will also deny that Serbia cannot defeat that Power. It can only be defeated by the Entente which, for the sake of Serbia and Belgium, has entered on this gigantic war and faced enormous sacrifices. The whole world bows before the bravery and self-sacrifice of these two countries. But if bravery and self-sacrifice give a right to liberty and national unity, if nations who display these qualities deserve to be drawn back from the abyss, has not Bulgaria won this right, does it not deserve the same treatment? The Great Powers are exhausting themselves to save Serbia and Belgium. Bulgaria asks for no sacrifices at their hands and they are not fighting on her behalf. But Bulgaria, who contributed far more to the crushing of Turkey than Serbia contributed to that of Austria, has a right, in consideration of her past services, to ask justice of these

(*) They are quite prepared to fight for Salonica.

Probably you know most of this already—but I send it in case there may be some point new to you. Would it not be possible to have an arrangement made?

One other point. A. told me that Lichnowsky speaking to him said: "La Cour d’Athènes autrefois était une Cour danoise et russe, mais maintenant nous pouvons la regarder comme une Cour allemande," which perhaps shows that emperors sometimes realise the positions of their sisters!

Best salaams,

XXX.
Powers, and to wish to be treated in conformity with the wise principles so loudly proclaimed at the beginning of the present war. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, speaking in the name of the three Entente Powers at the Guildhall banquet on November 9, 1914, said that the Triple Entente was fighting for small and oppressed nations. Ten days after this speech, the Central English Committee, entrusted with the enlightenment of public opinion on the causes of the war, published a circular, signed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, and by two former Prime Ministers, Lord Rosebery and Mr. Balfour, which contained the following sentence: "Our cause is doubly a righteous and a just one, because we fight not alone in defence of our existence and freedom, but for the right of small nations to enjoy the same freedom; and for civilisation and democracy, as we understand them." If this is the aim of the Triple Entente Powers, if they really desire a durable peace, based on the principle of the free choice of the peoples, is it possible to refuse to Bulgaria those territories which the Great Powers and the Balkan States themselves recognised as her own before the rupture of the Balkan Alliance? Is the iniquity committed in Bucharest to remain without reparation? Will it remain so even if Bulgaria takes a tardy part in the European war, or if she takes no part in it at all, as did Greece and Serbia in 1877? The claims of the Greeks and Serbians were
satisfied then. Are the Bulgarians to receive no satisfaction?

Res sacra miser. Poor Bulgaria has, I think, more right than any other country to be judged impartially and treated like the rest.
APPENDIX

THE BULGARIAN TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS WITH SERBIA AND GREECE

I. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia

His Majesty Ferdinand I, Tsar of the Bulgarians, and His Majesty Peter I, King of Serbia, being firmly convinced of the unity of interests and the identity of fate of their States and of the two kindred nations, the Bulgarian and the Serbian, and determined to defend those interests with united force and to work for their general advancement, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1.—The kingdom of Bulgaria and the kingdom of Serbia guarantee to each other their national independence and the integrity of their national territories, binding themselves absolutely and without reservation to succour each other with their entire forces, in the event of one of them being attacked by one or more States.

Article 2.—The two contracting parties also undertake to come to each other's assistance with all their forces in the event of any Great Power attempting to annex, occupy, or even temporarily to invade with its armies any part of the Balkan territories which are to-day under Turkish rule, if one of the parties should consider this as contrary to its vital interests and a casus belli.
Article 3.—The two contracting parties bind themselves not to conclude peace except jointly and after a preliminary understanding.

Article 4.—For the complete and most appropriate application of this treaty, a military convention will be concluded which will provide minutely for everything that may have to be undertaken by either side in the event of a war, or that appertains to the military organisation, disposition, or mobilisation of the armies and the relations between the higher commands which must be settled in time of peace, as a preparation for the war and its successful prosecution. The military convention will form an integral part of the present treaty. Its formulation must begin at the latest fifteen days after the signature of the present treaty, and the convention must be ready within a maximum period of two months.

Article 5.—This treaty and the military convention will remain in force from the day of their signature to December 31, 1920 (old style), inclusive. They can be prolonged after that date through an additional understanding, explicitly ratified by the two parties. If, on the day when the treaty and the convention expire, the contracting parties should be engaged in war, or should not yet have wound up the situation arising from a war, the treaty and the convention will retain their force until the conclusion of peace, or until the situation resulting from a war has been definitely settled.

Article 6.—The treaty will be signed in two identical copies, both of them in Bulgarian and Serbian. They will be signed by the two Rulers and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The military convention, also in two copies, both of them in Bulgarian and Serbian, will be signed by the Rulers, the respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and by special military plenipotentiaries.
Article 7.—The treaty and the convention may be published, or communicated to other States, only after a preliminary agreement between the two contracting parties, and even then only jointly and simultaneously by the two sides.

In the same way, a third party may be admitted to join the alliance after a preliminary understanding between the two parties.

Made in Sofia, on February 29, 1912 (old style).

I. Milovanovitch.

II. SECRET ANNEX TO THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BULGARIA AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA

Article 1.—In the event of internal troubles arising in Turkey which might endanger the State or the national interests of the contracting parties, or of either of them; or in the event of internal or external difficulties of Turkey raising the question of the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula, that contracting party which first arrives at the conclusion that in consequence of all this military action has become indispensable must make a reasoned proposal to the other party, which is bound immediately to enter into an exchange of views and, in the event of disagreement, must give to the proposing party a reasoned reply.

Should an agreement favourable to action be reached, it will be communicated to Russia, and if the latter Power is not opposed to it, military operations will begin as previously arranged, the parties being guided in everything by the sentiment of solidarity and community of their interests. In the opposite case, when no agreement has been reached, the parties will appeal to the opinion of
Russia, which opinion, if and in so far as Russia pronounces herself, will be binding on both parties.

If, Russia declining to state an opinion and the parties still failing to agree, the party in favour of action should on its own responsibility open war on Turkey, the other contracting party is bound to observe towards its ally a friendly neutrality, ordering at once a mobilisation in the limits fixed by the military convention, and coming to its assistance in the event of any third party taking the side of Turkey.

Article 2.—All territorial gains acquired by combined action within the scope of articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, and of article 1 of this secret annex, shall constitute common property (condominium) of the two allies, and their repartition will take place immediately or, at the latest, within a period of three months after the restoration of peace, the following principles being observed:

Serbia recognises the right of Bulgaria to the territory east of the Rhodope Mountains and the River Strouma; while Bulgaria recognises a similar right of Serbia to the territory north and west of Shar Mountain.

As regards the territory lying between Shar Mountain and the Rhodope Mountains, the Archipelago and the Lake of Ochrida, if the two parties should become convinced that the organisation of this territory into an autonomous province is impossible, in view of the common interests of the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalities, or owing to other internal and external causes, in such a case the said territory will be disposed of in accordance with the following declarations: Serbia undertakes to ask for nothing beyond a line, drawn on the accompanying map, which starts from the Turco-Bulgarian frontier, at Mount Golem (north of Kriva Palanka), and follows a general south-western direction to the lake of Ochrida, passing
through Mount Kitka, between the villages of Metchevo and Podarjikon, through the heights to the east of the village of Ncrav, along the watershed to the height 1,000, north of the village Bashtevo, between the villages of Lubentzi and Potarlitzza, through the height Ostritch 1,000 (Lissetz Mountain), the height 1,050, the height 1,000, through the village Kashali, along the main watershed, Gradishte Mountain to the height Gorishte, towards the height 1,023, along the watershed between the villages of Ivankovtzi and Logintzi, through Vetersko and Sopot on the Vardar; then across the Vardar, along the mountain ridge towards the height 2,550, as far as Peropole Mountain, along its watershed between the villages of Krapa and Barbares to the height 1,200, between the villages of Erkenovo and Drenovo, to the height Tchesma (1,254), along the watershed of Baba Mountain and Kroushka Tepessi, between the villages of Salp and Tzersko, to the height Protoisiska Mountain, east of the village Belitza, through Brejani to the height 1,200 (Iliinska Mountain), along the watershed through the height 1,330, to the height 1,217 and between the villages of Livoishta and Gorentzi to the lake of Ochrida, near the monastery of Gabovtzi. Bulgaria undertakes to accept this line, if His Majesty the Russian Emperor, who will be requested to act as supreme arbitrator, pronounces in its favour. It is understood that the two parties bind themselves to accept as a definite frontier the line between the indicated frontiers which His Majesty the Russian Emperor will esteem to correspond best to the rights and the interests of the two parties.

Article 3.—A copy of the treaty and of the secret annex, as also of the military convention, will be jointly communicated to the Russian Government, which will be asked to take note of them, to show itself benevolent towards their aims, and to request
His Majesty the Russian Emperor to accept and sanction the parts reserved by the treaty for His Majesty and the Imperial Government.

Article 4.—All disputes concerning the interpretation and the execution of any part of this treaty, of its secret annex, and of the military convention will be submitted to the final decision of Russia, as soon as one of the contracting parties declares that, in its opinion, an agreement by direct negotiations is impossible.

Article 5.—No disposition of the present secret annex shall be made public, or communicated to another State, without the previous consent of the two parties and the permission of Russia.

Made in Sofia, on February 29, 1912 (old style).

M. Milovanovitch.

III. MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BULGARIA AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA

In conformity with the spirit and in virtue of article 3 of the treaty of friendship and alliance between the King of the Bulgarians and the King of Serbia, as also in order to ensure the successful prosecution of the war and the attainment of the objects of the alliance, the two contracting parties have agreed upon the following conditions which will have the same force and value as the dispositions of the treaty itself.

Article 1.—The King of the Bulgarians and the King of Serbia undertake, in the eventualities specified by articles 1 and 2 of the treaty of alliance, and by article 1 of its secret annex, to render each other mutual help: Bulgaria, with an army not less than 200,000 strong; and Serbia, with an
army not less than 150,000 strong, fit to fight on their frontiers and to take part in military operations outside their countries.

These figures do not comprise soldiers of a supernumerary character, the third class of the Serbian reserve troops, or the second class of Bulgarian reserve troops.

This army must be sent to the frontiers, or beyond the frontiers of the two countries, in the direction where military operations are expected to take place, in accordance with the causes and objects of the war, not later than twenty-one days after the declaration of the war, or after one of the allied Governments shall have announced that a *casus fœderis* has arisen. In all events and before the specified period has elapsed, the two parties will consider it their duty as allies—in so far as this shall be compatible with the nature of the military operations, or might have a favourable influence on the issue of the war—to send their armies to the theatres of war in sections, while the mobilisation and the concentration are still proceeding, immediately after the seventh day following the declaration of the war, or the announcement of the *casus fœderis*.

**Article 2.**—If Roumania attacks Bulgaria, Serbia must at once declare war on her, and send a force at least 100,000 strong to the middle Danube, or to the Dobrudja theatre of war.

If Bulgaria is attacked by Turkey, Serbia undertakes to invade the Turkish territory, and to send to the Vardar theatre of war a force of at least 100,000 men.

Should Serbia be then at war with another country, separately or jointly with Bulgaria, she will use all her free forces against Roumania or Turkey.

**Article 3.**—If Austria-Hungary attacks Serbia, Bulgaria must immediately declare war on Austria-
Hungary and undertakes to send to Serbia an army at least 200,000 strong which, united to the Serbian army, will act offensively or defensively against Austria-Hungary.

Bulgaria owes Serbia the same assistance if Austria-Hungary sends, on whatever pretext, her troops to the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, with or without the consent of Turkey, Serbia being thereby forced to declare war on her or to order her army into the Sandjak in defence of her interests, thus provoking an armed conflict with Austria-Hungary.

If Turkey attacks Serbia, Bulgaria must immediately cross the Turkish frontiers and set aside at least 100,000 men of her army, mobilised in accordance with article 1 of the present convention, sending them to the Vardar theatre of war.

In the event of Roumania attacking Serbia, Bulgaria undertakes to attack the Roumanian forces as soon as they cross the Danube and invade the Serbian territory.

If, in any of the eventualities specified in this article, Bulgaria should find herself, separately or together with Serbia, in a state of war with another country, she binds herself to send all her free forces to the assistance of Serbia.

Article 4.—Should Bulgaria and Serbia declare war on Turkey in accordance with a previous agreement, both parties undertake, in the absence of any special disposition to the contrary, to detach from their armies, mobilised in accordance with article 1 of the present convention, at least 100,000 men each and to send them to the Vardar theatre of war.

Article 5.—If one of the contracting parties declares war on a third party without a preliminary understanding with the other party, or without the latter's consent, the non-consenting party is relieved of the liabilities specified in article 1 of the present convention, but must observe throughout the war
a friendly neutrality towards its ally, mobilising immediately at least 50,000 men and concentrating them in such a way as to ensure freedom of movement to its ally.

Article 6.—In the event of a joint war, neither party has the right to conclude with the enemy an armistice for more than twenty-four hours in the absence of a preliminary understanding with its ally, or without the latter's consent.

No peace negotiations may be opened, nor a treaty of peace concluded, without the previous consent of both parties, given in writing.

Article 7.—During the war, the armies of each contracting party will be commanded by its own officers, and their operations will be conducted through the same medium.

When army corps belonging to both parties are engaged against one and the same enemy force, the general command will devolve, both armies being equal, on the officer of senior rank, effective command being taken into account.

When one or more armies of one contracting party are placed under the orders of the other party, they will be commanded by their own officers, who, as regards the strategic operations, will follow the orders of the officer commanding the army to which they are attached.

In the event of a joint war against Turkey, the chief command in the Vardar theatre of war will belong to Serbia, if the principal Serbian army is operating in that theatre and is numerically superior to the Bulgarian army, sent to in that quarter in virtue of article 4 of the present convention. But if the main Serbian army does not operate in that theatre or is numerically weaker than the Bulgarian forces, the chief command will devolve on Bulgaria.

Article 8.—If the armies of the two contracting parties are placed under one command, all the
orders and directions regarding the strategic leadership of the general tactical operations will be issued in two languages—Bulgarian and Serbian.

Article 9.—As regards the clothing and the commissariat, housing, medical assistance, transport of sick and wounded, burial of dead, transport of war materials and of other similar articles, the armies of each contracting party will enjoy equal rights and facilities on the territories of the other party, utilising the same methods as the allied armies and conforming themselves to the local laws and regulations. All local authorities are bound to give the allied armies every assistance to that effect.

The payment of supplies will be effected by each side separately on the basis of local prices, preferably in money, and only in exceptional cases by bonds.

The transport of troops and all military materials, provisions and other articles by railway, and the cost of the transport, will be at the charge of the party through whose territories the transport is effected.

Article 10.—The trophies belong to the army which has captured them.

If these trophies have been captured as a result of fighting in which the two armies have participated, the two armies will divide them in proportion with the strength of the operating forces.

Article 11.—In time of war, each contracting party will be represented on the staff of the Headquarters, or of the commanders of armies, by special delegates who will maintain relations between the two armies.

Article 12.—All strategic operations and unforeseen cases, as well as the disputes which may arise, will be settled by mutual agreement between the two Headquarters.

Article 13.—The chiefs of the General Staffs of
the allied armies will, immediately after the conclusion of the present convention, agree as to the repartition of the mobilised armies, in accordance with article 1 of the convention, and as to their dispatch to the zones of concentration in the cases hereafter described. They will also determine what roads must be mended or freshly built for the rapid concentration of the armies on the frontiers and for all further operations.

Article 14.—The present convention becomes operative from the day of its signature, and will retain its force as long as the treaty of friendship and alliance, of which it forms an integral part.

IV. Ev. Gueshoff.
M. Milovanovitch.
General R. Putnik.

Varna, April 29, 1912.

IV. Agreement between the Bulgarian and Serbian General Staffs

In accordance with article 13 of the military convention between the kingdom of Bulgaria and the kingdom of Serbia, their special delegates, after taking into account their respective plans of operations, have agreed upon the following:

In case of a war of Bulgaria and Serbia against Turkey.

On the supposition that the main Turkish forces are concentrated in the region: Uskub, Koumanovo, Kratovo, Kotchani, Veles—the allied armies operating in the Vardar theatre of war will be distributed as follows:

1. A Serbian army of two divisions will advance towards Uskub, by way of Kara-Dag, and will form the right wing of the allied armies.
2. A Serbian army, consisting of five divisions and one cavalry division, will advance along the valley of Moravitza and Ptchina towards the front Koumanovo-Kratovo. This army will form the centre of the allied armies and will operate against the front of the enemy.

3. A Bulgarian army, consisting of three divisions, will form the left wing of the allied armies, and will be detailed to operate against the right wing and in the flank of the enemy, following the direction of Kustendil, Kriva-Palanka, Uskub, Koumanovo, Tzarevo Selö, Kotchani.

4. The two Chiefs of Staffs of the allied armies will reconnoitre the region between Kustendil and Vranja, and if the reconnaissance establishes that large masses of troops may be employed in the direction of Kustendil, Kriva-Palanka, Uskub, the two Serbian divisions, destined to act through Kara-Dag towards Uskub, will be used for strengthening the left wing of the allies and will concentrate near Kustendil, provided the general situation allows such a thing.

5. For the protection of the right wing of the allied armies, the Chief of Staff of the Serbian army will use the remaining three divisions of the Serbian second-class reserves, according to his discretion.

6. The Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian army will see that the road from Bossilegrad to Vlassina is constructed as soon as possible.

7. Should circumstances render it necessary that the Bulgarian army in the Maritza theatre of war should be strengthened while all the forces set aside for the Vardar theatre of war are not needed there, the required forces will be transferred from the Vardar theatre to the Maritza theatre. In the same way, if the situation requires the strengthening of the allied armies in the Vardar theatre of war, and the operations in the Maritza theatre of war do not demand the presence of all the forces reserved
for that theatre, then the necessary forces will be transferred from the Maritza theatre to the Vardar theatre.

**Addendum**

The two Staffs of armies undertake:

(a) To exchange with one another all information concerning the armies of their neighbours;

(b) To supply each other with a sufficient number of military manuals, instructions, maps, etc., whether they be public or secret;

(c) To attach to each other's army a sufficient number of officers for familiarising themselves with the allied armies, and for learning their language, bearing in mind article 11 of the military convention;

(d) The Chiefs of Staff of the Bulgarian and Serbian armies will meet every autumn to exchange views on the general situation, and to consider what changes should be made in their agreement so as to meet the altered circumstances.

(Signed) **General R. Putnik.**

**General Fitcheff.**

**Varna, June 19, 1912** (old style).

**Note.**—The grouping of the allied armies and the main principle of the operations belong to the Serbian General Staff, and I assume no responsibility whatever for them.

(Signed) **General Fitcheff.**

**V. Opinions of the Representatives of the General Staffs**

At the meeting for the examination of the plan of operations against Turkey, the Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff proposed:

1. I consider that the principal theatre of opera-
tions, in the event of a war with Turkey, will be the valley of Maritza, where the decisive stroke must be dealt, because I think that the main forces of the Turkish army will be concentrated in that theatre, both on account of the character of the ground and of other important strategic considerations.

2. On this assumption, I propose that the allied Serbian General Staff should examine in what way the Bulgarian army in the valley of Maritza can be strengthened, so as to secure for it a numerical superiority over the enemy, it being always supposed that the main Turkish force will be concentrated there.

3. The troops necessary for strengthening the Bulgarian army in the Maritza theatre of war might be supplied by the allied forces in the Macedonian theatre of war, irrespective of their nationality.

MAJOR-GENERAL FITCHEFF,
        Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Army,
        of the General Staff.

BELGRADE, August 23, 1912 (old style).

At the meeting for the examination of the plan of operations against Turkey, the Chief of the Serbian General Staff was of opinion:

1. That the Vardar theatre of war will be the principal one, and that the main enemy forces will be concentrated there;

2. On this assumption, it is necessary to concentrate in this theatre, from the very first, a superior allied army;

3. Taking into consideration the general importance of the Vardar theatre of war and the configuration of the ground, also the time of the year when the operations will be carried out and the political circumstance that the Turkish forces in
this theatre will be opposed by the Greek and Montenegrin armies, the Serbian General Staff declares:

(a) That the entire Serbian army must operate against the Turkish forces in the Vardar military theatre;

(b) That the allied Bulgarian army must send to the Vardar theatre, by way of Kustendil, at least one Bulgarian division (24 battalions, with artillery and the other special troops) which will form part of the Serbian army.

Jivotin Mishitch,  
Assistant Chief of the General Staff,  
Colonel of the General Staff.

Belgrade, August 23, 1912 (old style).

VI. Agreement between the Bulgarian and Serbian General Staffs

In virtue of article 4 of the military convention between the kingdom of Bulgaria and the kingdom of Serbia, the Chiefs of their General Staffs, acting as specially appointed delegates, after examining the plan for an offensive war against Turkey, have mutually agreed on the following:

1. The entire Serbian army will operate in the Macedonian theatre of war, undertaking at the same time to protect the line Kriva Palanka—Kustendil.

2. The entire Bulgarian army will act in the valley of Maritza, leaving at first one division on the line Kustendil—Dubnitza, the latter place being protected by a special garrison.

3. One Serbian division of the first class will be taken by railway to Kustendil and will form with the Bulgarian division a special army, co-operating with the main Serbian forces.
Should the principal Serbian army throw the Turks beyond the line Uskub—Veles—Shtip and advance to the south of that line, the Bulgarians will be free to utilise their division for reinforcing their army in the Maritza theatre, leaving on the Macedonian frontier reserve troops of the second class.

4. The organisation of the transport will be as follows: the railway line Pirot—Tzaribrod—Sofia-Kustendil will be placed at the disposal of the Serbian General Staff on the fifth day of the mobilisation. The transport will be effected by Serbian trains, the Bulgarian rolling stock being then employed for other purposes.

5. The revictualling of the Serbian division will be undertaken in the first instance by the Bulgarian Ministry of War.

The foodstuffs consumed will be paid for by the Serbian Ministry of War in kind.

6. The agreement between the Chiefs of the two General Staffs signed at Varna on June 19, 1912, continues in force notwithstanding the present combination.

(Signed) Major-General Fitcheff,
Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Army.

General R. Putnik.

Sofia, September 15, 1912 (old style).

VII. A Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bulgaria and Greece

Taking into consideration that the two kingdoms strongly desire the maintenance of peace in the Balkan Peninsula and can, by means of a solid defensive treaty, better secure that end;

Bearing in mind that the peaceable existence of the various nationalities in Turkey, based on a real
and genuine political equality and on the respect of all the rights of the Christian nationalities in the Empire, whether they derive from treaties or have been conceded to them in a different way, constitutes an indispensable condition for the consolidation of peace in the East;

Lastly, taking into account that the joint efforts of the two kingdoms in that direction would facilitate and strengthen the good understanding between Greeks and Bulgarians in Turkey, thereby helping their good relations with the Ottoman Empire;

The Government of His Majesty the Tsar of the Bulgarians and that of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, promising not to impart to their purely defensive agreement any aggressive tendency and determined on concluding with each other a peaceable and mutually protective treaty, on the lines indicated hereafter, have appointed as their plenipotentiaries . . . . .

Who, after verifying their credentials, agreed upon the following:

**Article 1.**—If, notwithstanding the sincere wish of the two high contracting parties and the efforts of their Governments to avoid all aggression or provocation against Turkey, one of the parties should be attacked by Turkey, either on its territory or through systematic disregard of its rights, based on treaties or on the fundamental principles of international law, the two contracting parties undertake to assist each other with all their armed forces, and not to conclude peace except by joint agreement.

**Article 2.**—The two high contracting parties promise each other to use their moral influence over their co-nationalists in Turkey so as sincerely to assist the peaceable existence of the nationalities forming the population of the Empire; they also promise to support each other and to act together, both as regards the Turkish Government and to-
wards the Great Powers, in all actions having for object to secure the respect of the privileges deriving from treaties or otherwise conceded to the Greek and Bulgarian nationalities, and to obtain political equality and constitutional guarantees.

Article 3.—The present treaty will remain in force for a period of three years from the date of its signature, and will be tacitly prolonged for another year, unless previously denounced. The denunciation must take place at least six months before the end of the third year from the day of its signature.

Article 4.—The present treaty will be kept secret and may not be communicated to any third State, totally or in part, nor be published, totally or in part, except with the consent of the two contracting parties.

The present treaty will be ratified as soon as possible. The exchange of the ratifications will take place in Sofia (or in Athens).

In proof whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed their seals.

Made in Sofia, in two copies, on May 16, 1912 (old style).

IV. EV. GUESHOFF.
D. PANAS.

Declaration

The first article does not apply to the case of a war breaking out between Greece and Turkey in consequence of the admission in the Greek Parliament of the Cretan deputies, against the wishes of Turkey. In that event, Bulgaria is only bound to observe towards Greece a benevolent neutrality. As the settlement of the Eastern crisis, due to the events of 1909, and of the Cretan question harmonises with the general interest, and is even likely
to consolidate the international situation favourably to peace, without upsetting the equilibrium in the Balkan Peninsula, Bulgaria (independently of any engagements assumed by the present treaty) promises in no way to embarrass any eventual action of Greece tending to solve this problem.

IV. Ev. Gueshoff.
D. Panas.

VIII. Military Convention between Bulgaria and Greece

His Majesty the Tzar of the Bulgarians and His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, desirous to complete by a military convention the treaty of defensive alliance, concluded in Sofia on May 16, 1912, between the kingdom of Bulgaria and the kingdom of Greece, have appointed as their plenipotentiaries for that purpose:

H.M. the Tzar of the Bulgarians—H.E. Monsieur Iv. Ev. Gueshoff, etc., etc.;
H.M. the King of the Hellenes—H.E. Monsieur D. Panas, etc., etc.;

Who, after having examined each other's credentials and found them to be in good and regular form, agreed upon the following:

Article 1.—If, in conformity with the engagements assumed by the treaty of defensive alliance, concluded in Sofia on May 16, 1912, between Bulgaria and Greece, this latter country should intervene by arms against Turkey in the event of a Turco-Bulgarian war, or should Bulgaria intervene against Turkey in the event of a Greco-Turkish war, the two parties, Bulgaria and Greece, undertake to cooperate with each other, viz.: Greece, with an army at least 120,000 strong; and Bulgaria, with an army at least 300,000 strong. These forces must
be ready to start towards the frontiers and to participate in any military operations outside the boundaries of their respective territory.

The said forces must complete their concentration on the frontiers and be ready to cross them at the latest on the twelfth day after the mobilisation order, or after one of the contracting parties shall have announced that a *casus fæderis* has arisen.

*Article 2.*—In the event of Greece being attacked by Turkey, Bulgaria undertakes to declare war on the latter State, and to attack it with all her forces, consisting of at least 300,000 men, conforming her movements with the plan previously elaborated by the Bulgarian General Staff.

If Bulgaria is attacked by Turkey, Greece binds herself to declare war on the latter State, and to attack it with all her forces, consisting of at least 120,000 men, conforming her operations to the plan previously elaborated by the Greek General Staff. The chief aim of the Greek fleet will be to secure naval supremacy over the Ægean sea, thus interrupting all communications by that route between Asia Minor and European Turkey.

In the eventualities specified by the previous two articles, Bulgaria undertakes to assume with an important part of her army offensive operations against the Turkish forces concentrated in the vilayets of Kossovo, Monastir, and Salonica. If Serbia should take part in the war, in accordance with her agreement with Bulgaria, the latter will be allowed to use her forces in Thrace; but in that case she guarantees to Greece by this convention that a Serbian army of at least 120,000 men will act on the offensive against the Turkish forces concentrated in the said vilayets.

*Article 3.*—If Bulgaria and Greece should declare war on Turkey, in accordance with a special agreement, they undertake to place in the field the number
of men mentioned in article 1 of the present convention, unless it be otherwise stipulated.

The dispositions of the last two paragraphs of article 2 are in such a case obligatory.

Article 4.—If one of the contracting parties declares war on a State other than Turkey without a previous understanding with the other party and without its consent, the non-consenting party is relieved of the obligations entailed by article 1, but must observe all through the war a friendly neutrality towards its ally.

Article 5.—In the event of a joint war, neither party will have the right of concluding an armistice for more than twenty-four hours without the consent and preliminary agreement of the allied State.

Similarly, the consent of the two parties, specially given in writing, is indispensable for either party to open peace negotiations or to conclude a treaty of peace.

Article 6.—If, after Bulgaria and Greece have mobilised or commenced a joint war, the latter country should find itself obliged to settle the Cretan question in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of Crete and, in consequence of that action, is attacked by Turkey, Bulgaria undertakes to assist Greece in accordance with article 1 of the present convention.

Article 7.—The Chiefs of the Bulgarian and Greek Staffs undertake, in the event of a war, to communicate to each other their plans of operations, as opportunity may offer. They also undertake every year to inform each other of the alterations in those plans, rendered necessary by new circumstances.

Article 8.—The present convention will become binding on the two parties immediately after its signature, and will retain its force as long as the treaty of defensive alliance, signed on May 16, 1912, of which it forms an integral part.
This Memoir refers to the part played by Russia in the liberation of Bulgaria, describes the struggle of the Serbians and Bulgarians for Macedonia, and

1 In connection with this Memoir, prepared (as I have already explained in Chapter III) at the request of the Russian Government in its capacity as arbitrator, it is not without interest to recall the efforts of one of the members of M. Pashitch's Cabinet, in the official Samouprava, as early as April 1913, to prove that our treaty with Serbia ought not to be carried out, because, according to a famous clause in international law, treaties are observed, pacta sunt servanda, but only provided there is no change in the situation, rebus sic stantibus. The Carnegie Commission severely blames this thesis of Serbian statesmen and professors, and quotes against it numerous works by German publicists like Kefïter, Bluntschli, Jellinek, and especially a new essay by Professor Erich Kauffmann (Das Wesen des Völkerrechts und die Clausula "rebus sic stantibus"). The Carnegie Commission says: "The allegations of a change in the circumstances was but a pis aller, to which recourse was had upon the failure of the attempts at giving a forced interpretation to the terms of the treaty and thereby proving that the Bulgarians had been the first to violate it. What makes the violation particularly odious, is that a condition vital, nay essential, to one of the contracting parties, indispensable to the
the treaties and conventions concluded between them, refuting the arguments on which the Serbians based their claims for compensations, not mentioned in the treaties, in the following terms:

1. The Serbians maintain that the events which led to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire were not fully foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the treaties of alliance, and that this fact gives them the right to call for an entire revision of the treaty. In our opinion, the text of the treaty is clear and gives a definite answer to these unjustifiable Serbian demands. It states that the Serbians have a right to the zone beyond Shar Mountain, and the Bulgarians to all the territory east of the Rhodopes and the Strouma. The territories between Shar Mountain and the Rhodope Mountains are also apportioned in the treaty, which therefore must clearly have had in view the possibility of what conclusion of the treaty, was violated by another party as soon as the common end had been obtained. The Serbians did not know what the English call 'fair play.' . . . It may be said with Jellinek, that there is not only no international treaty, but even no general law to which the clause *rebus sic stantibus* may not be applied. There could be no progress were there no means of adapting legislation to changing circumstances. But it does not follow that the series of necessary adaptations can be understood as a series of breaches of the law (*Rechtsbrüche*). One law is changed by another law. A treaty must be changed by another treaty. This principle is formally recognised in one of the cases cited as 'precedents' by the Serbian professors. . . ." The Commission also recalls the unanimous declaration of the seven Great Powers at the London Conference of January 17, 1871, that "it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power may evade its treaty engagements, nor modify the stipulations without the consent of the contracting parties by means of a friendly understanding."
actually occurred—the dismemberment of all Turkey in Europe.

2. The Serbians found their pretensions to a revision of the treaty on the fact that, after its conclusion, Greece and Montenegro took part in the war against Turkey. But this is no reason for modifying the relations between Serbia and Bulgaria. The arrival of the Greeks in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula gave assistance to Serbia which was not mentioned in the treaty. And now we are expected to pay for this help by recompenses to Serbia. The arrival of the Greeks, far from strengthening the Serbian pretensions, on the contrary gives Bulgaria a right to make greater claims.

3. The Serbian pretext, that they mobilised more troops than were called for by the treaty, is equally vain. Admitting for a moment the truth of such a statement, it should be observed that the contingent named in the treaty was a minimum to which either of the contracting parties might add at its convenience by calling out more troops. If Serbia did this, although Bulgaria never asked for anything of the kind—Serbia at the time did not even inform Bulgaria of the fact—she cannot now use it as an argument for the necessity of revising the treaty. Besides, to be just, we must point out that Bulgaria did not keep to the minimum of troops provided for in the treaty; she called to the colours 620,000 men, far exceeding the strength of the Serbian army.

4. The Serbians attempt to justify their demand for revision by alleging that, contrary to the text of the treaty, we sent less than 100,000 men to the Vardar theatre of war, while the Serbians helped us with two of their divisions in the Thracian theatre of war. This Serbian argument is not valid, because a comparison of the treaty of alliance with the military convention, supplemented by the agreements between the two General Staffs, signed
on June 19, August 23, and September 15, 1912, which in virtue of articles 2, 3, 4, and 13 of the military convention form an indivisible whole, will clearly show that, notwithstanding the original convention, the distribution and employment of the allied forces were settled by the two Staffs, before the declaration of the war, precisely as they took place in reality.

The military convention contained only a conditional stipulation that 100,000 Bulgarian troops should be sent to the Vardar theatre of war, the words used being "if no other special arrangement be made." But the supplementary agreements, afterwards concluded on the basis of the military convention, removed this obligation, replacing it by the engagement for Bulgaria to send one division to the Vardar theatre of war, and that only for a certain time, until the Serbian troops should have thrown the Turkish army behind the line Uskub—Veles—Shtip (arrangement of the two General Staffs, September 15, 1912). As a matter of fact Bulgaria sent the Seventh Rilo division, increased to a complement of 32,000, which, after having given substantial help in the battle of Koumanovo, occupied the whole Strouma valley and did not leave the Vardar theatre till much later than had been contemplated.

Serbia asserts also that without being obliged by the treaty she sent two divisions to assist the Bulgarians in capturing Adrianople. But the military aid of Serbia at Adrianople had been stipulated by article 7 of the military agreement of June 19 which arranges for the transport, according to circumstances, of the necessary troops from the Vardar theatre to the Maritza theatre, and vice versa. The two Serbian divisions at Adrianople were sent to replace the Bulgarian troops which went to Tchataldja to fight the enemy for the happy issue of the common cause.
dently of this, the principal object of the treaty was to break the military power of Turkey, and from that standpoint, it is not this or that secondary arrangement that is of consequence: the really important thing is to know what dealt the decisive blow to Turkey. By the terms of the treaty, the relation between the Serbian and Bulgarian forces was $3:4$. We may, therefore, say that by demolishing four-sevenths of the Turkish forces Bulgaria entirely fulfilled all her obligations which some people now seem to consider as so many faults. The remaining three-sevenths of the Turkish forces were left by the treaty for Serbia to deal with. The crushing defeat inflicted on the Turkish forces at Bounar Hissar and Lule-Bourgas, and the raising of the rampart to block them in at Tchataaldja and Bulair, against which all the Turkish reserves from Asia Minor wasted their strength in vain, were greater tasks than were incumbent on Bulgaria. From this point of view, it is absurd to pretend that the success of the war of liberation depended on the number of troops employed by Serbia in excess of those provided for by the treaty. The historical truth appears—and will be recognised universally, as it is already recognised by the specialists—when one examines the losses suffered in the course of the war. Those of Bulgaria amount to 93,000 men (killed, dead of illness, and wounded), while the Serbian total does not exceed 25,000 casualties.

5. The Serbian assertion that the taking of Adrianople by Bulgaria gave Serbia the right to claim special compensation only deserves a passing notice, since it clearly follows from the terms of the treaty that, leaving to Bulgaria the zone to the east of the Rhodopes necessarily implied leaving to her Adrianople, a first-class fortress, only twenty miles from her frontier, almost at the foot of the Rhodopes.
As to the assertion that the war would never have been resumed but for Adrianople, it must be pointed out that hostilities were reopened in consequence of the collective decision of all the allies, dictated by their common interest. If Adrianople still held out, Scutari and Janina were not taken either, and Turkey refused to cede the islands, neither would she hear a word of any war contribution.

6. It remains to examine the attempts of Serbia to make the revision of the treaty depend on the decision of those Great Powers owing to whom Serbia had been forced to withdraw from the coast of the Adriatic, which her troops had conquered.

We cannot but regret the decision of the Great Powers; still, from the point of view of our rights this fact is of no importance, as the treaty does not oblige the allies to keep the coast of the Adriatic at any price, but merely makes its conquest and retention depend on favourable circumstances. Bulgaria, whose duty it was to lend Serbia armed assistance if the new territories of the latter were in danger, never refused help within the limits of the treaty. In fact, the Serbians did not evacuate the shores of the Adriatic by agreement with us: they did so without even informing us. Justice forces us to add that if Serbia was deprived of part of the conquered territory, the same thing happened to Bulgaria who, by the decision of the Great Powers, was obliged to retire from her outposts near Constantinople and evacuate the shore of the sea of Marmora, accepting the Midia—Enos line. More than this, Bulgaria was obliged to pay for the violation of the status quo in the Balkans, by which all the allies profited, by the cession of a part of her own territory and the loss of the town of Silistria, one of the most painful operations imaginable. Serbia's access to the sea is, no doubt, a very important matter to her, but that question was settled by the
decision of the Great Powers to guarantee Serbia a free railway to one of the Adriatic ports, and also by the fact that after the annexation of the Sandjak Serbia will be able to use the Montenegrin ports. Setting aside this question on which Serbia has obtained satisfaction, the economic value of the territory which she gave up is not equal to that of the regions which we ceded along the sea of Marmora.

To all these Serbian pretensions one remark is applicable: during the war, Serbia conformed entirely to the arrangements of the General Staffs and undertook a number of special operations, without making any preliminary declaration concerning contractual rights as regards Bulgaria. We may assume that this conduct arose from the knowledge that she was acting on the basis of the treaty and strictly within its limits. If, in any of these cases she had felt that she was overstepping those limits and consequently assuming an unforeseen task, thus lightening Bulgaria's labour, she would, without doubt, have announced the fact in due time. If such a declaration had been made, the Bulgarian Government would have been able to choose its position, and in case the demands formulated by Serbia affected the vital interests of Bulgaria and threatened the bases of the treaty with Serbia, it could have stopped the carrying out of the treaty, rather than consent to the undermining of its foundations. If Serbia had made the slightest attempt to violate the bases of her agreement with Bulgaria and claimed the possession of this or that part of the uncontested zone, whether because a treaty had been arranged with the Greeks or the Montenegrins in view of their co-operation against the Turks, or because Serbia had mobilised more troops than were mentioned in the treaty, or because the displacement or employment of the allied troops was such and such, or because Serbia had
retired from the Adriatic, or because Adrianople was taken by the Bulgarians, it is no exaggeration to say that Bulgaria would rather have closed the whole joint enterprise than admit any tampering with the uncontested zone, which was established after long and laborious negotiations and which is so intimately bound to Bulgaria by common sufferings and by the hopes of centuries.

For the rest, most of the facts above mentioned, on which the Serbians base their arguments, occurred before the mobilisation and before the declaration of the war, so that the Serbian claims, had they been formulated in time, might have prevented any initiative on the part of Bulgaria, since they were fatal to Macedonia, which has been for so many years the object of her aspirations, and for the sake of whose freedom Bulgaria had concluded the treaty with Serbia.

From all that has been said it will be clearly seen that during the course of the war nothing occurred to modify the bases of the treaty, or to give Serbia a right to territory south of the stipulated frontier line. Even if we admitted for a moment the possibility of tampering with the treaty and altering its foundations—which we absolutely deny—there is nothing to warrant such conduct in the present instance. Under these circumstances only one conclusion can be drawn—that the demand of the Serbian Government for the revision of a treaty, which by its very nature would mean the destruction of the foundations of that treaty, is clean contrary to the precise meaning of the treaty. The circumstances accompanying the war afford no justification for this demand, which must, therefore, be treated as of no consequence.

Conscious of the poor foundations of her claims which nothing in the treaty warrants, Serbia attempts to base her demand on a circumstance entirely alien to the treaty, by declaring that she wishes to
maintain the balance of power in the Balkans. Let us point out that before the war no balance of power existed as between Bulgaria and Serbia. Neither can it exist after the war, so long as there is a marked difference between the two countries, both in population and in the geographical positions which they occupy.